Not sure what was rude in my post. Simply stating that's what good for the goose is good for the gander. As for the "troll" part, the vehemence of many of your posts could easily be construed as troll-like in that they appear to be strongly worded in a manner specifically designed to create an emotional response in others.
rookiepilot wrote: ↑Tue Jan 16, 2018 5:53 am
Yes, I've made tons of mistakes. None to my knowledge have cost any lives, so it's completely different.
None to your knowledge, but we know the Seneca going off the end of the runway didn't cost any lives either. Bad or negligent investment advice may not immediately cost lives, but being significantly impacted through investment losses certainly can result in lifestyle changes that are detrimental, perhaps significantly so, to whole families. Mental and physical health problems can certainly develop if the loss is significant enough. It's not the same direct link to death as an airplane crash, but everything people do affects others.
I just think that anyone as adamant as you are about the necessity for pilots to "fess up" publicly for the betterment of the aviation community should model the same behaviour within your own profession.
upnatem wrote: ↑Tue Jan 16, 2018 1:43 pm
Not sure what was rude in my post. Simply stating that's what good for the goose is good for the gander. As for the "troll" part, the vehemence of many of your posts could easily be construed as troll-like in that they appear to be strongly worded in a manner specifically designed to create an emotional response in others.
rookiepilot wrote: ↑Tue Jan 16, 2018 5:53 am
Yes, I've made tons of mistakes. None to my knowledge have cost any lives, so it's completely different.
None to your knowledge, but we know the Seneca going off the end of the runway didn't cost any lives either. Bad or negligent investment advice may not immediately cost lives, but being significantly impacted through investment losses certainly can result in lifestyle changes that are detrimental, perhaps significantly so, to whole families. Mental and physical health problems can certainly develop if the loss is significant enough. It's not the same direct link to death as an airplane crash, but everything people do affects others.
I just think that anyone as adamant as you are about the necessity for pilots to "fess up" publicly for the betterment of the aviation community should model the same behaviour within your own profession.
And if it was a mechanical defect that caused the overrun? Something the next student, or another school operating the PA 34 could learn from? Something that could have been fatal had they gotten off the ground? Be nice to know, wouldn't it? Anyway....
Cause you asked so nicely, let me help out:
I'll repeat some investment advice I've heard. Not mine, necessarily.
Put your all dough in Bitcoin. Or Litecoin, Ripple, or another. Or Pot stocks, perhaps at the same time as toking. That way supporting your investment!
All Seems to be the most popular theme -- from what I hear. So must be the right move --
rookiepilot wrote: ↑Tue Jan 16, 2018 2:18 pm
And if it was a mechanical defect that caused the overrun? Something the next student, or another school operating the PA 34 could learn from? Something that could have been fatal had they gotten off the ground? Be nice to know, wouldn't it?
You'll find out as soon as the TSB concludes its investigation/discussion with the operator - that'd be Montair. The information will then be forwarded to TC, who will update the original CADORS with the "final" report.
As for the threat of litigation, that's laughable. An international student "driving" a Seneca down the runway, with an instructor on board, managed to botch an RTO. Who's the student going to sue, themselves?
M..., would just as soon pretend nothing happened, hide the airplane in a hangar until everything's been buffed out and she's back online, but they're not getting the opportunity because it's hard to hide a twin in the green green grass, of home.
I've never fished for anything here .. or trolled (whatever that means), at least not intentionally.
There's a lingering question (after doing the forensic weather check), seeing that Towering Cumulus were building/passing-by there:
How close would they have to be (and which direction) so that any of their inflow/outflow turbulence might produce that description in the Cadors?
(ie: It's possible IMO the pilots aren't even sure "what happened")
How about airborne ? (An airborne example to look at: July 4 / 2013 TSB investigation at Griffiths Island A13O0125, a fatal 182 accident on approach 1000ft SE of rwy 27 threshold ... "remnants of the towering cumulus could be seen just east of the island at the time of the accident".)
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EDIT (7ECA):
These clouds seem to be in early formation so maybe not yet developed visually if drier updrafts. What's the minimum alt of the developing TCu ? How is the giant LO northeast influencing their strength ? ie How low are the effects of the developing activity .. and are they always as observeable to controller ... student ... or instructor ?
