Is this a good reason for a high speed RTO?

[telex]

You have free access to the most comprehensive accident investigation ever conducted in Canadian aviation history.

Your response is: Nope! Followed QRH. Died. Case closed.

Until you can post your qualifications to support your expert opinion I will kindly disagree with your assessment.

Nice attempt at diversion. My response, (to the topic at hand: the QRH prohibiting an RTO), stands. Doing an RTO under those circumstances did not violate the QRH. As to SOPs or whether or not its a good idea I make no comment.

My qualifications are already laid out elsewhere in the forum if you want to make the effort to find them. I'm not going to ask you about yours because I assess people based on what they say as opposed to what is printed about them in a booklet.

We'll finish this pissing match one way or another.

Let's finish with your Swissair excursion before we pivot back to the point. You cherry picked a fatal event which might have had a marginal chance of survival (at best) to illustrate your point that following a QRH is a bad idea. Even if immediate diversion action was taken when smoke was recognized the whole QRH issue quickly became secondary. Or even irrelevant. You disregarded the fact that it was the most comprehensive accident investigation in Canadian aviation history and summed it up rather succinctly in your own way. Nope. Followed QRH. Died. How stupid of them.

I cautioned against analyzing the result above (at least your result of following the QRH) but here you are analyzing the result. I said look at the report. What checklist did the crew follow? You said nope they followed the QRH! I said let's look at the report and see what checklist was in the QRH that the crew followed. It was a company checklist not approved by the manufacturer that the crew followed. But you said nope followed QRH and died! So simple and clean for you.

Repeating the same wrong information does not make it the right information.

Ok. I understand. In your world if a document is contained within the QRH the origin of such a document is irrelevant and it is simplified (in your world) as QRH. Follow QRH and die. Got it.

Of course you took the time to tell me you were right and you already knew you were right. Are you an egomaniac, ill-informed, or do you have magic powers? I can't be bothered to look for your qualifications but to dismiss the Swissair report and draw your own conclusions is nothing short of asinine.

Now, finally (and thankfully) back to the topic.

When I hear, "I did that because it didn't say I couldn't", what I reply is this; You should have done what it said in order to avoid making up dumb sh*t to try and save your ass. You are simply making up dumb sh*t at this point.

One more time I will post the published manufacturer direction in regards to an RTO for the B767.

Above 80 knots and prior to V1, the takeoff should be rejected for any of
the following: (But, in your words, "the QRH prohibiting an RTO". QRH does not prohibit such, but your lack of experience here is now glaringly obvious. But don't let that stop you from being the authority on such matters) Have you ever flown a Boeing? How much time on the 767?
• fire or fire warning - 208 should say nope
• engine failure - 208 should say nope
• if the airplane is unsafe or unable to fly. - Only 208 can properly interpret this one. And this is the point.

Some have already correctly stated that the B767 will fly with three, two, one, or none generators.

But it didn't say you could not reject for "that". Right, 208? So was it unsafe or unable to fly? It is really quite simple right here and right now. Unsafe or unable?

Since we already know it would fly I guess we know it was able and thus we can assume it was unsafe? That's your last leg to stand on 208. Please expand on why it was unsafe. And no more made up bullsh*t about blah blah blah. Stick to published data so we can have a common ground.

Boeing doesn't publish a document for you that says you can't do this or that. Boeing only publishes a document for you that says you should do this or that.

You're next uncontrollable tangent that the scope of Boeing manuals doesn't cover should be entertaining. I bet Boeing doesn't even say you shouldn't do that. Or isn't that your point?

[pelmet]

Not much detail in this case.

C-GENU, a Westjet Encore de Havilland DHC-8-400, was operating as flight WEN3109 from Calgary, AB (CYYC) to Nanaimo, BC (CYCD). During the take-off roll the flight crew noted an AC generator caution light and rejected the takeoff. While taxiing from the runway, the flight attendant reported smoke was coming from the brakes. The flight crew actioned the QRH and requested ARFF. ARFF met the aircraft and followed WEN3109 to the gate. There were no further smoke issues.

[Rockie]

You cherry picked a fatal event which might have had a marginal chance of survival (at best) to illustrate your point that following a QRH is a bad idea.

I'd like to point out doing a QRH and landing are not mutually exclusive. In a time critical scenario the crew can set the aircraft up for an immediate landing and simultaneously do as much of the relevant QRH as possible in the time available. There are at least two people up there afterall, and they can do two separate things at once.

[telex]

You cherry picked a fatal event which might have had a marginal chance of survival (at best) to illustrate your point that following a QRH is a bad idea.

