Boeing Systemic Problems Continue

[Raymond Hall]

Finally, a little light at the end of the tunnel:

Boeing 737 Max could be recertified before midyear, FAA says

The head of the Federal Aviation Administration has told airlines that it could lift a flight ban on the Boeing 737 Max before midyear, ahead of the manufacturer’s new timeline that it shared with its customers this week. The news sent Boeing’s shares higher.

FAA Administrator Steve Dickson told carriers that it could recertify the planes before the middle of the year if no new issues are discovered, according to a person familiar with the conversations.

“While the FAA continues to follow a thorough, deliberate process, the agency is pleased with Boeing’s progress in recent weeks toward achieving key milestones,” the FAA said in a statement. “Safety is the top priority, and the FAA continues to work with other safety regulators to ensure that Boeing has addressed all known issues with the aircraft.”

https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/24/boeing- ... says.html

[Raymond Hall]

From today's Guardian:

Ryanair warns it could shut bases and cut jobs after 737 Max delays

Airline says Boeing will not deliver aircraft until autumn, missing peak summer months

Ryanair has warned pilots and cabin crew it could close bases and cut jobs after the date for delivery of its first 10 of Boeing’s grounded 737 Max aircraft slipped into the autumn.

The Irish low-cost airline said Boeing would not deliver the first aircraft until September or October at the earliest, as Ryanair does not take deliveries during its peak summer months of June, July and August, according to a memo dated 27 January.

Two months ago Ryanair said it hoped to get the first of the 135 new 737 Max planes it has ordered in March or April, already two months after their original due date.

The memo said the airline’s commercial team would be drafting plans for job cuts over the coming week, with staff to be informed in the first or second week of February. Ryanair declined to give details on the number or location of the redundancies.

Boeing’s 737 Max aircraft have been grounded worldwide since March 2019, following two deadly crashes which were blamed on the model’s faulty systems. A total of 346 people died in the two crashes.

In the memo Ryanair executive Eddie Wilson wrote that the airline’s summer schedule relied on the delivery of the 10 planes. He apologised for the uncertainty and said the airline would try to prioritise cuts in flight frequencies over the closure of bases.

Boeing, the world’s largest aerospace company, has repeatedly pushed back its estimate for when the 737 Max will be allowed to fly again. Last week, it said that deliveries would recommence in “mid-2020” as it awaits US regulators to recertify the plane’s safety following software updates.

https://www.theguardian.com/business/20 ... ing-summer

[goingnowherefast]

Ryan Air pilots should follow the example and sue Boeing for lost wages and now jobs.

Aren't there any 737 NGs and classics (400/500 series) that they could pull out of the desert somewhere and use for a year while waiting for the MAX? Common type rating and all...

[Raymond Hall]

Boeing posts first annual loss in more than two decades as 737 Max crisis drags on

Boeing on Wednesday reported its first annual loss in more than two decades as costs from the 737 Max crashes rise sharply.

Boeing said it lost $636 million in 2019, marking the company’s first annual loss since 1997. That’s in stark contrast to the $10.46 billion profit it posted in 2018 — before a second crash grounded its best-selling planes worldwide.

The stock price gained nearly 3% in early trading.

In its earnings statement, Boeing reported a loss of $2.33 per share for the fourth quarter. Revenue in the last three months of the year dropped 37% to $17.91 billion from $28.34 billion in the year-earlier period.

The debacle’s costs to Boeing are rising to more than $18 billion, the company said, roughly double what it outlined in the previous quarter. That amount includes an additional $2.6 billion pretax charge to compensate airlines and other 737 Max customers because of the grounding. Boeing had taken a $5.6 billion pretax charge in the second quarter to compensate its customers.

The company recently reported its worst annual sales figures in decades and it handed the crown to the world’s biggest aircraft manufacturer to its rival, Europe’s Airbus.

https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/29/boeing- ... -2019.html

['97 Tercel]

They'll be fine...probably soon to be lifted up by a fresh round of government subsidies, I mean, contracts.

[boeingboy]

Aren't there any 737 NGs and classics (400/500 series) that they could pull out of the desert somewhere and use for a year while waiting for the MAX? Common type rating and all...

