Are the pilots lying to the accident investigators

[pelmet]

Last week I read 6 accident reports. Five of them came to my attention from a magazine that I get monthly which provides a bit of info on recently released reports. Those five were quite small accident briefs by the NTSB. The sixth one was a well publicized foreign airline accident last year that had been sitting on my computer for a while.

Of the six, I was very surprised to get the distinct feeling that the pilots in 5 of the accidents were giving false statements to the investigators. The pilot of the sixth accident did not survive. Of course, I wasn’t “there” so it is just a feeling based on what the reports say, but you be the judge. To save space I will just post what I think is the critical info but a link to each report is provided.

The first one was a turbine powered Air Tractor down in Texas. According to the report…
http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviat ... &pgsize=50

“The pilot reported that prior to departure the airplane was filled with fuel. After engine start, he taxied to runway 18, and conducted an engine run-up with no anomalies noted. The initial takeoff appeared normal; however, about half way down the runway, he noticed a "lack of airspeed" and the engine monitor was flashing "several red lights". About this time, the airplane became airborne. The pilot added that he was able to climb to about 150 feet, before he noticed an additional power loss. He kept adding throttle and even with full power selected, the airplane lost altitude.”

“The pilot added that the engine never developed full power, even after adding full throttle.”

“The engine examination did not reveal any pre-impact anomalies that would have precluded normal engine operation.”

“the Electronics International Inc., MVP-50T, engine monitor's installation, was completed on January 30, 2015.”

“The accident flight was the airplane's first flight after installation of the engine monitor. Review of the monitor's setup revealed the unit's clock was set to one hour earlier then local time, and the fuel flow calibration factor, was off by a factor of 10, meaning the monitor would indicate fuel flow ten times the actual fuel flow.”

“During the takeoff run, the propeller rpm reached 1,730 rpm at an engine torque of 1,304 ft-lbs. About 21 seconds after power was applied for the takeoff, the torque reached 1,492 ft-lbs, and was the maximum seen for the entire flight. The torque then dropped to about 1,200 ft-lbs and remained there for about 20 seconds before further reduction was noted. The propeller rpm remained at 1,730 rpm for about 32 seconds after maximum torque was reached, then dropped below 1,700 rpm, with a torque reading of 736 ft-lbs, The torque then dropped into the 500 ft-lbs range, before a slight increase was noted about 10 seconds before the crash; the rise was followed by a decrease in the torque.”

But wait a minute, the pilot told the investigators that he kept adding throttle but still lost altitude. Or was the truth that he kept reducing power to try to stop the engine warning indications while continually losing airspeed and not paying attention to flying resulting in a crash. All systems tested OK except the new engine monitor which was flashing due to a false warning. In the end the NTSB said......

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows: Maintenance personnel’s improper installation of the engine data monitor (EDM), which was not in accordance with the supplemental type certificate instructions and resulted in engine warning indications and the pilot’s subsequent reaction to the warning indications due to his lack of experience with the EDM and airplane.”

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The second accident is a Cessna 550 Citation crash in Alaska after both engines flamed out after ice ingestion on an icing research flight. http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviat ... 150&akey=1

“N77ND, sustained substantial damage during an off airport, gear-up emergency landing, following a complete and simultaneous loss of engine power in both engines, about 60 miles west of Fort Yukon, Alaska.”

“The inboard section of each wing is provided with anti-ice protection via electrically heated mats in the leading edge. The main wing sections are deiced by the activation of pneumatic leading edge boots. The engines are protected from ice accumulation by heated air inlets, and are operated by the same switch as the wing's inboard anti-ice.”

“On October 1, the IIC received a telephone call from a passenger who stated he was the onboard representative of the company that contracted the flight. The passenger said he was monitoring icing test equipment in the rear of the airplane during the accident flight. He further stated he took a series of photographs, which show both wing's leading edges prior to the loss of engine power. He forwarded the pictures to the IIC. The passenger said the captain announced that he was going to activate the wing's deice boots, and he took the series of pictures prior to and after the deice boot activation. The pictures taken prior to the boot activation show an accumulation of about 1 inch of ice on both the deiced and anti-iced, inboard portion of the wing. The pictures taken after the boot activation show the ice removed from the deiced (booted) section of the wing, but the ice remained on the anti-iced, inboard portion of the wing. The scientist said a few minutes after the boot activation, he heard a loud bang, and both engines lost power.”

“During a telephone conversation with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC) on October 4, the captain said while in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), the airplane accumulated about seven-eights inch of ice on the wing leading edge surfaces. He stated he cycled the deice boots to remove the ice accumulation, and several minutes later he heard a loud "bang" at the rear of the airplane, and both engines lost power. He said he initiated an emergency descent, and attempted to restart the engines without success.”

