Mechanical failures....check lists...SOPs and decisions.

[Beefitarian]

Because as you would know if you read what happened, before he had started the take off run he was aware there was not a balanced field length for his all up weight at the time. Therefore V1 would occur beyond the point where you'd have enough runway to skid to a stop.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

Cat,
If you rejected at V1, why did the aircraft overrun the runway?
C-206

First lets go back to what I said at the start of this thread.

I think it may be educational to relate a mechanical failure I had one day just at V.R.

The airplane I was flying was a PBY water bomber and we had a full load of long term retardant to make it simple we will say the load weighed ten thousand pounds.

At that weight V.R. will occur at approximately 72 knots using normal elevator input, V.R. in a loaded PBY is a process wherein the nose wheel will lift off the runway but the mains will stay on the runway for a few seconds before the airplane will actually get airborne.

It was just as I started the rotation that the throttle lever broke off and of course it was at full power.

I was very familiar with the airport and the over run past the actual runway, which was gravel and part of my decision making was based on the fact that I had a visual go no go point decided before take off and it was briefed. As I have explained I dropped the ten thousand pounds of retardant at the same time as I killed ignition to both engines and there was zero doubt in my mind that I could stop safely on the grass over run at the end of the runway......the only reason I started this story was to point out that mechanical failures can occur that require different methods to handle the failure.

In that case the normal action to pull power would be to pull the throttles to the closed position.....had I done that I would have had an airplane with one engine at zero thrust and the other one at full power and it would have been a real bearcat to get back under control once the yaw started.

I wish I had never started this because I can see where it is leading.....next thing will probably be someone asking me if I understand V1 / VR / V2 and all the other speeds.

In those days the machines did not require us know things like having a machine stall because we failed to remember we were in alternate law and floor alfa protect is no longer available, so pulling back on the elevator control will result in a stall....

I digress to much..... must be getting senile.

[photofly]

I've a question.... what were you doing with the throttle at rotation time that made the lever break off?

[Chuck Ellsworth]

I've a question.... what were you doing with the throttle at rotation time that made the lever break off?

I was holding it in the full power position exactly like I had done thousands of times before and since.

The throttle broke inside the quadrant due to metal fatigue, the airplane was about thirty five years old at the time...things break on mechanical devices.

To answer your question more specifically I was not using any forces in a pushing movement that would break either throttle...it just broke off....period.

By the way your decision to turn back to the runway with the towers permission and the fact you did it safely was not something you should beat yourself up over, you made a decision based on what was going at the time and it worked just fine.

[robertsailor1]

I generally fail to see the "mutual" respect between the "Old" Generation and the "New" Generation. I have met very cocky , arrogant, and pathetic "Old" and "New" crews. Bottom line - just because you have 40,000 hours does not mean you are the second coming of Christ. Experience is again, one thing. The rest can be decided by those who fly beside / behind you

Some people can fly 40,000 hours and not be much better than they were at 2000 hours but usually that is the exception. Pilots by their nature tend to have egos and are often sensitive to criticism. No body enjoys a horses ass but one thing I've learned is that you don't learn much from people that are always agreeing with you, so its good to have a difference of opinion. Having said that all differences should be discussed in a respectful way and remember it is an opinion and like my friend always tells me...opinions are like assholes, everyone has one.
These forums are wonderful opportunities for younger less experienced pilots to learn things and for older wiser and experienced pilots to debate ideas....and learn things.

[Colonel Sanders]

things break on mechanical devices

Odd that so many of the experts here are surprised by this. A friend of mine had a weird engine failure in a piston twin - the fuel selector handle broke off in his hand inbetween detents, and he had to fly quite a ways with a very heavy load on one engine. That would have been easy for the keyboard pros here, but he found it dodgy.

He always flew with his gerber multi-tool after that. He's not the only pilot I know that won't fly without one.

just because you have 40,000 hours does not mean you are the second coming of Christ

No, but generally you know a heluva lot about aviation. That's irrelevant these days, of course, because when someone screws up and crashes it is celebrated as a "learning opportunity".

[trey kule]

because when someone screws up and crashes it is celebrated as a "learning opportunity".

How very true.

[winds_in_flight_wtf]

Insurance companies have nothing to do with this as there is no rate factor.

Really??

Maybe you should apply to fly for Miramax as a pilot flying in one of their movie shoots and get back to me about the insurance requirements thing..the truth it is all about what the insurer wants and believe me it is very strict.

Taken out of context. In the world of insurance companies, sure ...pilot's need to be insured. That has nothing to do with what my post, and the one i was referencing.

