Are the pilots lying to the accident investigators

[pdw]

Do you have any details ...

I avoided calling M.O.T. which sounded like the right thing to do for the moment. The adrenalin really gets going after the event. Author Dr B Killinger et al in "Respectable Addicts"/2004, writes 'an addiction to (your own) adrenalin increases lying'. That could have been me in that situation/ those days. There was some concern on the part of the strip owner: 'better hide the plane before the neighbours come looking'. Later I began to feel it would have been better to make the call. The owner of the plane was freaking because a week earlier had dropped hull insurance for the winter.

It's years ago, was just a kid. A little strip 2.8nm SE of Vineland ON, still there; sloped along the escarpment, the farmer let me park it in the barn to take off the prop to get straightened (Leavens $80) and replace a small $26 tailcone fiberglass-piece / C172. My pax both flying now (one has license), were glad to be alive, and between them and the farmer critics helped figure out a responsible account. Wx records came available on the net 25 years later; the surface analysis /Occluded front fairly easy to find Nov18/1976 355pm. Those days a report was short: "another 'pilot error' "etc (a fuller account of it is back a ways on here / in past posts).

Only mentioned it since had same tailquartering effect as in #4, just opposite direction (coincidentally a similar lake-effect enhancement of the area component from the same lake); the strong south/southwest wind surely got stronger as a Southerly component over the open water way behind me, and no way to measure the increasing final groundspeed on account of it, just by eye .
Of course #4 synopsis might have defense for that too, if GPS keeps track; just thinking maybe this was more-isolated at the lower final-app altitude (see pre-landing CVR vref conversation )..and looks like maybe then totally missed as a threat to their approach because seemed just light enough of a stability issue not to lable it as such. Was interesting to note commentary in #4 synopsis the fact that "1kt high can lose 250ft of TODA in touchdown and 1kt extra groundspeed uses up an extra 30-40ft" (had to think about that for a bit ..how to calculate that in)... and then squat switches of WOW-system don't likely allow unstowing/spooling of reverse until stops bouncing ...

[pelmet]

Do you have any details ...

I avoided calling M.O.T. which sounded like the right thing to do for the moment. The adrenalin really gets going after the event. Author Dr B Killinger et al in "Respectable Addicts"/2004, writes 'an addiction to (your own) adrenalin increases lying'. That could have been me in that situation/ those days. There was some concern on the part of the strip owner: 'better hide the plane before the neighbours come looking'. Later I began to feel it would have been better to make the call. The owner of the plane was freaking because a week earlier had dropped hull insurance for the winter.

It's years ago, was just a kid. A little strip 2.8nm SE of Vineland ON, still there; sloped along the escarpment, the farmer let me park it in the barn to take off the prop to get straightened (Leavens $80) and replace a small $26 tailcone fiberglass-piece / C172. My pax both flying now (one has license), were glad to be alive, and between them and the farmer critics helped figure out a responsible account. Wx records came available on the net 25 years later; the surface analysis /Occluded front fairly easy to find Nov18/1976 355pm. Those days a report was short: "another 'pilot error' "etc (a fuller account of it is back a ways on here / in past posts).

Only mentioned it since had same tailquartering effect as in #4, just opposite direction (coincidentally a similar lake-effect enhancement of the area component from the same lake); the strong south/southwest wind surely got stronger as a Southerly component over the open water way behind me, and no way to measure the increasing final groundspeed on account of it, just by eye .
Of course #4 synopsis might have defense for that too, if GPS keeps track; just thinking maybe this was more-isolated at the lower final-app altitude (see pre-landing CVR vref conversation )..and looks like maybe then totally missed as a threat to their approach because seemed just light enough of a stability issue not to lable it as such. Was interesting to note commentary in #4 synopsis the fact that "1kt high can lose 250ft of TODA in touchdown and 1kt extra groundspeed uses up an extra 30-40ft" (had to think about that for a bit ..how to calculate that in)... and then squat switches of WOW-system don't likely allow unstowing/spooling of reverse until stops bouncing ...

Glad to hear that no one was hurt. Fortunately, most accidents actually do turn out that way.

Was this a short strip with trees/power lines at one end? How long was the runway? Or was it a porpoising problem which can lead to a damaged propeller. You are certainly correct that the winds can be stronger than anticipated.

[pdw]

Glad no one hurt ..

