Boeing Systemic Problems Continue

[2R]

If it just requires pilot training ,and pilots to do their jobs.

Why is it still grounded ?

Surely they could have retrained them all by now ?

Or is it the reasoning . It is taking so long to find a solution is because there is no real problem ?
Aviation has never been safer .

That first crash may have been avoided if the aircraft had been grounded as the previous crew had control issues , but for some reason the crew did not communicate the issues in a manner that would have mitigated the risk to the next flight. Getting a control issue Dvfr is easier to handle than a control issue while IMC .

The Kipling ceremony is all about trust.

The issues raised by the Boeing test pilot were not communicated in a way that resulted in mitigation of those issues . But were communicated in a manner to obfuscate the issues using " Jedi mind tricks"
Others regulators may not be as generous and demand to witness test flights through video links.

Trust is like Virginity , you only need to get fooked once to lose it

[L39Guy]

The MAX is still grounded because this is no longer a technical or certification issue - the MCAS was fixed a long time ago. This is a political issue and when politics and politicians get involved it get really stupid, really fast. You can train the pilots all you want but until the aircraft has a valid C of A, what is the point?

I don't recall what the weather was for the Lion Air crash but the Ethiopean one as clear and million VFR and after the AD about the MCAS had been issued that reminded crews of the UAS and stab trim runaway drills as well as providing the symptoms of a MCAS failure. How do you explain that crash when the captain did not do the UAS drill, let alone the runaway trim drill with full knowledge of MCAS?

Professional pilots are paid to know their stuff, particularly recall drills. I don't think that's too much to ask. Do you?

[2R]

You seem convinced that these accidents are the pilots fault ?
And yet the aircraft are still grounded and may not fly revenue flights until March. Which march is anyone's guess.

I am trying to keep an open mind .

Learn from the mistakes of others, you will not live long enough to make them all yourself.

https://www.airliners.net/forum/viewtop ... start=5550

[L39Guy]

Have you read the accident report or are you relying on such knowledgeable Aviation publication like the G and Mail, New York Times, Washington Post, etc.?

If you read the Indonesian report, which I think is very well done, there is plenty of blame allotted but the failure of the crew to do what they (should) have been trained to do is blindingly obvious.

Read the report, cover to cover, then we can chat again.

[corethatthermal]

you will see that Boeing used sound reasoning and judgement with the MCAS.

Thats BULLSHIT ! A system with only 1 driving sensor ( instead of what should have been 3 ) A system that went 3+ times quicker than any previous system ( and FAA was not informed ) and a system that would drive trim down then stop for 5 seconds then start again,,,,all this stuff was not known to pilots flying the A/C ! And all the bells and whistles AND the stick shaker And where is the MCAS switch WHY combine it with the yoke trim system. All it should have taken was 1 person at Boeing to do a simulated sensor failure in the sim to find out the repercussions !

[2R]

I stayed in a holiday inn last week and I am an avid reader of the back of toilet doors at airports and flying clubs . Although I must say the quality of art and Intel gleaned from the rambling scribes of the outhouse has gone down since the internet .

The Seattle Times has some great insight into the issue , but they have not assigned blame yet , and are still digging through the facts . They are a bit biased as Seattle does have a lot of great Boeing employees who have contributed to make aviation as safe as it is today .

There are few media outlets that are considered papers of record . That is a byproduct of the internet .

The record is still open and the investigations are still ongoing . Hence the Aircraft are still grounded .
QED
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/

[L39Guy]

you will see that Boeing used sound reasoning and judgement with the MCAS.

Thats BULLSHIT ! A system with only 1 driving sensor ( instead of what should have been 3 ) A system that went 3+ times quicker than any previous system ( and FAA was not informed ) and a system that would drive trim down then stop for 5 seconds then start again,,,,all this stuff was not known to pilots flying the A/C ! And all the bells and whistles AND the stick shaker And where is the MCAS switch WHY combine it with the yoke trim system. All it should have taken was 1 person at Boeing to do a simulated sensor failure in the sim to find out the repercussions !

Easy on the language, cowboy.

I agree that MCAS needs to be redesigned to be dual sensor, less aggressive and limited to a smaller, maximum angle.

But a single point of failure is nothing new to aircraft. Engine failures and a window blowing out are also single point of failures. That's why there are emergency procedures including those that must be memorized.

