CYBW Mooney Crash

[digits_]

Is it normal there is no statement from the right seat pilot? I'd be very interesting to hear about her point of view.

They heavily focus on ice build up, which was likely a factor, but I find it hard to believe a Mooney at 114kts would be uncontrollable with the amount of ice pictured in the report.

[karmutzen]

Once again I find myself questioning a TSB report -seems to say that they flew in icing conditions, iced up, and fell out of the sky. Doesn't jive. Stall speed on a 231 is 57 knots, it was flying more than double that at 114, lots of margin.

The report doesn't say what approach was being flown, so any reference to "vertical path" is conjecture. With good radar they'd also have ROD which isn't referenced at all.

Sloppy work by the TSB. They're on the hobby horse of icing and don't want facts to get in the way.

[digits_]

Once again I find myself questioning a TSB report -seems to say that they flew in icing conditions, iced up, and fell out of the sky. Doesn't jive. Stall speed on a 231 is 57 knots, it was flying more than double that at 114, lots of margin.

Not to mention:

The investigation was unable to determine with certainty what weather information the pilots consulted before the occurrence flight; however, the pilots had not contacted a NAV CANADA flight information centre for a weather briefing before departure. The Canadian Aviation RegulationsFootnote6 require that the pilot-in-command be familiar with the available weather information appropriate for the intended flight.

Stating the obvious. They could add this statement to 99% of my flights if something happened. It's 2022. All weather info is online, and the few times I did need them, they all told me they only had access to the information we have online. So what's the point of calling for a weather briefing
Or mentioning that the PIC didn't call?

[CpnCrunch]

Once again I find myself questioning a TSB report -seems to say that they flew in icing conditions, iced up, and fell out of the sky. Doesn't jive. Stall speed on a 231 is 57 knots, it was flying more than double that at 114, lots of margin.

The report doesn't say what approach was being flown, so any reference to "vertical path" is conjecture. With good radar they'd also have ROD which isn't referenced at all.

Sloppy work by the TSB. They're on the hobby horse of icing and don't want facts to get in the way.

According to the flightaware log, the groundspeed dropped to 79kt just above minimums, and then reduced to 73kt.

[CpnCrunch]

Is it normal there is no statement from the right seat pilot? I'd be very interesting to hear about her point of view.

She doesn't remember anything about it:

https://energeticcity.ca/2022/08/17/fsj ... ank-crash/

[PilotDAR]

Stall speed on a 231 is 57 knots, it was flying more than double that at 114, lots of margin

Even a small amount of airframe ice can really increase the stall speed, perhaps coupled with some G built up in maneuvering. The transition from streamlined air to stalled air over the wing can change much more abruptly with ice on the wing. Avoid ice, and if you have some, leave huge speed margins and minimize maneuvering.

[digits_]

Stall speed on a 231 is 57 knots, it was flying more than double that at 114, lots of margin

Even a small amount of airframe ice can really increase the stall speed, perhaps coupled with some G built up in maneuvering. The transition from streamlined air to stalled air over the wing can change much more abruptly with ice on the wing. Avoid ice, and if you have some, leave huge speed margins and minimize maneuvering.

Have you tested iced profiles in any of your planes? What kind of stall speed increases have you witnessed?

There isn't too much factual data out there, so really curious if you've done any tests in that area.

[pelmet]

I believe it is basically an abbreviated report by the TSB. Overall, I think they have made the point of the reason for the accident. It would have been useful to mention the slowest speed that they got to and that the surviving pilot could not remember the flight.

It seems to me based more on discussion with pilots than actual experience(I tended to avoid such scenarios) in light aircraft that the wings of some aircraft are more sensitive to ice than other aircraft, which makes sense. A Mooney is a bit of a higher performance aircraft, one might want to add more margin on an aircraft like that than a Cessna 172 if icing conditions are encountered.

Any actual experience on light aircraft in icing conditions with pilot and their experience with one light aircraft versus another would be interesting. That being said, there are various types of icing and each encounter would be unique.

[PilotDAR]

I have not done any formal icing testing, though I have tuft tested some rather large antennas, and watched the flow separation, it was much more abrupt than a good airfoil. I have had some rather alarming experiences in icing, in both FIKI and no so types, it was scary! A mentor of mine had a really bad experience in a Cherokee in un forecast ice. Hi mistake was encountering it at night over Labrador.