Nope. Your about a year too late for that.

After the max was grounded - practically every available airplane was leased or spoken for. That's why you see so many companies leasing whatever they can find to fill in. Air Canada with 767's from Omni, Sunwing with 767's, 737 classics, and even an A340, everyone everywhere has been scrambling to extend leases or find other lift.

[yycflyguy]

Proof of why CBC should be defunded - a terrible and sensationalized story, particularly since the official report has been available for over 3 months. Not surprising in a sense at Terrence McKenna got caught by veterans a few years ago exercising less than honest journalism.

https://www.cbc.ca/fifth/episodes/2019- ... he-737-max

What are you talking about? This episode was relatively well done (small nuance errors) as it's objective was to convey the technical issues to Joe Public with an emphasis on the human element. You think the AA Captains were sensationalizing or explaining? It was not as sensational as other media reports. The episode has nothing to do with politics or CBC.

[Raymond Hall]

From today's New York Times:

Boeing Expects 737 Max Costs Will Surpass $18 Billion

The grounding of the 737 Max jet continues to drag on the company’s results.

Boeing said on Wednesday that the costs associated with the grounding of the 737 Max were likely to surpass $18 billion, a significant increase over earlier forecasts.

The new estimate, announced during Boeing’s quarterly earnings report, is the company’s most recent approximation of just how expensive it will be to return the Max to service, compensate airline customers and restart the shuttered 737 factory.

Boeing continues to grapple with the fallout from the crashes of two Max jets in 2018 and 2019, which killed 346 people, leading to the worldwide grounding of the plane in March. In addition to the rising costs, the company is contending with a new chief executive, the temporary shutdown of the 737 factory and a range of challenges in other parts of the business.

Boeing said on Wednesday that the costs associated with shutting down and restarting the factory would amount to some $4 billion. The decision to temporarily halt production of the Max was made only last month, and Boeing had not previously given guidance on what the move would cost.


The company also said that the cost of compensating airlines that had lost sales as a result of the grounding of the Max was now expected to reach $8.3 billion, up from a previous estimate of $5.6 billion. That figure represents a mixture of cash payments to airlines and discounts on future sales.

And Boeing said that as a result of the grounding, which has lasted nearly a year now, it expected the overall cost to produce the 737 Max to rise to $6.3 billion in the years ahead, up from an earlier estimate of $3.6 billion.

In total, the anticipated costs now equal more than $18.6 billion, or nearly 20 percent of Boeing’s annual sales before the Max was grounded.

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/29/busi ... osts.html

[Raymond Hall]

From today's New York Times:

Boeing Expects 737 Max Costs Will Surpass $18 Billion

It sure makes the cost of an AOA comparator and a couple of hours of simulator training regarding MCAS pale in comparison to the ultimate cost of not providing same, n'est-ce pas?

[L39Guy]

Proof of why CBC should be defunded - a terrible and sensationalized story, particularly since the official report has been available for over 3 months. Not surprising in a sense at Terrence McKenna got caught by veterans a few years ago exercising less than honest journalism.

https://www.cbc.ca/fifth/episodes/2019- ... he-737-max

What are you talking about? This episode was relatively well done (small nuance errors) as it's objective was to convey the technical issues to Joe Public with an emphasis on the human element. You think the AA Captains were sensationalizing or explaining? It was not as sensational as other media reports. The episode has nothing to do with politics or CBC.

What’s wrong with this news piece? Allow me to explain.
First, bear in mind that this was aired fully 3 months after the Indonesian accident report was released.
Here is what I really don’t like:

- The simulator assessment was a little bogus. It is well known that the APA pilots (this guy in particular is a little annoyed about the lack of MCAS info. Offended is probably a good way to put it.

- The airspeeds and altitudes were not were not “wildly wrong” at all. They disagreed by a few knots and feet, repectively.