We're only talking about a light incident if looking at it in terms of a real accident avoided, which was aborting take-off in the negative shear right after the 'touchdown into positive shear' (reason for aborting the landing) in an "unknown" high-groundspeed. All it was .. is that the choice of direction best into wind turned out NOT to be up there in the first half ... you know ...a ways uphill from the windsock down below telling us west/northwest on the fly overs.
The sequence/timing: From the point of touchdown in soft/mud (a low spot) .. 1sec ... unknown mud/drag & positive-shear, yet could see groundspeed is too fast ... 2nd sec ... I instantly apply goaround power but then IAS starts slowing ( the neg shear) ... 3rd second ... IAS slowing nearing a rise / midfield, the runway gone so fast, lost visual for TODA, so the take-off aborted. It happened real fast ... the point of no return for either option.

You are certainly correct that the winds can be stronger than anticipated.

It's the negative component that is stronger than anticipated (because unknown) for three downwind examples 1,3, & 4 and thus it's the higher groundspeed NOT expected by the pilots (not even recorded/reported by NTSB); and, just saying there ... if not known, then neither is the true reason for these three accidents. For an extra #4 comparison to a nearby similar-type accident, was just saying winds were "stronger" across that same open water but opposite direction as in #4 from a southerly direction in my "occluded front" experience years ago coincidently on the opposite shore in the 290V200 tendency over 15 minutes. This is evidenced at kbuf / cwpc at 30-40kpa (wx-hist Nov18/'76 3-4pm) in the first-half / high-end of the 1600ft / 360T strip on the North slope of the Niagara Escarpment 70nm/N from KJHW-rwy25/#4 (both rwys are 35nm from mid L Erie on same longitude).

The runway components in the 3 downwind examples are LESS-strong than anticipated. ADD the difference between the positive relative wind expected on runway in each case and the negative component it turned out to be to get the greater TRUE groundspeed NOT anticipated by pilots. In #4 it's possible up to 15kts less relative wind than planned-on (up to 15kts higher groundspeed) while in what the pilot determines to be "stable approach"; if all 4 pilots on board haven't identified the extra groundspeed, neither has the investigation.
Decision to land in #4 (on Thursday Jun20/2013 between 14:09:45-50pm/DH and 14:09:55pm/over-the-threshold at KJHW) looks OK when at normal IAS whether or not knowing about a groundspeed unusually high. The PIC says "braking nil" after touchdown 14:10:00, which states an opinion of 'not enough'; the higher groundspeed equals "more braking" required to stop .. so says "nil" on account of 'too little' available. Any aircraft must stop without aid of reverse thrust; this being the checkride, none is applied but CFI says anti-ski "cycled three times", which means 'working'.
___________________________________________________
EDIT (July 29):

Any denials (or lying), whether to yourself or to others (by mistake or not) about any factor(s) in your accident sequence, will get challenged eventually as the investigation collects the proof to show what actually has taken place. New info that shows different after a final report is is always possible where the conclusion is based on vague evidence or "lying". By asking the title question with five such examples for scrutiny, Pelmet has allowed us to revisit these accident reports for such a reason; a main purpose for those databases. Anyone can go back and check for new/developing profiles they hear of or know of.

-In #2 the investigation concludes no clean concept on departure, using photo evidence from the scientist's camera. 'Investigating 101' (easy).

-In #5, the off co-ordinates in alleged poor vis/ busted mins have photos of the foggy conditions at the time of the accident. Requires some analysing to figure out beyond just the photos (a higher level of difficulty in establishing the truth).

The other 3 of the 5 examples here are invisible downwind/shear examples, so nothing about component arrived in those reports; however, each synopsis has the snapshot of their respective surface analysis from history to interpret for low level component.
- In #4 the pilots do not have evidence of negative component/easterly-lakebreeze from northeast-of / or-above JHW except afterwards in a surface analysis.

- In #3/KEGE there's decreased performance in aborting after 'light-controls & EPR warning' occurs mid-runway at the high altitude airport - in apparent decreased performance shear-zone (rapid entry) on rwy25 as traceable with wx history - ; the brake fire occurs in aborting the second try immediately after the first. Into the negative shear would be sudden , abrupt change, but no noise; just the control feel/lighterand the EPR increase / trigger. Two effects of the sudden slowing; one affects take-off power and the other affects handling/feel.

- In #1: A significant downwind backed by area metar(s) is corresponding the takeoff direction/time given in the report of this example.

[pelmet]

We're only talking about a light incident if looking at it in terms of a real accident avoided, which was aborting take-off in the negative shear right after the 'touchdown into positive shear' (reason for aborting the landing) in an "unknown" high-groundspeed. All it was .. is that the choice of direction best into wind turned out NOT to be up there in the first half ... you know ...a ways uphill from the windsock down below telling us west/northwest on the fly overs.
The sequence/timing: From the point of touchdown in soft/mud (a low spot) .. 1sec ... unknown mud/drag & positive-shear, yet could see groundspeed is too fast ... 2nd sec ... I instantly apply goaround power but then IAS starts slowing ( the neg shear) ... 3rd second ... IAS slowing nearing a rise / midfield, the runway gone so fast, lost visual for TODA, so the take-off aborted. It happened real fast ... the point of no return for either option.

