It is interesting that AC feels that the FAA ATC is considered to be a threat because....
"A review of industry safety data highlights the fact that KSFO holds a top 5 position in a list of airports in the United States concerning go-arounds, unstable approaches, landings without landing clearance, GPWS events, TCAS RA events, runway incursion events and missed crossing restrictions. All of these events suggest there is a significant FAA ATC threat at KSFO."
Well, we saw this year why AC subsequently landed at SFO without a clearance. Was that ATC's fault as well. And here is an even more recent example of a runway incursion.....viewtopic.php?f=118&t=117542&start=775#p1053508. Do these subsequent AC incidents fit the pattern of AC's belief that SFO ATC is a threat?
In order to bolster their claim that there was potential for misperception as to the proper location to land, AC has submitted that there was another flight that had a potential issue as to whether they would land on the proper landing surface, the previous aircraft. The crew of that flight did in fact state that they encountered difficulties and had doubts that they were lined up with the proper runway. But the report in fact, ends up showing how such an issue can be resolved. I suspect that the Delta crew were very aware of the potential for misperception based on Notams they read and fully reading the ATIS info that also had information on the runway closure which resulted in successfully resolving it.
"The crew of Delta flight 521, which landed on runway 28R about 4 minutes prior to the incident, confirmed during an interview conducted by the NTSB that they were also confused by the lighting during the approach. The flight crew of Delta 521 reported that the “construction lights were so bright we could not determine the location of the inboard runway, 28L.” Visually acquiring the runway, both crewmembers reported questioning if they were lined up for runway 28R; however, after crosschecking with their LNAV they were able to determine they were lined-up for runway 28R. They received additional confirmation about 300 feet AGL when the Captain visually acquired the painted “28R” on the paved surface of the runway."
It is interesting that this particular aircraft, a 737 did not state that they used the ILS to resolve the confusion but instead used their LNAV. Whether that could be done in the Airbus is not stated in the report.
AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?
Moderators: sky's the limit, sepia, Sulako, lilfssister, North Shore
Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?
The AC submission is quite large so I have broken this up into several posts.
This one is about the tuning of the ILS. According to the FMS Bridge Visual Approach plate, it says....
"Tune the ILS 28R"
According to the submission by AC....
"The crew did not tune the Instrument Landing System (ILS) 28R, which is advised by the Jeppesen 19-3-1A page applicable at that time, though this tuning is done manually and is not a normal procedure for FMS visual approaches. They chose to fly the visual approach."
"The purpose for manually tuning the ILS is to provide situational awareness during the approach. However, since the FMS Bridge Visual Approach is on a heading of 281° after the final approach fix, F101D, and the ILS 28R localizer is on a heading of 284°, the crew would expect to see the localizer scale indicating left of the centerline, which they were. Therefore, even though the crew did not tune the ILS, the impact would have been minimal since they would have been showing right of the LOC on the Primary Flight Display (PFD)."
But did it not occur to the people who wrote this report that even though the localizer would not show on centerline during the majority of the published approach phase of the FMS arrival(because it is offset from the runway for noise abatement) that the localizer could be extremely useful for reference once lined up on final which occurs about 3 miles from the threshold. An aircraft can use the localizer as something to intercept during the final prtion of the approach.
It appears that because other visual approaches, mostly at far away locations do not require ILS tuning, AC feels that this one shouldn't either but perhaps there is good reason that someone inserted this requirement at SFO airport such as the fact that it has very closely spaced parallel runways and using the localizer can prevent a misalignment causing reduced separation with the parallel runway at this airport.
The ACA759 crew did not tune the ILS 28R per the FMS Bridge Visual Approach Jeppesen 19-3-1A (Attachment 8.2), which states that crews “tune the ILS for 28R.” This is done manually and it is not a normal procedure for an FMS Visual Approach. A review of all visual approaches (KEWR, KLAS, KLGA, KPSP, MROC) was conducted and none requires crews to manually tune navigational aids (NAVAIDS).
It appears that the NTSB was curious about the ILS tuning(or lach thereof) on this flight because in their docket, they have a report about a sim evaluation in AC's A320 sim. According to the NTSB, one of the overall objectives was to "Document procedure for input of ILS frequency when the FMS is loaded with the FMS Bridge Visual approach". Not much detail is given in the report except that they stated "Tuning in ILS resulted in an alert tone (simulator limitation)".
However, it has been posted earlier on this thread that manually tuning and displaying the ILS in the Airbus may not be so simple. In fact AC wrote this later on....
"Air Canada has removed guidance to set the ILS frequency as the ILS scale is not visible when flying the FMS approach. Guidance is provided that requires the crew to fly the FMS approach in “LNAV/VNAV” (FINAL APP) mode in order to ensure the aircraft is perfectly aligned to the runway on short final"
So AC has now removed the requirement to tune the ILS but they also seem to state something very important. LNAV guidance(and even VNAV guidance) is available for runway alignment on final approach. Page 14 of the report shows the database coding for the waypoints which goes right to the runway threshold. The Jeppesen chart that they were using that night says "Selecting this procedure will display the entire approach procedure including missed approach guidance". It appears that the last leg in the procedure prior to the threshold is FD101 which is where the aircraft intercepts the runway centerline at 4.4 DME from the airport VOR(located at the center of the airport).
I didn't realize(subject to confirmation) that there was in fact LNAV guidance on this flight for the final approach course. According to what I quoted in my previous post, the previous landing flight(a 737) used LNAV guidance to confirm that they were aligned with the runway. This seems to indicate that it would have been fairly easy to be aligned with the runway but that visual cues dominated the alignment process onto the chosen landing surface based on the assumption that the single set of illuminated approach lights were for 28L when in fact they were for 28R. LNAV cues may not be considered as accurate as a localizer.