I'd like to point out doing a QRH and landing are not mutually exclusive. In a time critical scenario the crew can set the aircraft up for an immediate landing and simultaneously do as much of the relevant QRH as possible in the time available. There are at least two people up there afterall, and they can do two separate things at once.

As always Rockie, thank you for your valuable, timely, and insightful input.

If you could clarify a couple issues for me I'd appreciate it. I'm confused as to whether your input is in relation to a QRH, landing, or people in the flightdeck?

The thread is about an RTO event. Right?

But, to the insights you offered.

1.Did you read the report?

2.If so, did you understand it?

I'll give you a hint as to where this is going Rockie.

Suppose for a minute there were two people/pilots in the flightdeck.

One would be the Captain and one would be the First Officer. Agreed?

Who do you think would be the one that decided what the course of action would be in the Swisair situation?

Keep in mind the one sentence you cherry picked was only in relation to following QRH direction was a bad idea. And that idea only belongs to 208.

I look forward to the clarity you will offer.

[Rockie]

Keep in mind the one sentence you cherry picked was only in relation to following QRH direction was a bad idea. And that idea only belongs to 208.

Correct, it only belongs to B208.

Yes, I read the report but it was a long time ago.

The Captain decides the division of duties and course of action. To make an informed decision input from other crew members is a necessary part of the equation.

My comment was in response to people who think there are only two responses to a perilous situation - blind adherence to the QRH and recommended procedures - or ignoring them altogether. It is rarely that simple. This also is not in any way commenting on the origin of this thread either. I will not second guess anybody without knowing all the facts first, and even then I'd have a hard time doing that because I wasn't there.

[pelmet]

Looks like the 737 cautions are not inhibited in the higher airspeed range. Fairly long runway at 10,000 feet.

"C-FSCY, a Boeing 737-8 MAX aircraft operated by Air Canada, was conducting flight ACA1049 from Palm Springs Intl (KPSP), CA to Calgary Intl (CYYC), AB. During the takeoff roll on Runway 31L at KPSP, the flight crew received a Master Caution Light for the FWD Entry Door. At an indicated airspeed of approximately 110 kts, the flight crew rejected the takeoff, brought the aircraft to a full stop, declared a PAN PAN, and exited the runway. A flight attendant confirmed that the door appeared to be properly closed and locked. A brake inspection was done by a safety vehicle, and maintenance personnel inspected once the brakes cooled."

[ReserveTank]

You cherry picked a fatal event which might have had a marginal chance of survival (at best) to illustrate your point that following a QRH is a bad idea.

I'd like to point out doing a QRH and landing are not mutually exclusive. In a time critical scenario the crew can set the aircraft up for an immediate landing and simultaneously do as much of the relevant QRH as possible in the time available. There are at least two people up there afterall, and they can do two separate things at once.

Exactly. The MD-11 QRH was updated to reflect this idea. It says (I'm paraphrasing), "Don't waste time with the QRH if you need to land now."

[Jet Jockey]

Apologize in advance because I did not read the whole thread so I don't have all the info on this incident.

A good friend of mine that flew the B767 for Air Canada (now retired) tells me that there is no way he would have rejected for a "Generator Failure" at 130kts. As far as he is concerned that was not part of any Air Canada SOPs and training manuals and never once in his career was he told he should reject for this type of failure.

Even if the APU would have been U/S (MEL), he would have taken the aircraft in the air and dealt with the consequences once at a safe altitude.

Question to the Air Canada pilots... Do we know if the pilots were replaced? Did another crew take the aircraft back home to CYYZ after the repairs?

Again, based on my friend's experience... They rejected (another type) for a valid warning but it was below 100kts.

When he talked to Ops/dispatch after getting back to the gate, one of the questions he was asked was at what speed the reject was accomplished.

They were very specific in asking if the reject had occurred above 100kts (which he confirmed it was not) because he was told by Ops that a reject above 100kts was considered an emergency and that a crew change would be required.

Personally I would not reject for a "Gen Fail" caution message at high speed.

[pelmet]

The RTO speeds are getting higher. Flaps are more of a concern than a generator of course but what would one do here. Maybe add full thrust and rotate at a higher speed if there is a concern. Any thoughts...…

"C-GCIJ, a Boeing 767-300 operated by CargoJet Airways, was conducting a flight from
Winnipeg/James Armstrong Richardson International (CYWG), MB to Iqaluit (CYFB), NU. During
the takeoff roll at CYWG, the flight crew observed a red FLAP EICAS message and aural warning
subsequently rejecting takeoff above V1. The aircraft stopped within the confines of the runway
and the crew subsequently followed the recommended brake-cooling schedule. ARFF was
requested for precautionary measures and emergency vehicles escorted the aircraft safely to the
ramp.
The operator's maintenance identified the flaps could not retract and was stuck at 1 with
FLAP/SLAT ELEC status message. Water was found on FSPM cards, the FSPM cards were dried
and FSPM M838 was replaced. The flaps were cycled and tested normal with no further faults."