This seems like a good accident to dig a little deeper into as you were there and are the pilot/witness. What sort of aircraft was it? How long was the runway? Were there trees at the approach end or some other obstacle? Did you float and float but then not attempt a go-around until it was too late? Unknown mud? Did you call ahead to the operator to get a field condition? How was the actual weather that day?

[pdw]

This seems like a good accident to dig a little deeper into as you were there and are the pilot/witness.
(There were many witnesses; at least one other experienced pilot watching, including the strip owner.)
What sort of aircraft was it? (1968 C172 Skyhawk)
How long was the runway? (~1500')
Were there trees at the approach end or some other obstacle? (yes)
Did you float and float but then not attempt a go-around until it was too late? (no float .. hey, good question!)
Unknown mud? (determined by witnesses / research .. just a bit, right at the point of touchdown 1/4 in ... elsewhere all dry)
Did you call ahead to the operator to get a field condition? (no)
How was the actual weather that day ?
(poor in the AM/ great by mid-aft)

(my responses in parentheses)

Anyways, an identical longitude / distance (opposite-side and different time & component direction on L.Erie as #4 example) so ok to disclose the experience there in similar situation with lake-influenced aft-quartering component strengthening over the same water surface. Was searching #4/KJHW WX a few days after initiating response when noticing the lake-effect co-incidence.

There was still a #6 ...

(Considering why any fibbing could be going on in the previous 5 examples: Investigators are a threat since not there for the best interest of the PIC involved, despite the motto/statement that the investigations's mandate is to determine the cause of the accident rather than finding fault. )

[pelmet]

.

[pelmet]

edited...

Ok, thanks for the responses and the suggestions of the importance of checking the weather carefully in any investigation. I have nothing further to add to this thread.

[pdw]

There's an old song called " Alice's Resaurant ", and in this ballad "officer Obie" is questioning the driver of a VW microbus on the telephone about "a envelope" with his name on it found under some garbage dumped down a local cliff off a sideroad on thanksgiving day when the dump was unexpectedly closed. Obie was asking whether he had any information about it ...

He answers ..."Officer Obie I cannot tell a lie, I put that envelope under that garbage".
________________________________________

Maybe this confession would be rare nowadays. Seems in general we're coached 'not to talk' is our best bet, even when it looks obvious.

[pelmet]

Maybe this confession would be rare nowadays. Seems in general we're coached 'not to talk' is our best bet, even when it looks obvious.

Perhaps you were coached this way. In the example I gave on the first post, it appears to be more than just not talking about outright lies. And then there is just the blaming of other factors instead of taking personal responsibility for a mistake or bad judgement.

Continuing on with this thread, I read an article lately that makes me suggest to any accident investigator to expand the title of this thread to.....

.....Are the Friends and Acquaintances Lying to the Investigators.

Once again, I am only including excerpts tp keep the post reasonably short.

http://www.flyingmag.com/aftermath-some ... nt-help-it

"Witnesses who knew that the pilot did not have an instrument rating were surprised to see the Arrow take off and disappear into the overcast beyond the end of the runway."

"One witness, who lived south of the airport, heard the Arrow as well and noticed the engine sound seemed to go “up and down,” as if the airplane were doing aerobatics. Then he saw the Arrow emerge from the clouds and fly over his neighbor’s house, lower than he had ever seen an airplane before. He sent his daughter inside for her safety. The airplane disappeared into the clouds and then re-emerged briefly two or three times.
Then he heard the crash."

"As is usual after an accident, friends and acquaintances of the pilot described him as “meticulous” and “safety-conscious.” He would not intentionally fly into clouds or put himself in danger. He would take no risks with his son on board. A flight instructor who knew him said it was completely out of character for him to do what he did. He was said to be attentive to maintenance. When told one of his cylinders needed overhaul, the pilot had replaced all four, one acquaintance recalled. A newspaper report speculated there must have been some sort of mechanical problem that even a pilot of his 10 years of experience could not deal with."

"The truth was slightly different. He had been flying for five years and had less than 400 hours. He had replaced two cylinders, not four. His medical was long out of date, as was his transponder check. And flying into clouds was not out of character. His wife told the FAA investigator her husband occasionally flew through clouds 1,000 to 2,000 feet thick — never in them more than two minutes — at the start or end of a flight. “Sometimes, ” she said, “you can’t help it.” The boy thought flying into clouds was “cool.” She didn’t like it so much."