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61499 ... 614666.pdf (page 19/20)
I am now reading the NTSB preliminary report. According to the NTSB, this particular aircraft did not have GPS updating. Usually, that means updating by other sources which can vary. It could be DME sources alone or combined with VOR or localizer. Whether or niot this would provide as accurate alignment as GPS updating is unknown. I don't know if the De3lta 737 which had a crew using their LNAV for runway identification had GPS updating,
This one is about the tuning of the ILS. According to the FMS Bridge Visual Approach plate, it says....
"Tune the ILS 28R"
According to the submission by AC....
"The crew did not tune the Instrument Landing System (ILS) 28R, which is advised by the Jeppesen 19-3-1A page applicable at that time, though this tuning is done manually and is not a normal procedure for FMS visual approaches. They chose to fly the visual approach."
"The purpose for manually tuning the ILS is to provide situational awareness during the approach. However, since the FMS Bridge Visual Approach is on a heading of 281° after the final approach fix, F101D, and the ILS 28R localizer is on a heading of 284°, the crew would expect to see the localizer scale indicating left of the centerline, which they were. Therefore, even though the crew did not tune the ILS, the impact would have been minimal since they would have been showing right of the LOC on the Primary Flight Display (PFD)."
But did it not occur to the people who wrote this report that even though the localizer would not show on centerline during the majority of the published approach phase of the FMS arrival(because it is offset from the runway for noise abatement) that the localizer could be extremely useful for reference once lined up on final which occurs about 3 miles from the threshold. An aircraft can use the localizer as something to intercept during the final prtion of the approach.
It appears that because other visual approaches, mostly at far away locations do not require ILS tuning, AC feels that this one shouldn't either but perhaps there is good reason that someone inserted this requirement at SFO airport such as the fact that it has very closely spaced parallel runways and using the localizer can prevent a misalignment causing reduced separation with the parallel runway at this airport.
The ACA759 crew did not tune the ILS 28R per the FMS Bridge Visual Approach Jeppesen 19-3-1A (Attachment 8.2), which states that crews “tune the ILS for 28R.” This is done manually and it is not a normal procedure for an FMS Visual Approach. A review of all visual approaches (KEWR, KLAS, KLGA, KPSP, MROC) was conducted and none requires crews to manually tune navigational aids (NAVAIDS).
It appears that the NTSB was curious about the ILS tuning(or lach thereof) on this flight because in their docket, they have a report about a sim evaluation in AC's A320 sim. According to the NTSB, one of the overall objectives was to "Document procedure for input of ILS frequency when the FMS is loaded with the FMS Bridge Visual approach". Not much detail is given in the report except that they stated "Tuning in ILS resulted in an alert tone (simulator limitation)".
However, it has been posted earlier on this thread that manually tuning and displaying the ILS in the Airbus may not be so simple. In fact AC wrote this later on....
"Air Canada has removed guidance to set the ILS frequency as the ILS scale is not visible when flying the FMS approach. Guidance is provided that requires the crew to fly the FMS approach in “LNAV/VNAV” (FINAL APP) mode in order to ensure the aircraft is perfectly aligned to the runway on short final"
So AC has now removed the requirement to tune the ILS but they also seem to state something very important. LNAV guidance(and even VNAV guidance) is available for runway alignment on final approach. Page 14 of the report shows the database coding for the waypoints which goes right to the runway threshold. The Jeppesen chart that they were using that night says "Selecting this procedure will display the entire approach procedure including missed approach guidance". It appears that the last leg in the procedure prior to the threshold is FD101 which is where the aircraft intercepts the runway centerline at 4.4 DME from the airport VOR(located at the center of the airport).
I didn't realize(subject to confirmation) that there was in fact LNAV guidance on this flight for the final approach course. According to what I quoted in my previous post, the previous landing flight(a 737) used LNAV guidance to confirm that they were aligned with the runway. This seems to indicate that it would have been fairly easy to be aligned with the runway but that visual cues dominated the alignment process onto the chosen landing surface based on the assumption that the single set of illuminated approach lights were for 28L when in fact they were for 28R. LNAV cues may not be considered as accurate as a localizer.
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61499 ... 614666.pdf (page 19/20)
I am now reading the NTSB preliminary report. According to the NTSB, this particular aircraft did not have GPS updating. Usually, that means updating by other sources which can vary. It could be DME sources alone or combined with VOR or localizer. Whether or niot this would provide as accurate alignment as GPS updating is unknown. I don't know if the De3lta 737 which had a crew using their LNAV for runway identification had GPS updating,
Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?
According to the NTSB...
"The crew discussed the weather expected enroute and reviewed their dispatch paperwork, which included NOTAMs for SFO. Both crewmembers indicated that they were aware of the closure of runway 28L, which was NOTAMed to occur at 2300 PDT (0600Z)."
The notams also stated that the approach lights were U/S. Whether they were aware of that is unknown although they did have plenty of time while enroute to update themselves on the applicable notams as many people do on longer flights. The ATIS also mentioned about the ruway and runway approach lights being out of service. However, one can only conclude that based on the fact that they aligned themselves to the right of the only set of approach lights illuminated, thet they either forgot about this fact or were never in fact aware of it. There were a lot of notams but there are airports that have much worse as I saw today at the airport that I flew into. Lots of useless notams with occasional important one mixed in. It is not uncommon to hear in one of our briefings that we will review in more detail, the taxiway closure notams and other stuff while enroute. A good briefing about lighting can prevent this on a visual approach at night.
PAPI's can be helpful in identifying en error. I wrote somewhere in here about a runway misalignment that I had once. One of the hints that I had was the APAPI being offset to the left in a non-normal position. If the PAPI is not where it is supposed to be, which would have been the case here, ask yourself why. In fact, the AC ops manual mentions this....