“Procedures for flight into icing conditions for the accident airplane are contained in the FAA approved Airplane Flight Manual, Section III, Operating Procedures. The icing section states: "All anti-ice systems should be turned on when operating in visible moisture, and the indicated air temperature is +10 degrees C or below," and further warns that "failure to switch on the system before ice accumulation has begun may result in engine damage due to ice ingestion." During a previous telephone conversation with the IIC, a representative of the manufacturer stated that if the anti-ice equipment was inadvertently left off, and subsequently turned on after entering icing conditions, it would take 2-4 minutes before the anti-iced surfaces (in-board wing leading edges, and engine inlets) would heat up enough to shed the already accumulated ice.”

“During a telephone conference, which included the director of aviation safety for the operator, the captain, and the IIC on October 17, the captain stated that he operated the anti-ice equipment in accordance with the airplane's flight manual, and never intentionally flew the airplane in icing conditions with the icing equipment turned off. The pilot said he was familiar with the photographs of the airplane parked on the ramp with ice buildup on the anti-ice surfaces, but said he did not report a malfunction of the anti-ice system. He said during the next preflight inspection, there was no indication of an anti-icing or deicing system malfunction. He further stated that prior to the loss of engine power during the accident flight, there were no indications of any anti-icing or deicing system malfunction. The pilot reiterated the general procedure for the operation of the anti-ice/deice systems of the airplane pursuant to the Airplane Flight Manual, but could not definitively say he turned the anti-ice on prior to entering icing conditions or prior to the loss of engine power.”

“The co-pilot did say that during icing missions he and the captain talked a lot about the subject of airframe icing. He further stated that during the accident flight he did not operate the icing protection controls. He also said he remembered the captain announced that he was going to cycle the deice boots. He said a few minutes after the captain cycled the boots, both engines lost power. In a written statement to the NTSB dated October 10, 2005, the co-pilot wrote that during the accident flight while in clouds, the captain said he was going to turn off the anti-ice. The co-pilot reported that as the anti-ice system was turned off, the captain was looking over his shoulder at a computer screen that displayed atmospheric instrumentation data, and the captain remarked that they were not in icing conditions. He wrote that this procedure of referring to the instrument data was different from his usual procedure of turning the engine anti-ice on when in cloud, and turning if off when out of cloud.”

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows: The pilot's improper use of anti-icing equipment during cruise flight, which resulted in ice ingestion into both engines (foreign object damage), the complete loss of engine power in both engines, and an emergency descent and landing on tree covered terrain. Factors associated with the accident were the icing conditions, inadequate crew resource management, and failure to use a checklist.”

So the captain told the investigators that he operated the anti-ice in accordance with the AFM. The NTSB doesn’t seem to agree. Looks like he took off with some ice already on the wings and then accumulated more ice. Then he operated the de/anti-icing equipment improperly and flamed out both engines. Kinda looks like he doesn't want to incriminate himself with the FAA.

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The third report is an incident involving a GIV that did a high speed RTO leading to a wheel fire.
http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviat ... 139&akey=1

“The pilot reported that before taxing the airplane a flight control check was performed. He noted that the flight control check was "normal," with "no binding or resistance issues." He added that the flight control forces seemed "normally loaded."

"During the initial takeoff attempt, the pilot engaged the auto-throttles. He stated that about 75 knots, a triple chime sounded and a master warning illuminated. He immediately rejected the takeoff with "light" brake pressure and coasted to the end of the runway. The flight crew reported that they did not observe any message on the Crew Alert System (CAS), nor were there any exceedance events recorded. In addition, they did not observe any tripped circuit breakers. Based on this information, the pilot elected to attempt another takeoff. During this takeoff, he did not use the auto-throttles, electing to set the engine power manually. He reported that as the airplane accelerated through approximately 75 knots, the triple chime/master warning activated again. He observed that the engine low pressure (LP) turbine speed indicated within the yellow arc. He subsequently reduced engine thrust slightly in order to return the LP turbine speed to the white arc (normal operating range). The pilot continued the takeoff. At rotation speed, he pulled back on the control yoke but the flight controls did not seem to respond normally. He added that the controls had no "noticeable pressure resistance and felt unloaded with hydraulic pressure." He noted that the yoke was moved "forward and then back further aft" with the same result. The pilot subsequently rejected the takeoff, applying maximum braking and full reverse thrust.”

“A postincident examination was conducted under the direct supervision of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Flight Standards inspectors. The examination was directed and monitored by an NTSB aircraft systems engineering specialist.”
“An inspection of the flight control system was conducted without any electrical or hydraulic power supplied to the airplane. Movement of the cockpit control column and control yoke was smooth throughout the required range of motion (stop-to-stop). Movement of the flight control surfaces corresponded to the inputs from the cockpit controls. With the elevator rig pins installed, the control cable tensions measured 113 lbs. and 160 lbs. at the inboard and outboard cables, respectively. The required minimum cable tension was 135 lbs. [Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) 27-01-00]. The rig pins were subsequently removed in order to allow the system to balance. With the rig pins removed, the control cable tensions measured 129 lbs. and 140 lbs., respectively. The elevator trim cable tensions measured 40 lbs., which was within the specifications (AMM 27-04-00).
An operational test of the gust lock was completed without any anomalies or adverse findings (AMM 27-05-00). A general examination of the elevator gust lock hook was unremarkable. Inspection of the elevator input bungee, input bungee attachment bolt, elevator actuator load relief bungee assembly, and elevator actuator damper shaft (AMM 27-01-00) revealed no anomalies. Indexing of the horizontal stabilizer corresponded correctly at all flap settings in accordance with the Wing Flap/Stabilizer Operational Test (AMM 27-06-01). Operational testing of the stall barrier/angle of attack system and the stall barrier dump valve (AMM 27-01-01) did not reveal any anomalies. The FPSOV operated normally in accordance with the Flight Control Manual Shut-off Valve – Operational Test (AMM 27-08-00).”