How often do you fly in Ontario .?

[Chuck Ellsworth]

How often do I fly in Ontario?

Seldom, but what does that have to do with the issue of insurance and how the insurance underwriters determine their risk exposure?

My point is risk exposure is directly tied to the experience level of the pilot.

I used the movie industry as an example of flying where experience tied directly to a pilots safety record is what determines if you are insurable.

That is a fact easily proven by the simple process of trying to get hired to fly for the movie industry.

[whipline]

Hi .. I have absolutely no knowledge of the PBY. My question is this. If you had continued the takeoff, could you have brought the aircraft back for a safe landing? Without knowing anything about the PBY I would be more inclined to fix the problem(s) airborne and bring it back for a safe landing.

[pika]

Undoubtedly this event occurred in a bygone era so I would suggest that rather than making this an in-depth educational thread make it a little lighter and more along the lines of I Learned About Flying From That... What did you take away from this day Cat?

When one realizes who their audience is it will be much easier to deliver an effective message. Endless references to the new generation of regulation following button pushing robots has been made throughout this website so nothing further needs to be said about that. Ask yourself, how is this message going to be received by the present audience? Is it going to translate well? Good or bad, right or wrong; aviation today is what it is (and of course that belongs in another thread with another title).

I don't have the luxury of a time machine to zip back to the day of the event and understand the operational philosophy of the time so perhaps my opinion is biased by what I know of today's philosophy. What was the outcome of this event? Was it regarded as good decision making and a successful conclusion?

Fast forward to now and dissect this event from a new breed of pilots and a regulator's perspective. Of course keeping in mind that we now have the advantage of decades of compiled stats and data that may suggest an alternate course of action. Anybody unfortunate enough to be in the front of that airplane as the events described would be SLAUGHTERED in today's industry. This is not a personal attack, this is a professional opinion based on the events as presented combined with my biases of the industry I operate in today.

Without the specifics, can the lesson be clearly defined?

[Chuck Ellsworth]

Hi .. I have absolutely no knowledge of the PBY. My question is this. If you had continued the takeoff, could you have brought the aircraft back for a safe landing? Without knowing anything about the PBY I would be more inclined to fix the problem(s) airborne and bring it back for a safe landing.

Maybe, maybe not.

The engine was time limited in the operating manual at four minutes at full power and the only engine driven hydraulic pump was on that engine. Then there was the question of would it feather on the shut down and would I have raised the gear or left it down increasing the time to climb to a safe altitude to sort things out.......the answer was I was still on the ground with room to safely stop when I made the decision to reject.

When one realizes who their audience is it will be much easier to deliver an effective message. Endless references to the new generation of regulation following button pushing robots has been made throughout this website so nothing further needs to be said about that. Ask yourself, how is this message going to be received by the present audience? Is it going to translate well? Good or bad, right or wrong; aviation today is what it is (and of course that belongs in another thread with another title).

As I have stated I made a mistake here not only relating this story but in the manner I have let it unfold.


.

What was the outcome of this event? Was it regarded as good decision making and a successful conclusion?

I and my company regarded it as good decision making as the airplane was not damaged.

What was the outcome of the event? It was a safe conclusion to a unusual mechanical problem.

Fast forward to now and dissect this event from a new breed of pilots and a regulator's perspective.

Interesting thought, would this new breed of pilots have the mechanical and aeroplane performance knowledge to have made the decision and take the actions to safely reject the take off ?

Of course keeping in mind that we now have the advantage of decades of compiled stats and data that may suggest an alternate course of action. Anybody unfortunate enough to be in the front of that airplane as the events described would be SLAUGHTERED in today's industry.

You are telling me that in today's industry a pilot can not deviate from any rule, normal handling procedures or SOP in an emergency to save the aircraft and possibly their lives?

This is not a personal attack, this is a professional opinion based on the events as presented combined with my biases of the industry I operate in today.

I do not take it as a personal attack and having progressed through my career from biplanes to flying for Airbus Industries and being trained at their factory by their flight instructors I have a fair grasp of not only the past history of aviation but also today's operations.

Without the specifics, can the lesson be clearly defined?

I have gone over and over the specifics and described the failure and pointed out the risk of continuing the take off with an uncontrollable engine in a low performance heavy airplane and knowing I would not have an engine driven hydraulic pump and the risk of it not feathering and several other issues. The lesson I was trying to get across is sometimes we are faced with unusual events and with proper planning ahead.....such as in that case where I had knew I had room to stop after a reject at that speed and place down the runway.