"For approach procedures that require lateral maneuvering below minimums, (e.g., LGA Expressway Visual Rwy 31, or SFO ILS 28R Sidestep minima to 28L) the aircraft shall be established on the extended runway centerline by 300 feet AAE. Published sidestep approaches must be carefully planned and briefed including additional
considerations such as:
– use of flight directors after initiating the sidestep;
– possible GPWS glideslope alerts;
– use of VASI or PAPI;"
The crew complained about fatigue but the NTSB report states that the captain was advised well before the flight about it but spent the whole day awake(the FO did take a snooze).
As the AC FOM states..."Even if flight crew members do not feel sleepy during the rest period, they should always attempt sleep. External stimuli may mask fatigue which may lead flight crew members to believe they are not able to sleep when in fact, sleep may come quite easily." Of course, there have been people I know that have a lot of activities that they do even when on standby but could make one tired when they have to fly. Not many are going to do nothing all day but a mid-afternoon nap can do wonders. And AC pilots do have a legal advantage in that they have approval for controlled rest in the flight deck, as mentioned in the NTSB report. One wouldn't think that this flight had any more fatigue potential than all the flights to Europe that departed from YYZ that night with two crew. In this case, one did have the ability to take the call, take an afternoon snooze then snooze on the airplane enroute.
"The crew discussed the weather expected enroute and reviewed their dispatch paperwork, which included NOTAMs for SFO. Both crewmembers indicated that they were aware of the closure of runway 28L, which was NOTAMed to occur at 2300 PDT (0600Z)."
The notams also stated that the approach lights were U/S. Whether they were aware of that is unknown although they did have plenty of time while enroute to update themselves on the applicable notams as many people do on longer flights. The ATIS also mentioned about the ruway and runway approach lights being out of service. However, one can only conclude that based on the fact that they aligned themselves to the right of the only set of approach lights illuminated, thet they either forgot about this fact or were never in fact aware of it. There were a lot of notams but there are airports that have much worse as I saw today at the airport that I flew into. Lots of useless notams with occasional important one mixed in. It is not uncommon to hear in one of our briefings that we will review in more detail, the taxiway closure notams and other stuff while enroute. A good briefing about lighting can prevent this on a visual approach at night.
PAPI's can be helpful in identifying en error. I wrote somewhere in here about a runway misalignment that I had once. One of the hints that I had was the APAPI being offset to the left in a non-normal position. If the PAPI is not where it is supposed to be, which would have been the case here, ask yourself why. In fact, the AC ops manual mentions this....
"For approach procedures that require lateral maneuvering below minimums, (e.g., LGA Expressway Visual Rwy 31, or SFO ILS 28R Sidestep minima to 28L) the aircraft shall be established on the extended runway centerline by 300 feet AAE. Published sidestep approaches must be carefully planned and briefed including additional
considerations such as:
– use of flight directors after initiating the sidestep;
– possible GPWS glideslope alerts;
– use of VASI or PAPI;"
The crew complained about fatigue but the NTSB report states that the captain was advised well before the flight about it but spent the whole day awake(the FO did take a snooze).
As the AC FOM states..."Even if flight crew members do not feel sleepy during the rest period, they should always attempt sleep. External stimuli may mask fatigue which may lead flight crew members to believe they are not able to sleep when in fact, sleep may come quite easily." Of course, there have been people I know that have a lot of activities that they do even when on standby but could make one tired when they have to fly. Not many are going to do nothing all day but a mid-afternoon nap can do wonders. And AC pilots do have a legal advantage in that they have approval for controlled rest in the flight deck, as mentioned in the NTSB report. One wouldn't think that this flight had any more fatigue potential than all the flights to Europe that departed from YYZ that night with two crew. In this case, one did have the ability to take the call, take an afternoon snooze then snooze on the airplane enroute.
Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?
According to the NTSB docket......
"When asked to describe what navigation system the A-320 had, he stated that the incident airplane was equipped with an artificial horizon and navaids. He restated that they had not tuned in the ILS on the first approach."
"When asked if SOP guidance required the localizer to be used as a backup to the FMS, he stated that it was recommended to back up the FMS with the localizer. After they were taken off the STAR, vectored, and then placed back on the FMS bridge visual, they missed putting the localizer in as a backup."
The captain didn't mention anything about difficulties in displaying the ILS on the Airbus but this was not asked of him either. It would not be surprising if the investigators had no direct Airbus flying experience and this remains a question that hopefully will be fully investigated.
If the notam for the approach lights was read, it was obviously forgotten...
"He did not observe the “rabbits” but he could see the lead in lights for what he thought was runway 28L and white lights for what he thought was runway 28R. He thought that the runway 28R lights were dimmer and that the lights, for what he thought was 28L, were bright but he would have liked the lights to be a little bit brighter...."
it is interesting to note that the runway construction lights on 28L to have been confusing were no considered to have had any detrimental effect on the AC captain....
"When asked if noticed anything left of what he perceived as runway 28L, he stated that nothing to the left drew his attention."
Concerning the F/O....
"When asked if they had the localizer frequency dialed in and were using it, he stated that they did not have the ILS dialed in for the approach. He should have noticed it on the PFD but did not notice it and was unsure how he missed it. He would normally set that up prior to the briefing. He would first go to the performance page, put in the MDA, and then confirm with the captain what flaps they were to use, check routing and altitude constraints. The final page was RAD NAV and he stated he must have missed that page."
"Some of the main things he and the incident captain were discussing was how they got into the situation. One of the items he and the captain discussed was that he had not set-up the localizer to track inbound to the runway. He stated that it had upset him that he had not set it up."
Once again, no mention of difficulty displaying ILS indications as someone posted earlier in this thread.
