Glad no one hurt ..
We're only talking about a light incident if looking at it in terms of a real accident avoided, which was aborting take-off in the negative shear right after the 'touchdown into positive shear
' (reason for aborting the landing) in an "unknown" high-groundspeed. All it was .. is that the choice of direction best into wind turned out NOT to be up there in the first half ... you know ...a ways uphill from the windsock down below telling us west/northwest on the fly overs.
The sequence/timing: From the point of touchdown in soft/mud (a low spot) .. 1sec ... unknown mud/drag & positive-shear, yet could see groundspeed is too fast ... 2nd sec ... I instantly apply goaround power but then IAS starts slowing ( the neg shear) ... 3rd second ... IAS slowing nearing a rise / midfield, the runway gone so fast, lost visual for TODA, so the take-off aborted. It happened real fast ... the point of no return for either option.
You are certainly correct that the winds can be stronger than anticipated.
It's the negative component that is stronger than anticipated
(because unknown) for three downwind examples 1,3, & 4 and thus it's the higher groundspeed NOT expected by the pilots (not even recorded/reported by NTSB); and, just saying there ... if not known, then neither is the true reason for these three accidents. For an extra #4 comparison to a nearby similar-type accident, was just saying winds
" across that same open water but opposite direction as in #4 from a southerly direction in my "occluded front" experience years ago coincidently on the opposite shore in the 290V200 tendency over 15 minutes. This is evidenced at kbuf / cwpc at 30-40kpa (wx-hist Nov18/'76 3-4pm) in the first-half / high-end of the 1600ft / 360T strip on the North slope of the Niagara Escarpment 70nm/N from KJHW-rwy25/#4 (both rwys are 35nm from mid L Erie on same longitude).
The runway components in the 3 downwind examples are LESS
-strong than anticipated
. ADD the difference between the positive relative wind expected on runway in each case and the negative component it turned out to be
to get the greater TRUE groundspeed NOT anticipated
by pilots. In #4 it's possible up to 15kts less
relative wind than planned-on (up to 15kts higher groundspeed) while in what the pilot determines to be "stable approach"
; if all 4 pilots on board haven't identified the extra groundspeed, neither has the investigation.
Decision to land in #4 (on Thursday Jun20/2013 between 14:09:45-50pm/DH and 14:09:55pm/over-the-threshold at KJHW) looks OK when at normal IAS whether or not knowing about a groundspeed unusually high. The PIC says "braking nil" after touchdown 14:10:00, which states an opinion of 'not enough'; the higher groundspeed equals "more braking" required to stop .. so says "nil" on account of 'too little' available. Any aircraft must stop without aid of reverse thrust; this being the checkride, none is applied but CFI says anti-ski "cycled three times", which means 'working'.
EDIT (July 29):
Any denials (or lying
), whether to yourself or to others (by mistake or not) about any factor(s) in your accident sequence, will get challenged eventually as the investigation collects the proof
to show what actually has taken place. New info that shows different after a final report is is always possible where the conclusion is based on vague evidence or "lying". By asking the title question with five such examples for scrutiny, Pelmet has allowed us to revisit these accident reports for such a reason; a main purpose for those databases. Anyone can go back and check for new/developing profiles they hear of or know of.
-In #2 the investigation concludes no clean concept on departure, using photo
evidence from the scientist's camera. 'Investigating 101' (easy).
-In #5, the off co-ordinates in alleged poor vis/ busted mins have photos
of the foggy conditions at the time of the accident. Requires some analysing to figure out beyond just the photos (a higher level of difficulty in establishing the truth).
The other 3 of the 5 examples here are invisible downwind/shear examples, so nothing about component arrived in those reports; however, each synopsis has the snapshot
of their respective surface analysis from history to interpret for low level component.
- In #4 the pilots do not have evidence of negative component/easterly-lakebreeze from northeast-of / or-above JHW except afterwards
in a surface analysis.
- In #3/KEGE there's decreased performance in aborting after 'light-controls & EPR warning' occurs mid-runway at the high altitude airport - in apparent decreased performance shear-zone (rapid entry) on rwy25 as traceable with wx history -
; the brake fire occurs in aborting the second try immediately after the first. Into the negative shear would be sudden
, abrupt change, but no noise; just the control feel/lighter
and the EPR
increase / trigger. Two effects of the sudden slowing; one affects take-off power and the other affects handling/feel.
- In #1: A significant downwind backed by area metar(s) is corresponding the takeoff direction/time given in the report of this example.