WestJet and Sunwing ground collision - YYZ

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Rockie
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Re: WestJet and Sunwing ground collision - YYZ

Post by Rockie »

“Remain seated” is not intended for the passengers, it is a trigger phrase for the cabin crew to prepare for a possible evacuation. You also do not discuss with passengers over the PA that there is a serious incident ongoing and you will decide in a few moments if they will need to evacuate.

Good decision by the crew to evacuate. Bad decision by the pax to take their stuff with them.
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Re: WestJet and Sunwing ground collision - YYZ

Post by 4Stroke »

RatherBeFlying wrote: Sat Jan 06, 2018 9:01 pm Then inform the passengers that evacuation will begin when the engines have been shut down. Keep the passengers in the information loop. The Sewol passengers were told to return to their cabins and wait for instructions. Unfortunately the capsize trapped some 300 victims.
Yes, after watching the multitude of iPhone clips blasted over the interwebs from passengers on that flight, lets have the captain say over the PA: "we are going to evacuate this aircraft, but if you would be so kind as to remain in your seats for 15 seconds......that'd be great....".

This crew did what they had to do, when they had to do it.

Everyone walked away.

The end.

4S.

:roll:
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Victory
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Re: WestJet and Sunwing ground collision - YYZ

Post by Victory »

You're right that the remain seated is a "trigger phrase", but not to prepare for an imminent evacuation, it's so the FA's don't order an evacuation on their own because they've heard no instruction from the cockpit (as they are trained to do in case of fire).
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Re: WestJet and Sunwing ground collision - YYZ

Post by RatherBeFlying »

What can happen in a delayed evacuation - PWA 501 YYC 1984

https://web.archive.org/web/20061104195 ... -200.pdf
1.15 Survival Aspects
Passengers who were on the left side of the aircraft near the
wing were almost immediately aware of the existence of fire. As
the aircraft slowed, several passengers left their seats, and, as
more became aware of the fire, a general level of agitation
developed. The number two flight attendant seated in the rear of
the aircraft heard a passenger yell "fire" within ten seconds of
the occurrence; the purser and number three flight attendant
both seated at the front of the aircraft, were aware of the fire
within twenty-five seconds of its occurrence.
In accordance with published procedures for a rejected take-off,
the three flight attendants remained in their seats awaiting
instruction from the captain. All assumed that, because the
aircraft continued to taxi, the captain was aware of the
situation and that it was under control. As the fire continued
to increase in size, the flight attendants attempted to contact
the flight crew. The number two flight attendant, seated in the
rear of the aircraft, attempted to notify the flight deck of the
fire by using the aircraft interphone system. Although the
signal tone was heard on the flight deck, it went unanswered
because the first officer mistook the tone for that associated
with the passenger flight attendant call button. The number two
flight attendant continued in his attempts to contact the flight
deck and also began to call the front cabin flight attendant
station. The purser attempted to enter the flight deck but was
unable to do so because the door was locked in accordance with
standard company procedures. The door was unlocked in response
to her knocks, and, about 45 seconds after the take-off was
rejected, she entered the flight deck and, after first asking if
they had blown a tire, informed the captain of a fire at the
back. In the meantime, the number three flight attendant made a
brief public address (PA) announcement for the passengers to
remain seated and calm. After having been informed by the
captain to prepare for an evacuation, the purser then returned to
the cabin. Upon returning, she answered the interphone and was
informed by the number two flight attendant that there was a fire
at the back and that the aircraft should be stopped. Throughout
this period, the aircraft continued to taxi slowly up C-4.
The purser then returned to the flight deck, advised the captain
of the deteriorating situation, and was again directed to prepare
for evacuation. The purser then left the flight deck and
directed the two flight attendants to prepare for evacuation.
When the aircraft stopped, the three flight attendants initiated
an evacuation by opening their doors and inflating the escape
slides .
There was no general announcement of the evacuation made by
either the captain or the flight attendants. Evacuation commands
were given to passengers as they exited the aircraft. The
passengers' decisions to leave their seats and evacuate were
based on their perceptions of the emergency situation and their
observations of the flight attendants opening the exits.
Passengers were at the doors awaiting the inflation of the escape
slides.
Four exits were used during the evacuation; these were as
follows: main entrance door (left front); galley service door

