Boeing allegedly Misled FAA on MAX certification.

[Curiousflyer]

You can maybe make an argument about the trim cut out switches, but faulting them for not reducing power when they are in an uncontrolled descend is silly.

I suggest you become familiar with the facts before stating claims like this - they were not in an uncontrolled decent until the last 10 secs or so. The throttles were left wide open since they started the takeoff roll.

Throttles should have been full power the entire time, if not more power - it was the only thing that kept them in the air as long as it did.
More power= more airspeed= less nose up elevator.
As there nose was trimmed down (thank you MCAS) a reduction in airspeed would have doomed the flight sooner as the FDR shows the elevator controls fully aft.
Basic principles of flight.

[photofly]

By your response I am quite sure you either have no related experience, (that's ok, it's not a bad thing) or you didn't read the report(s) in which there was a lot of criticism leveled at the crew for their serious mismanagement of the basics of aircraft handling. Go find it and read the part about auto throttle and speed management.

I'd still like to read the specific report(s) that GRK2 is referring to, directly, in this post. Can anyone (GRK2 him/herself, perhaps) help me to find them?

[corethatthermal]

BECAUSE of the aggressive nature of MCAS trimming, AND the absence of dual AOA inputs and a comparator, At the very least, the pilot community should have been made aware of the system, completed MCAS failure scenarios in their training AND there should have been a procedure to pull an MCAS CB in the cockpit AND manually or ideally, electrically trim the A/C back to a safe flight regime. Hindsight is 20/20 but people NOW know that all these things above would have been discussed, suggested and thrown out for the sake of $$$$ ( Fast-tracking The max into service without the need for additional type training in order to compete with Airbus) Boeing AND the FAA have failed big time ( MUCH More Boeing's fault ) Pilot training ( or lack of it, lack of basic skills and automation) is one of the holes in this swiss cheese model (BUT not a small hole) towards the big smoking hole in the ground !

[sportingrifle]

"I am working on Jedi-mind tricking regulators into accepting the training that I got accepted by FAA.”
Mark Forkner, Boeing Chief Technical Pilot B737 Max.

Wow, just Wow.
Those " Jedi mind tricked" regulators are going to be trusting nothing they get from Boeing or the FAA, and with good reason given that Boeing subverted the certification process by withholding data. The question now is what else did Boeing try to hide and during certification of the airplane. There is already some evidence that the stall testing was also not done completely and as per accepted flight test practices.

If the FAA release the aircraft for flight before the rest of the world, they will be lying awake at night praying another one doesn't pound in due to a certification oversight. In the long term, the biggest harm to the US aerospace industry in general, but affecting Boeing predominantly, is the lack of trust in their FAA certification worldwide. Getting future aircraft like the 777X or even a modification to a C-172 certified outside of the US is going to be a lot harder. The "rubber stamp" approach of past will be greatly missed.

And the Boeing engineers that were fired for trying to hold their employer to established standards are going to make great expert witnesses!

Cheers Sportingrifle.

[daedalusx]

We’ll see how strong the military industrial lobby is. Precedent was set when the US DOJ attested, jailed and charged the VW executives for the so-called diesel emissions scandal. Haven’t seen any Boeing execs mugshots yet, but then again how much Boeing have legally bribed the duopoly (repubs and dems) in the last couple of years ? In China, for better or for worst, the accountable executives would likely been lined up and shot.

https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/totals ... 00&cycle=A

https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/totals ... cycle=2014

Maybe VW needs to hire better lobbyists

[photofly]

VW is from a foreign country; and worse, it competes with US car manufacturers - of course its executives deserve to be in jail. Boeing is run by all-American heroes.

[rxl]

This is what happens when corporations put the "creation of shareholder value" before everything else.
Whatever happened to concern for customer safety and producing a quality product?
Boeing's good reputation as one of the USA's great companies is quickly going down the toilet.

[rookiepilot]

Boeing statement on the instant messages:
https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-relea ... tem=130533

Boeing says FAA told "multiple times" re MCAS:
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles ... max-crisis

The plot thickens...........

[PilotDAR]

Boeing said:

And FAA personnel also observed the operation of MCAS in its low-speed configuration during certification flight testing, beginning in August 2016 and continuing through January 2017.

I wonder if the FAA were invited to observe mis-operation of the MCAS.

Someone, either an FAA staff member or a delegated person would have had to find compliance with:

Sec. 25.1309

Equipment systems and installations.

(a) The equipment, systems, and installations whose functioning is required by this subchapter, must be designed and installed to ensure that they perform their intended functions under any foreseeable operating condition.
(b) The equipment, systems, and installations must be designed to prevent hazards to the airplane if they malfunction or fail.
.........