- Startle factor. Ok, there is a startle factor, not doubt about it. But they Lion Air accident Captain overcame that and called for the Airspeed Unreliable drill. He didn’t now it so he asked the FO to do it. He didn’t know it either and the transcript reveals the sound of pages turning. Finally, the Captain says “10.2”, i.e. page 10.2 of the checklist. These are memory drills and were never done before the flaps were retracted and the “beast” MCAS kicked in. Moreover, how is it that the crew of that same aircraft the previous day with the same problem overcame the “startle factor” and did the drill (and flew the aircraft for an hour and a half with MCAS)?

- Lots of drama about the nose down pitching with MCAS activating. But how is it that the Captain of the accident aircraft managed to manually trim the aircraft to neutral 26 times before handing control to the FO who promptly lost control of the aircraft? How is it that the crew of the incident aircraft the previous day not only controlled the longitudinal trim of the aircraft but they also recognized it as a stab trim runaway, did the drill (turn off the stab trim) then flew the aircraft for an hour and a half to the destination?

- The AA pilots were offended about not being informed about MCAS. Fair enough. But would it have changed the outcome. The Lion Air accident crew could not do the unreliable airspeed drill by memory nor could they do the stab trim runaway drill, despite the trim running away 26 times. Following the Lion Air accident, all MAX pilots were informed about MCAS, including the Ethiopian pilots. I didn’t change the outcome did it?

- 4 seconds to recognize a failure and 10 seconds to react. Ok, so how did the Lion Air incident crew do it? The Lion Air accident crew flew the aircraft for minutes after the MCAS did its thing – the had plenty of time to react, 26 six times the aircraft was retrimmed to neutral then MCAS pitched the aircraft nose down. They could have had all day to react but they never were going to get it right because they were never going to recognize this as a stab trim runaway and turn off two switches on the center console. Same for the Ethiopian crew.

- The accident report describes the decision process in allowing MCAS with a single sensor. Boeing assumed that type-rated pilots could do a UAS drill and a Stab Trim Runaway drill. Bad assumption.

- And, yes, that meant no requirement for extra simulator training as these are well known emergencies, the Stab Trim one going back to the 707 days and present on every Boeing since. The UAS drill has been in existence for years too. Yet, despite all of the neither the Lion Air accident crew nor the Ethiopian did them (although the Lion Air incident crew did).

- The Ethiopian crew only had 10 seconds to perform the procedure? B.S. McKenna is quoting that figure out of context. They had plenty of time as they were airborne for 6 minutes and not during any of that did anyone do the UAS drill and at least pull the throttles back to control the aircraft. Even worse, they turned the Stab Trim back on!

- I could go on about the public hearings, etc.

Don’t get me wrong. I am not a heartless SOB; I have every sympathy for the victims and families. I have lost enough friends in airplane accidents to know how they feel.

I am pissed off as a professional aviator as these accidents were entirely preventable, as the Lion Air incident proved. I am pissed off with the regulators in these countries for not regulating; the airlines for providing crappy training and not insisting on their pilots to manually fly their aircraft (as their manual flying skills were non-existent); and, yes, the pilots for not knowing their emergencies drills. If the accident aircraft crews had done nothing but pulled the power back from take-off thrust and controlled the airspeed of the aircraft, neither of these accidents would have occurred. But they couldn’t even do that.

Boeing makes great airplanes and, yes, Boeing is culpable for these accidents with the crews, the airlines, the regulators, the maintainers, and the component overhaul shop. But this documentary does not reflect this story accurately and completely. But that is Terrance McKenna’s style.

[L39Guy]

From today's New York Times:

Boeing Expects 737 Max Costs Will Surpass $18 Billion

It sure makes the cost of an AOA comparator and a couple of hours of simulator training regarding MCAS pale in comparison to the ultimate cost of not providing same, n'est-ce pas?

As detailed above, I doubt if simulator training would have changed the outcome. Simulator training didn't do anything for the fatal accident crews in recognizing and executing unreliable airspeed and stab trim runaway. What makes you think simulator training for MCAS, which would involve the unreliable airspeed and stab trim runaway drills, would change things?

[Raymond Hall]

What makes you think simulator training for MCAS, which would involve the unreliable airspeed and stab trim runaway drills, would change things?

Training, to first, recognize the onset of the problem, then second, to habituate the appropriate response.