(right front); right over-wing exit; and right rear service door.
The main entrance door was opened by the number three flight
attendant and the galley service door by the purser. The right
over-wing exit was opened by the passenger seated next to it at
the urging of several passengers seated nearby. The first few
passengers out this exit reported that the escape slide at the
galley service door had not yet deployed when they exited the
aircraft. The right rear service door was opened by the number
two flight attendant.
Shortly after the evacuation commenced, fire melted windows along
the left side of the aircraft. When the windows melted through,
heat and smoke entered the aircraft, and the cabin environment
quickly deteriorated. Substantial quantities of smoke also
entered through the right over-wing exit and right rear service
door.
Conditions within the aircraft cabin were significantly worse in
the aft section. Heat was felt as the windows melted through.
Those passengers who had been seated beside the windows nearest
the fire experienced some singeing of hair and clothing. Smoke
obscured visibility almost totally during the latter stages of
the evacuation.
Passenger perceptions in the forward part of the cabin differed
markedly from those in the aft. It took much longer for them to
be aware of the existence of fire, and, even then, some did not
perceive the seriousness of the situation.
Most passengers chose the closest exit for evacuation. Many
stopped to retrieve handbaggage before they left. Those
passengers who exited through the main entrance door and galley
service door were seated primarily in rows one through seven.
Most initially chose to use the main entrance door until the
number three flight attendant began directing alternate
passengers to the galley service door. The passengers who exited
through the right over-wing exit were almost all seated in rows 8
through 16. With only a few exceptions, the rear exit was used
by all passengers seated aft of row 16.
The evacuation was without panic; however, a sense of urgency
prevailed. There was some pushing, and several people went over
seat backs to get to the exit ahead of others already in the
aisle. There was no noticeable yelling or screaming.
As the evacuation progressed, smoke began to thicken and obscure
vision. Smoke conditions were worse in the aft section of the
cabin. Passengers who exited via the rear exit reported that
they were unable to see the exit and were required to follow the
person ahead to locate it. By the time most had reached this
exit, the smoke had lowered to about knee height. The bottom
portion of the door and the slide were all that was visible. The

13 -
passenger who was the last one to exit via the over-wing exit
reported he had to drop to his knees to breathe fresh air before
he was able to reach the exit. Only when he neared the exit, did
it become visible through the smoke.
AI1 passengers who exited via the over-wing exit jumped off the
leading edge of the wing. The vertical drop from the wing to the
ground is in excess of six feet, and this distance increases as
one moves outward from the wing root. Smoke and flames near the
trailing edge influenced the passengers to go forward after they
bad left the aircraft. Most jumped down from the wing inboard of
the engine, although several proceeded out the wing before
dropping to the ground.
The rear slide was observed to deflate, because of fire damage,
immediately after the number two flight attendant exited the
aircraft . A precise determination of the time taken to evacuate the
aircraft could not be made; however, it is estimated that the
evacuation took between two and three minutes . Four passengers sustained serious injuries during the evacuation.
All four exited the aircraft via the right over-wing exit. Three
of these passengers sustained bone fractures of varying severity
when they jumped to the ground from the leading edge of the wing.
The fourth passenger, who was apparently the last person to exit
the aircraft, sustained pelvis and rib fractures when he fell to
the ground, after slipping on foam on the wing.
Mumerous other passengers sustained minor bruises, cuts,
abrasions, and sprains during the evacuation. Some singeing of
hair and mild blushing of the skin from heat were also reported.
Blood samples were taken from the 29 passengers who reported to
hospital. Carbon monoxide levels were minimal when measured, and
there were no reports of other toxic substances.
Following the evacuation, the passengers and crew gathered in
groups a short distance from the aircraft and observed the fire-
fighting activities.
were helped away from the aircraft by other passengers and cabin
crew. Some passengers had to be told to move away from the
aircraft and fire.
but it was not started until after some passengers had begun to
wander away from the scene. After a while, a few passengers
began to disperse and make their own way back to the terminal.
Later, taxi cabs were dispatched to transport the remaining
passengers back to the terminal building.
Those passengers who required assistance
A head count was attempted by the cabin crew,
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Eric Janson
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Re: WestJet and Sunwing ground collision - YYZ

Post by Eric Janson »

A similar event to PWA 501 - but with a very different outcome.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_A ... Flight_28M

Can't believe we have people on here second-guessing a decision to evacuate.
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Re: WestJet and Sunwing ground collision - YYZ

Post by plhought »

I think people are mis-interpreting what people are saying.