The Ethiopian pilots knew about MCAS - explain to me why they didn't do the UAS drill which would have at least allowed them control the aircraft even with MCAS. And how about the stab trim runaway drill for what was by all appearance to be a stab trim runaway.

Pilots are the last line of defense. This event was perfectly manageable just like an engine failure, which is also a single point of failure. But the pilots have to be competent - the Lion Air pilots the day before were, the ones the next day were not. please read the report.

[Duke Point]

I gotta agree with L39Guy.

We live in a blameless society when it comes to people. NEVER blame the individual. Look elsewhere.

Memory drills were forgotten, ignored, or done incorrectly. Yes MCAS V.1 was poorly designed, but the 737's in question were NEVER uncontrollable.

Memory drills are memory drills for a reason, and these crashes --would not have occurred--- if the proper memory drills had been followed. Unfortunately this valuable lesson will likely be lost in the media firestorm, and sloppy pilots will continue to make fundamental errors.

DP.

[TFTMB heavy]

you will see that Boeing used sound reasoning and judgement with the MCAS.

Thats BULLSHIT ! A system with only 1 driving sensor ( instead of what should have been 3 ) A system that went 3+ times quicker than any previous system ( and FAA was not informed ) and a system that would drive trim down then stop for 5 seconds then start again,,,,all this stuff was not known to pilots flying the A/C ! And all the bells and whistles AND the stick shaker And where is the MCAS switch WHY combine it with the yoke trim system. All it should have taken was 1 person at Boeing to do a simulated sensor failure in the sim to find out the repercussions !

Easy on the language, cowboy.

I agree that MCAS needs to be redesigned to be dual sensor, less aggressive and limited to a smaller, maximum angle.

But a single point of failure is nothing new to aircraft. Engine failures and a window blowing out are also single point of failures. That's why there are emergency procedures including those that must be memorized.

The Ethiopian pilots knew about MCAS - explain to me why they didn't do the UAS drill which would have at least allowed them control the aircraft even with MCAS. And how about the stab trim runaway drill for what was by all appearance to be a stab trim runaway.

Pilots are the last line of defense. This event was perfectly manageable just like an engine failure, which is also a single point of failure. But the pilots have to be competent - the Lion Air pilots the day before were, the ones the next day were not. please read the report.

Didn’t they have a third pilot on the jumpseat and he’s the one that suggested they flip the trim cutoff switches? They also didn’t snag the defect if IRC.

Also, I read on here that Boeing still hasn’t submitted the full software package for the MCAS fix and that pilots still pooched it in the sim during testing for the fix.

[Old fella]

I gotta agree with L39Guy.

We live in a blameless society when it comes to people. NEVER blame the individual. Look elsewhere.

Memory drills were forgotten, ignored, or done incorrectly. Yes MCAS V.1 was poorly designed, but the 737's in question were NEVER uncontrollable.

Memory drills are memory drills for a reason, and these crashes --would not have occurred--- if the proper memory drills had been followed. Unfortunately this valuable lesson will likely be lost in the media firestorm, and sloppy pilots will continue to make fundamental errors.

DP.

To this uninformed bystander on all things B737 and airlines, I never heard nor read anything on this side of the airline earth about the MCAS getting out of hand. If there were such incidents no ‘37s went screaming(literally and figuratively) head first into the ground at a great number of kts, that would say to me training and execution of required memory drills were appropriately attended to. Just asking!

[corethatthermal]

Pilots are the last line of defense. This event was perfectly manageable just like an engine failure, which is also a single point of failure. But the pilots have to be competent - the Lion Air pilots the day before were, the ones the next day were not. please read the report.

I agree The pilots were ALSO at fault ,,,,Boeing first, then the pilots . The plane, as configured , should have never made it into pilots hands, let alone incompetent ones ! BTW, Where is the NG switch that only shut -off the Automatic trim systems but allowed the yoke trim to work ?

[L39Guy]

Didn’t they have a third pilot on the jumpseat and he’s the one that suggested they flip the trim cutoff switches? They also didn’t snag the defect if IRC.

Also, I read on here that Boeing still hasn’t submitted the full software package for the MCAS fix and that pilots still pooched it in the sim during testing for the fix.

There is no mention in the Indonesian report of a jumpseater telling them to turn off the stab trim on the incident flight.

Don't believe everything you read on here; my guess that everything has been redesigned, tested and submitted by now as there is huge pressure to get it done.