And, if the FAA properly invoked "Changed Product Rule", the following should have been required, and found to comply as well/instead:

Sec. 25.1309

[Equipment, systems, and installations.]

(a) The equipment, systems, and installations whose functioning is required by this subchapter, must be designed to ensure that they perform their intended functions under any foreseeable operating condition.
(b) The airplane systems and associated components, considered separately and in relation to other systems, must be designed so that--
(1) The occurrence of any failure condition which would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane is extremely improbable, and
[(2) The occurrence of any other failure condition which would reduce the capability of the airplane or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions is improbable.
(c) Warning information must be provided to alert the crew to unsafe system operating conditions, and to enable them to take appropriate corrective action. Systems, controls, and associated monitoring and warning means must be designed to minimize crew errors which could create additional hazards.

In any case, the spirit of 25.1309 was overlooked, and both Boeing and the FAA (and possibly a delegate) are accountable for that. 'Sounds like pilot Forkner is realizing that he may have played a part in suppressing the truth with respect to the finding of compliance for this requirement.

[GRK2]

By your response I am quite sure you either have no related experience, (that's ok, it's not a bad thing) or you didn't read the report(s) in which there was a lot of criticism leveled at the crew for their serious mismanagement of the basics of aircraft handling. Go find it and read the part about auto throttle and speed management.

I'd still like to read the specific report(s) that GRK2 is referring to, directly, in this post. Can anyone (GRK2 him/herself, perhaps) help me to find them?

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/maga ... ashes.html

Read it ALL. Both accidents are here.

If the reply to whoever thought it was an attack on them personally, no apologies will be made. I personally don't care. I have way too much to do than to worry about your reading comprehension.

[corethatthermal]

Boeing was and is a great company ! There are MANY things going on that are pulling from various directions to make Boeing an average or worse company ! Power of the shareholders, subcontracting to India for mcas and other computer code to save a few $, globalization, affirmative action ( hiring someone who works poorly , slowly and makes many mistakes but are prevented from being fired because they are a transvestite black female etc ) , the erosion of society and moral fibre, the failure to uphold laws ( 2 sets of laws, one for the commoners and another for the elites, politicians etc ) Greed, incompetence, etc etc etc etc etc etc etc etc etc ,,,,,, Shall I go on ?

Those who look for a straw in a haystack are as blind as the ostrich who hides his head in the sand !

[corethatthermal]

As the airplane climbed through 2,150 feet, Harvino retracted the wing flaps, and the MCAS kicked in for the first time, ambushing Suneja with its 10 seconds of double-fast nose-down trim and resulting in the 700-foot plunge seen on radar by the controller. Suneja countered by using his thumb switch to apply a burst of nose-up trim as he hauled back on the control column and returned the airplane to its climb. Adding to the workload, the controller chose this moment to issue the first needless turn and to formally clear the flight to 5,000 feet. Harvino dutifully responded. Suneja then ordered him to put the wing flaps back down to where they had been. It was the best move of the morning and seems to have been based on a rule of thumb that if you do something in a cockpit and are rewarded by some unwanted event, do not waste time wondering what the connection is — undo that something you just did.

Suneja knew they had experienced some kind of runaway trim, but now with the flaps extended (and therefore with the unknown MCAS neutralized) it did not happen again. This would have been a good time to quit and go home. Instead, Suneja leveled at 5,000 and 30 seconds later ordered the flaps retracted. He may have made that choice because the airplane was flying at aerodynamic speeds in excess of 300 knots, which is not only fast for that altitude but also at least 50 knots faster than the maximum flap speed and enough to generate a loud overspeed clacker in the cockpit. He did not know about the MCAS, it’s true, but he had just experienced a violent runaway trim after flap retraction, and you might think he would have had the wherewithal to leave the flaps alone and throttle back to slow or, alternatively, pull into a climb to achieve the same result while also buying time. But no, he stuck obediently to 5,000 feet, left the throttles forward and retracted the flaps.

Throttles should have been full power the entire time, if not more power - it was the only thing that kept them in the air as long as it did.
More power= more airspeed= less nose up elevator.
As there nose was trimmed down (thank you MCAS) a reduction in airspeed would have doomed the flight sooner as the FDR shows the elevator controls fully aft.
Basic principles of flight.

The A/C was under control at 5000 feet with flaps 1 WHEN they decided to retract the flaps back to the same problem due to overspeed BECAUSE they failed to fly the plane and reduce thrust so that they could maintain the last flap position which "corrected" the problem and they knew it !!!! They FAILED to fly the plane and reduce thrust !