No one (in the posts I read) is second-guessing the reason/eventual evacuation.

There's little doubt an evacuation was eventually ordered.

The question is wether a mass gaggle of passengers had basically begun the evacuation before the cabin crew had begun it themselves; or,
an FA/Passenger had opened the door and begun the evacuation which eventually led to the cockpit/cabin crew commanding/beginning the evacuation-proper.
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Rockie
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Re: WestJet and Sunwing ground collision - YYZ

Post by Rockie »

Victory wrote: Sat Jan 06, 2018 10:19 pm You're right that the remain seated is a "trigger phrase", but not to prepare for an imminent evacuation, it's so the FA's don't order an evacuation on their own because they've heard no instruction from the cockpit (as they are trained to do in case of fire).
Incorrect. In an emergency where the cabin crew have been briefed the phrase means “get ready”. When they have no prior knowledge as in this case it informs them there is a serious incident unfolding, and upon hearing that phrase they are to begin certain actions in preparation for a possible evacuation including a silent review of their shouted commands.

In all cases if a cabin crew feels an evacuation is immediately essential and they cannot contact the flight crew, and there is no direction forthcoming from them in a reasonable period of time, then they can order it themselves.

“Remain seated” doesn’t mean wait, it means get ready.
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Re: WestJet and Sunwing ground collision - YYZ

Post by Victory »

Incorrect. It's industry standard to say remain seated after a rejected takeoff, for example, and that fits none of the criteria you mentioned.
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altiplano
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Re: WestJet and Sunwing ground collision - YYZ

Post by altiplano »

I understand numerous people in shorts and flip flops evacuating at -20°...

Certainly a good reminder to wear clothing at least semi-appropriate to your route of flight and destination. Shoes and pants at least...
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Re: WestJet and Sunwing ground collision - YYZ

Post by altiplano »

Victory wrote: Sun Jan 07, 2018 9:17 am Incorrect. It's industry standard to say remain seated after a rejected takeoff, for example, and that fits none of the criteria you mentioned.
I don't think he's incorrect at all.

Also, is it industry standard?

Common, maybe. But I don't think "standard."

At my airline we say it for pretty much any ground incident, and after assessment/recalls/checklist as appropriate it is followed by either calling the back or ordering an evacuation if they haven't previously been briefed on the expectation.
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Rockie
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Re: WestJet and Sunwing ground collision - YYZ

Post by Rockie »

Victory wrote: Sun Jan 07, 2018 9:17 am Incorrect. It's industry standard to say remain seated after a rejected takeoff, for example, and that fits none of the criteria you mentioned.
It fits all of my criteria - it tells them to be ready in case of a decision to evacuate. If an evacuation is deemed unnecessary following the “remain seated” call a plain language PA to the back explaining what the next actions will be is made to defuse the situation and stand them down.

We don’t ever tell the FA’s not to evacuate just like we never tell them what doors not to evacuate out of. They make that determination on their own based on what they see. Is it SOP at your company for FA’s to automatically evacuate after a rejected takeoff unless told not to?
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Re: WestJet and Sunwing ground collision - YYZ

Post by altiplano »

Mapleflt wrote: Sun Jan 07, 2018 10:24 am The FA's are responsible for the safety of the passengers, collaboration is of course preferred. With the advent of looked cockpit doors if the cabin crew feels it necessary to "elevate" the response I as the captain will both support and assist in any way possible.
You got the cart before the horse here.