[L39Guy]

Pilots are the last line of defense. This event was perfectly manageable just like an engine failure, which is also a single point of failure. But the pilots have to be competent - the Lion Air pilots the day before were, the ones the next day were not. please read the report.

I agree The pilots were ALSO at fault ,,,,Boeing first, then the pilots . The plane, as configured , should have never made it into pilots hands, let alone incompetent ones ! BTW, Where is the NG switch that only shut -off the Automatic trim systems but allowed the yoke trim to work ?

If you would read the Indonesian report, you will see that blame is allocated to Boeing, FAA, the outfit that overhauls these AOA probes, the Indonesian regulator, Lion Air, the contract maintenance outfit that "fixed" the problem after the incident flight and finally the pilots. Lots of blame to go around.

[L39Guy]

It is interesting and sad how times have changed, particularly with the social media frenzy.

There were two fatal B737 accidents in the US, United 585 in Colorado Springs in 1991 and US Air 427 in Pennsylvania in 1994, both of which were determined to be caused by a defective rudder actuator that would go hard over for no apparent reason. Unlike the MCAS issue, it took a long, long time to figure out what caused the accident and even longer to fix the problem with new actuators.

Yet, in the 1990's the B737's kept on flying with crews being alerted to the issue, its symptoms and reminded of the recovery actions. Every B737 out there was a ticking time bomb but the risk was accepted as it was felt that trained crews could manage the situation. And there were thousands of B737's affected by this.

Fast forward twenty five years. An entire sub-fleet of the B737 is grounded over an issue that was known shortly after the first accident, was known immediately after the second accident, it has been demonstrated that the aircraft is flyable by line pilots with this condition by trained pilots (Lion Air incident flight) and no special procedures or training is required because the response in an MCAS event is simple, well known, memory emergency drills.

The treatment of the MAX has got to be more than just a fix of the MCAS. Surely there are other political (FAA spanking Boeing), geopolitical (China sticking it to the US/Trump), competitive (Airbus vs Boeing), media (conventional and sensationalism) and social media issues at play.

[Curiousflyer]

It is interesting and sad how times have changed, particularly with the social media frenzy.

There were two fatal B737 accidents in the US, United 585 in Colorado Springs in 1991 and US Air 427 in Pennsylvania in 1994, both of which were determined to be caused by a defective rudder actuator that would go hard over for no apparent reason. Unlike the MCAS issue, it took a long, long time to figure out what caused the accident and even longer to fix the problem with new actuators.

Yet, in the 1990's the B737's kept on flying with crews being alerted to the issue, its symptoms and reminded of the recovery actions. Every B737 out there was a ticking time bomb but the risk was accepted as it was felt that trained crews could manage the situation. And there were thousands of B737's affected by this.

Fast forward twenty five years. An entire sub-fleet of the B737 is grounded over an issue that was known shortly after the first accident, was known immediately after the second accident, it has been demonstrated that the aircraft is flyable by line pilots with this condition by trained pilots (Lion Air incident flight) and no special procedures or training is required because the response in an MCAS event is simple, well known, memory emergency drills.

The treatment of the MAX has got to be more than just a fix of the MCAS. Surely there are other political (FAA spanking Boeing), geopolitical (China sticking it to the US/Trump), competitive (Airbus vs Boeing), media (conventional and sensationalism) and social media issues at play.

The MCAS response is not simple. It’s incredibly complex and difficult to diagnose amongst the many bells and whistles going off.
https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safe ... ax-return/

“During the recent pilot trials, which tested how crews react to various scenarios involving the revised 737 Max flight control software and new checklists, all the pilots managed to get themselves out of trouble, but Boeing and regulators found that “more than half…of pilots responded with the wrong procedures,” ”

[boeingboy]

“During the recent pilot trials, which tested how crews react to various scenarios involving the revised 737 Max flight control software and new checklists, all the pilots managed to get themselves out of trouble, but Boeing and regulators found that “more than half…of pilots responded with the wrong procedures,” ”

Yes - I read the same thing....but you have to keep an open mind as there are too few details. Such as what procedures did they use and at what time, why did they do that, and what were the actual issues.

The main takeaway here is that even though they applied the incorrect procedures - they all were able to recover the aircraft. That itself speaks volumes about the re-design itself.