The F/O stated that he was very busy on the approach as can happen sometimes. "He further stated that there was “a lot” going on. The captain asked for the heading bug to be set for the missed approach, as was their SOP. At some point but could not recall when, the captain asked if he could confirm the runway was clear, he looked up and he expected to see the runway; however, when he looked up he could not understand what he was looking at. He further provided that he could not process what he was looking at. He contacted tower and asked for confirmation on the landing clearance and that they runway was clear. He clarified that what didn’t seem right was that there appeared to be a line of stationary lights. The controller confirmed cleared to land but felt it was “glossed over.”" it would be interesting to know what 'glossed over' means to the F/O for the ATC statement....“Air Canada seven five nine confirmed cleared to land runway two eight right. There’s no one on runway two eight right but you.”
When asked to further clarify or describe the stationary lights he observed, he stated that he thought it was a line of green lights at the beginning of what he thought was the threshold and then further down the runway. Taxiway centerline lights are green. One should keep in mind that a taxiway may not always be able to be identified by blue lights as they are not required if the taxiway has centerline lights. This taxiway in SFO had no edge lights.
"When asked to describe what navigation system the A-320 had, he stated that the incident airplane was equipped with an artificial horizon and navaids. He restated that they had not tuned in the ILS on the first approach."
"When asked if SOP guidance required the localizer to be used as a backup to the FMS, he stated that it was recommended to back up the FMS with the localizer. After they were taken off the STAR, vectored, and then placed back on the FMS bridge visual, they missed putting the localizer in as a backup."
The captain didn't mention anything about difficulties in displaying the ILS on the Airbus but this was not asked of him either. It would not be surprising if the investigators had no direct Airbus flying experience and this remains a question that hopefully will be fully investigated.
If the notam for the approach lights was read, it was obviously forgotten...
"He did not observe the “rabbits” but he could see the lead in lights for what he thought was runway 28L and white lights for what he thought was runway 28R. He thought that the runway 28R lights were dimmer and that the lights, for what he thought was 28L, were bright but he would have liked the lights to be a little bit brighter...."
it is interesting to note that the runway construction lights on 28L to have been confusing were no considered to have had any detrimental effect on the AC captain....
"When asked if noticed anything left of what he perceived as runway 28L, he stated that nothing to the left drew his attention."
Concerning the F/O....
"When asked if they had the localizer frequency dialed in and were using it, he stated that they did not have the ILS dialed in for the approach. He should have noticed it on the PFD but did not notice it and was unsure how he missed it. He would normally set that up prior to the briefing. He would first go to the performance page, put in the MDA, and then confirm with the captain what flaps they were to use, check routing and altitude constraints. The final page was RAD NAV and he stated he must have missed that page."
"Some of the main things he and the incident captain were discussing was how they got into the situation. One of the items he and the captain discussed was that he had not set-up the localizer to track inbound to the runway. He stated that it had upset him that he had not set it up."
Once again, no mention of difficulty displaying ILS indications as someone posted earlier in this thread.
The F/O stated that he was very busy on the approach as can happen sometimes. "He further stated that there was “a lot” going on. The captain asked for the heading bug to be set for the missed approach, as was their SOP. At some point but could not recall when, the captain asked if he could confirm the runway was clear, he looked up and he expected to see the runway; however, when he looked up he could not understand what he was looking at. He further provided that he could not process what he was looking at. He contacted tower and asked for confirmation on the landing clearance and that they runway was clear. He clarified that what didn’t seem right was that there appeared to be a line of stationary lights. The controller confirmed cleared to land but felt it was “glossed over.”" it would be interesting to know what 'glossed over' means to the F/O for the ATC statement....“Air Canada seven five nine confirmed cleared to land runway two eight right. There’s no one on runway two eight right but you.”
When asked to further clarify or describe the stationary lights he observed, he stated that he thought it was a line of green lights at the beginning of what he thought was the threshold and then further down the runway. Taxiway centerline lights are green. One should keep in mind that a taxiway may not always be able to be identified by blue lights as they are not required if the taxiway has centerline lights. This taxiway in SFO had no edge lights.
Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?
Rockie wrote: ↑Fri Jul 14, 2017 3:33 amYou aren't the first person to have that idea Pelmet. It is something I and my colleagues here do routinely on every other airplane if for no other reason than having displayed vertical guidance to the runway. However things are rarely that straight forward on a bus because an action here often has unintended reactions there that don't occur on conventional airplanes. For example flying in/out of an airfield not contained in the database is a non-event in most airplanes - not so with the bus where some reading is required before you do it.pelmet wrote:Based on the large number of aircraft that have landed on wrong runways, taxiways, and even the wrong airports over the years, you might want to re-evaluate that idea that no one would think to use the ILS as a back-up. It was one of the first things I thought of when I heard about this incident.Rockie wrote: Although it is not something we normally do it is possible to manually enter an ILS frequency/course and display it when flying some other type of procedure.
The FMS Bridge Visual is coded in the database, but since it is a visual approach flown only in VFR conditions identifying the runway is not something that should be a problem so no one would think to manually enter the ILS as a backup. Perhaps that's something that could be considered in the future but that involves other considerations than just the obvious ones and is way above my pay grade.
There are too many illusions and possibilities for misidentification as we see over and over again. When the system being used is not accurate enough to guarantlee alignment of the aircraft with the runway, manually tuning an available ILS as a backup, if reasonably easy to do, is an obvious simple thing to do if it does not cause interference with other required indications, especially at night.
One shouldn't need to wait for others to consider it in the future when we have the tools to do certain thing ourselves in the present.
Even seemingly obvious things need to be carefully thought out on the bus. That particular backup just isn't a regular part of the Airbus routine, but perhaps now it will be looked at among other mitigation strategies.