FYI Shortbus that was just a slang for actual surface analysis .. back-checking for an occurrance timing .. after-the-fact. An up to date surface analysis for the precise time rarely exists unless the issued one happens to coincide.
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Last edited by pdw on Sun Jan 21, 2018 5:43 pm, edited 6 times in total.
(An airborne example to look at: July 4 / 2013 TSB investigation at Griffiths Island A13O0125, a fatal 182 accident on approach 1000ft SE of rwy 27 threshold ... "remnants of the towering cumulus could be seen just east of the island at the time of the accident".)
Well... Having flown that 182, and a number of other 18x amphibs, and, having flown in and out of Griffith Island many times, I have great certainty that remnants of towering cumulus had nothing to do with the cause of that accident. A low experience for type pilot flying a close to gross plane would have been a major factor in that accident.
As for Pitt Meadows, though I have never flown a Seneca from that airport, I have flown a number of other types from there. The controllers are excellent, and very attuned to training flights. If a pilot is cleared to takeoff at Pitt Meadows, the atmospheric conditions will be safe for the takeoff. Any slight variation in wind which could exist, would be entirely within the capability of a competent pilot - even a student.
If a pilot is foolish enough to attempt a takeoff or landing close to a developing thunderstorm, they are asking for trouble, and their training should make that obvious to them. Otherwise, certified aircraft have enough control available for a competent pilot to maintain safe flight. Mysterious atmospheric conditions are no excuse for loosing control of an aircraft.
We often get TCUs in the Lower Mainland, especially near the mountains. Do they produce thunderstorms? Rarely.
This incident occurred on a lovely VFR afternoon, weather did not play a role - and it doesn't matter how anyone or any company tries to play the WX card, it did not contribute. Period. Full stop.
(second plane .. rotation tried at 25sec .. windsock at 49sec .. flap setting ?)
EDIT:
There is one very clear photo of this plane attempting rotation abeam the windsock on AV HERALD.
HiFlyChick the Cadors at the beginning of this thread clearly states 'wouldn't rotate when rotation speed reached' as the reason for the student's/pilot's RTO, so just posted it for the visual of 'struggling to rotate' and any reasoning presented (ie: in the news, by the company).
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Last edited by pdw on Tue Jan 23, 2018 5:44 pm, edited 3 times in total.
Ummmm.... I see a very light wind that is mostly crosswind, and to tell the truth, I can't for the life of me figure out the point that you're trying to make with that video...
Someone mentioned that the pilots may not actually know what happened themselves, and at the speed that things go wrong, that could very well be true. Not because they are trying to be evasive, but just because it's only in hindsight that they would start thinking "At that precise moment, what was I doing?" Up until everything went wrong, they didn't realize that they would be analyzing each and every second up to that point and most of it would be immediately forgotten until "routine" became terribly "not routine"
Someone mentioned that the pilots may not actually know what happened themselves, and at the speed that things go wrong, that could very well be true. Not because they are trying to be evasive, but just because it's only in hindsight that they would start thinking "At that precise moment, what was I doing?" Up until everything went wrong, they didn't realize that they would be analyzing each and every second up to that point and most of it would be immediately forgotten until "routine" became terribly "not routine"
Interesting opinion.
If that is what aviation has come down to I think I'll drive or walk.
Someone mentioned that the pilots may not actually know what happened themselves, and at the speed that things go wrong, that could very well be true. Not because they are trying to be evasive, but just because it's only in hindsight that they would start thinking "At that precise moment, what was I doing?" Up until everything went wrong, they didn't realize that they would be analyzing each and every second up to that point and most of it would be immediately forgotten until "routine" became terribly "not routine"
Interesting opinion.
If that is what aviation has come down to I think I'll drive or walk.
Really? If I asked you every single action you made in every second for a 2 minute or less period when at the time of each and every second you didn't know it would be crucial to remember, could you accurately say the reading on every dial and all external outputs. A simple example is that if I'm super rushed in the morning and taking phone calls and e-mails and trying to get out of the house and now I can't find my keys, I might get in my car and say to myself, "I brushed my teeth, didn't I? I mean, I must have because I always do..." Some actions are just so second nature that it's possible to not know if you actually remember or just think you do. And now, in out example, imagine that after you left the house it caught fire and somehow those simple everyday actions are crucial to remember, even though at the time they were same-old, same-old do-them-routinely-every-day....