“On March 3, 2015, an evaluation flight was completed by Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation Production Test Pilots. The evaluation flight was conducted without any adjustments to the flight control system following the rejected takeoff event. A maintenance preflight inspection and ground engine run-up were performed the day before the flight. During the engine run-up, at a takeoff engine pressure ratio (EPR) of 1.75, the left engine low pressure (LP) turbine speed approach the exceedance limit of 95.5-percent, which would intermittently trigger a master warning. The flight crew elected to complete the takeoff with a slightly reduced EPR of 1.73 in order to avoid the possibility of a nuisance warning message on takeoff. The flight control check conducted before takeoff was normal. Airplane flight manual procedures specify an elevator control check at 60 knots during the takeoff roll. Specifically, the airplane flight manual included a note with the Line Up checklist stating, "At sixty (60) knots, the pilot shall confirm that the elevators are free and the yoke has reached the neutral position." Due to the flight control issues reported as part of the incident, the evaluation flight crew elected to conduct an additional control check at 80 knots. During the takeoff roll, at both 60 and 80 knots, the elevator response was "positive, obvious, and 100% normal." The takeoff continued normally and the flight crew completed a left-hand traffic pattern to return for a full stop landing. The pilot subsequently executed a landing without any anomalies; the brakes and thrust reversers functioned normally during the rollout. No anomalies were identified during the evaluation test flight. The airplane was subsequently released to the owner/operator for return to service.”

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this incident as follows:
• The pilot's rejected takeoff due to perceived flight control system anomalies, which led to excessive brake temperatures and resulted in a right main landing gear brake fire.”

So why did the PIC perform the second RTO which was after Vr. Was it perhaps due to a nuisance engine warning(in which case you should continue if at high speed) or was it due to a flight control anomaly as the pilot told the investigators. Only the flight control anomaly might justify a high-speed RTO above V1. There was no flight control anomaly on the test flight however.

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The fourth flight was a Gulfstream 200 bizjet landing on a 5300 foot runway in New York state that overran the runway. There was an FAA inspector on board.
http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviat ... 294&akey=1

“The 1415 recorded weather observation at JHW, included calm wind, 10 miles visibility, clear skies, temperature 23 degrees C, dew point 09 degrees C; barometric altimeter 30.25 inches of mercury.”

“The pilot flying stated that during the incident flight, the airplane landed within the touchdown zone of runway 25, about 1,000 feet past the threshold, following a "normal stabilized approach." After touchdown, the pilot flying deployed the engine thrust reversers and applied steady brake pressure; however, the "braking/stopping ability was nil."

“The FAA inspector seated in the cockpit jumpseat reported in a written statement, "the touchdown was normal and within the 1000 foot markers, the PIC [pilot in command] activated the thrust reversers, but no power increase was noted. The braking action or deceleration was noted as 'smooth.' The second-in-command [SIC] was calling out the airspeeds and runway remaining and was noted to be alarmed by the last 2000 foot markers, it was also noted that the SIC, attempted to stand on the brakes just prior to the end of the runway. The PIC was noted as alarmed and applying maximum braking pressure and attempted to steer the aircraft to the right towards the taxiway at the end of the runway, but then straighten the aircraft out just prior to the end of the runway."

“According to the recording, the airplane touched down at 1410:00 and 3 seconds later the thrust reversers were first deployed at a Throttle Lever Angle (TLA) of 16 degrees, which corresponded to a thrust reverser idle power lever selection. Then 20 seconds after touchdown, a TLA of 20 degrees was recorded, which corresponded to maximum thrust reverser power lever selection. 24 seconds after touchdown, the N1 (engine fan speed) increased to the maximum recorded value of 55 percent. Finally, 32 seconds after touchdown, N1 began to decrease, an indication consistent with the thrust reversers being stowed."

