RCAF Cyclone Down

[ozone]

Human tendency is to push the limits or “hot dog” when there is an audience. Sounds like this “photo op” as they call it was an excuse to do just that.

[Eric Janson]

The Cyclones are now back in service, the investigative team has determined that the crash was caused by the flight director being coupled for the manoeuvre which didn't allow the pilot inputs to be escalated in the system. You would think that manual inputs would be enough but the system design precluded recovery from that low altitude. Most civilian Heli autopilot systems would probably do the same but most aren't fly by wire nor would anyone be coupled for such low manoeuvres.

I couldn't find the official release but most news outlets have the story now.

I've always been taught to turn off the automatics if they are not doing what you want.

On my aircraft its 2 buttons to gain full manual control and 2 push button switches to turn off the Flight Directors.

I do notice a real reluctance to turn things off in the present generation of Pilots - not a good thing. Autopilot is an aid - not a crutch. Same for the Flight Directors.

Not familiar with how things are done in the military - will have to see what the report says.

[AuxBatOn]

Eric, sounds like the event was so sudden and unexpected that there was no time to recover. The press conference from the Director of Flight Safety covers this nicely.

[AirFrame]

Since you asked, yes, still hotdogging.

A simple turn to final would not have been a problem but the "complex" turn was obviously too much for the system.

I'd like to see some transparency on this investigation but it's still just being tossed out like corn to pigeons.

So, throw out an accusation of hotdogging without corroboration, and then undermine it by admitting the system failed.

While it may have happened after flying a "photo pass" beside the ship, I find it hard to believe that a military helicopter isn't capable of handling a low pass, a break, and a tight turn to landing. These are not "hotdogging" manoeuvers, they are aggressive manoeuvers that a military helicopter shouldn't be brought down by.

This is more of an MCAS-like failure event, and it just happened to happen too close to the ground/water to recover. This is apparently not the first time this particular system failure occurred.

[Heliian]

Since you asked, yes, still hotdogging.

A simple turn to final would not have been a problem but the "complex" turn was obviously too much for the system.

I'd like to see some transparency on this investigation but it's still just being tossed out like corn to pigeons.

So, throw out an accusation of hotdogging without corroboration, and then undermine it by admitting the system failed.

While it may have happened after flying a "photo pass" beside the ship, I find it hard to believe that a military helicopter isn't capable of handling a low pass, a break, and a tight turn to landing. These are not "hotdogging" manoeuvers, they are aggressive manoeuvers that a military helicopter shouldn't be brought down by.

This is more of an MCAS-like failure event, and it just happened to happen too close to the ground/water to recover. This is apparently not the first time this particular system failure occurred.

It is nothing like MCAS and the system didn't fail. The system did what it was programmed to do, the pilot did not. If it was a normal manoeuvre then they wouldn't have specified that it was under a very strict set of circumstances that the accident happened. If you go back in the posts, I was positing previously on the inputs being dampened by the FBW system which can happen under hand flying so the aircraft does not destroy itself midair. That system was accentuated by being coupled to the autoflight system and the aircraft did not have enough altitude to correct itself. Again, this thing is a bus, not an apache.

[Gannet167]

Before we grab out pitchforks and light the torches for a good 'ole AvCanada lynching over 'hot-dog' manoeuvres, there's a few things to consider. The RCAF is very intolerant of 'hot-dogging' and is quite heavy handed dealing with crews who are caught doing it. If one were to try some 'hot-dog' stuff, you certainly wouldn't do it in plain view of the ship. They were conducting a flypast and a "complex" turn, hardly an exotic or unsafe manoeuvre in the broad context of military flying. It should have easily honoured all aircraft limitations and flying orders and been well within the accepted operational safety norms. They were likely directed to do it for a photo op with the military "Combat Camera" magazine or some other similar publication.

To give some context, this is a tactical military helicopter that engages in operations such as: ground support in operational theatres (Sea Kings flew in Somalia and East Timor), counter piracy, counter drug smuggling (all of which exposes them to small arms fire or worse), SAR, as well as the obvious surveillance and anti-submarine warfare. Flying a complex turn is hardly a 'hot-dog' sequence and likely well within the operating norms, likely even required in certain situations and worth maintaining some proficiency on. Former Sea King / Cyclone guys can possibly comment, I never flew one.