HiFlyChick wrote: ↑Tue Jan 23, 2018 3:06 pm Someone mentioned that the pilots may not actually know what happened themselves, and at the speed that things go wrong, that could very well be true.
I believe it's possible. Seeing a student has immediate control (permitted the grip on power levers) might RTO sooner in a snap decision for a peculiar airspeed/stability interruption on the runway (ie "at the speed that things go wrong") if completely unexpected in "lovely VFR". Looked like that event is located still inside that intense LO system (eye to the northeast) but in the warm sector. BIN OVC ? (Hey lets go flying .. it's clearing up!)
I posted the video as example of the description in the CADORS first page of this thread, but where a 'struggle to rotate' doesn't trigger an RTO decision .. where SOME turbulence off 07 was expected from the first plane (opening footage of the video). The 050V110 at 3:20pm or the 020V190 for 3:50pm (Frankfurt Metars Jul23/2016) would have also been copied before this takeoff recorded at 4pm. Noting the flap setting there ... is abscent ?
EDIT:
PilotDar (below):
In the developing TCu (bottoms down to 1000ft) invisible TCu-turbulence would have been possible even if heavier cloud not yet as visible. There's evidence of brief daytime heating of drier air south/southwest of Pitt M around 2pm (developing TCu moving NE rapidly after that time). Agreed, once the TCu have grown into full blown CB's they'd be hard to miss ...
Not so much "an attempt to blame the weather", simply calling it from weather history. Still can't be certain what the rotation issue (cause of this "CADORS" observation) was until admitted/confirmed what it was or wasn't.
The video example of the 747 (advanced experience) shows LIFToff plans not thrown off by an invisible anomaly on the runway even though known 07 wake also carries downwind of 07-threshold unexpected, thereby cutting through it at the much higher speed than expected too (nearing/at V1). Would have expected wake bumps before reaching the extended centerline of 07 in slower groundspeedof the previous headwind (southbound from the north end of rwy18) but now also powering to a higher groundspeed in the tailwind rotation no flap (noflap config apparently intended for anticipated wake crossing ?). IMO just an example how final-narrative explanations can turn out to be so different from what the cause might appear to be prior to investigation.
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Last edited by pdw on Wed Jan 24, 2018 3:33 pm, edited 7 times in total.
Interesting video, though I don't see that it has much relevance to the accident being discussed here. Sure, takeoffs get rejected, and in the case of that video, it does appear that there could have been a configuration error, but 737's are not in my area of expertise.
But, if the pilot flying (any aircraft) is using indicated airspeed for their decision to rotate, and there is a change in surface wind, that's going to indicate on the ASI. Perhaps that might affect the pilot's decision to rotate. That said, in my 40 years of flying, I have never encountered a sudden or surprise wind shift toward being a tailwind, which affected my decision to takeoff, or the takeoff itself. I have certainly encountered variable winds, and had to apply extra skill and control, but it always worked, with an adequate reserve of safety.
Thus, I would be unwilling to accept a surprise wind change as an excuse for going off the end of a suitably long runway. If the pilot had attempted a takeoff with a thunderstorm looming a mile or two away, then sure, there could have been a horrendous change in winds. In that case, I'd ask the pilot what they were thinking, attempting takeoff in such conditions!
For my awareness of runway excursion accidents, where the runway was long enough ('cause, yes, sometimes pilots go off the end because it simply was not long enough), if there were two pilots, the excursion could be the result of cockpit confusion or delay resulting from a pilot discussion or disagreement, when simply picking an action, and doing it without delay would probably have been the better thing to do. Too many accidents happen because the pilots have differing ideas about what to do. With two acting pilots, there should always be a pilot briefing, and the briefed actions should be well within the capabilities of the pilot flying. If super skilled senior pilot/instructor briefs an emergency action that the pilot flying really can't manage well, there is a problem. The pilot [to be] flying should understand that briefed action, and state their concerns. Certainly for myself, there have been a number of time I regretted after the fact, not stating to the other [always more experienced than I) pilot, that I was not comfortable with the briefed plan. I did it, and it worked, but I should have spoken up sooner.