“1409:33 the pilot monitoring stated "before landing checklist complete and you're ref plus ten"
1409:37 the PIC stated "correcting"
1409:44 the pilot monitoring stated "runway's clear ref plus fifteen don't let it increase it's a short runway"
1409:47 the PIC stated "ahh great correcting"
1409:49 the EGPWS alerted "one hundred"
1409:51 the EGPWS alerted "fifty"
1409:52 the EGPWS alerted "thirty"
1409:53 the EGPWS alerted "twenty"
1409:55 the EGPWS alerted "ten"
1410:00 the airplane touched down on runway 25 at JHW
1410:00 the PIC stated "your tops"
1410:01 the pilot monitoring stated "my tops"
1410:02 the pilot monitoring stated "one twenty"
1410:04 the pilot monitoring stated "one fifteen two thousand remaining"
1410:06 the pilot monitoring stated "more brakes"
1410:08 the pilot monitoring stated "one hundred"
1410:09 the pilot monitoring stated "a little to the right"
1410:10 the pilot monitoring stated "ninety knots one thousand remaining"

“There was no indication that the crew utilized the emergency braking system. In addition, the FAA inspector on the jumpseat reported debriefing the flight crew on the emergency brake system and that it "was not used by the flight crew."

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this incident as follows:
• The pilots’ failure to effectively use the airplane's primary (brakes), secondary (thrust reversers), and emergency braking systems to decelerate the airplane, which resulted in a runway excursion. Contributing to the accident was the pilots’ failure to conduct a go-around maneuver upon recognizing that the airplane had excessive airspeed while on final approach to the runway.”

But the PIC said the approach was stable(which includes proper airspeed control) and that braking/stopping ability was nil(on a bare, dry runway). Really? The CVR shows that he was fast on approach according to the FO. Both the PIC and the FAA inspector claimed a touchdown at 1000 feet. Well, they touched down at 1410:00 supposedly 1000 feet down the runway. Four seconds later, the FO said "one fifteen, two thousand remaining". That means they travelled 2300' in 4 seconds which require an average ground speed of 340 knots. Not too likely. It is more likely that they landed much further down the runway than 1000 feet(it was 5 seconds from the 10 foot autocall to touchdown) which is why it only took 4 seconds to have two thousand feet remaining. As well, it took three seconds before for initiation of reverse thrust, with only idle reverse selected and then, 20 seconds after touchdown, max reverse was selected. It appears that braking was not utilized as well as it could have been as the FO asked for more brakes to be used.

The claim was made by the PIC that the bare dry runway had no braking/stopping ability on this nice sunny day but it looks more like someone trying to minimize wear and tear on the aircraft by minimizing brake use and minimizing reverse thrust. That may be a good idea sometimes but not on a short runway after an unstable(fast) approach.

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The last accident was a Turkish Airlines A330 in Khatmandu. After the first missed approach due to fog, another approach was initiated. The F/A had told the captain about the difficulties that would be encountered if they diverted. The aircraft flew an autopilot coupled RNP approach. Unknown to the crew, the runway waypoint coordinates were in error and located slightly to the left of the runway but the coordinates for the approach were accurate. The autopilot was disconnected at a low altitude of 14 feet and the aircraft touched down partially off the runway resulting in a nosegear collapse and significant other damage. A video of the landing can be seen at this link starting around 1:45.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GkLUriZPqIM
http://www.tourism.gov.np/uploaded/TURK ... alcopy.pdf

“During the interview after the accident for post flight incident report the pilots stated that they were visual with the approach lights of the runway at the Decision Altitude and continued the approach below the DA. According to the PF, during the final approach he momentarily lost visual contact with the runway but before he initiated a missed approach the runway became visual again and he decided to land.”

“The CCTV footage showed that at 01:58 hrs when the aircraft was approaching and landing during second approach, the visibility was almost zero. This visibility was much worse than the visibility when the aircraft was executing go-around at 01:22 hrs during first approach. “

“Four seconds before the “MINIMUMS” auto-callout, the PM stated “it will appear when we descend below…””

“When the “MINIMUM” auto-call out was annunciated at 01:58:30 hrs the PF responded “continue until 300 ft””

“Had he established visual contact with approach lights at decision altitude, the response to the “MINIMUM” auto-call out would have been “visual and continue” in accordance with SOP.”

"Approximately 5 seconds before touchdown the PF states “appearing” which was the first mention of the runway being visual."

“The aircraft descent below the DA, towards the amended runway threshold coordinates, the approach lights and the runway would have been offset to the right of the aircraft nose. Had the flight crew been visual with the runway they should have noticed this offset.”

“The auto-pilots remained coupled to the aircraft until 14 ft AGL, when it was disconnected, a flare was attempted. The maximum vertical acceleration recorded on the flight data recorder was approximately 2.7 G. The aircraft pitch at touchdown was 1.8 degree nose up up which is lower than a normal flare attitude for other landings”

“Causal Factor
The probable cause of this accident is the decision of the flight crew to continue approach and landing below the minima with inadequate visual reference and not to perform a missed approach in accordance to the published approach procedure.”

So are the pilots telling the truth to the investigators. Did they really have the required visual references at the DA? Maybe, but not too likely. Now you know why it is good to have CVR's and FDR's. Even if the pilots survive, it appears that more is needed to discover the truth sometimes.

