Former Navy pilot Dale ‘Snort’ Snodgrass dies in crash

[Aux1]

Former Navy pilot Dale ‘Snort’ Snodgrass dies in crash at Idaho airport

https://www.stripes.com/veterans/2021-0 ... 00056.html

RIP

[TG]

Nobody is safe from doing stupide mistakes.
https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID= ... vs3N6efqeY
https://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=https%3A ... _-Dua-tmaA

The pilot was attempting an intersection takeoff about midfield when, shortly after the airplane became airborne, it pitched up aggressively, rolled left, and descended into the ground in a nose-down attitude.
Examination did not reveal any evidence of preaccident malfunctions or failures of the flight control system, and there was no evidence to indicate that the pilot’s seat had moved. Both the engine and propeller exhibited damage signatures consistent with high engine power at impact.
The airplane was equipped with a flight control locking system that comprised a pivoting, U- shaped control lock tube mounted permanently to the rudder pedal assembly and a forward- facing locking arm mounted to the pilot’s control stick. The control lock immobilized the aileron and elevator controls but still allowed for near-full movement of the rudder and tailwheel.
The cabin floor, where the control lock tube should have been mounted for flight, was severely deformed and compressed. Had the lock been stowed during impact, it would have been pinned under the flight control stick, crushed longitudinally, and its retaining clip would have been deformed; however, the control lock and its retaining clip were essentially undamaged, and the lock was found raised off the floor. The locking arm on the control stick also showed no evidence of deformation or impact damage but had rotated about 90° to the right of its normal position, as if forced into that position on impact while the control lock was still attached.
Given this information, it is likely that the control lock was installed on the flight control stick during takeoff and impact. High-resolution security camera footage of the accident revealed no discernable movement of the elevators or ailerons, further suggesting that the flight controls were immobilized by the control lock.

[PilotDAR]

The SM1019 has some uncommon (to GA aircraft) control forces dependent upon flap setting, and it will certainly "fly the pilot" if allowed to do so. It will pitch up unexpectedly as it accelerates on climbout, I have run out of pitch down control travel in the one I flew, and had to reduce power to maintain a safe pitch attitude. I did a pitch control force study of the plane, and was able to repeat flight conditions in which there was control force reversal.

The SM1019 is sort of like a Greek Siren, luring pilots with it's fantastic capability. Magnificent performance, unique, agile, and just military enough to let you know you're in for an unusually fun flight. But it can bite in both pitch and yaw unlike the Cessnas which would seem so similar.

None of the foregoing is an excuse for failing to check "free and correct" before takeoff, but this is one airplane type which demands extra respect, and a step back to think about what you're doing, rather than just yielding to the call of the Siren....

[pelmet]

viewtopic.php?p=1147493#p1147493

A link to a post well worth reading about differences of opinion for enhancing safety. In fact you should read the whole thread. I wish the Snort, who seemed to be one of America’s most worshipped pilots had. It was only a few months earlier than the accident.

Reading that other thread should be a good message to new pilots not to let themselves be influenced by negative responses to simple safety checks that can save your life. same with experienced pilots. One can argue all they want but they can’t change the reality that if Snort gave a quick wiggle of the controls as part of a final procedure just before taking off, he wouldn’t have joined a long list of people who really wished they had.

General aviation is a dangerous game. Most experienced pilots know more fellow pilots that have been killed flying than fellow drivers killed while driving, despite the lopsided numbers between the two activities. My ratio is about ten to three.

While not a takeoff issue, I came closer to an incident than I would have liked in just the last week. Double check your killer items just before takeoff. Because very soon after, it will be too late. And the consequences can be deadly.

[photofly]

Once again, your obviously well-intentioned advice will not reach the people who need it, just like it would not have reached Dale Snodgrass, had he read it. As such, it’s of no use, and will do nothing to reduce accidents.

[pelmet]

There is no way of measuring the accuracy of your statement and I suspect you just say it as someone who digs in their heels in a discussion with a difference of opinion rather than be willing to admit your advice is higher risk. Inability to admit error(or that your idea is worse) is a significant weakness.

Anyways, say what you want, Snort is gone forever due to a rookie mistake. One that even the best of the best can make, more easily than they think. You won’t learn that from Top Gun movies.

[photofly]

Do a thought experiment.

What do you think a pilot with 1200 carrier landings in an F4 would say to you if you told them they should be sure to double check the controls weren’t locked before takeoff?

Play that conversation in your head. How does it go?

[‘Bob’]

The number of “exceptional” pilots who have met their end in rather pedestrian aircraft doing stupid things is quite astounding. Steve Fossett and Scott Crossfield are two examples that immediately come to mind.

That’s why safe flight is an attitude A person with 1200 traps should not only be treated like a 100 hour private pilot on a new aircraft, but they should deconstruct themselves back down that level and be asking the simplest of questions covering the basics.

Because in my opinion there’s no more dangerous combination than a very experienced pilot who thinks a new aircraft is simple and beneath them.

Complacency and overconfidence does not discriminate. A more skilled pilot may be able to recognize and salvage it quickly.. but they should have never been there in the first place.

[pelmet]

Do a thought experiment.

What do you think a pilot with 1200 carrier landings in an F4 would say to you if you told them they should be sure to double check the controls weren’t locked before takeoff?

Play that conversation in your head. How does it go?

It goes……”good idea”.

But my thinking this through also tells me that most of the rest who are not Top Guns say the same thing. And they are the ones reading this thread…..including you. If the best of the best does this, so will one of us eventually.