Could have prevented both prior accidents.

No guarantee, but there is nothing like experience, and simulated experience is much less costly than real experience.

Even Boeing now agrees that there should have been training provided, and the FAA apparently is mandating it for any re-certification.

[HavaJava]

L39guy,

Your summary is spot on. It scares me how many so called professional pilots don’t think that a transport category jet pilot should be expected to handle an emergency that they have not been explicitly trained for (or for which there isn’t a perfectly designed checklist). And, as you so eloquently pointed out, if these crews had just followed the associated drills they would still be alive today.

Don’t get me started on the “startle factor” either. Unreliable Airspeed is confusing by definition. The whole point of the drill is to get the plane into a safe config until the problem can be sorted out. Of course that involves manually flying the plane and the Ethiopian crew were stabbing at the A/P like their life depended on it...sad state of affairs in the industry.

I have not heard one valid or convincing argument that somehow the MAX is a death trap. I will happily fly it if I get the chance in the future.

[yycflyguy]

I disagree that L39guy's post is "spot on". There is a lot there I, and many others, could debate but won't bother as it has been done ad nauseam for almost a year now. My questions was why the CBC should be defunded as the report was geared towards a simplified explanation to the public, not a technical review.

[Duke Point]

Proof of why CBC should be defunded - a terrible and sensationalized story, particularly since the official report has been available for over 3 months. Not surprising in a sense at Terrence McKenna got caught by veterans a few years ago exercising less than honest journalism.

https://www.cbc.ca/fifth/episodes/2019- ... he-737-max

What are you talking about? This episode was relatively well done (small nuance errors) as it's objective was to convey the technical issues to Joe Public with an emphasis on the human element. You think the AA Captains were sensationalizing or explaining? It was not as sensational as other media reports. The episode has nothing to do with politics or CBC.

What’s wrong with this news piece? Allow me to explain.
First, bear in mind that this was aired fully 3 months after the Indonesian accident report was released.
Here is what I really don’t like:

- The simulator assessment was a little bogus. It is well known that the APA pilots (this guy in particular is a little annoyed about the lack of MCAS info. Offended is probably a good way to put it.

- The airspeeds and altitudes were not were not “wildly wrong” at all. They disagreed by a few knots and feet, repectively.

- Startle factor. Ok, there is a startle factor, not doubt about it. But they Lion Air accident Captain overcame that and called for the Airspeed Unreliable drill. He didn’t now it so he asked the FO to do it. He didn’t know it either and the transcript reveals the sound of pages turning. Finally, the Captain says “10.2”, i.e. page 10.2 of the checklist. These are memory drills and were never done before the flaps were retracted and the “beast” MCAS kicked in. Moreover, how is it that the crew of that same aircraft the previous day with the same problem overcame the “startle factor” and did the drill (and flew the aircraft for an hour and a half with MCAS)?

- Lots of drama about the nose down pitching with MCAS activating. But how is it that the Captain of the accident aircraft managed to manually trim the aircraft to neutral 26 times before handing control to the FO who promptly lost control of the aircraft? How is it that the crew of the incident aircraft the previous day not only controlled the longitudinal trim of the aircraft but they also recognized it as a stab trim runaway, did the drill (turn off the stab trim) then flew the aircraft for an hour and a half to the destination?

- The AA pilots were offended about not being informed about MCAS. Fair enough. But would it have changed the outcome. The Lion Air accident crew could not do the unreliable airspeed drill by memory nor could they do the stab trim runaway drill, despite the trim running away 26 times. Following the Lion Air accident, all MAX pilots were informed about MCAS, including the Ethiopian pilots. I didn’t change the outcome did it?

- 4 seconds to recognize a failure and 10 seconds to react. Ok, so how did the Lion Air incident crew do it? The Lion Air accident crew flew the aircraft for minutes after the MCAS did its thing – the had plenty of time to react, 26 six times the aircraft was retrimmed to neutral then MCAS pitched the aircraft nose down. They could have had all day to react but they never were going to get it right because they were never going to recognize this as a stab trim runaway and turn off two switches on the center console. Same for the Ethiopian crew.