Apparently I have made a mistake in relating that event here and I will never ever make the same mistake twice because that is part of the learning process.

I have been retired from aviation for five years and when I retired I was at the top of my career having flown so many different airplanes and helicopters I cant recall all of them.

My last job was an adviser working for the Greek CAA in Athens...and my job was advising on aviation safety with regard to a new airline being planned for that region.

I am now back in aviation flying for a corporation and will soon be getting a type rating on a Bell Jetranger which the company plans to buy for a new corporate lodge we are building north west of Vancouver.....but maybe I am too out of touch with reality to think of doing this?

[whipline]

. I enjoy your posts and im not your nemisis. You certainly don't need to defend your background on AvCanada. Is there a secondary/emergency/electric hydraulic system on the PBY? Why wouldn't the engine feather? Is there a mechanical pump or other method of extending the gear?

I'm all for systems knowledge and using your brain but SOPs were designed to mitigate pilots from doing "their own thing". Some SOPs are obviously better then others though.

Your outcome was good (you didnt get hurt and no metal was bent) but could have it been better? If the aircraft was flyable I would have continued the takeoff, raised the gear, dumped the load over the trees, kept climbing for 4 minutes, secured the engine, set up for final, dropped the gear and landed. But I don't know anything about the PBY.

[robertsailor1]

A very good friend of mine sat on the Transportation Safety Review Board( whatever the real name is) He said approx 8 of them took in information collected and spent hours dissecting a decision made in a couple of seconds by the pilot.

[pika]

You are telling me that in today's industry a pilot can not deviate from any rule, normal handling procedures or SOP in an emergency to save the aircraft and possibly their lives?

Any SOP will state in the preamble that the document is intended as a guideline and cannot cover all non-normal circumstances. When deviations are required sound pilot judgement and good decision making is expected.

Now without the benefit of the time machine to fully appreciate the situation or circumstances...

How can a take off be justified without a balanced field?

My initial findings suggest: too much weight for the available runway, reject initiated after V1, resulting in a 500' over run.

Zero fatalities and zero damage to property. Not a great day but could have been worse.

[Doc]

Anybody unfortunate enough to be in the front of that airplane as the events described would be SLAUGHTERED in today's industry. This is not a personal attack, this is a professional opinion based on the events as presented combined with my biases of the industry I operate in today.

I find this a telling comment from a poster who's opinion I respect. Not that SOP's cannot be deviated from in today's world, but the tendency to do so, has been "trained" out of today's pilots. I think today's pilots, while having the benefit of years of learning from the mistakes of the past, modern technology and equipment not even dreamed about during .'s PBY days, would be far less likely to throw the "rules" and SOP's "out the window" at a moment's notice. If this were to happen today, the aircraft would most certainly have rotated at V1. I know there have been times when I've changed the "play" in the middle of the "down" without any dire consequences. You just have to know when to say, "WTF".

[trey kule]

SOP's are part of the alphabet speak of new CPL's. But the understanding of their purpose is sometimes lacking.
SOP's work very very well in normal situations. They allow pairing of pilots without previous experience as a team to immediately work well as the procedures are standardized. They eliminate the "I thought you did that" incidents. And they should eliminate such boo boos as leaving the master on , flaps down after landing, type of error.
But too many of the alphabet speakers feel they somehow apply to all emergency situations.. They dont. You cannot train for every possible emergency. Sometimes you just have to think, and you dont have all that much time.. All these decision making models that are so well taught in the classroom, the use of checklists, and SOP's all get forgotten when there is 300 feet of runway left and something has gone wrong..It is at that point that common sense, and, yes , experience come into play Anybody who does not think experience is necessary in flying is either someone who does not have any so cannot really judge what they dont know, because.....well ,,,,they dont know what they dont know..Or, someone who celebrates all failures as learning opportunities (I love that line)...the kind that thinks all kids should get a Participation ribbon in sports, or that we should not keep score in a game..

What I see in this thread is a lack of understanding about the actual role SOP's are to play ...the S stands for standard....and they apply to more than just when the plane is flying.

Doc, you make a good point, but it is a difficult balancing act sometimes. Once SOP's start being ignored, we get little screwups, like a plane not being fueled and not be checked properly (SOP not being followed to be present at fueling, and checklist ignored). An FO, who is out of their seat before the final checklist is run, and the master being left on.
On the other hand, there are simply times when you must forget about the SOP, and sometimes that decision has to made in a split second. That is a big part of where experience comes in...how does that little prayer go....courage to change the things I can, accept the things I cannot change, and the wisdom to know the difference.