So there you go. We see all these people associated with the pilot just saying stuff attempting to portray the pilot as something much better than he actually was. And it seems to be something familiar to be heard after many accidents when the reality I suspect, is much different.

Something for the investigators to consider when interviewing friends and acquaintances.

And for the newbies out there, a reminder that you have to sort through a lot of incorrect and misinformation to get to the truth.

[pdw]

On the "truth" side here, firstly, with the "wife" that was supportive of the flying (in general it seems), might be worth here exploring why "she was confused why he would have trouble in the clouds" when never before had been a problem (if it's true he did it lots).

I checked out Nor'Ida (from hurricane/cyclone IDA remnants wikepedia) for this Nov 14/2009 (for 10:46am take-off) accident south of Atlantic City, and more importantly the "secondary low offshore Delaware" right there that morning (off shore from the ocean airport where "her husband" took off rwy31 /300T). That's a 90deg crosswind take-off (wx hist inerpolation) and already showing slightly irregular nne/NE component (influence of the "Vermont HI"/ntsb) at the surface; then certainly stronger-irregular and tailquartering by "1600ft" ~ 1.5-2min after takeoff .. is possible. Radar evidences the plane drops down to "200ft" right there; a lot easier to be thrown off "handflown"-climbout left onto course at "1600ft" upon entering any stronger negative EAST component ... and even during the left turnout toward WEST as more than adequately described in this NTSB narrative.

The transponder looks to have been working for "200ft" as it should (Ntsb rep does'nt speak of "transponder check" anywhere I could see). Then for the character reference where the mechanic only called for one cylinder replacement, yet ended up doing two: It mentions in both the magazine article and the report that the pilot had said "he had replaced all four". This may be very important to reconsider as a negative reference .. considering an expensive repair like this, simply because the two pots that were not replaced would have been deemed equally as good as new (all pistons replaced like new) if a mech happened to have used that discretion in the abscense of his customer.

Those things DO NOT MAKE UP EXCUSES FOR THE POOR DECISIONS ... I know .. (just exploring potential overlooked "truth")

[pelmet]

Those things DO NOT MAKE UP EXCUSES FOR THE POOR DECISIONS ... I know .. (just exploring potential overlooked "truth")

400 hour pilot, 300 foot ceiling, plane wrecked and an innocent passenger killed. From what I have been reading lately, there is a renewed push to reduce general aviation accidents. I would say that we are going to first have to admit the "overlooked" and harsh truth that is reality. That a significant portion of those pilots are incompetent and based mostly on the personality/decision making capability, should not be in command of an aircraft as they are a significant hazard. This accident is one of so many examples.

[pdw]

IFR without the rating ... hmmm .. that has trumped all other discussion for the last example, fair and square. Poor decision was made. Just saying .. the versions of truths from witnesses used to underpin ' cause ' can become so real once printed in an official narrative of news articles, magazines, or databases. Anyone represented who has tweaked/ommitted the truth sure wouldn't be doing anyone any favours in helping to "reduce general av accidents" esp if in a synopsis of IMC upset like this the one 'less visible' FACTOR among other "holes in swiss" remains undiscovered in the process.

The lady loses her son and her husband. She indicates "she was confused why he would have trouble in the cloud". It's fair questioning really; why this time and not before ?

[pelmet]

I found this one interesting...….

https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/1362391/a ... 59_001.pdf

"The investigation could not reconcile the discrepancies between the pilot and witness accounts of the event."

Why? Because the pilot is lying to the investigators.

[corethatthermal]

Short answer Pilots lie !
Apparently Lawyers lie also, as I have found out a few days ago!

[rookiepilot]

I miss PDW for some reason.
Pelmet and PDW need to be reunited. A great thread!

[Diadem]

I miss PDW for some reason.

Me too. I always had fun trying to figure out what the hell he was saying.
Aww, now I'm getting all nostalgic...

[rookiepilot]

I miss PDW for some reason.

Me too. I always had fun trying to figure out what the hell he was saying.
Aww, now I'm getting all nostalgic...

Totally. Variable anything......

[goingnowherefast]

Variable Stockholm Syndrome?

[5x5]

Anyone that misses PDW should starting pulling off their fingernails, one each day for 10 days. On the 11th day you'll miss not having another one to pull off. That'll get you over it.

[rookiepilot]

Anyone that misses PDW should starting pulling off their fingernails, one each day for 10 days. On the 11th day you'll miss not having another one to pull off. That'll get you over it.

Ouch.......