Am I right to be suspicious in all these accidents or am I way out of line. Something for the accident investigators to think about.

[pdw]

No, not "way out of line".
Take for instance your very first example:

The first one is a turbine powered Air Tractor down in Texas.

Feb5/2015 15:10Z/9:10am/SlaterTX

Was 20C on the previous day; 9AM fueled-up then dep rwy 18/188T, temp -2to-3C. Interesting, here we have increasing N/360T component during that precise time for approx 10 min (check Slater/town station only 2mi south of airport at 8:52am-9:02am and Lubbock 9am).

A lengthy winter stay in/out of shop easily has excess condensation settle to tank bottom, the multiple moisture droplets that form on tank walls ? Empty vented tanks during many days of expansion/ contraction enduring wider swings in daytime heating / night-time cooling (maybe even frozen/slushy line that morning) are potential for water interrupting power on that first high fuel flow of take-off after many months inactive.

Also this takeoff is exactly during the 12.9 kph tail component registering at Slater station .. might be a dip in power (at least it would feel like/ exacerbate any power issue) if component is "V" according to some area/9am wx-hist.

I'm guessing instead of risking speculating the PIC in this case could just honestly say 'not sure why the light was flashing'. Here's the example where truth is lost if neither pilot nor investigator have enough detail as to what all has actually has taken place.

Scared of self-incrimination ... is always going to be there.

[pelmet]

Looks like you did some very detailed follow up. I think the investigators found the reason for the false warning based on inaccurate fuel flow measurement. Water in fuel is certainly a consideration. I would think that a post accident fuel check is standard procedure.

[pdw]

The third "accident report" is a rwy25 rejected take-off incident, KEGE Feb7/2015 /21:36local-time/night; the report contains a metar error, where the metar-data applies 15min after the actual time of the accident data. The 21:50 local time AWOS/calm from the report is long after the RTO/heated-brake incident where EPR warning triggered and controls look/felt not right at 60-80kts. The preceding metar identified an East component prevailing that hour and it appears take-off Engine-Pressure-Ratio is already up a bit with the higher thrust/ acceleration to greater TakeOff groundspeed on account of high-altitude. The report states EPR setting no longer triggered in testing when only slightly lower (as with normal into-wind take-offs esp at much lower altitudes). Two Av jobs appear forfeighted from an inability to explain to the owner why the AC did what it did, and the investigation equally at a loss; cannot determine what was amiss. In the report, it certainly reads as though they are sincere about the problem they were having.

[pelmet]

The third "accident report" is a rwy25 rejected take-off incident, KEGE Feb7/2015 /21:36local-time/night; the report contains a metar error, where the metar-data applies 15min after the actual time of the accident data. The 21:50 local time AWOS/calm from the report is long after the RTO/heated-brake incident where EPR warning triggered and controls look/felt not right at 60-80kts. The preceding metar identified an East component prevailing that hour and it appears take-off Engine-Pressure-Ratio is already up a bit with the higher thrust/ acceleration to greater Takeoff groundspeed on account of high-altitude. The report states EPR setting no longer triggered in testing when only slightly lower (as with normal into-wind take-offs esp at much lower altitudes). Two Av jobs appear forfeighted from an inability to explain to the owner why the AC did what it did, and the investigation equally at a loss; cannot determine what was amiss. In the report, it certainly reads as though they are sincere about the problem they were having.

I believe that the metar given in the report would be the closest one issued to the accident time. If so, there an error especially when the weather does not appear to be a factor in this incident. But you could post the previous metar(45 minutes before the incident) if you feel it is significant.

EPR is typically what is set by the pilots or the autothrottle in my experience and is set well below the maximum attainable in order to prevent overboosting the engine. On the test flight, the test pilots manually adjusted engine power(EPR) to prevent a master warning. Any further information on how the wind would have affected the EPR that you have would be welcome though. I believe that these would have been Rolls-Royce Tay engines and I haven't operated them.

As you mentioned, both pilots were fired( I was surprised that it was mentioned in the report) but they reported a flight control malfunction and then without adjustment, the test pilots found no evidence of a flight control problem and I bet no further problems have been found since. That is why the NTSB said "The pilot's rejected takeoff due to perceived flight control system anomalies" with perceived the critical word as it never existed.

Sounds like not too many people are buying their story.

[pdw]

Maybe also about having to figure out how to sell/tell their story.

E is 3.6/8pm and 2.6/9pm in m/s; calm 15 minutes after (at the high end of the airport where the station is). Rwy25 is 262T / downhill.

Next:
#4 NY/JHW example, just across L.Erie from CYSN(my area), also rwy25 but this time 239T with some N flow off both lake ends Erie/Ont. No station at the immediate airport area for history, means also none available for that landing (the N component shows at some area stations). Here 'the truth' is also 'distraction by a Check Rider' with an example of Great-Lake effects ...easier to miss for transients.

ps: The second/icing example is right on point to how careful the PIC needs to be when answering questions. IMO the accurate final synopsis can be achieved when the answers are cross referenced properly; any (perceived) untruth uttered is not necessarily "lying" if the context of the dialogue is meant to arrive at the truth of the matter.