- The accident report describes the decision process in allowing MCAS with a single sensor. Boeing assumed that type-rated pilots could do a UAS drill and a Stab Trim Runaway drill. Bad assumption.

- And, yes, that meant no requirement for extra simulator training as these are well known emergencies, the Stab Trim one going back to the 707 days and present on every Boeing since. The UAS drill has been in existence for years too. Yet, despite all of the neither the Lion Air accident crew nor the Ethiopian did them (although the Lion Air incident crew did).

- The Ethiopian crew only had 10 seconds to perform the procedure? B.S. McKenna is quoting that figure out of context. They had plenty of time as they were airborne for 6 minutes and not during any of that did anyone do the UAS drill and at least pull the throttles back to control the aircraft. Even worse, they turned the Stab Trim back on!

- I could go on about the public hearings, etc.

Don’t get me wrong. I am not a heartless SOB; I have every sympathy for the victims and families. I have lost enough friends in airplane accidents to know how they feel.

I am pissed off as a professional aviator as these accidents were entirely preventable, as the Lion Air incident proved. I am pissed off with the regulators in these countries for not regulating; the airlines for providing crappy training and not insisting on their pilots to manually fly their aircraft (as their manual flying skills were non-existent); and, yes, the pilots for not knowing their emergencies drills. If the accident aircraft crews had done nothing but pulled the power back from take-off thrust and controlled the airspeed of the aircraft, neither of these accidents would have occurred. But they couldn’t even do that.

Boeing makes great airplanes and, yes, Boeing is culpable for these accidents with the crews, the airlines, the regulators, the maintainers, and the component overhaul shop. But this documentary does not reflect this story accurately and completely. But that is Terrance McKenna’s style.

I've got to agree with this 100%. Most aviators with decades in the industry will.

As has been said hundreds of times, Boeing really dropped the ball badly after the first accident. They should have immediately recognized the varied training standards and experience levels that exist throughout the world and immediately mandated dual AOA in all aircraft, neutered the MCAS to a single cycle per event and combined that with a comprehensive training amendment that would cover an MCAS malfunction scenario. If national aviation authorities forced their airlines to mandate this training or not, at least Boeing would have covered themselves. However, they likely felt their share price and rep of the Max would be too badly affected, so hush-hush. They get what they deserve.

The bright side is that there will be drastic changes that will likely prevent further catastrophic "sloppy self-certification related" events that would have occured unchecked.

DP.

[Old fella]

I disagree that L39guy's post is "spot on". There is a lot there I, and many others, could debate but won't bother as it has been done ad nauseam for almost a year now. My questions was why the CBC should be defunded as the report was geared towards a simplified explanation to the public, not a technical review.

The CBC Fifth Estate going into its fifth decade now isn’t without its distractors and has been kinda losing viewership. Note as of last year the internal divisions aired publicly about a planned exposé on Paul Bernardo which was intended as an attempt to increase lost viewing support. Remember Swissair 111 the untold story back 2012 based on some former law enforcement type views on explosions who really had nothing to do with the aviation investigation. Having said this, I agree with you on this defund CBC musing because of one episode(‘37Max)in a rather long in the tooth investigative program that may have an expired best before date. It is like me saying I will never fly on any Air Canada aircraft again because they have in their fleet that “ dreaded widowmaker, coffin corner “ B737 Max. The CBC is no doubt seen as an Eastern Canada based elite taxpayer draining conglomerate with bias against Conservatism and Western area of Canada, I am into my 7th decade and this is the way CBC has always been tagged, I shrug it off with a whatever.

[L39Guy]

What makes you think simulator training for MCAS, which would involve the unreliable airspeed and stab trim runaway drills, would change things?

Training, to first, recognize the onset of the problem, then second, to habituate the appropriate response.

Could have prevented both prior accidents.

No guarantee, but there is nothing like experience, and simulated experience is much less costly than real experience.

Even Boeing now agrees that there should have been training provided, and the FAA apparently is mandating it for any re-certification.