[corethatthermal]

The fight continued for the next five minutes, during which time the MCAS mounted more than 20 attacks and began to prevail.

3 things come to mind

1 The stick shaker and indications are already a past event, they figured it out and moved on.
2 They knew that flaps out worked and that retracting the flaps produced a "runaway trim" ( they retracted flaps after take-off, experienced the mcas runaway, set flaps back, it stopped, THEN they retracted the flaps AGAIN ! )
3 They knew that the trim was running away from them AND that they could stop it with electric trim operation

On the previous flight, this happened :

Finally the ghost in the jump seat intervened. It is impossible to know if he was a better airman than the pilots in the front or simply had the advantage of an overview. Either way, he recommended the obvious — shutting off the electric trim by flipping the cutout switches. The captain flipped the switches, the trim stopped running away and the MCAS was disabled. It was that easy.

With the captain’s stick shaker continuing to rattle and the trim switches set to the off (cutout) position, the crew flew to Jakarta without further issue, adjusting trim as sometimes necessary by use of the manual trim wheels mounted on both sides of the central pedestal, and landed just before midnight. Investigators do not seem to have explored why the pilots required nearly five minutes to handle what normally might have been a 30-second adventure, or why they required a cockpit guest to provide the solution

It took 3 pilots and the jumpseater to save the day ! They did 1 thing right though, they determined the probable fault of the stick shaker and dealt with it and went forward. In the accident flight , they didn't deal with the stick shaker in the same manner and it allowed a higher and confusing workload

IMHO an experienced pilot with good airmanship would:

1) leave the bloody flaps in a position where nothing bad happens and reduce power and land 2) Operate the trim if necessary as it was effective in getting back to a trimmed position ( they already knew that ) and 3) shut off the trim switches because there was obviously a trim runaway of some sort ( unreliable trim operation) and land asap . Even with the stick shaker AND especially now a runaway trim, it should have been obvious to say " to hell with this , leave the F______ flaps alone, shut off the trim and manually fly to the nearest suitable runway, and screw the ATC" !

In this order I would prioritize the fault 1) Boeing 2) the FAA and 3 ) the Pilots ( When I say Pilots, I mean the pilots failure to follow simple trim runaway procedure, fly the airplane, prioritize and land asap. I am also meaning the airlines for their overemphasis on automation, inexperienced pilots, lack of airmanship and economic / corrupt forces causing an atmosphere not conducive to safety ETC!

[corethatthermal]

He gave a few feeble inputs of nose-up trim with his thumb switch and began calling on God for a miracle. The MCAS ignored his entreaties and pitched the airplane into a steepening dive at airspeeds that quickly exceeded the engineered limits. Harvino stopped even trying to thumb the trim.

Obviously, Being Ethiopian and calling on "god" He was most likely calling on allah ! There have been other accidents where this scenario played out and they have often given up on the fight and prayed to their god (Satan) but with no effect !

[boeingboy]

Throttles should have been full power the entire time, if not more power - it was the only thing that kept them in the air as long as it did.
More power= more airspeed= less nose up elevator.
As there nose was trimmed down (thank you MCAS) a reduction in airspeed would have doomed the flight sooner as the FDR shows the elevator controls fully aft.
Basic principles of flight.

Correct - in a properly trimed airplane.

Here in lies the problem...…..with increased airspeed - yes there is increased lift - however in this case there is also increased force acting on the nose down stab....increasing the amount of back force required on the yoke to maintain level flight.

Trim the aircraft for hands off flight - basic airmanship.

[boeingboy]

With the nose down trim the only thing keeping the bird in the air was airspeed.

Horse poop. See above post.

[boeingboy]

I suggest you do the same.

Looking at the graph in the preliminary report, they were close to/at vmo from the moment the mcas started to trim down, attempting an uncommanded descend. The crew fought it by force. How would it make any sense at all to reduce power when the plane wants to descend and you want to climb?

When they couldn't hold it anymore vmo was grossly exceeded.

I have...many times.

See above posts. Besides - I was responding to your comment that they were in an uncontrolled decent. That was only the last 10 secs or so.

[boeingboy]

As there nose was trimmed down (thank you MCAS) a reduction in airspeed would have doomed the flight sooner as the FDR shows the elevator controls fully aft.

No it doesn't.