[boeingboy]

I agree The pilots were ALSO at fault ,,,,Boeing first, then the pilots . The plane, as configured , should have never made it into pilots hands, let alone incompetent ones ! BTW, Where is the NG switch that only shut -off the Automatic trim systems but allowed the yoke trim to work ?

You should do less yapping and more learning.

As someone who is not a pilot and has no knowledge of aircraft design, engineering or operation....you should be listening and asking intelligent questions from those more experienced. As has been said before - the switches to disable the trim system on the 737 and pretty much all other Boeing airplanes are located on the center pedestal - just to the right of the fuel cutoff switches. Well within easy reach of either pilot.

As for the configuration - single point failures happen. They have happen many times before. Just familiarize yourself with Turkish Airlines 1951. Yes it was a single point failure - but it was the inattention of the crew that doomed the plane.

It is very interesting to learn just how and why MCAS morphed into what it is now. Boeing didn't intentionally design it badly, and the thing that sticks out to me is that they actually had protections built in so you could shut it off. Airbus never did that. If it faults - you ride It into the ground - unless the aircraft decides to give control back to you (Qantas Flight 72) ((Yes - there are new procedures now))

Boeing must share some of the blame for the accident - but as I have maintained since day one - even with that failure, the aircraft was not unrecoverable.

[plausiblyannonymous]

It is interesting and sad how times have changed, particularly with the social media frenzy.

There were two fatal B737 accidents in the US, United 585 in Colorado Springs in 1991 and US Air 427 in Pennsylvania in 1994, both of which were determined to be caused by a defective rudder actuator that would go hard over for no apparent reason. Unlike the MCAS issue, it took a long, long time to figure out what caused the accident and even longer to fix the problem with new actuators.

Yet, in the 1990's the B737's kept on flying with crews being alerted to the issue, its symptoms and reminded of the recovery actions. Every B737 out there was a ticking time bomb but the risk was accepted as it was felt that trained crews could manage the situation. And there were thousands of B737's affected by this.

Fast forward twenty five years. An entire sub-fleet of the B737 is grounded over an issue that was known shortly after the first accident, was known immediately after the second accident, it has been demonstrated that the aircraft is flyable by line pilots with this condition by trained pilots (Lion Air incident flight) and no special procedures or training is required because the response in an MCAS event is simple, well known, memory emergency drills.

The treatment of the MAX has got to be more than just a fix of the MCAS. Surely there are other political (FAA spanking Boeing), geopolitical (China sticking it to the US/Trump), competitive (Airbus vs Boeing), media (conventional and sensationalism) and social media issues at play.

I understand the point you are making, but you are failing to account for Boeing's actions in 2009 vs 1991.

Boeing made a choice to have critical flight control software be affected by a single AoA sensor. It was a choice to save money and it backfired. They were shown to have cheated the system and now they are facing the consequences.

The rudder control failure was a malfunction that could not have been foreseen.

[corethatthermal]

As someone who is not a pilot and has no knowledge of aircraft design, engineering or operation

Maybe YOU are the armchair wannabe , Please answer the below information Boeing boy

The Boeing 737 NG has stabilizer trim cutout switches marked as MAIN ELECT (left) and AUTOPILOT (right). Turning off the right switch disables automatic stabilizer trim in autopilot mode and automatic stabilizer trim by the STS in manual mode. The stabilizer can still be trimmed with electric trim switches on the control wheel or manually with the hand crank. Turning off the left switch disables the electric trim on the control wheel.

The Boeing 737 MAX has stabilizer cutout switches marked as PRI (left) and B/U (right).

With the MAX, Boeing added MCAS to the existing STS functionality. If Boeing kept the cutoff switches functionality intact, then turning off the right switch would disable both STS and MCAS, keeping the electric trim operable. Instead, in case of misbehaving MCAS Boeing requires to cut off BOTH switches without explaining what each of the switches does. With both switches turned off the only option to change stabilizer trim is to use a hand crank.

What do you know, I found the answer to my exact question in the Seattle Times:

First of all, even after two fatal crashes,

Boeing declined to detail the specific functionality of the two switches.

Nevertheless,

The Seattle Times found that the left switch on the 737 NG model is capable of deactivating the buttons on the yoke that pilots regularly press with their thumb to control the horizontal stabilizer. The right switch on the 737 NG is capable of deactivating just the automated controls of the stabilizer.

So far this corresponds to the information I found in the 737 NG FCOM myself.