[GyvAir]

Maybe also about having to figure out how to sell/tell their story.

You ought to consider starting a consulting service.

[pelmet]

Maybe also about having to figure out how to sell/tell their story.

You ought to consider starting a consulting service.

Or an aviation accident lawyer in America. They always choose jurors with no knowledge of aviation.

Maybe also about having to figure out how to sell/tell their story. E is 3.6/8pm and 2.6/9pm in m/s; calm 15 minutes after (at the high end of the airport where the station is). Rwy25 is 262T / downhill.

A jury might just buy an argument of the effect of a few knots of wind on the EPR or downhill info perhaps affecting the flight controls? Selling a story to the investigators? Is it not a federal crime to lie to the investigators?

Next:
#4 NY/JHW example, just across L.Erie from CYSN(my area), also rwy25 but this time 239T with some N flow off both lake ends Erie/Ont. No station at the immediate airport area for history, means also none available for that landing (the N component shows at some area stations). Here 'the truth' is also 'distraction by a Check Rider' with an example of Great-Lake effects ...easier to miss for transients.

So now the FAA inspector is responsible for the runway overrun for.....just being there. An airport typically does have a windsock in case you don't believe the metar which showed calm wind for JHW, which is the airport where the overrun happened. JHW airport with its "Great Lake effects" also has an AWOS-3 according to my Jeppesen FD VFR program. They usually give a minute by minute update on the weather.

ps: The second/icing example is right on point to how careful the PIC needs to be when answering questions. IMO the accurate final synopsis can be achieved when the answers are cross referenced properly; any (perceived) untruth uttered is not necessarily "lying" if the context of the dialogue is meant to arrive at the truth of the matter.

Don't utter any untruths. He said that he operated the anti/de-ice system in accordance with the POH despite a large amount of evidence to the contrary.

No offense but the arguments you are making are not exactly convincing. But I will standby for #5, the Turkish Airlines possible alternative explanation.

[pdw]

]Selling the story to investigators?

No, no ... just understanding their own story so they can tell it, and don't get caught in a lie.

And that's just my point here, if the windsock at the high end of the runway suggested (from their perspective) it was CALM to depart Eagle Co down rwy25 in addition to the ATIS at that end of the runway, how would they have know that 75ft lower down the Valley it is still 10kts tail. I understand who cares about the 10 kts from any direction on any type of Jet, so that's why I read into that synopsis it is part of their inexplanation ... that these 2 unexplained items (control & EPRwarning) to which that downhill component added it's influence ... and why they had to RTO (just because not considering the strength of the unexpected i.e. East component significantly different than anticipated). For #3, just SW of Eagle Co found the clearest NE at 10kts; checked lots of stations, lots available (not so many for #4).

[pdw]

Selling the story to investigators?

No, no ... just understanding their own story so they can tell it, and don't get caught in a lie.

And that's just my point here, if the windsock at the high end of the runway suggested (from their perspective) it was CALM to depart Eagle Co down rwy25 in addition to the ATIS at that end of the runway, how would they have know that 75ft lower down the Valley it is still 10kts tail. I understand who cares about the 10 kts from any direction on any type of Jet, so that's why I read into that synopsis it is part of their inexplanation ... that these 2 unexplained items (control & EPRwarning) to which that downhill component added it's influence ... and why they had to RTO (just because not considering the strength of the unexpected i.e. East component significantly different than anticipated). For #3, just SW of Eagle Co found the clearest NE at 10kts; checked lots of stations, lots available (not so many for #4).

[pelmet]

Selling the story to investigators?

No, no ... just understanding their own story so they can tell it, and don't get caught in a lie.

And that's just my point here, if the windsock at the high end of the runway suggested (from their perspective) it was CALM to depart Eagle Co down rwy25 in addition to the ATIS at that end of the runway, how would they have know that 75ft lower down the Valley it is still 10kts tail. I understand who cares about the 10 kts from any direction on any type of Jet, so that's why I read into that synopsis it is part of their inexplanation ... that these 2 unexplained items (control & EPRwarning) to which that downhill component added it's influence ... and why they had to RTO (just because not considering the strength of the unexpected i.e. East component significantly different than anticipated). For #3, just SW of Eagle Co found the clearest NE at 10kts; checked lots of stations, lots available (not so many for #4).

In the end, all we really have for the airport at Eagle, Co is a metar, a mere 15 minutes after the accident showing calm winds. I agree that based on your statement of finding that there was some wind recorded 45 minutes before the accident, that there may still have been some wind at the time of the accident. And it is possible that the winds at a location other than where they were measured could be different but the trend was definitely moving toward a wind decrease and the accident occurred much closer to the end of the trend period than the beginning.