As to the thread itself, I had the sense that Cat felt there was only one option open to him. Chose it. And it worked out well for him.
I am not certain that means there were not other options available, but I was not there. I am not sure what can be learned form this incident as few , if any of the others here (myself included) know the working, limitations, etc. of the PBY. Possibly a choice to use a plane more people are familiar with would have provided a better opportunity for knowledgable discussion.

And while I am ranting, let me share this. One of the things I get some shameful joy of is watching a brand new hire CPL's face when they first open up the company SOP....and after reading the first pages regarding duty times, reporting times for duty, appropriate dress...they thumb through the pages for the flying parts...and, as someone posted early, when asked, can never properly answer the question regarding the very first page that indicates when SOP's can /should/must be deviated from. Some of this I attribute to the fact that many of the simulated SOP's the colleges use really only relate to flying. Nothing about preflight responsabilities such as confirming NOTAMs and Weather understanding.post flight etc.. SOPs and checklists have a very important role to play in flying, particualrily in complex machinery, but understanding their appropriate use seems to be a real problem. Few pilots who are exposed to them during training seems to have ever been taught ...when can/should you deviate from them? Not when you are in hurray to TGIF with the folks so you ignore a shutdown checklist. Not because it is cold outside so you decide it is not necesssary to watch the fueling trunk actually put fuel in the plane. But when you have less time to make a decision than it will take to read the checklist..of course....

[C-206]

Pika,
Finally someone said it, after all the SOP bull***t , and old pilot vs. new pilot, robot vs. non robot, You, Pika finally said it.
C-206

[Doc]

As to the thread itself, I had the sense that Cat felt there was only one option open to him. Chose it. And it worked out well for him.
.

That's really the"bottom line" here. If it hadn't worked out for him, well we wouldn't be hearing about it, now would we? That, and things WERE done a little differently back then. Yes they were.
I flew with a crusty old fart of a guy who retired as a BOAC 707 Captain. Loads of time on Britannia's, Connie's an the like. He was a pretty good story teller (to say the least!) and let me tell you, they had NO CRM! The Captain was the bloody KING. The lowly "fool" in the right seat was his "slave". When something ran amok, the "old boy" played HIS cards. They either worked, and he was a hero, or they didn't, and the landscape became littered with corpses. THIS IS NOT A SHOT AT CAT, it's just the way the "game" was played. SOP's were very much in the future, and indeed THE future of aviation. Now, with the equipment we fly, a pilot can maintain strict adherence to SOP's his entire career and NEVER have a reason to deviate from them. They are "usually" that good. Sometimes (Hello Air France) when they don't work, you have to know when to "toss" them. It may never happen.
But, bottom line remains. It IS SOP to continue a take off after V1. It was an unusual situation, that required the high speed processor known as the human brain to make a snap decision based on available data in the memory banks. In this case, it worked. It could well not have. Continuing the take off, might have worked as well. We'll never know. I know I've "gotten away" with a couple . Perhaps Cat "got away" with one here?

[Big Pistons Forever]

As to the thread itself, I had the sense that Cat felt there was only one option open to him. Chose it. And it worked out well for him.
.

That's really the"bottom line" here. If it hadn't worked out for him, well we wouldn't be hearing about it, now would we? That, and things WERE done a little differently back then. Yes they were.
I flew with a crusty old fart of a guy who retired as a BOAC 707 Captain. Loads of time on Britannia's, Connie's an the like. He was a pretty good story teller (to say the least!) and let me tell you, they had NO CRM! The Captain was the bloody KING. The lowly "fool" in the right seat was his "slave". When something ran amok, the "old boy" played HIS cards. They either worked, and he was a hero, or they didn't, and the landscape became littered with corpses. THIS IS NOT A SHOT AT CAT, it's just the way the "game" was played. SOP's were very much in the future, and indeed THE future of aviation. Now, with the equipment we fly, a pilot can maintain strict adherence to SOP's his entire career and NEVER have a reason to deviate from them. They are "usually" that good. Sometimes (Hello Air France) when they don't work, you have to know when to "toss" them. It may never happen.
But, bottom line remains. It IS SOP to continue a take off after V1. It was an unusual situation, that required the high speed processor known as the human brain to make a snap decision based on available data in the memory banks. In this case, it worked. It could well not have. Continuing the take off, might have worked as well. We'll never know. I know I've "gotten away" with a couple . Perhaps Cat "got away" with one here?

IMO this is the best post on this thread so far ........