As Boeing was transitioning from its 737 NG model to the 737 MAX, the company altered the labeling and the purpose of those two switches.

On the newer 737 MAX, according to documents reviewed by The Times, those two switches were changed to perform the same function – flipping either one of them would turn off all electric controls of the stabilizer. That means there is no longer an option to turn off automated functions – such as MCAS – without also turning off the thumb buttons the pilots would normally use to control the stabilizer.

If the above is correct, then not only MCAS, but STS/autopilot as well cannot be turned off on the MAX while keeping electric trim on the control wheel functional.

Peter Lemme, a former Boeing flight-controls engineer, said if the company had maintained the switch design from the 737 NG, Boeing could have instructed pilots after the Lion Air crash last year to simply flip the “AUTO PILOT” switch to deactivate MCAS and continue flying with the normal trim buttons on the control wheel.

(^ bold is mine). This is exactly what I was alluding to in my question. I really want to hear the reasons for the change.

Lemme said he’s surprised that Boeing made the change to take away the functionality that could have allowed the pilots to shut off MCAS without shutting off the electric switches at their thumbs.

Oops.

[L39Guy]

It is interesting and sad how times have changed, particularly with the social media frenzy.

There were two fatal B737 accidents in the US, United 585 in Colorado Springs in 1991 and US Air 427 in Pennsylvania in 1994, both of which were determined to be caused by a defective rudder actuator that would go hard over for no apparent reason. Unlike the MCAS issue, it took a long, long time to figure out what caused the accident and even longer to fix the problem with new actuators.

Yet, in the 1990's the B737's kept on flying with crews being alerted to the issue, its symptoms and reminded of the recovery actions. Every B737 out there was a ticking time bomb but the risk was accepted as it was felt that trained crews could manage the situation. And there were thousands of B737's affected by this.

Fast forward twenty five years. An entire sub-fleet of the B737 is grounded over an issue that was known shortly after the first accident, was known immediately after the second accident, it has been demonstrated that the aircraft is flyable by line pilots with this condition by trained pilots (Lion Air incident flight) and no special procedures or training is required because the response in an MCAS event is simple, well known, memory emergency drills.

The treatment of the MAX has got to be more than just a fix of the MCAS. Surely there are other political (FAA spanking Boeing), geopolitical (China sticking it to the US/Trump), competitive (Airbus vs Boeing), media (conventional and sensationalism) and social media issues at play.

I understand the point you are making, but you are failing to account for Boeing's actions in 2009 vs 1991.

Boeing made a choice to have critical flight control software be affected by a single AoA sensor. It was a choice to save money and it backfired. They were shown to have cheated the system and now they are facing the consequences.

The rudder control failure was a malfunction that could not have been foreseen.

In retrospect, perhaps there should be dual input. I suppose its easy to second guess engineers and test pilots after these accidents and say "I told you so". Engineering and design involves choices and compromises based upon cost, ease of implementation, weight, complexity, etc.

Boeing made a mistake with the NG when they used a single source of radar altimetry which turned out to be the cause of the Turkish accident at Schipol. Now it is a dual installation - I suppose they assumed how could two pilots (in the Turkish case, three) could possibly not notice the throttles going to idle hundreds and thousands of feet in the air, let alone not notice the speed decay to the stall.

Airbus never contemplated someone flying into a thunderstorm in the ITCZ where the rate of ice accretion exceeding the heating capabilities of the probes. Nor did they anticipate a situation where one pilot is pulling back and the other pushing forward on the joystick (AF 447) with the aircraft getting into a deep stall.

ATR never anticipated pilots shutting down the wrong engine shortly after take-off (Taipei).

And finally, Boeing never thought that professional airline pilots type rated on the B737 could not hand fly the aircraft - i.e. manually trim the aircraft with the thumb switch (thus shutting off MCAS), pulling the power levers out of take-off power to at least a climb or cruise setting so they were not racing around at Vne and trying to use the manual trim wheel. Boeing never thought that professional airline pilots type rated on the B737 could not recognize an unreliable airspeed condition let alone do the (very) simple drill. Boeing never thought that professional airline pilots type rated on the B737 could not, after 26 trim runaways, not turn of the stab trim using the cut-out switches.

Use your imagination and think of the wildest, most ridiculous situation of pilot incompetence and now design an aircraft that will be crash proof. Good luck doing that with a cost and weight that would allow the aircraft to fly.