Long Landing Thread

[complexintentions]

It's very simple - land in the Touchdown Zone or Go- around. No ambiguity.

Yep. And it's not because of a "dumbing down" or because the Chief Pilot is a big meanie or some other such nonsense alluded to. It's simply due to the fact landing performance data is predicated on landing in the touchdown zone. Go outside it and you can throw the numbers out. Sure, there are large margins built in but they're not there to protect against wilfully landing long. And for some field/landing weight combinations the margins can be uncomfortably tight.

I've seen it many times with people transitioning from a B737/A320 to the B777, being casual about where they place the wheels. Not always, some narrowbody operators have just as disciplined SOP's regarding the TDZ as heavy operators, especially in Europe. But often enough for me to be alert until I see how an FO new to the type operates.

Who cares what someone in their private Super Cub does, could probably land across the runway if they want.

[pelmet]

It's very simple - land in the Touchdown Zone or Go- around. No ambiguity.

Yep. And it's not because of a "dumbing down" or because the Chief Pilot is a big meanie or some other such nonsense alluded to. It's simply due to the fact landing performance data is predicated on landing in the touchdown zone. Go outside it and you can throw the numbers out. Sure, there are large margins built in but they're not there to protect against wilfully landing long. And for some field/landing weight combinations the margins can be uncomfortably tight.

I've seen it many times with people transitioning from a B737/A320 to the B777, being casual about where they place the wheels. Not always, some narrowbody operators have just as disciplined SOP's regarding the TDZ as heavy operators, especially in Europe. But often enough for me to be alert until I see how an FO new to the type operates.

Who cares what someone in their private Super Cub does, could probably land across the runway if they want.

This thread was meant more for light aircraft but......

From an airliner point of view....I wouldn't even necessarily fully agree with the above. One can be landing in the touchdown zone and be almost 3000 feet down the runway. Combine that with some slipperiness at a heavy landing weight and you might be going off the end of the runway. Touching down in the touchdown zone is not a guarantee, especially when a few knots fast and a small tailwind. One should consider each landing as its own situation which can change from day to day on the same runway, in the same aircraft, at the same weight.

[pelmet]

C-FFIN a Cessna 152, operated by Lachute Aviation (6800009 Canada Inc.), was landing on
runway 25 at the Alexandria Aerodrome (CNS4), ON. During the approach, the speed was reported
to be higher than anticipated, and the aircraft touched down with about 2/3 of the runway
remaining. The pilot initiated a go-around, however, before becoming airborne the go-around was
rejected. The aircraft went off the end of the runway and struck an embankment located about 120
feet from the runway end. The aircraft came to rest on its nose; there were no injuries.

[pelmet]

From TSB......

C-FZKK, a Cessna 172N operated by Acadia College/AAA Aviation, was conducting circuit training
at Langley (CYNJ), BC, with 1 student pilot on board. After touchdown, the pilot reported
experiencing an unusual wobble in the landing gear and elected to attempt a full stop landing
rather than the intended touch and go. The aircraft overran the end of the runway and traversed
approximately 70 feet of grass before the nose gear collapsed and the aircraft collided with the
airport perimeter fence. The pilot exited the aircraft without assistance. There were no injuries, but
the aircraft was substantially damaged.
Maintenance crews recovered the aircraft. They will examine the aircraft and assess the extent of
the damage in general and in particular to the propeller, engine cowling, wing strut, and landing
gear.

[Eric Janson]

From an airliner point of view....I wouldn't even necessarily fully agree with the above. One can be landing in the touchdown zone and be almost 3000 feet down the runway. Combine that with some slipperiness at a heavy landing weight and you might be going off the end of the runway. Touching down in the touchdown zone is not a guarantee, especially when a few knots fast and a small tailwind. One should consider each landing as its own situation which can change from day to day on the same runway, in the same aircraft, at the same weight.

We use the airbus Flysmart software on an iPad.

We get very detailed information about every landing including the factored landing distance and the go-around climb gradient available.

A very important number is the margin remaining - this gives a good indication of whether landing at the end of the touch down zone will give issues.

If something changes a new calculation can be done very rapidly.

I'm surprised that this calculation still isn't mandatory at some Airlines.

[pelmet]

From TSB...

C-FUGU, a privately registered Cessna 172H, was returning to Michael's Bay Field, a private grass
runway approximately 17nm SW of Manitoulin East Municipal Airport (CYEM), ON, after a local
flight with only the pilot on board. During the landing flare on Runway 19, the pilot encountered an
unexpected tailwind (winds were observed, based on the appearance of the water, to be from the
west at approximately 20 knots), resulting in the aircraft floating along the runway. The pilot
decided that he was too far along the runway to make a successful go-around due to obstacles,
including a house, beyond the end of the runway. The pilot landed and used maximum braking
before steering the aircraft into nearby trees to avoid colliding with the house. The nose aircraft
received substantial damage to the nose, and the nose gear collapsed after hitting a rock. The left
and right wingtips received damage from contact with trees. The pilot was not injured.