Different operational communities will view manoeuvres in different light. Is there any need for a Cyclone to do a flypast and complex turn? Is there any real need for a CF18 to do 400 kts to initial for an overhead brake/final turn? They could just setup at 10 miles, fully configured and fly an ILS at 150 kts. Is it 'hot-dog' when a formation of Harvards does Gear Up Low Approaches? or 120 degree bank/3g turns in formation? Griffons do Tac-Decels, at night, with ninjas repelling out the door. Commercial airline pilots may find it a little crazy for a heavy C17 to go into reverse airborne and descend at 10,000'/min+, but it's not unusual for a tactical descent. The Cyclone crew wasn't looping the helicopter or attempting to go super sonic. It may be interesting to note that Canadian maritime helicopters are one of very few air force operators world wide who bear trap a helo, at night, in high sea states and winds, onto a rolling ship deck. Most others don't even attempt it because it's too dangerous. Perhaps that's 'hot-dog' as well?

(edited for spelling)

[AuxBatOn]

Since you asked, yes, still hotdogging.

A simple turn to final would not have been a problem but the "complex" turn was obviously too much for the system.

I'd like to see some transparency on this investigation but it's still just being tossed out like corn to pigeons.

So, throw out an accusation of hotdogging without corroboration, and then undermine it by admitting the system failed.

While it may have happened after flying a "photo pass" beside the ship, I find it hard to believe that a military helicopter isn't capable of handling a low pass, a break, and a tight turn to landing. These are not "hotdogging" manoeuvers, they are aggressive manoeuvers that a military helicopter shouldn't be brought down by.

This is more of an MCAS-like failure event, and it just happened to happen too close to the ground/water to recover. This is apparently not the first time this particular system failure occurred.

It is nothing like MCAS and the system didn't fail. The system did what it was programmed to do, the pilot did not. If it was a normal manoeuvre then they wouldn't have specified that it was under a very strict set of circumstances that the accident happened. If you go back in the posts, I was positing previously on the inputs being dampened by the FBW system which can happen under hand flying so the aircraft does not destroy itself midair. That system was accentuated by being coupled to the autoflight system and the aircraft did not have enough altitude to correct itself. Again, this thing is a bus, not an apache.

It did what it as programmed to do, perhaps. Was it properly designed though?

[Gannet167]

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cyclon ... -1.5613239

"That means the helicopter software did not recognize the pilot's instructions and chose to ignore them — something "for which the crew would have had no previous experience, nor exposure prior to this event ... It was "an unavoidable accident," - Colonel John Alexander, RCAF Flight Safety Investigator.

Sounds like the crew didn't do anything wrong. Pretty hard to argue when the flight control system ignores the pilot's inputs and flies the aircraft - uncommanded - in a descent. Crews were apparently unaware of what the FBW system would do and weren't trained on how to handle this situation.

The fleet was grounded the FIRST time in 2017 when another Cyclone also entered an uncommanded descent, also ignoring pilot inputs:
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cyclon ... -1.5566656

"The limitations were meant to address the pitch and roll of the aircraft and only applied at certain altitudes and in specific flight control modes... It's more of a technical restriction and avoiding certain pieces of the code, really, in the software, making sure we don't induce a fault ... Sikorsky has narrowed down very specifically what pieces of code are affected in the software and how we would induce those pieces of code to be triggered." - Col. Peter Allan, Commande 12 Wing Shearwater.

The big question for me is how did this thing get airworthiness? It's great that Sikorsky has identified the pieces of code that cause crashes and there's an ops restriction on the flight regime where that code is triggered. That should've been identified and fixed back in the design and testing phase, the thing should never have been given operational airworthiness as it sits. It's great that there will be training for crews on how to handle the automation and FBW system when it acts in an uncommanded way an tries to crash the plane. That should've been incorporated into the original training, not identified after 2 uncommanded descents leading to 2 fleet wide groundings.

"It was 'an unavoidable accident'" I partially agree with this. It seems unavoidable for the crew on that flight, conducting fairly routine ops and unknowingly triggering a defect in the flight controls. I don't think from a design/testing/certification stand point that it's fair to say this was unavoidable. It appears crews are unknowingly and unwillingly guinea pigs, testing the software for glitches by trial and error (at times with severe consequences.)

Seeing as this was labelled "the worst procurement in the history of Canada", complete with immense delays, budget over-runs, multiple mid project redesigns, reductions in stated capability requirements, lost operational capability as Sea Kings were obsolete and coming out of service, and perhaps most profoundly political embarrassment - the root cause of this may be rushing it into service to save face. It sounds like another airworthiness debacle of recent memory.