I disagree about the general point of not caring about 10 knots of wind in any type of jet as in certain situations, it can be a significant concern depending on other factors, but I still don't see how the wind would have had any effect on the flight controls and the operational capability at Vr which is the reason the pilots stated that they rejected the takeoff at an airspeed after Vr. A specific explanation of that would be helpful to understanding your argument.

As for #4, we had the only wind that mattered, the one recorded at the airport. But if there was a tailwind as you suggest, one can always go-around if it appears that the landing will be long whether it is due to an airspeed higher than it should be for the approach as we know it was or any other reason. Then there is the idea of using brakes and reverse in the manner in which they were designed to be used after landing.

[pdw]

but I still don't see how the wind would have had any effect on the flight controls and the operational capability at Vr which is the reason the pilots stated that they rejected the takeoff at an airspeed after Vr. A specific explanation of that would be helpful to understanding your argument.

He added that the controls had " no noticeable pressure resistance and felt unloaded with hydraulic pressure. "

That second try was past Vr ... already farther down the runway ..

#4 the air is warm overriding from north .. rwy 239T ( sure ... maybe an unexpected supplement to the real overrun cause yet only minor contributor ... but is that a thrust reverser bungling like Southwest at MDW ? (that was also aft-side quartering/ and there the reverse resisted deployment)

#5 ... tommorrow

[pelmet]

but I still don't see how the wind would have had any effect on the flight controls and the operational capability at Vr which is the reason the pilots stated that they rejected the takeoff at an airspeed after Vr. A specific explanation of that would be helpful to understanding your argument.

He added that the controls had " no noticeable pressure resistance and felt unloaded with hydraulic pressure. "

That second try was past Vr ... already farther down the runway ..

Correct that it would have been further down the runway. So how would a tailwind affect the flight controls at Vr?

#4 the air is warm overriding from north .. rwy 239T ( sure ... maybe an unexpected supplement to the real overrun cause yet only minor contributor ...

Unfortunately, there is no evidence of warm air "overriding from the north" although it would be welcome if you could provide the evidence. But if there was some sort of a tailwind component(or any other factor) leading to a long landing on a tight strip, a go-around would be prudent or at least using maximum stopping capability if you decide to land instead of claiming no braking action on the runway.

When there is an accident, there is a high potential for lawsuits. When a pilot is lying about the cause, a company or responsible person has a higher likelihood of being the one that is sued. Remember...it could someday be you or your company(whether it is a snow clearing company of a maintenance person/facility that is being sued because of the words of a lying pilot unwilling to accept blame for their actions. This is serious stuff that could affect you and should concern you. At a minimum, you everyday costs are higher because of this sort of widespread irresponsibility in terms of higher operating costs due to higher insurance costs.

[pdw]

Underpinning from North (my mistake), it's the cold air bubble hanging over the water moving East across Erie, colder due to unusual cold water for June (16-17C) after previous months total freezeover. Warmer/drier above (real hot wx coming from south) would move faster east ? NNYLAKEW3 and KNYFRED02 both show some of that cooler air Northward there .. just west of the airport at Channel Lake NNW@14.5kpa max. Your AWOS metar looks like the one I'm quoting for JHW given lat 42:15/long79:26 ... 22C/1400; the east threshold of that airport/rwy 25 is lat 42:09.4/long79:15.1 (wnw of DH).

Whether 5-8kts or not ..aren't they then also committed to staying down after at "1000" (once that/fast thing happens ... and the fumbling?) ... once they've blown a few seconds to get braking in higher GS ? Wouldn't that be more dangerous to change-mind back to a high groundspeed ? No way to prove IAS below GS after-the-fact, no GPS keeps record. A second to decide what's up with the landing, yet hours of interpolation to find.

I'd agree that it's possible to catch someone in the lie (inadvertantly or otherwise) if they were fibbing about something in their moment of fight or flight/confusion about future/career etc after their accident sequence, as those experiences are traumatic; if you can get the details ... and esp when its really important for future accident preventions, it's worth more pursuing the truth.

EDIT:
- #5 seems to be self explanatory (point made)
ps: #4 Answer: Thought maybe slippery because of rubber (or lake air fairly moist /possible condensation) but looks like clean from latest google image. No idea about reversers (check Dec 8 2005/MDW IMO .. looks similar wx/ and reverser "stowed" because too fast )
#3 Answer: IMO if there was a sharp-enough downwind/increasing shear-zone on the runway ... both steep temp & IAS difference (i.e when that different air is entered abruptly/not expected) can effect a "small amount" more engine/pressure and also make controls feel suddenly lighter (as I understood the quote from PIC / what they were describing).

[pelmet]

Underpinning from North (my mistake), it's the cold air bubble hanging over the water moving East across Erie, colder due to unusual cold water for June (16-17C) after previous months total freezeover.

A north flow off the lake is what you are meaning. The colder denser air underneath the warmer air above. That flow is quite possible as you state that other station had a north wind but JHW did not have this wind. It has to stop somewhere and obviously did prior to reaching JHW based on the metar. But once again, if you are going to land long and fast on a short runway, go-around as we do in training. Any suggestions on the reason the pilot stated that his braking ability was nil?