[valleyboy]

Above V1 why would they reject unless the captain had better insight, like excess runway. This would have required an over weight landing at high landing ref. considering flaps stuck if they took it into the air. It worked out so no issue and proper call at the time. I'm not sure if a human brain could weigh all this in the split second and muscle memory rules. That could be the question but a red warning light could move you towards wanting to stay on the ground.

[tbayav8er]

I'd say good job to the crew. Electrical issues can be very complicated, and you never know...maybe the generator went offline due to an electrical fire. Better to reject the takeoff and potentially overheat the brakes than get airborne and realize you have an electrical fire. In our training, they basically say to reject below 80 kts for any caution, and between 80 kts and V1 for any fire or engine warning etc. Having said that, it's at your discretion as the pilot if you want to reject past 80 kts for less critical stuff. Have to use some decision making. Between 80 kts and V1, I tend to stay on the side of rejecting, rather than taking a problem into the air. Then again, I don't fly a wide body jet.

But yeah, I would not fault someone for doing a safe high speed reject, especially for a fault with the electrical system. You never know if that fault is going to snowball into more problems once you're airborne.

[GRK2]

Uh yeah, because those pesky electrical systems cause so many fires. A generator fault is NOT a great reason for a high speed reject. I'd rather have one less gen and go flying (esp when the RTOW is max weight) than burning brakes and/or blown fuse plugs any day! As for a FLAP EICAS warning above V1...I have to think that at the very least the crew would have confirmed a correct takeoff flap setting (at least the checklist covers that) and if they did have an incorrect flap setting, there would have been a Takeoff CONFIG warning well before take off thrust was set. THAT"S when you reject. If a decision is made to reject BEYOND V1, there'd better be a seriously good reason and explanation as to why it happened. I know my own concerns about heavy weights and V1 and reasons to reject and always include a conversation about what might constitute a decision to go flying rather than stop at heavy weights and high speeds. I'm certainly not second guessing the Cargojet reject at all, just wondering why the decision was made above V1? If it wasn't a CONFIG warning I think that jet was capable of flying perfectly well.

[ayseven]

I have no experience with this sort of thing, have never flown a jet (other than video games) am not referencing any QRH or anything, but my gut says that the crew decided to abort. They made a decision that may be debated later. Maybe it was not a good move for the equipment, but by my definition, it was a good move. The moral of the story is that he made a decision with enough runway to stop. Sometimes the wrong decision is the right decision.

People work with what they have available at the time, and we can talk til eternity second guessing - easy in retrospect. I have not read the whole thread, but can anybody enlighten me as to the manufacturer recommendations in this case?

[AuxBatOn]

https://www.cmfmag.ca/duty_calls/royal- ... n-florida/

In the accident described in the article, they were well past every abort point and yet, judgement from the pilot to put the aircraft back down, despite against SOPs, saved the lives of all onboard.

Going against SOPs is not always a bad thing. I’ll take popped tires over a ball of flames any day I have doubts.

[telex]

Above V1 why would they reject unless the captain had better insight, like excess runway. This would have required an over weight landing at high landing ref. considering flaps stuck if they took it into the air. It worked out so no issue and proper call at the time. I'm not sure if a human brain could weigh all this in the split second and muscle memory rules. That could be the question but a red warning light could move you towards wanting to stay on the ground.

Why would a flap problem require an overweight landing?

[valleyboy]

Why would a flap problem require an overweight landing?

Returning to an airport immediately after T/O would be an over weight landing on the planned flight. Flying around a heavy aircraft with flaps out, even at 1 degree is limiting, back on the ground is good. I don't think the 76 has fuel dumping and even if it did an O/W landing is much better than dumping fuel, especially in this day and age. The inspection involved is minor so operators will land over weight and to hang around and burn off the fuel is just silly, you open yourself up for more "issues".

[telex]

Why would a flap problem require an overweight landing?

Returning to an airport immediately after T/O would be an over weight landing on the planned flight. Flying around a heavy aircraft with flaps out, even at 1 degree is limiting, back on the ground is good. I don't think the 76 has fuel dumping and even if it did an O/W landing is much better than dumping fuel, especially in this day and age. The inspection involved is minor so operators will land over weight and to hang around and burn off the fuel is just silly, you open yourself up for more "issues".

Can you provide flightplan information to support your position that an overweight landing would be required for this flight?

What is limiting about flying a heavy around with flaps out?

I think B767-300 does have fuel dump capability...