So let's see what we will do for training an MCAS event. First, there is all those bells and whistles upon lift off and a disparity between the airspeeds and altimeters. In the presence of this uncertainty, let's turn off the autothrottle, the autopilot, the flight director, set a 10 degree attitude and set 80% N1. My, that sounds a lot like the Unreliable Airspeed drill. Oh, and that is part of the existing QRH for any type rated B737 pilot. Nothing new here.

Next, let's introduce, after the flaps are retracted, an uncommanded nose down trim. And let's have the pilot hold the control column firmly, apply nose up trim with the electric trim switch on the control wheel. If that doesn't work or if the nose down trim returns, how about it if we turn off the stabilizer trim using those two switches on the centre console. My, that sounds a lot like the Stabilizer Trim Runaway drill. And that too is part of the existing QRH for any type rated B737 pilot. Nothing new here either.

So while training for MCAS makes for good press, those of us in the industry that fly Boeing airplanes know that what needs to be trained is already trained, or at least should be.

Probably more valuable training - and you don't need a simulator to do this - is toe have the pilots hand fly the aircraft from take-off to at least 10,000 ft on the way up and from at least 10,000 ft to landing on the way down, going through airspeed and configuration changes that actually require one to use those little switches called electric trim to trim out the forces. It's clear by the lack of control of the aircraft in manual flight that the Lion Air FO and the two Ethiopian pilots did not know how to hand fly an aircraft. Controlling the speed by moving those levers on the centre console would be helpful too.

In a ground school environment training for "airmanship" would be helpful. If one has read the Indonesian accident report, you'll read that the investigators asked the incident crew why they didn't return to land rather than fly for 94 minutes to destination with UAS and using the manual trim wheel to trim the aircraft. Their answer? The QRH did not say "Land as Possible". In the same vein, what were the crews of both of the accident aircraft thinking cleaning up the aircraft with UAS rather than returning to land immediately at the departure airport.

Finally, in either a ground school or flight line environment, how about reviewing the memory items likes UAS, stab trim runaway, etc as it is obvious that the accident crews did not know their memory drills.

Extra MCAS simulator training will probably give everybody a warm and fuzzy feeling but the problems are much deeper than that. These crews had (or should have had) training to recognize the problem and respond. Only 1 of the 3 did. And these drills are the easy ones; if they can't even figure out an UAS in two minutes what hope to do they have for something serious, like an engine failure or rapid depressurization?

[HavaJava]

Nailed it L39guy,

You’ve exposed the root problem and no amount of engineering will overcome lack of basic airmanship until pilots are removed from the equation completely. The way the profession is going I believe that day will come sooner than later. Today’s “professional” pilots are becoming more of a liability than anything.

[L39Guy]

Thanks.

I largely agree with you however I would say “incompetent pilots” are removed. I hope this MAX thing turns into a wake-up call for the entire industry, particularly with the declining experience levels that are occurring.

I don’t agree with removing pilots completely. We only hear about pilots when there is an issue; we never hear about the instances when the pilots save the day. As an example, the crew of the same Lion Air aircraft the day before the accident did the job they’re trained to and saved the aircraft and the souls onboard (although their decision to fly to destination is highly questionable). We never would of heard about their fine work if there wasn’t an accident the next day with the same aircraft. There are scores of cases where pilots quietly do their jobs professionally and we and the public are no wiser.

[Duke Point]

Nailed it L39guy,

You’ve exposed the root problem and no amount of engineering will overcome lack of basic airmanship until pilots are removed from the equation completely. The way the profession is going I believe that day will come sooner than later. Today’s “professional” pilots are becoming more of a liability than anything.

They cant seem to figure out consistently safe automated operation in 2-dimensions. Trains still have Engineers, and they're on tracks. Cameras on vehicles can fail or become dirty rendering "auto-pilots" inoperative. Snow, icing, muddy roads, etc. Were a long way off in the vehicle department.

We're a long, long way from having fully automated aircraft operating in a fast 3-dimensional/ rapidly changing environment that doesn't require on-board operators. Commercial aircraft of this nature aren't even on any drawing board yet. The ground based infrastructure will be prohibitively expensive. I doubt a commercial aircraft without pilots will carry anyone on any appreciable scale in my or your lifetime.

DP.