Me too. I always had fun trying to figure out what the hell he was saying.
Aww, now I'm getting all nostalgic...
Are the pilots lying to the accident investigators
Moderators: sky's the limit, sepia, Sulako, lilfssister, North Shore
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Diadem
- Rank 8
- Posts: 899
- Joined: Fri Mar 05, 2010 10:16 pm
- Location: A sigma left of the top of the bell curve
Re: Are the pilots lying to the accident investigators
Aww, now I'm getting all nostalgic...
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rookiepilot
- Rank 11
- Posts: 4413
- Joined: Sat Apr 01, 2017 3:50 pm
Re: Are the pilots lying to the accident investigators
Totally. Variable anything......
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goingnowherefast
- Rank (9)
- Posts: 1989
- Joined: Wed Mar 13, 2013 9:24 am
Re: Are the pilots lying to the accident investigators
Variable Stockholm Syndrome?
Re: Are the pilots lying to the accident investigators
Anyone that misses PDW should starting pulling off their fingernails, one each day for 10 days. On the 11th day you'll miss not having another one to pull off. That'll get you over it.
Being stupid around airplanes is a capital offence and nature is a hanging judge!
“It ain't what you don't know that gets you into trouble. It's what you know for sure that just ain't so.”
Mark Twain
“It ain't what you don't know that gets you into trouble. It's what you know for sure that just ain't so.”
Mark Twain
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rookiepilot
- Rank 11
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- Joined: Sat Apr 01, 2017 3:50 pm
Re: Are the pilots lying to the accident investigators
Passenger statements:
"The plane was running completely fine the entire ride, we then began flying really low &
he said “ this is where I like to do some water dancing” we flew low over the water around the
curves of the lake the lake straightened out & so did we, we were flying low & about 75-
80mph I believe the plane was level. It was running completely fine, no weird noises or
movements, I was looking straight then looked to my right and saw we were level if not right
above or below the power lines and as soon as I thought “ what the f” we got yanked or
grabbed and violently thrown down into the water"
"bruce kept saying he couldn't believe that
happened & asking if i was ok. he said he has to tell insurance it was engine failure or they
wont cover it, he kept mentioning it was a 200k plane, he was visibly upset, we really did not
have much conversation but once we were both in the ambulance the-medics and police had
asked him what happened and he said an engine failed,"
" That is my statement & it is all correct. I would like to also emphasize that we were
not exiting the water or area when he hit the lines, it was not engine failure, he either thought he was low enough to
miss the lines or just did not see them. I would also like to emphasize that he mentioned in front of me & and others
that he had to say it was engine failure or his insurance would not cover his “ 200k plane”. That’s all I’m my
statement."
You can look at docket #1 to see what the pilot told the NTSB.....focusing on engine problems when he hit a power line.....
https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=105808
"The plane was running completely fine the entire ride, we then began flying really low &
he said “ this is where I like to do some water dancing” we flew low over the water around the
curves of the lake the lake straightened out & so did we, we were flying low & about 75-
80mph I believe the plane was level. It was running completely fine, no weird noises or
movements, I was looking straight then looked to my right and saw we were level if not right
above or below the power lines and as soon as I thought “ what the f” we got yanked or
grabbed and violently thrown down into the water"
"bruce kept saying he couldn't believe that
happened & asking if i was ok. he said he has to tell insurance it was engine failure or they
wont cover it, he kept mentioning it was a 200k plane, he was visibly upset, we really did not
have much conversation but once we were both in the ambulance the-medics and police had
asked him what happened and he said an engine failed,"
" That is my statement & it is all correct. I would like to also emphasize that we were
not exiting the water or area when he hit the lines, it was not engine failure, he either thought he was low enough to
miss the lines or just did not see them. I would also like to emphasize that he mentioned in front of me & and others
that he had to say it was engine failure or his insurance would not cover his “ 200k plane”. That’s all I’m my
statement."
You can look at docket #1 to see what the pilot told the NTSB.....focusing on engine problems when he hit a power line.....
https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=105808
Re: Are the pilots lying to the accident investigators
Well I guess he was right that eventually he had an engine failure....
As an AvCanada discussion grows longer:
-the probability of 'entitlement' being mentioned, approaches 1
-one will be accused of using bad airmanship
-the probability of 'entitlement' being mentioned, approaches 1
-one will be accused of using bad airmanship
Re: Are the pilots lying to the accident investigators
It is interesting sometimes how when a report is made, there is no lying, but the writer may through omission, fail to mention how screwed up things really were. In other words, you may not be getting the full story.
From ASRS.....
An ERJ-175 flight crew describes a confusing and
convoluted sequence of events during an approach where
CRM and SOP performance is questioned by both pilots.