Are you suggesting environmental issues are more important than following a checklist to dump fuel in an effort to land under max landing weight?

What "issues" will surface while flying around burning off fuel?

[valleyboy]

Fuel dumping is a thing of the past and a over weight landing is preferred. First you just can't dump fuel where ever you want to unless you are prepared for great mounds of paperwork and possible costs of impact studies and such. Sure if you ass is on the line "dump to minimums" was a common phrase in T/O emergencies but that was extreme with 2 engines out in a muli eng jet (more than 2 engines) The modern aircraft usually has enough power to weight ratio fuel dumping is not required. The other thing about fuel dumping is that ATC has specific areas which might be up to an hour flight time each way so why noty land over weight. It's done on a daily basis all over the world and providing crew does what they are trained for an aircraft inspection is carried prior to next flight.

I assume a 76 has a max t/o weight and a landing weight alone with a zero fuel weight. A trip to YFB is about 2.5 to 3 hours from YWG and alternates are either YVP or YRT (usually) and possibly YYQ This (while I do not have the manuals) would mean T/O weights would exceed landing weight at initial point of flight.

I'm not sure if you are trolling me or are not familiar with heavy jets. I have not flown a 76 but do have other boeing types on my ticket. For a pilot with light aircraft only experience landing over weight seems contradictory to all you were ever taught but it's done all the time and routinely as well. WX forecasting is getting better but even unforecast tail winds can put you in an over weight landing situation (which is usually ignored since a few hundred pounds on a 200,000 aircraft is so small) if you are operating at that magic point where max landing weight and load is predicated on the fuel load on touch down.

[pelmet]

Bottom line, we don’t know if this aircraft was over it’s max landing weight. As for fuel dumping policy, I worked at two airlines that had totally different policies. One wanted the overweight landing, likely to save fuel cost, while the more recent one had a policy to dump fuel for most of the time I was there.

[complexintentions]

Fuel dumping is a thing of the past and a over weight landing is preferred. First you just can't dump fuel where ever you want to unless you are prepared for great mounds of paperwork and possible costs of impact studies and such. Sure if you ass is on the line "dump to minimums" was a common phrase in T/O emergencies but that was extreme with 2 engines out in a muli eng jet (more than 2 engines) The modern aircraft usually has enough power to weight ratio fuel dumping is not required. The other thing about fuel dumping is that ATC has specific areas which might be up to an hour flight time each way so why noty land over weight. It's done on a daily basis all over the world and providing crew does what they are trained for an aircraft inspection is carried prior to next flight.

I assume a 76 has a max t/o weight and a landing weight alone with a zero fuel weight. A trip to YFB is about 2.5 to 3 hours from YWG and alternates are either YVP or YRT (usually) and possibly YYQ This (while I do not have the manuals) would mean T/O weights would exceed landing weight at initial point of flight.

I'm not sure if you are trolling me or are not familiar with heavy jets. I have not flown a 76 but do have other boeing types on my ticket. For a pilot with light aircraft only experience landing over weight seems contradictory to all you were ever taught but it's done all the time and routinely as well. WX forecasting is getting better but even unforecast tail winds can put you in an over weight landing situation (which is usually ignored since a few hundred pounds on a 200,000 aircraft is so small) if you are operating at that magic point where max landing weight and load is predicated on the fuel load on touch down.

Uhhh...overweight landings are not done "routinely" and jettisoning fuel is not a "thing of the past". You have zero idea of what you speak of.

WTF are you talking about with "unforecast tailwinds"? I've shown slightly over MLW at destination during cruise several times in the career, there are always strategies to reduce to landing weight, descend early, drop 14 tons of gear early...there is no justification for overweight landing due to poor planning. Don't know who you fly for, but just try casually landing overweight for any reputable operator and let us know how that goes for you. The QAR email will be waiting for you before you even taxi to the gate.

Oh and it's an old thread, but a high-speed reject for a generator failure is piss-poor risk management in any modern ETOPS twin with multiple electrical sources. There's a reason pretty much everything is inhibited after 80 and 100 kts. It's just plain riskier to reject going fast than to have your electrical supply reduced from three sources to two. Oh, the humanity. If only there was some other source of electricity installed on the aircraft.

Then there's the pain of reading the rationalizing of an incorrect decision with the ever-popular "captain's authority". Everyone wants to be a hero, gonna save the day by operating outside the box. Got away with it, so must be right. Wowsa. Let's extrapolate an engine gen failure into an uncontrollable cockpit fire. Makes sense. Now we can just abandon SOP's. Solid logic.

But the crown jewel: let's just reject AFTER V1. Why not? I'll just eyeball it, looks like about enough runway to stop.

Please God, is this all just a Christmas joke?