Whether 5-8kts or not ..aren't they then also committed to staying down after at "1000" (once that/fast thing happens ... and the fumbling?) ... once they've blown a few seconds to get braking in higher GS ? Wouldn't that be more dangerous to change-mind back to a high groundspeed ? No way to prove IAS below GS after-the-fact, no GPS keeps record. A second to decide what's up with the landing, yet hours of interpolation to find.

You are committed to land after selecting reverse thrust. An astute pilot would be going around before touchdown but it is quite possible to do so after touchdown as well, if you have let things get that far. But, as you said....at some point you are committed to landing and they reached that point. Why would you then only use idle reverse and probably not full braking if groundspeed is high on a short runway with high groundspeed after a long landing? Whatever the reason, he did just that. But then claimed the braking/stopping capability was nil.

[pdw]

Any suggestions on the reason the pilot stated his braking ability was nil ?

(question is for the #4 syopsis from above)

First thing that came to mind was: How would you ever get all the information that is required to answer that ?

How high is groundspeed exactly when brake first applied ? How soon were flaps up ? Any rubber / oils / moisture / salt residue on surface ? Mechanical status?

Downslope minor .. 2-3ft

And then eventually, I come to realize where your line of thinking stems from. If there is something else then only the PIC's accurate slant on the sequence can help to yield what that is /might be; the forthright anwers, as opposed to being overly defensive for image etc. The benefit to a pilot would be finding out something about their own perception of events, that may not have been obvious while attempting to save the plane etc during the unfolding of the precarious sequence. There are statistics of the amount of times an average person lies, so not surprising then if no less prevolent during sensitive scrutiny of aftermath (debriefings) following a traumatic event like an accident.

EDIT (Tues Jul19):
Salt residue not likely affecting braking index on #4; after checking, there were numerous heavy spring rains that would have thoroughly cleaned the rwy after the last cold night in May 2013. (It's in the snow belt and various salts / ice-melters are used on a regulart basis, which attracts moisture on humid days like on June 20.)

[pelmet]

Any suggestions on the reason the pilot stated his braking ability was nil ?

First thing that came to mind was: How would you ever get all the information that is required to answer that ?

How high is groundspeed exactly when brake first applied ? How soon were flaps up ? Any rubber / oils / moisture / salt residue on surface ? Mechanical status?

Downslope minor .. 2-3ft

If there is something else then only the PIC's accurate slant on the sequence can help to yield what that is; the forthright anwers, as opposed to being overly defensive for image etc. There are statistics of the amount of times an average person lies, so not surprising then if no less prevolent during sensitive scrutiny of aftermath debriefings following a traumatic event like an accident.

Thanks for the reply. These smaller NTSB reports tend to not have a lot of detail written into them which is unfortunate. There is no analysis section as the larger reports have. No doubt the investigators will take a look at the runway if the pilot says that there was no braking action(usually happens on a heavily rain-soaked or snow/slush covered runway which is not likely that day). A giant oil slick, massive amounts of rubber, salt residue from the Atlantic Ocean perhaps, maybe even the meteorite theory somehow having an effect can always be brought up.(I see you edited the previous post about salt but I am not aware of it being used at airports due to corrosion concerns).

You are right though, people do lie and as I said in the original post, the investigators need to be aware of this as we have five blatant examples in this thread right here out of a random sample I read two weeks ago of...........5 reports where pilots were interviewed. Pretty bad results. For those who fought against having CVR's in the flight deck, now you know one of the main reasons for having them. Even if the pilots survive, the CVR may be the best source of evidence.

[pdw]

You're welcome.

These smaller NTSB reports tend to not have a lot of detail written into them

I go straight weather history to corroberate wx offered in a preliminary of interest. There are often errors and ommissions not considered important. I've found serious error a few times; most prelims say "pending correction" (what does that mean ?); case in point: ASN / Bellevue-Idaho(10:30am,Dec6/04) says was 7C/10C for temp dewpoint, but still not changed. It's -6/-7(Lately working on the Van wx-synopsis north of Superior); that old data works for profile comparison, where accuracy is a BIG deal.

#5 exempified "pilots lying" best, how the 'little while lie' comes alive. Was totally fogged in and 300' was the limit yet AP switched to manual at 14'. If not for the very slight co-ordinate shift, we'd not have read about it.

[pelmet]

These smaller NTSB reports tend to not have a lot of detail written into them

I've found serious error a few times; most prelims say "pending correction" (what does that mean ?

Just to clarify, these are final reports and all weather reports given show no evidence of being other than what they were claimed to be.

#5 ... tommorrow

Still waiting.

[pdw]

#5 exempified "pilots lying" the best, how the 'little while lie' comes alive. Was totally fogged in and 300' was the limit yet AP switched to manual at 14'. If not for the very slight co-ordinate shift, we'd not have read about it.