Rockie wrote: ↑Mon Jul 24, 2017 6:06 pm As I've explained, you can display it but it isn't a normal Airbus procedure when there is another non-localizer approach selected in the MCDU nor are crews trained to. Perhaps it could become a normal procedure but with this airplane it's not as simple as just deciding to do so. Few things with this airplane are if you're talking about deviating from Airbus operating procedures. You'll just have to take my word for it.
Rockie wrote: ↑Mon Jul 24, 2017 4:51 pmExplained on page 3 of this thread. It's not as simple as you imagine on a bus not least because it isn't part of the operating philosophy of the airplane. Not an easy thing to ignore and overcome just because you think it's a good idea. Which it is, and no, you're not the first person to think of it either.rookiepilot wrote:Assuming this is correct -- of course anything critical could be "fake news".flyer 1492 wrote:Today in the WSJ, they reported that the crew did not have the ILS tuned for runway 28R.
Someone please give me a reason why NOT doing this somehow enhances the safety of the approach.
Maybe it's Airbus's fault?
Sorry for the multiple posts guys. I am just trying to get more info out here and clear things up. I was told that it is difficult to enter the ILS during this approach as a backup but....Maybe another Airbus pilot can clarify.
From the NTSB interview of the F/O....
"Normally, if it was an ILS approach, they’d select the ILS pushbutton at 10000 feet. If the bridge visual is loaded, they would put in the ILS frequency as a backup into the RADNAV page. It would have shown on his display as a pink triangle. With the localizer, it would have been deflected to the left when on the incident approach. He was pretty sure if the RADNAV is tuned, both should show up on the display. He thinks that if it was armed, the FD would try and follow the ILS."
You can see the view that the pilots had on final on the last two pages have pictures of the view they saw on final....
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61499 ... 614632.pdf
Last edited by pelmet on Tue Oct 09, 2018 10:56 pm, edited 2 times in total.
-
Gilles Hudicourt
- Rank 10
- Posts: 2227
- Joined: Thu Mar 22, 2012 5:51 am
- Location: YUL
Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?
The FMS auto tunes the appropriate ILS frequency when an ILS or LOC approach is selected in the FMS. When another approach is selected in the FMS for the same runway (VOR, RNAV) the ILS is not automatically tuned and pilots are not in the habit of manually tuning the frequency in such cases, although it is possible.
Normally tough, when an aircraft is cleared for a Non Precision approach at a runway usually served by an ILS, it is because the ILS is not available........
I do not recall ever manually tuning an ILS in such a case....
Normally tough, when an aircraft is cleared for a Non Precision approach at a runway usually served by an ILS, it is because the ILS is not available........
I do not recall ever manually tuning an ILS in such a case....
Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?
Thanks for the info Gilles.Gilles Hudicourt wrote: ↑Tue Oct 09, 2018 3:53 pm The FMS auto tunes the appropriate ILS frequency when an ILS or LOC approach is selected in the FMS. When another approach is selected in the FMS for the same runway (VOR, RNAV) the ILS is not automatically tuned and pilots are not in the habit of manually tuning the frequency in such cases, although it is possible.
Normally tough, when an aircraft is cleared for a Non Precision approach at a runway usually served by an ILS, it is because the ILS is not available........
I do not recall ever manually tuning an ILS in such a case....
I am reading another document from the docket which are notes taken by the NTSB during an interview of Captain Eddy Doyle, Vice President of Flight Operations. The notes appear to be what the investigators have written down based on the responses from the VP.
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61499 ... 614633.pdf
It says on page 12 0f 72..."The localizer was to be tuned for the FMS Bridge Visual approach. Would expect at some point to line up on heading 281 at a few hundred feet."
On page 14 of 72, a training captain that was interviewed who has been an Approved Check Pilot on the A320 check pilot for 5 years stated...."With the bridge visual, you could put the ILS frequency in as a backup; have it hard-tuned. He believes that the ILS comes up automatically. After you cross the bridge, you would disconnect the autopilot and hand fly the aircraft. The PM would be doing other things such as setting the missed approach altitude and turning off the flight director. With regards to putting the ILS in as backup, he said that it is encouraged but he doesn’t know if it was a hard-fast rule. He doesn’t recall if it was written anywhere, but believes that almost everyone does use the ILS as a backup."
Further down a different check captain states...."He could not recall ever going into SFO without backup navigation when on a visual approach. He referred to page 2 of the approach. He stated that they would generally set up the ILS frequency as a backup to the visual. He interpreted the verbiage on the approach plate as saying that tuning in the ILS is optional. He does use navigational aids on visual approaches because it’s easy to land at the wrong airport and that has happened before. He did not believe there was a requirement at Air Canada to use navigation aid backup to visual approaches, but thinks there was something in the FOM previously."
A third check airman interviewed stated...."The notes for the airport advise you to hard tune the ILS frequency. He considers this a requirement. He would press the ILS push button to get the information on his PFD and would use the information more for high/low information than for localizer. He would definitely tune in the ILS for this approach(Page 23 of 72).
There is something strange between what I am being told on this forum(in response to my suggestion to tune the ILS as a backup) and what I am reading from interviews with check airmen on type.
Also...."He was asked to walk through the FMS Bridge Visual into SFO." "Pressing the ILS push button is on the in-range checklist so they would have done that about 10000 feet and 30 miles out."
A 4th ACP says on page 31 of 72..."When asked if there are any quirks with ILS on A320, he responded nothing other than the NAV accuracy downgrade at between 5 and 1 mile back...…..In terms of presentation and performance, it works well."
ACP #5 says "He would backup the FMS bridge visual approach by tuning the ILS with raw data. It is a good suggestion but he didn’t interpret that it was mandatory to tune in the ILS as a backup during this approach into SFO. When asked if it is a requirement or suggestion, he would say a good suggestion, though he’s sure that there is lots of debate on that right now (after incident). He can’t recall if it is mandatory."