You do understand that, do you?

[photofly]

It might go that politely; it might not.

I think the bit that you’re ignoring is that good intentions on the ground don’t translate well into consistent action in the plane. If they did, everyone would run their checklists fine the first time, which we know they don’t.

If one has the consistency to do personal made-up checklists of “killer-items” then of course one has no need for made up personal checklists, because one has already consistently used the proper checklists.

The one time that you didn’t operate the checklist, that includes a check of “controls full free and correct” it will be for the same reason that you don’t do your own private made up checklist of personal “killer items”.

A 1200 carrier landing display pilot doesn’t need to be told to check the controls are free, and thinking that you’re having advised him to do so would have helped on the one occasion he appears not to have done, is learning the wrong lesson.

[pelmet]

It might go that politely; it might not.

A 1200 carrier landing display pilot doesn’t need to be told to check the controls are free, and thinking that you’re having advised him to do so would have helped on the one occasion he appears not to have done, is learning the wrong lesson.

Apparently, he does need to be told. Wish I had. If that ‘wrong lesson’ saves your life…..so be it.

I have nothing more to add than what was said on the linked thread.

[photofly]

Apparently, he does need to be told. Wish I had. If that ‘wrong lesson’ saves your life…..so be it.

Actually what he needed to do was to remove the control locks.

Then what he apparently needed to do was the check.
Don’t confuse being told to do something with actually doing it. They aren’t the same thing.

I have nothing more to add than what was said on the linked thread.

I’m sure you’ll find something soon enough.

[pelmet]

Apparently, he does need to be told. Wish I had. If that ‘wrong lesson’ saves your life…..so be it.

Actually what he needed to do was to remove the control locks.

Then what he apparently needed to do was the check.
Don’t confuse being told to do something with actually doing it. They aren’t the same thing.

I have nothing more to add than what was said on the linked thread.

I’m sure you’ll find something soon enough.

I have found nothing to add at this point.

[CpnCrunch]

Actually what he needed to do was to remove the control locks.

What he needed to do was use a checklist. Lots of people here say they don't use checklists.

[airway]

Here is a paraphrased version of this thread:



pelmet: Pilots should double check your killer items just before takeoff.

photofly: Although this is probably good advice, there is no point in giving it, as no pilot will listen to it.

pelmet: I believe there are some pilots who will listen and use it, so I will continue to give it.





.

[boeingboy]

The pilot purchased the airplane on April 21, 2021, and it was delivered to him in June by a friend, who was also a flight instructor. The instructor flew with the pilot for the first flight after delivery, during which they performed slow flight, stalls, steep turns, and multiple stop-and-go landings. The instructor stated that the pilot demonstrated proficiency in the operation of the airplane, and at no time did he need to take the controls. The instructor stated that, before their first flight, the pilot performed a very thorough and detailed walk-around, lasting approximately 90 minutes. He was particularly impressed with his “exemplary” checklist
discipline, both during that flight, and when he had flown with the pilot previously. During the preflight, he observed the pilot perform a full check of the flight controls to verify proper movement and operation. They discussed the control lock operation, and the pilot stated that it was very similar to the lock used on other airplanes he had owned and flown. The pitch trim was found in an almost full nose-down position, suggesting that the pilot may have been attempting to use the trim to arrest the airplane’s increasing nose-up attitude due to the locked control stick.

Sounds like he was familiar with that style of control lock. It was also stated to the FAA that he NEVER did intersection departures - only using the full length. This last flight for whatever reason was an intersection departure....which was very close to his hanger. One can only guess this small change - whatever the reason he accepted it - shortened his time to do his full checks and it caught him. A last min change to a flight that lead to a crash has happened to a lot of people over the years, sad it caught such a pilot as Dale.

[pelmet]

viewtopic.php?p=1147493#p1147493

A link to a post well worth reading about differences of opinion for enhancing safety. In fact you should read the whole thread. I wish the Snort, who seemed to be one of America’s most worshipped pilots had. It was only a few months earlier than the accident.

Reading that other thread should be a good message to new pilots not to let themselves be influenced by negative responses to simple safety checks that can save your life. same with experienced pilots. One can argue all they want but they can’t change the reality that if Snort gave a quick wiggle of the controls as part of a final procedure just before taking off, he wouldn’t have joined a long list of people who really wished they had.

General aviation is a dangerous game. Most experienced pilots know more fellow pilots that have been killed flying than fellow drivers killed while driving, despite the lopsided numbers between the two activities. My ratio is about ten to three.

While not a takeoff issue, I came closer to an incident than I would have liked in just the last week. Double check your killer items just before takeoff. Because very soon after, it will be too late. And the consequences can be deadly.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The pilot’s failure to remove the flight control lock before departure, which resulted in a loss of airplane control and impact with terrain. Contributing to the accident was his failure to perform an adequate preflight inspection and flight control check before takeoff.

So..no control check. In addition to any regular procedures before takeoff, I like to simply give a fore and aft movement(and maybe some aileron input) of the control stick/wheel soon before adding power to takeoff, just in case something happened that could cause a restriction on movement.

As for the accident pilot, I have trouble understanding how he would not have noticed the control stick being locked as he taxied onto the runway. When I do in any taildragger that I have flown, I have my hand on the control stick/wheel as I hold it fully aft from the neutral position and keep it fully aft for the first part of the takeoff roll(I thought that this is a standard tail wheel technique). It would be obvious at this point that the stick is not movable(assuming that it is immovable on this aircraft when locked).