It can take a long time to get the full story

[pelmet]

I remember reading this accident report many years ago. One wonders why this sort of flying would be done but no detailed info is provided about the accident by the investigators except obvious regulatory info. But what is the deeper reason that we can learn from. Does the TSB not want to say that the pilot was an accident waiting to happen because someone's feelings might be hurt or do they just not take the time to look deeper. I saw this sort of investigating on an another accident that I was much more familiar with.

Then we find out two decades later...the real background on a pilot forum of all places. Now you know...the rest of the story(Or at least some of it) and it just proves that the idea spouted by some that we will get the true known story in the final report can be very wrong. An honest mistake made by the 18,000 hour PIC trying to follow the rules one might think after reading the report or someone who not only broke the rules repeatedly but more importantly....broke them in a dangerous way along with the rules of common sense.

We, as pilots need to dig deeper somehow to get closer to finding out what really happened in accident and be our own investigators finding out slivers of information here and there through discussion and putting the pieces together. And while there is something to learn from reading the report....don't be stupid and do what they did and ensure your terrain clearance, there is more to learn from this accident from a point of view of considering what one might do as PIC on this night and what one might do as an F/O when placed in this scenario.

http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-r ... 9p0006.asp

Interesting history, Chris. Thank you for compiling it and presenting it.

The Racer was the first airplane I flew two-crew where the captain spent our entire time aloft either breaking every Air Reg. he could fit into a flight or, between violations, spending as much effort as he could muster to kill us both. I Have 800 hours in that particulat one and graduated from the school of "no" with all its permutations and nuances.

Levelling at 12,000' and calling "level at 14,000'" when the mea was 14...calling "by the beacon outbound" when we weren't there yet as My Hero didn't like procedure turns... Easy stuff in a no-radar environment, no? Tracking an NDB down a frozen northern lake in the mountains in the dead of winter in a snow storm at night, 50-100' on radar altimeter, to a one-way gravel airstrip with flare pots...

Anyway, I'm here and he's not, having thundered in with another copilot.

But it was the Racer that kept me alive, any other airplane and I wouldn't be here either. He had to hit a mountain top in solid cloud to do in his last Racer. Or in his case, a better name would have been "Eraser."

Ahhh you triggered a memory.

If he is the same pilot I am thinking about he was the best example of dangerous I ever met.

I was doing some part time flying for Freddy Carmichael out of Inuvik and got paired with that idiot in
the DC3 because Freddie was really short of drivers.

One trip was all it took for me to tell Freddie I would never get in the same airplane again with him.

That's him, Cat, you always were a lot smarter than me!

He smoked into the top of that hill on Mayne Island, doing buckshee IFR. Took his copilot with him too.

His disregard for the rules of safety was breath taking like his special VFR departures into known IMC weather on the route could only end one way which it did that morning.

[Zaibatsu]

The TSB has changed their reports quite a bit since that one was released. It was very sterile, pointing to regulations that were not complied with and corrective actions that brought them into compliance.

Newer ones have focused on factual information related to possible pilot deficiencies... failed PPC rides, previous violations, previous (documented) accidents or incidents, revealing toxicology reports, poor rest and fatigue management. But none of these go as far as listening to heresay or rumour regarding the conduct of a pilot.

What’s interesting to note is that the first officer was highly trained, experienced, and mature. Even if the captain was a dangerous type, he should have been more assertive in avoiding that dangerous situation. Perhaps the military training of the era didn’t condition him to question orders or usurp the authority of his captain. Maybe it was complacency, not thinking about obstacles when flying over water. Though as an IFR check pilot on a DC-3, he must have known the dangers.