Check Airman #6 says...."He would tune in the ILS. When reading the approach chart, he said that it was a requirement as the notes do not say “recommend tune in ILS.” All of the other items on the page are required, why wouldn’t this one be."
Looks like a little investigation by myself has found the answer to all this....The Assistant Chief Pilot of A320's in AC says.....
"She has flown into SFO before and flown the FMS Bridge Visual approach. She said the ILS pushbutton could be selected at any time when the crew was setting up for the approach. If she was the pilot flying (PF) she would press that button around 10,000 feet while they go through the approach set up. She would not expect all crews to push it at 10,000 feet, but would expect it to be pushed by the time they would be turning final. There is no harm done by pressing the ILS button early."
A simple pushbutton, yet I was told that it is extremely difficult to back up this approach in the Airbus with the ILS. I believe a manual tuning as well. Full details would be nice but it sure is a good example of how one really needs to go digging for info sometimes to get more accurate information.
-
Eric Janson
- Rank (9)
- Posts: 1248
- Joined: Thu Feb 08, 2007 10:44 am
Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?
Ok let me give this a try:-
There is an LS pushbutton - this will display the LOC and G/S on the PFD if the ILS has been tuned in the RAD NAV page.
The other button is the APP pushbutton. This will allow a non precision approach to be flown like an ILS using FINAL APP mode.
The APP button is also used on an ILS approach. When an ILS approach has been selected the APP button will arm LOC and G/S modes.
The problems start when you have both selected - a non precision approach and an ILS. Pressing the APP button will generate a number of messages including (from memory) an amber flashing VDEV message on the PFD.
The easiest work around is to fly a selected non precision approach in TRK FPA mode or a "mixed" approach in NAV FPA mode. Now you can select the ILS when needed without all kinds of strange things happening - but you'll need to fly the ILS 'Raw Data".
A second option would be to have the ILS approach in the secondary flightplan and activate this at some point. This does require the PNF to stop monitoring the approach while this takes place. It wouldn't be my choice to do this unless this was done early in the approach.
We are allowed to fly non precision approaches 3 different ways at my Airline but some Airlines want every non precision approach flown the same way.
I don't know anything about Air Canada SOPs or how they fly non precision approaches.
There is an LS pushbutton - this will display the LOC and G/S on the PFD if the ILS has been tuned in the RAD NAV page.
The other button is the APP pushbutton. This will allow a non precision approach to be flown like an ILS using FINAL APP mode.
The APP button is also used on an ILS approach. When an ILS approach has been selected the APP button will arm LOC and G/S modes.
The problems start when you have both selected - a non precision approach and an ILS. Pressing the APP button will generate a number of messages including (from memory) an amber flashing VDEV message on the PFD.
The easiest work around is to fly a selected non precision approach in TRK FPA mode or a "mixed" approach in NAV FPA mode. Now you can select the ILS when needed without all kinds of strange things happening - but you'll need to fly the ILS 'Raw Data".
A second option would be to have the ILS approach in the secondary flightplan and activate this at some point. This does require the PNF to stop monitoring the approach while this takes place. It wouldn't be my choice to do this unless this was done early in the approach.
We are allowed to fly non precision approaches 3 different ways at my Airline but some Airlines want every non precision approach flown the same way.
I don't know anything about Air Canada SOPs or how they fly non precision approaches.
Always fly a stable approach - it's the only stability you'll find in this business
Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?
Deleted
Last edited by C.W.E. on Sun Oct 14, 2018 2:57 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?
Thanks for the info Eric. It is valuable. It might coordinate with this statement from a previous post...Eric Janson wrote: ↑Sun Oct 14, 2018 6:43 am Ok let me give this a try:-
There is an LS pushbutton - this will display the LOC and G/S on the PFD if the ILS has been tuned in the RAD NAV page.
The other button is the APP pushbutton. This will allow a non precision approach to be flown like an ILS using FINAL APP mode.
The APP button is also used on an ILS approach. When an ILS approach has been selected the APP button will arm LOC and G/S modes.
The problems start when you have both selected - a non precision approach and an ILS. Pressing the APP button will generate a number of messages including (from memory) an amber flashing VDEV message on the PFD.
The easiest work around is to fly a selected non precision approach in TRK FPA mode or a "mixed" approach in NAV FPA mode. Now you can select the ILS when needed without all kinds of strange things happening - but you'll need to fly the ILS 'Raw Data".
A second option would be to have the ILS approach in the secondary flightplan and activate this at some point. This does require the PNF to stop monitoring the approach while this takes place. It wouldn't be my choice to do this unless this was done early in the approach.
We are allowed to fly non precision approaches 3 different ways at my Airline but some Airlines want every non precision approach flown the same way.
I don't know anything about Air Canada SOPs or how they fly non precision approaches.
On the notam front, there was talk at the NTSB hearing, which was reported in the news about the difficulty of finding the significant notams as they can be buried in among other useless notam information. That being said, some of the documentation in the NTSB docket makes it sound like at least one crew member was aware of the runway closure prior to departure. Then again, the ATIS mentioned this fact and one should read through/listen to the entire ATIS, difficult as it can be sometimes. Some major airports can have excessively long ATIS info while others are pleasently short. I have found myself on occasion glossing over this information even though I am not short of time which is a bad habit. Read/listen to the entire ATIS whenever possible, at least for the initial one that you get. Lack of time may prevent you from doing so later on.
However, I think the key in this incident is whether the crew were aware of the approach light system(ALS) for 28L being out of service. I would suggest that they were not, otherwise, why would they line up parallel to it and offset to the right. The only logical explanation is that in the mind of the captain(who was flying the aircraft), the ALS for 28L was on. At this point, I do not know if it was in the ATIS. However, it was in the notams provided to the crew. One can easily gloss over extensive notam info as well although a long flight certainly give one opprtunity for a review. I do that for taxiways sometimes but as can be seen here, if a visual is expected with no backup navaids to be used, other info can be crucial.