On each occasion when airframe ice became a factor in the flight, I kept the speed as fast as practical for the phase of flight, and it worked. I have no idea what the margins were. In the case of the Mooney, I doubt that the weight of the ice played much of a role in the accident, but I have flown other types (Twin Otter) where I'm pretty certain that the weight of the ice we were carrying was a significant factor as well as the effect on aerodynamics.

Different ice results in different effects. Clear ice is probably more a weight effect before aerodynamic. But heavy frost or rime ice will very certainly be aerodynamic before being too heavy.

Depending upon the location of the ice accumulation, a little can have a horrible effect. I was ferrying a Cessna 303 with a friend, and got into clear ice. No problem, I thought to myself, nearly brand new FIKI certified plane, turn everything on. With all deicing systems working, the plane still gave us a bucking bronco ride of the most alarming nature. My speeding up, settled it down. My descent to warmer air, shed the ice over the next few hours. That type was subject to an AD to absolutely avoid any ice, as there was an aerodynamic defect with the type, which had resulted in three in flight break ups due to loss of control resulting from ice on the tail with the de icing system would not shed. We were very nearly number four! Again, speed saved me!

I opine that it's problematic to attempt to train pilots of non FIKI airplanes how to fly after an icing encounter, when "180 at first encounter" is the only true action to take. No one wants to say that they trained someone to "handle" and icing encounter, other than to 180. But, from my experience in general, other than flutter, if you have an aerodynamic problem, increasing airspeed is probably safer than decreasing it until you have things figured out - and certainly avoid maneuvering as much as possible - big wide turns!

[pdw]

According to the flightaware log, the groundspeed dropped to 79kt just above minimums, and then reduced to 73kt.

Enough times we have read report description of previous approach accidents happening, and even on fair weather days. So whether or not this case constituted the “180” for the icing, and yes it states the ice WAS discussed, so the PIC knew it; the kind of ‘increased speed vigilance’ mentioned above is questionable with the 73kt/1250m” hit (which is descending there soon after 79kt (60mhigher) thru approx 200ft AGL … over roughly 1200m elev).

When obvious like this, IMO a report could try to portray how quick that speed deficit/ point of no return might arrive on occasion (ie seeing so often how others have found out the hard way how “abrupt” it really is) ie if/when injury or fatality prevents from hearing the description directly.

[AirFrame]

Or mentioning that the PIC didn't call?

There are systems in place that allow them to determine whether or not the PIC called FSS for a briefing. There is nothing in place to let them determine that they went to WeatherUnderground, Google Weather, Windy, or any number of other options. So they can report that the recommended weather briefing wasn't obtained. They do not speculate so can't say that the pilot "may have" used other methods.

[CpnCrunch]

Or mentioning that the PIC didn't call?

There are systems in place that allow them to determine whether or not the PIC called FSS for a briefing. There is nothing in place to let them determine that they went to WeatherUnderground, Google Weather, Windy, or any number of other options. So they can report that the recommended weather briefing wasn't obtained. They do not speculate so can't say that the pilot "may have" used other methods.

They just seem to look into this when a pilot takes off into obviously inappropriate conditions, where the forecast indicated that the weather wasn't suitable for the intended flight, to try and figure out why the pilot did what they did. In some cases they find that the forecaster warned the pilot, but they took off anyway just to have a look-see.

I suspect they saw no mention of icing in the 0000 icing+turbulence GFA issued at 1800 (which was later updated to show moderate icing east of YBW), and thought it would be ok, even though it said there could be light icing in cloud. Presumably they didn't check the ASEP, or the ASEP wasn't showing icing at the time they checked. (The ASEP shown in the TSB report shows icing for their route, although they don't say what data time was used).

[Fishizl]

might have taken off with ice already on as well http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-repor ... ure-04.jpg

[digits_]

Or mentioning that the PIC didn't call?

There are systems in place that allow them to determine whether or not the PIC called FSS for a briefing. There is nothing in place to let them determine that they went to WeatherUnderground, Google Weather, Windy, or any number of other options. So they can report that the recommended weather briefing wasn't obtained. They do not speculate so can't say that the pilot "may have" used other methods.

I understand that, but it still doesn't mean anything. I'd say the majority of pilots flying do not call FSS yet they do get the exact same weather information from other sources, such as flightplanning.navcanada.ca . Yet people (press) reading it interpret it as 'they pilot didn't get any weather briefing!', which is not necessarily correct.