The had approximately 1/2 back yoke deflection for most of the flight. With regards to throttle and stab position - the readings are very close to the Lion air aircraft and they were able to throttle back without issue. In fact - using some of the logic some people here are using - you might say that throttling back was the right thing to do as Lion air was airborne about 3x longer. (just throwing that out there)

The Lion air FDR data only shows control column force and not position - I don't think it's possible to find a control column position simply by looking at the force applied on a graph. But it does show they exerted approx. 50 lbs - which is half measured scale.

Again - Trim the airplane.

[boeingboy]

t
by corethatthermal » Sun Oct 20, 2019 8:38 pm
The fight continued for the next five minutes, during which time the MCAS mounted more than 20 attacks and began to prevail.
3 things come to mind

1 The stick shaker and indications are already a past event, they figured it out and moved on.
2 They knew that flaps out worked and that retracting the flaps produced a "runaway trim" ( they retracted flaps after take-off, experienced the mcas runaway, set flaps back, it stopped, THEN they retracted the flaps AGAIN ! )
3 They knew that the trim was running away from them AND that they could stop it with electric trim operation

On the previous flight, this happened :
Finally the ghost in the jump seat intervened. It is impossible to know if he was a better airman than the pilots in the front or simply had the advantage of an overview. Either way, he recommended the obvious — shutting off the electric trim by flipping the cutout switches. The captain flipped the switches, the trim stopped running away and the MCAS was disabled. It was that easy.

With the captain’s stick shaker continuing to rattle and the trim switches set to the off (cutout) position, the crew flew to Jakarta without further issue, adjusting trim as sometimes necessary by use of the manual trim wheels mounted on both sides of the central pedestal, and landed just before midnight. Investigators do not seem to have explored why the pilots required nearly five minutes to handle what normally might have been a 30-second adventure, or why they required a cockpit guest to provide the solution
It took 3 pilots and the jumpseater to save the day ! They did 1 thing right though, they determined the probable fault of the stick shaker and dealt with it and went forward. In the accident flight , they didn't deal with the stick shaker in the same manner and it allowed a higher and confusing workload

IMHO an experienced pilot with good airmanship would:

1) leave the bloody flaps in a position where nothing bad happens and reduce power and land 2) Operate the trim if necessary as it was effective in getting back to a trimmed position ( they already knew that ) and 3) shut off the trim switches because there was obviously a trim runaway of some sort ( unreliable trim operation) and land asap . Even with the stick shaker AND especially now a runaway trim, it should have been obvious to say " to hell with this , leave the F______ flaps alone, shut off the trim and manually fly to the nearest suitable runway, and screw the ATC" !

In this order I would prioritize the fault 1) Boeing 2) the FAA and 3 ) the Pilots ( When I say Pilots, I mean the pilots failure to follow simple trim runaway procedure, fly the airplane, prioritize and land asap. I am also meaning the airlines for their overemphasis on automation, inexperienced pilots, lack of airmanship and economic / corrupt forces causing an atmosphere not conducive to safety ETC!

Well said.

[Curiousflyer]

As there nose was trimmed down (thank you MCAS) a reduction in airspeed would have doomed the flight sooner as the FDR shows the elevator controls fully aft.

No it doesn't.

The had approximately 1/2 back yoke deflection for most of the flight. With regards to throttle and stab position - the readings are very close to the Lion air aircraft and they were able to throttle back without issue. In fact - using some of the logic some people here are using - you might say that throttling back was the right thing to do as Lion air was airborne about 3x longer. (just throwing that out there)

The Lion air FDR data only shows control column force and not position - I don't think it's possible to find a control column position simply by looking at the force applied on a graph. But it does show they exerted approx. 50 lbs - which is half measured scale.

Again - Trim the airplane.

The Ethiopian FDR shows column input and has a maximum range. The graphs show control column position, not “force”. When the aircraft accelerates to VMO it is very clear that the control column position is fully aft, ie the only thing that saved them was increasing the airspeed as the elevator was fully aft at the time. According to the radar altimeter they were 1000 feet AGL at this time. If the aircraft would have been going slower, it would have crashed. The aircraft was flying at maximum lift, due to the commanded nose down trim of MCAS. This event happens 100 seconds into the flight, full aft elevator deflection due to nose down trim, the only recourse to keep the plane flying is full power.
After the aircraft accelerated to VMO, you’re right it took about 1/2 column input to keep the aircraft flying, thankfully they were going that fast! And thank you for proving my point.
Now it could have been possible to reduce the thrust before this event, but why? Do you always reduce thrust on takeoff? Pull the throttles back when you get a stall indication? Reduce thrust on takeoff because there’s a problem? Now if Boeing had done a proper job of trading pilots on MCAS, perhaps there would have been a training drill to reduce thrust and airspeed with the anticipation of nose down trim.