It is interesting to see in the link below, AC(or their provider) had done something helpful in that they have grouped the notams by various subjects which appears to be quite handy. There is a runway section which shows the runway closure time and mentions that the ALS for 28L would be out of service.
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61499 ... 614636.pdf
I haven't watched the video of the hearing where something about the notams or perhaps the system was described as "garbage" and there can be some merit for this, but it is what it is right now and one needs to sort through the garbage and find critical info. I went through the SFO notams for that night and it was a bit extensive but not nearly as bad as one can see in some countries where I have a feeling that the notam system is a job creating bureaucracy. One could search the internet and look at India or Thailand and find much more in the way of notams, many of which are totally useless. Even the multi-page US security notam that appears sometimes is huge. Does one really care about the air excercises, aeriel photgraphy, new terminal areas with coordinates, and on and on such as multiple crane and antenna notams. They can be quickly passed over of course.
Just looking at FIR notams in Canada for a VFR flight can be extensive. Thirty or forty might pop up and I find myself saying 'airway, airway, airway, antenna, airway, prison, antenna, etc' as I quickly go through them, just reading the first few words in each one. But then an important one can pop up about an airspace closure. But that is the reality we have to deal with keeping in mind that the notams that are useless for one person may be useful for another person's operation.
Last edited by pelmet on Wed Oct 17, 2018 11:55 pm, edited 3 times in total.
Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?
It was recently mentioned to me that NorCal ATC Ops requires lighting for both 28 runways to be active to run the Bridge Visual Approach program at night.
If so, I don't know why that didn't come up. Maybe it's not true, I don't know where one would find that info relevant ATC procedures.
If so, I don't know why that didn't come up. Maybe it's not true, I don't know where one would find that info relevant ATC procedures.
Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?
Lots of talk about having ILS tuned in the rad nav as a back up, (which I think is a very good idea BTW) but I haven’t seen any explanation as to why the approach in use was the bridge visual. Why were they not using the ILS? The approach is over water so I can’t see any noise abatement issues. 28L was closed so there were no parallel approach separation issues. Why make pilots do an offset visual approach late at night when you have a perfectly good straight in approach available? I’ve flown the bridge visual many times and can see how confusing it could be in this situation. Not excusing the pilots loss of SA but why were they put into that position to start with?
Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?
I found the ATIS info on the last page of the posted document that contains ACARS info. They downloaded three ATIS messages, one before departure and two when getting close to SFO. All three ATIS broadcasts mentioned that the ALS for 28L was out of service.
It is easy to see what could have happened. First received ATIS is quickly reviewed to see good weather with a strong wind out of the west and 28L/R in use. Later on, one can quickly look through the ATIS and see 28L closed but miss that the 28L ALS is out of service or maybe not even realize that 28L is closed(although I believe that the crew said they were aware of this). This combined with the associated notam not being seen or understood thoroughly can lead to one assuming for some reason that the illuminated approach lights are for 28L. Although in that case, one might want to ask the tower why the approach lights are not on for 28R(despite the fact that someone else who seems to have now disappeared from the forum stating that he would never do such a thing). Unfortunately, neither did this crew. If they had, the tower might have said that the ALS was illuminated for 28R and resolved the misconception.
It just shows how important it can be to thoroughly read the full ATIS and perhaps review the notams again when time permits, perhaps an hour or so before landing.
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61499 ... 614637.pdf
-
Eric Janson
- Rank (9)
- Posts: 1248
- Joined: Thu Feb 08, 2007 10:44 am
Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?
Nobody is making Pilots do anything imho - up to you as Captain to accept or reject any ATC Clearance. That's why you get paid the big $$bcflyer wrote: ↑Thu Oct 18, 2018 9:35 am Why make pilots do an offset visual approach late at night when you have a perfectly good straight in approach available? I’ve flown the bridge visual many times and can see how confusing it could be in this situation. Not excusing the pilots loss of SA but why were they put into that position to start with?
!A lot of people seem to forget that - I've rejected Clearances in the past. It doesn't happen very often - a testament to just how well the ATC system works.
Regarding NOTAM info:-
My flight a few days ago had 23 pages of Origin/Destination/Alternate/Enroute Alternate weather and NOTAM info. Then an additional 67 pages of FIR NOTAMS - I have no idea where any of the restricted areas are - we are flying 1/4 of the way around the World.
Quite easy to miss something important imho. I understand there will be a graphical depiction of NOTAMS as part of Jeppesen FD Pro - long overdue.
Always fly a stable approach - it's the only stability you'll find in this business
Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?
Cool, it can already can show NAT routes and PACOTS tracks(which change daily) as well.Eric Janson wrote: ↑Fri Oct 19, 2018 1:27 am I understand there will be a graphical depiction of NOTAMS as part of Jeppesen FD Pro - long overdue.
Noise abatement to prevent overflight of the city shoreline. To quote....bcflyer wrote: ↑Thu Oct 18, 2018 9:35 am …. I haven’t seen any explanation as to why the approach in use was the bridge visual. Why were they not using the ILS? The approach is over water so I can’t see any noise abatement issues. 28L was closed so there were no parallel approach separation issues. Why make pilots do an offset visual approach late at night when you have a perfectly good straight in approach available? I’ve flown the bridge visual many times and can see how confusing it could be in this situation. Not excusing the pilots loss of SA but why were they put into that position to start with?
"For arrivals landing on Runways 28L/R, under Visual Meteorological Conditions, they ask flight crews to request the Quiet Bridge Visual or FMS Bridge Approach for Runway 28R. This approach keeps aircraft over the bay and away from Foster City, a noise sensitive community located adjacent to the San Mateo Bridge."
Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?