The Pilots are responsible for the safety of the ship and passengers and the flight attendants are there to assist them.
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rudder
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Re: WestJet and Sunwing ground collision - YYZ

Post by rudder »

Victory wrote: Sun Jan 07, 2018 9:17 am Incorrect. It's industry standard to say remain seated after a rejected takeoff, for example, and that fits none of the criteria you mentioned.
There is no “industry standard”. There are just local company procedures (which have been approved by the regulator).

I have worked for different operators that do it differently. I preferred some procedures over others but in either case I followed the SOP that applied at that carrier. The key is that the flight crew and the in flight crew are on the same page when it comes to phraseology, procedures, and responsibilities.
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Re: WestJet and Sunwing ground collision - YYZ

Post by HHI »

RatherBeFlying wrote: Sun Jan 07, 2018 12:54 am What can happen in a delayed evacuation - PWA 501 YYC 1984

https://web.archive.org/web/20061104195 ... -200.pdf
1.15 Survival Aspects
Passengers who were on the left side of the aircraft near the
wing were almost immediately aware of the existence of fire. As
the aircraft slowed, several passengers left their seats, and, as
more became aware of the fire, a general level of agitation
developed. The number two flight attendant seated in the rear of
the aircraft heard a passenger yell "fire" within ten seconds of
the occurrence; the purser and number three flight attendant
both seated at the front of the aircraft, were aware of the fire
within twenty-five seconds of its occurrence.
In accordance with published procedures for a rejected take-off,
the three flight attendants remained in their seats awaiting
instruction from the captain. All assumed that, because the
aircraft continued to taxi, the captain was aware of the
situation and that it was under control. As the fire continued
to increase in size, the flight attendants attempted to contact
the flight crew. The number two flight attendant, seated in the
rear of the aircraft, attempted to notify the flight deck of the
fire by using the aircraft interphone system. Although the
signal tone was heard on the flight deck, it went unanswered
because the first officer mistook the tone for that associated
with the passenger flight attendant call button. The number two
flight attendant continued in his attempts to contact the flight
deck and also began to call the front cabin flight attendant
station. The purser attempted to enter the flight deck but was
unable to do so because the door was locked in accordance with
standard company procedures. The door was unlocked in response
to her knocks, and, about 45 seconds after the take-off was
rejected, she entered the flight deck and, after first asking if
they had blown a tire, informed the captain of a fire at the
back. In the meantime, the number three flight attendant made a
brief public address (PA) announcement for the passengers to
remain seated and calm. After having been informed by the
captain to prepare for an evacuation, the purser then returned to
the cabin. Upon returning, she answered the interphone and was
informed by the number two flight attendant that there was a fire
at the back and that the aircraft should be stopped. Throughout
this period, the aircraft continued to taxi slowly up C-4.
The purser then returned to the flight deck, advised the captain
of the deteriorating situation, and was again directed to prepare
for evacuation. The purser then left the flight deck and
directed the two flight attendants to prepare for evacuation.
When the aircraft stopped, the three flight attendants initiated
an evacuation by opening their doors and inflating the escape
slides .
There was no general announcement of the evacuation made by
either the captain or the flight attendants. Evacuation commands
were given to passengers as they exited the aircraft. The
passengers' decisions to leave their seats and evacuate were
based on their perceptions of the emergency situation and their
observations of the flight attendants opening the exits.
Passengers were at the doors awaiting the inflation of the escape
slides.
Four exits were used during the evacuation; these were as
follows: main entrance door (left front); galley service door