The 'systems in place' aren't very robust either. If you file a flightplan at the same time, they assume your weather briefing is for that airplane -which makes sense-, but if you just call for a weather briefing, it has happened that you call and tell them plane A, while you end up flying plane B.

It makes the weather briefing statement in the report obsolete.

[airway]

might have taken off with ice already on as well http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-repor ... ure-04.jpg

They had been flying for at least 45 minutes before the crash, probably in icing conditions, so I doubt this ice was on the tail before takeoff. Also, it was +1 on the ground.

[truecolours]

A few thousand hours between them, and yet they failed to recognize the danger in taking off that day. "Icing" should jump right out at you when you see a temperature hovering around 0 and a forecast of rain, snow, and mist.

What a sad and completely unnecessary occurrence.

[AirFrame]

It makes the weather briefing statement in the report obsolete.

It makes it incomplete, but it's not obsolete. They just need better ways to know what other weather sources may have been checked. Take notes when you get a briefing from NavCanada online, or from WUnderground, or whereever. At least if they find it on your kneeboard they'll know you got weather from somewhere.

Better yet, once you get your briefing, don't push limits into sh*tty weather, and you won't show up in a TSB report...

[sportingrifle]

True colours….I agree….as I posted earlier, an advanced single has just enough performance and capabilities to get you into a world of hurt on a day like that. The other puzzling thing is what kind of a type check were they hoping to achieve? Certainly not stalls, slow flight, simulated engine failures, or circuits. When I am teaching IFR I spend a lot of time discussing when not to go flying and I think this isn’t stressed enough. Probably because a lot of the people teaching instrument flying have very little real world instrument flying experience.

[rookiepilot]

True colours….I agree….as I posted earlier, an advanced single has just enough performance and capabilities to get you into a world of hurt on a day like that. The other puzzling thing is what kind of a type check were they hoping to achieve? Certainly not stalls, slow flight, simulated engine failures, or circuits. When I am teaching IFR I spend a lot of time discussing when not to go flying and I think this isn’t stressed enough. Probably because a lot of the people teaching instrument flying have very little real world instrument flying experience.

Agreed +100.

I found this case study shocking as to what unforecast icing can do to a (much more) powerful airplane.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0JkLR_xgayM

[Donald]

I'm certainly not looking to cast judgement, but I wonder how much time pressure may have affected their decision to conduct the flight?

The report mentioned this flight was to train, prior to delivery to a new owner.

[digits_]

I found this case study shocking as to what unforecast icing can do to a (much more) powerful airplane.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0JkLR_xgayM

How was the youtube movie unforecasted? Lots of pireps with icing reports. ATC was aware as well.

[rookiepilot]

I found this case study shocking as to what unforecast icing can do to a (much more) powerful airplane.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0JkLR_xgayM

How was the youtube movie unforecasted? Lots of pireps with icing reports. ATC was aware as well.

Don't think the severe incidents were forecast nor pireps issued till after the pilot took off, and no one told him. (nor did he appear to ask)

Should have descended immediately but hindsight of course is perfect.

[photofly]

Maybe heavier-than-forecast is a better term.

[trey kule]

It is my understanding that the pilot flying had zero instructional experience. A bit puzzling that he was in the left seat.
In any event he did have hundreds upon hundreds of IF experience throughout Canada , the US and transatlantic trips.

If only the two of them had all the wisdom of the posters here, who sitting behind their keyboards with 100% correct hindsight, pontificate on the dangers of ice.

Ice is a killer. And we have all, even the condescending posters here, made bad decisions flying. The truth is that for most of us we lucked out and only the stains in our underwear reflect the outcome.

Reading some of the posts I am gobsmacked by how uninformed some pilots are about the effects of ice on an aircraft. Doesn’t seem to stop them from posting.

[pdw]

If only the two of them had all the wisdom of the posters here, who sitting behind their keyboards with 100% correct hindsight, pontificate on the dangers of ice.

After the pilot’s ‘icing-realization’’ at 5000ft agl, this may have been clean configuration approach throughout. It appears to be a stable approach (high ground speed and even higher airspeed) up to last flightaware hit of 73kts GS (the decision height). That 73 is also the IAS there at 200-250ft agl, given on 345 M rwy heading and “speci 0606kts” groundwind being valid then. So now it more easily could get slow right there in not having allowed any edge flaps out within this emergency or concern about the ice accretion.