And yet they run straight in visuals to 28L all day long which is even closer to Foster City than the straight in to 28R would be.
Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?
The airport is very busy during the day and they have no choice. People tend to be more noise sensitive at night which is why the noise abatement approach is done. Not sure what is difficult to understand. I agree in the dislike of noise abatement approaches in general. But it is pretty simple to see why they have it.
Eric Janson wrote: ↑Sun Oct 14, 2018 6:43 am
The APP button is also used on an ILS approach. When an ILS approach has been selected the APP button will arm LOC and G/S modes.
The problems start when you have both selected - a non precision approach and an ILS. Pressing the APP button will generate a number of messages including (from memory) an amber flashing VDEV message on the PFD.
I found some further info on this with at least some(if not all) of the info that is provided to AC pilots on this subject. Perhaps there are more complications but this alone doesn't seem too bad....I wonder if it can vary by Airbus type or even fin number.
"If the flight crew inserts a non-ILS approach into the flight plan, and then uses the RAD NAV page to tune an ILS manually, the MCDU displays "CHECK APPR SELECTION•. This message is a reminder that the available APPR guidance modes are APP NAV and FINAL."
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61499 ... 614670.pdf
Last edited by pelmet on Fri Oct 19, 2018 3:50 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?
Looks like there was a similar in some ways incident this past summer. Little detail is given.
https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/Repor ... m&IType=IA
http://aviationweek.com/business-aviati ... 279f96b896
"The NTSB has issued a preliminary report on its investigation of a near miss involving a Gulfstream IV charter flight at Philadelphia International Airport.
The aircraft was operated by Pegasus Elite Aviation as PEGJET Flight 19. Four passengers and three crewmembers were on board and were not injured. The aircraft was not damaged, the NTSB said.
The flight, which occurred Aug. 10, was on visual approach and cleared to land on Runway 35 about 8:50 p.m. But during the approach, the aircraft aligned with Taxiway E. When about one-tenth of a mile from the end of the taxiway, the pilot initiated a go-around.
Four air carrier passenger jets were on Taxiway E. Estimates indicate the PEGJET flight overflew the first jet, an Embraer ERJ 145, by about 200 ft. and then overflew an Embraer 175, a Canadair CRJ700 and another Embraer ERJ 145, the NTSB said.
The FAA reported the incident to the NTSB on Aug. 11. The cockpit recorder had already been overwritten, the NTSB said. The flight data recorder was removed from the aircraft and sent to the NTSB laboratory for analysis. The preliminary report does not contain analysis or other findings."
https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/Repor ... m&IType=IA
http://aviationweek.com/business-aviati ... 279f96b896
"The NTSB has issued a preliminary report on its investigation of a near miss involving a Gulfstream IV charter flight at Philadelphia International Airport.
The aircraft was operated by Pegasus Elite Aviation as PEGJET Flight 19. Four passengers and three crewmembers were on board and were not injured. The aircraft was not damaged, the NTSB said.
The flight, which occurred Aug. 10, was on visual approach and cleared to land on Runway 35 about 8:50 p.m. But during the approach, the aircraft aligned with Taxiway E. When about one-tenth of a mile from the end of the taxiway, the pilot initiated a go-around.
Four air carrier passenger jets were on Taxiway E. Estimates indicate the PEGJET flight overflew the first jet, an Embraer ERJ 145, by about 200 ft. and then overflew an Embraer 175, a Canadair CRJ700 and another Embraer ERJ 145, the NTSB said.
The FAA reported the incident to the NTSB on Aug. 11. The cockpit recorder had already been overwritten, the NTSB said. The flight data recorder was removed from the aircraft and sent to the NTSB laboratory for analysis. The preliminary report does not contain analysis or other findings."
Re: AC Lining Up with a Taxiway SFO...?
The final report is out....
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61499 ... 619243.pdf
Here is the probable cause....
"The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this incident was the flight crew’s misidentification of taxiway C as the intended landing runway, which resulted from the crewmembers’ lack of awareness of the parallel runway closure due to their ineffective review of notice to airmen (NOTAM) information before the flight and during the approach briefing. Contributing to the incident were (1) the flight crew’s failure to tune the instrument landing system frequency for backup lateral guidance, expectation bias, fatigue due to circadian disruption and length of continued wakefulness, and breakdowns in crew resource management and (2) Air Canada’s ineffective presentation of approach procedure and NOTAM information."
I notice that the NTSB did not accept any of AC's attempts to place the blame on the controller instead of taking responsibility for an error made by their flight crew. The NTSB did put some blame on fatigue, something that happens to most pilots in the airline industry. It is inevitable at some point. If so afflicted, one might try to counter such an issue by using as much of the tools available as possible. In this case, tuning the ILS was a tool that was available. Something to consider on any visual approach to a runway that has an ILS, and especially at night.
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61499 ... 619243.pdf
Here is the probable cause....
"The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this incident was the flight crew’s misidentification of taxiway C as the intended landing runway, which resulted from the crewmembers’ lack of awareness of the parallel runway closure due to their ineffective review of notice to airmen (NOTAM) information before the flight and during the approach briefing. Contributing to the incident were (1) the flight crew’s failure to tune the instrument landing system frequency for backup lateral guidance, expectation bias, fatigue due to circadian disruption and length of continued wakefulness, and breakdowns in crew resource management and (2) Air Canada’s ineffective presentation of approach procedure and NOTAM information."
I notice that the NTSB did not accept any of AC's attempts to place the blame on the controller instead of taking responsibility for an error made by their flight crew. The NTSB did put some blame on fatigue, something that happens to most pilots in the airline industry. It is inevitable at some point. If so afflicted, one might try to counter such an issue by using as much of the tools available as possible. In this case, tuning the ILS was a tool that was available. Something to consider on any visual approach to a runway that has an ILS, and especially at night.