(right front); right over-wing exit; and right rear service door.
The main entrance door was opened by the number three flight
attendant and the galley service door by the purser. The right
over-wing exit was opened by the passenger seated next to it at
the urging of several passengers seated nearby. The first few
passengers out this exit reported that the escape slide at the
galley service door had not yet deployed when they exited the
aircraft. The right rear service door was opened by the number
two flight attendant.
Shortly after the evacuation commenced, fire melted windows along
the left side of the aircraft. When the windows melted through,
heat and smoke entered the aircraft, and the cabin environment
quickly deteriorated. Substantial quantities of smoke also
entered through the right over-wing exit and right rear service
door.
Conditions within the aircraft cabin were significantly worse in
the aft section. Heat was felt as the windows melted through.
Those passengers who had been seated beside the windows nearest
the fire experienced some singeing of hair and clothing. Smoke
obscured visibility almost totally during the latter stages of
the evacuation.
Passenger perceptions in the forward part of the cabin differed
markedly from those in the aft. It took much longer for them to
be aware of the existence of fire, and, even then, some did not
perceive the seriousness of the situation.
Most passengers chose the closest exit for evacuation. Many
stopped to retrieve handbaggage before they left. Those
passengers who exited through the main entrance door and galley
service door were seated primarily in rows one through seven.
Most initially chose to use the main entrance door until the
number three flight attendant began directing alternate
passengers to the galley service door. The passengers who exited
through the right over-wing exit were almost all seated in rows 8
through 16. With only a few exceptions, the rear exit was used
by all passengers seated aft of row 16.
The evacuation was without panic; however, a sense of urgency
prevailed. There was some pushing, and several people went over
seat backs to get to the exit ahead of others already in the
aisle. There was no noticeable yelling or screaming.
As the evacuation progressed, smoke began to thicken and obscure
vision. Smoke conditions were worse in the aft section of the
cabin. Passengers who exited via the rear exit reported that
they were unable to see the exit and were required to follow the
person ahead to locate it. By the time most had reached this
exit, the smoke had lowered to about knee height. The bottom
portion of the door and the slide were all that was visible. The

13 -
passenger who was the last one to exit via the over-wing exit
reported he had to drop to his knees to breathe fresh air before
he was able to reach the exit. Only when he neared the exit, did
it become visible through the smoke.
AI1 passengers who exited via the over-wing exit jumped off the
leading edge of the wing. The vertical drop from the wing to the
ground is in excess of six feet, and this distance increases as
one moves outward from the wing root. Smoke and flames near the
trailing edge influenced the passengers to go forward after they
bad left the aircraft. Most jumped down from the wing inboard of
the engine, although several proceeded out the wing before
dropping to the ground.
The rear slide was observed to deflate, because of fire damage,
immediately after the number two flight attendant exited the
aircraft . A precise determination of the time taken to evacuate the
aircraft could not be made; however, it is estimated that the
evacuation took between two and three minutes . Four passengers sustained serious injuries during the evacuation.
All four exited the aircraft via the right over-wing exit. Three
of these passengers sustained bone fractures of varying severity
when they jumped to the ground from the leading edge of the wing.
The fourth passenger, who was apparently the last person to exit
the aircraft, sustained pelvis and rib fractures when he fell to
the ground, after slipping on foam on the wing.
Mumerous other passengers sustained minor bruises, cuts,
abrasions, and sprains during the evacuation. Some singeing of
hair and mild blushing of the skin from heat were also reported.
Blood samples were taken from the 29 passengers who reported to
hospital. Carbon monoxide levels were minimal when measured, and
there were no reports of other toxic substances.
Following the evacuation, the passengers and crew gathered in
groups a short distance from the aircraft and observed the fire-
fighting activities.
were helped away from the aircraft by other passengers and cabin
crew. Some passengers had to be told to move away from the
aircraft and fire.
but it was not started until after some passengers had begun to
wander away from the scene. After a while, a few passengers
began to disperse and make their own way back to the terminal.
Later, taxi cabs were dispatched to transport the remaining
passengers back to the terminal building.
Those passengers who required assistance
A head count was attempted by the cabin crew,
The FACTS as told to me by the F/O of that flight.

The pilots heard a "pop" sound when accelerating through about 40-50 knts. They had no fire or abnormal engine indications, assumed they blew a tire and the Captain initiated a reject. The engine had spit a turbine blade up into the wing, punctured the fuel tank and the fuel poured onto the hot turbine sectin of the (still running) engine and a fire erupted with thick black smoke rising. The fire was aft of the engine fire detector loop and there was NO fire indication in the cockpit. F/O told tower they were rejecting. Tower (incorrectly) assumed they were rejecting because of the fire and did not mention the obvious (to them) smoke/fire, but did activate the crash alarm.
Cabin crew and passengers also assumed the pilots knew the aircraft was on fire and waited for the pilots to stop, shut down and start the evacuation.