[MOAB]

I don't know anything about their SOP's, but I find it interesting that they would be coupled to anything while doing something that I would consider "hand flown"

[Heliian]

I will admit, that I lost objectiveness on this one. I failed to properly assess all of the factors and became more focused on the actual piloting of the aircraft. Most of us know that an accident isn't caused by just one thing, it's a chain of events that do. Removing a link in that chain can prevent it.
There are still many variables and details that are missing. We don't know who directed the photo op or if it was preplanned. We don't know the experience level of the crew and we don't know the flight profile they actually were on, as "complex" is too loose a term. I don't think anything within the flight envelope as "complex" but I know pilots who think transiting controlled airspace is complex.
They obviously tested the crap out of the control system and even revised the software after issues were found.

Ganet, get off the politics, we're beyond that, focus on the f35 deal.

[W5]

Found this old article (2007)
https://www.flightglobal.com/sikorsky-p ... 32.article

Is the FBW just a Canadian thing?

[Heliian]

Found this old article (2007)
https://www.flightglobal.com/sikorsky-p ... 32.article

Is the FBW just a Canadian thing?

No. It's a world thing.

[Gannet167]

Found this old article (2007)
https://www.flightglobal.com/sikorsky-p ... 32.article

Is the FBW just a Canadian thing?

No. It's a world thing.

The FBW is Canadian Air Force only. The civilian S92 does not have it. It was completely designed from scratch for the Cyclone and is Sikorsky's first attempt at FBW. Very few other helo's in the world use it.

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cyclon ... -1.5616809:

"Going to a fly-by-wire system, with no mechanical links, is not for the faint of heart and needs pretty detailed knowledge about software and hardware and all of that sort of thing," said Shawn Coyle, a former Canadian military pilot and civilian accident investigator.

There are just a few helicopters in service around the world with that kind of technology. They include the European-designed NH-90 and the Bell-Boeing V-22 Osprey.

The scarcity of fly-by-wire choppers has led to a shortage of expertise, Coyle said.

"There are very few people who've done a certification on fly-by-wire control system on a helicopter,"

https://www.flightglobal.com/sikorsky-p ... 32.article:

"Sikorsky has begun ground testing a fly-by-wire (FBW) flight-control system in its S-92 medium helicopter to support development of the H-92 maritime variant for the Canadian Forces. The company plans to introduce FBW on the commercial S-92 at a later stage.

An S-92 development aircraft has been modified with the BAE Systems-supplied triple-redundant digital flight-control computers, and will be used for flight testing to obtain US Federal Aviation Administration certification of the FBW system. FAA approval is planned for mid-2008, with delivery of 28 H-92s to Canada to begin early in 2009.

The S-92 will be the first civil-certificated fly-by-wire helicopter, says Stan Hunter, Sikorsky's Canadian Maritime Helicopter Programme manager."

[Gannet167]

Ganet, get off the politics, we're beyond that, focus on the f35 deal.

The only reference to politics in two lengthy posts is one line about saving face. As someone who's lost friends, I don't consider it irrelevant. Politics have plagued this and other procurements (although, oddly not Challengers) with bad results.

The system did what it was programmed to do

The system did not do what it was supposed to do. It flew the machine - against pilot inputs - into the water. If it was programmed to do that, it was programmed wrong.

the pilot did not.

Do you have knowledge of the pilot's actions? You've seen the flight data? What did the pilot fail to do specifically? That's quite a statement to make, particularly when the RCAF has said the accident was unavoidable. The "unavoidable" part directly implies the pilot couldn't avoid it, which would suggest they didn't have the option to prevent it nor did they do anything wrong.

[AirFrame]

Before we grab out pitchforks and light the torches for a good 'ole AvCanada lynching over 'hot-hog' manoeuvres, there's a few things to consider.

*cringe* It's not "hot-hog". It's "hot-dog".

Apart from that, thanks for the well written and referenced replies. Much preferable to the baseless accusations of others.

[Gannet167]

Before we grab out pitchforks and light the torches for a good 'ole AvCanada lynching over 'hot-hog' manoeuvres, there's a few things to consider.

*cringe* It's not "hot-hog". It's "hot-dog".

Apart from that, thanks for the well written and referenced replies. Much preferable to the baseless accusations of others.

That is cringe worthy. I'm not even sure what my auto correct thought it was doing by 'fixing' that for me. I believe a 'hot-hog' is an entirely different thing and usually handled by the wingman. Ironically, automation did something unintended there with my spelling in a post about - automation doing unintended things.

This was all predicted, a long time ago https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9W5Am-a_xWw