Pilots must develop their skill to fly the aircraft entirely within its capability, and during, and afterword, make good decisions about flying. Accidents will still happen, but an attempt to blame the weather, on a "nice" day, at a controlled, flight training airport, is, in my opinion, lame.
My comments are meant to address the simple fact that there are not that many unforeseen factors that could suddenly require a to late take off rejection and over run that wrecked that airplane HiFlyChick, the weather was not a factor, the runway was not a factor.
So that leaves mechanical failure or pilot error as the most likely cause in my opinion.
One does not have to remember every split second of any event to figure out what caused such an accident and to suggest so is not in my opinion relevant to fact finding in why this accident happened.
We may have developed our flying thought process from having learned our flying skills, thought patterns in different circumstances and times so neither of us can be completely correct in our opinions.
My opinion is the cause for this accident should not be all that difficult to determine without the pilots having to recall every split second of thoughts they went through.
C.W.E. wrote: ↑Wed Jan 24, 2018 10:45 am
...
I trust this answers your " Really " comment.
Thanks for the clarification, CWE - I think we were comparing apples and oranges - or it may be another case of I haven't had enough coffee yet today.
In the discussion of the pilots not really even knowing what had happened, I meant more like the sequence of events that snowballed and could be hard to recall, as opposed to the overall cause. It's like the old swiss cheese model - there was stuff leading up to the event and a point at which things started to go wrong, and sometimes if you can quickly enough react to the "something's wrong", you can stop the sequence (i.e. best solution probably was abort the take-off). They may be able to point to why the accident occurred (be it tailwind, not developing enough power, whatever), and even to their thinking at the time as to why they didn't abort immediately, but with things happening at the speed that they do on the take-off, they may not even know themselves why they took the ground run so far past the abort point that it was no longer possible. That seemed to be a pretty long runway for a light twin, and one would think that there would've been not just a single point at which to abort the take-off, but an actual period of time when it could have been done. Were they shoving power at that time, retracting flaps, looking at the gauges? My point was that on those details they may be fuzzy themselves (the old "what was I thinking?" syndrome)
It is nice to be able to have polite professional discussions about things Hifly, there are far to many discussions on these forums where people talk past each other and start arguing just because they can.
By the way I am gender blind when it comes to aviation for the simple reason gender has no bearing on flying anything.
What I do expect is value for money spent when it comes to flying training and in the FTU school world in Canada that is not guaranteed due to the inertia in the system and lack of quality control from the regulator once they squeeze every penny out of the applicant they can get during the approval process.
It has been thus and will continue to be in Canada due to the lack of accountability to the tax payers that prevails in the upper management of TCCA.
But that is something that is truly a waste of time discussing in this thread.
Anyhow thanks for the comments and never push the levers up for take off until you have flown the profile in your mind and have decided what you will do if something starts to go wrong.
That will give you the best life insurance plan you can have and it is free.
2)HiFlyChick - I agree with what your saying. It is very difficult to remember the exact things that were done and the exact timing of them. And many accidents are the result of something where an action can be the right one but the timing incorrect which compromises a following action and the result is poor.
Looking back in any situation, aviation or not, is certainly not that accurate. Look at the trial system and the very frequent disagreement between eye witness testimony of any given event. Even nowadays with multiple videos there is often disagreement about what actually happened. It also makes the point that our current fascination with back-casting isn't always positive. It seems to be more a desire to lay blame and make people feel better about themselves than to actually learn and improve a process. Knowing the outcome of something that at the time of decision-making was not known gives a very different perception. Any situation where you've heaved a sigh of relief could just as easily turned out poorly and observers from the outside would be pointing and saying "What idiots,why on earth did they do such and such!"
It is very difficult to remember the exact things that were done and the exact timing of them.
Yup, I agree with this. The more experienced the pilot, the more they might notice, simply because they are not overwhelmed by the basics. But I'm here to say that as an experienced pilot, bad things can still happen in a blur!