Captain’s report:
The flight was vectored to base for an RNAV approach
while flying with full automation. The vectors brought us
inside the fix that the FMS had been extended off of. I failed
to direct the pilot monitoring (PM) to advance the FMS
to a fix in front of us or to activate vectors. This caused
the aircraft not to capture the final approach course, so
I had to manually turn the aircraft back toward the final
approach course. By the time we got back on course, we
were significantly high, and the FMS still didn’t capture
the course. I directed the PM to go gear down, flap 3, then
flap full. I then mistimed my attempt to get on glideslope
by dropping the nose too quickly after disengaging the
autopilot, overspeeding the flaps. Unable to regain
glideslope, I elected to discontinue prior to 1,000 feet. As
I did so, I directed the PM to go flap 4 and cycle the FMS
forward. I believe my direction to sequence the FMS at this
point was a key error, since it distracted [the PM] from
getting the flaps retracted quickly. When the PM struggled
to sequence the FMS, I opted to hit Takeoff/Go-Around (TO/
GA) [mode] and do a go-around instead of discontinue. I
was hand-flying and did not pull the nose up quickly enough,
so the aircraft rapidly accelerated to the point we almost
oversped the flaps again. I overrode the autothrottle to slow
the aircraft, and we immediately got an EGPWS warning,
surprising us both. After a split second of shock, I climbed
rapidly to honor the warning. We then stabilized, caught our
breath, and were vectored back around for a landing.
First Officer’s report:
At around base, the pilot flying (PF) had me clean up the
approach from a waypoint behind us. I suggested that we
would not capture lateral guidance this way, but the PF said
we would. We were cleared for the approach, but the aircraft
did not capture lateral or vertical guidance.… No approach
callouts were performed, because the course was never
alive and [glidepath] was never alive. No missed approach
altitude was set, due to the same reason.… I did not hear the
missed approach callout, so I said, “Missed approach, flap
4,” and the PF said, “Positive rate, gear up.” I suggested
he press TO/GA. I noticed that we were descending, and the
flight director guidance was in its standard pitch up attitude
for a go-around, so I suggested we pitch up. The PF did not
pitch up, so I took the controls and pitched up, then handed
controls back after we were established on a climb.… I
called, “Autopilot on, autothrottle on,” because I noticed
that those were not on, and it would increase situational
awareness if those were on. I switched over to Approach,
and they asked if we were climbing. I said we were, and
they started vectoring us. At this point, the autopilot and
autothrottles were on, and I continued monitoring the
trajectory of the airplane. We were vectored on downwind.
On base, the PF had me clean it up from a waypoint behind
us. I suggested vectors to final.… We may have gone through
final again, I do not recall precisely.… By 1,000 feet we were
stabilized and cleared to land, so we continued and landed
and taxied normally.
From ASRS.....
An ERJ-175 flight crew describes a confusing and
convoluted sequence of events during an approach where
CRM and SOP performance is questioned by both pilots.
Captain’s report:
The flight was vectored to base for an RNAV approach
while flying with full automation. The vectors brought us
inside the fix that the FMS had been extended off of. I failed
to direct the pilot monitoring (PM) to advance the FMS
to a fix in front of us or to activate vectors. This caused
the aircraft not to capture the final approach course, so
I had to manually turn the aircraft back toward the final
approach course. By the time we got back on course, we
were significantly high, and the FMS still didn’t capture
the course. I directed the PM to go gear down, flap 3, then
flap full. I then mistimed my attempt to get on glideslope
by dropping the nose too quickly after disengaging the
autopilot, overspeeding the flaps. Unable to regain
glideslope, I elected to discontinue prior to 1,000 feet. As
I did so, I directed the PM to go flap 4 and cycle the FMS
forward. I believe my direction to sequence the FMS at this
point was a key error, since it distracted [the PM] from
getting the flaps retracted quickly. When the PM struggled
to sequence the FMS, I opted to hit Takeoff/Go-Around (TO/
GA) [mode] and do a go-around instead of discontinue. I
was hand-flying and did not pull the nose up quickly enough,
so the aircraft rapidly accelerated to the point we almost
oversped the flaps again. I overrode the autothrottle to slow
the aircraft, and we immediately got an EGPWS warning,
surprising us both. After a split second of shock, I climbed
rapidly to honor the warning. We then stabilized, caught our
breath, and were vectored back around for a landing.
First Officer’s report:
At around base, the pilot flying (PF) had me clean up the
approach from a waypoint behind us. I suggested that we
would not capture lateral guidance this way, but the PF said
we would. We were cleared for the approach, but the aircraft
did not capture lateral or vertical guidance.… No approach
callouts were performed, because the course was never
alive and [glidepath] was never alive. No missed approach
altitude was set, due to the same reason.… I did not hear the
missed approach callout, so I said, “Missed approach, flap
4,” and the PF said, “Positive rate, gear up.” I suggested
he press TO/GA. I noticed that we were descending, and the
flight director guidance was in its standard pitch up attitude
for a go-around, so I suggested we pitch up. The PF did not
pitch up, so I took the controls and pitched up, then handed
controls back after we were established on a climb.… I
called, “Autopilot on, autothrottle on,” because I noticed
that those were not on, and it would increase situational
awareness if those were on. I switched over to Approach,
and they asked if we were climbing. I said we were, and
they started vectoring us. At this point, the autopilot and
autothrottles were on, and I continued monitoring the
trajectory of the airplane. We were vectored on downwind.
On base, the PF had me clean it up from a waypoint behind
us. I suggested vectors to final.… We may have gone through
final again, I do not recall precisely.… By 1,000 feet we were
stabilized and cleared to land, so we continued and landed
and taxied normally.