Meanwhile the pilots were taxiing back to the gate for a tire change -still unaware of the fire.

When the pilots were made aware of the fire (at this point still no fire indication in the cockpit) the Captain (since nicknamed "Flaming Stan") stopped the aircraft and the shutdown/evac sequence was initiated. Andy (F/O) told ground they were evacuating. ATC asked them to taxi ahead to the next taxiway/taxiway intersection to give the fire trucks a paved surface from which to fight the fire. Captain refused (and delay the evac another minute). This refusal no doubt saved lives.

The engine fire warning came on as they were shutting down.

This accident changed the airline procedures after a reject.

We used to train that after a reject we get off the runway to let aircraft behind land. The procedure changed to stop on the nice wide runway until assured its safe to move. No longer a concern about following traffic who may have to overshoot.

After ANY reject for ANY reason the pilots will announce either "remain seated, remain seated" or "evacuate, evacuate" as soon as possible.

The "remain seated" PA is intended ONLY for the cabin crew as a signal to stand by for a possible evac but that an evac is not required at this time or that the engines are not shut down yet with a possible evac to follow.

If the cabin crew do not hear either PA from the cockpit within a short time they will attempt to contact the pilots to confirm the next step.

This "remain seated" call was not SOP at the time of the YYC emergency.

============

From what I know so far of the WestJet evac the crew followd their SOP's and deserve an Attaboy for a stressful task well handled.

HHI
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Re: WestJet and Sunwing ground collision - YYZ

Post by cossack »

The British Airtours Manchester fire was made worse by the crew's turn off the runway which put the fire upwind of the fuselage. I, as a controller, will pass as much information as I think necessary to enable a decision to be made. If you want to stop on the runway, stop on the runway. Subsequent arrivals will not be using it whether you are on it or not.
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Re: WestJet and Sunwing ground collision - YYZ

Post by Grumbler »

Oh the irony. The Sunwing ground handlers were Swissport, the union that was on strike for months and disrupted YYZ vehicle traffic when the strike wasn't going their way, all the while claiming the temporary workers hired in their place weren't the, ahem, professionals they were and all sorts of dire predictions of.....exactly this type of thing.
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Re: WestJet and Sunwing ground collision - YYZ

Post by mantogasrsrwy »

Not to mention the Teamsters (Swissport) crying wolf and blaming temporary workers when AC marshaled their plane into LOT.
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Re: WestJet and Sunwing ground collision - YYZ

Post by rookiepilot »

It's evil management. Always.

Responsible for every incident, accident, near miss, delay, lost baggage, turbulence, crappy meals, weather and traffic on the way to the airport. Evil management made me do it. :roll:

Close down the TSB. Save some money.
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altiplano
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Re: WestJet and Sunwing ground collision - YYZ

Post by altiplano »

Mapleflt wrote: Sun Jan 07, 2018 12:51 pm There that's far more inline with CRM concepts, your welcome
CRM might feel good and all touchy feely teamwork and stuff, but it doesn't change the fact of who the professionals are and where the buck stops with regards to responsibility and decisions for safety onboard.

A competent flight attendant is important, they need to be the eyes and ears sometimes, but I don't want my in-flight crew jumping the gun and commencing an evacuation into a running engine, or unnecessarily because they're a Nervous Nellie...

Good example is a tail pipe fire... It looks bad.
An FA "elevating the response" or "taking the initiative" to evacuate because they see a fire and didn't hear from me immediately puts the passengers at extreme risk - running engines/motoring starters/jumping out of an airplane - when in fact it looks worse than it is and an evacuation would typically not needed.

https://youtu.be/anlpKkxCvpY

We aren't talking about a crash or something where the pilots are dead or incapacitated, but most incidents they need to reach out to us with information if they see something, or have concerns that we might not be aware of.
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Re: WestJet and Sunwing ground collision - YYZ

Post by hotwings56 »

After seeing the video of a burning APU in contact with the right wing (read right fuel tank) I join the crowd of "nice job guys" What did or did not happen in the cabin is of concern and will be the subject of debrief and investigation. Should they have evacuated? YES
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