[pelmet]

From TSB...

C-FYMK, a Cessna 208B operated by Superior Airways, was conducting a VFR flight from Red
Lake (CYRL), ON to Pikangikum (CYPM), ON with 1 pilot and 6 passengers onboard. During the
flare for landing on Runway 27 at CYPM, the aircraft entered fog and landed long. The aircraft
experienced a runway excursion when it rolled off the end of Runway 27. The aircraft sustained
damage to its propeller. There were no injuries. The ELT did not activate.

[Eric Janson]

I've also been clear to land to hold short of an intersection, to me, that has the potential for a similarly bad outcome if not accomplished as intended.

We are not allowed to accept these clearances - called Land and Hold Short Operations (LAHSO). For the reason stated above.

I've never worked for an Airline where this was approved.

Seems to be a North American thing - don't recall ever seeing this anywhere else.

[pelmet]

I've also been clear to land to hold short of an intersection, to me, that has the potential for a similarly bad outcome if not accomplished as intended.

We are not allowed to accept these clearances - called Land and Hold Short Operations (LAHSO). For the reason stated above.

I've never worked for an Airline where this was approved.

Seems to be a North American thing - don't recall ever seeing this anywhere else.

Works well. Greatly increases airport efficiency. Many times, the intersection is so far down the runway, one would never have gotten that far anyways.

[digits_]

I've also been clear to land to hold short of an intersection, to me, that has the potential for a similarly bad outcome if not accomplished as intended.

We are not allowed to accept these clearances - called Land and Hold Short Operations (LAHSO). For the reason stated above.

I've never worked for an Airline where this was approved.

Seems to be a North American thing - don't recall ever seeing this anywhere else.

Works well. Greatly increases airport efficiency. Many times, the intersection is so far down the runway, one would never have gotten that far anyways.

LAHSO is mainly used with intersecting runways, right? I'm wondering: if plane A is landing, touches down, but then goes around for whatever reason, after plane B on the other runway has gotten its LAHSO clearance, and also goes around, are both planes protected not to hit each other?

[pelmet]

We are not allowed to accept these clearances - called Land and Hold Short Operations (LAHSO). For the reason stated above.

I've never worked for an Airline where this was approved.

Seems to be a North American thing - don't recall ever seeing this anywhere else.

Works well. Greatly increases airport efficiency. Many times, the intersection is so far down the runway, one would never have gotten that far anyways.

LAHSO is mainly used with intersecting runways, right? I'm wondering: if plane A is landing, touches down, but then goes around for whatever reason, after plane B on the other runway has gotten its LAHSO clearance, and also goes around, are both planes protected not to hit each other?

A go-around can lead to a collision regardless of whether LAHSO operations are in effect. I remember one time we were taking off out of Chicago from 14L with a clearance to turn left to something like 090 degrees. The winds were out of the south at 30 knots. While we were on the roll an A330 was instructed to go around from 14R due to a dead bird reported on the runway. Meanwhile, an RJ landing on 10C decided to go around as well due to the effects of the wind. So double go-around and us taking off. Let's just say that it got interesting with plenty of confusion, mostly for the controllers. With two towers in operation, I was only able to piece things together later on by downloading the communication tapes from the internet. 14L did not intersect with 10C but the centerlines did.

Even a go-around from parallel runway ops can lead to a collision with the parallel. Happened recently in Paris....

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5CFhVvMTkk

Anyways, when all is said and done, I don't remember any collisions due to LAHSO ops. Doesn't mean it won't happen though.

[pelmet]

C-GEOW, a Pilatus PC-12/45 aircraft operated by North Star Air Ltd., was conducting a flight from
Sioux Lookout Airport (CYXL), ON to Kasabonika Airport (CYAQ), ON. During the landing on
Runway 03, the aircraft experienced a runway excursion when it overran the end of the runway.
The aircraft came to rest approximately 350 feet past the departure end of the runway and the
aircraft was substantially damaged. The pilots and passengers were uninjured. The ELT activated.


.....from TSB.

[pelmet]

From TSB.....

C-GBYN, a Beech B200 King Air registered to Keewatin Air LP, was conducting flight KEW201
MEDEVAC from Goose Bay Airport (CYYR), NL, to Ottawa/Macdonald-Cartier International Airport
(CYOW), ON, with a planned enroute fuel stop at Québec/Jean Lesage International Airport
(CYQB), QC. Shortly after departure from Runway 26, the flight crew received a LH engine fire
indication. The crew arrested their climb, actioned the appropriate checklist memory items which
led them to shut down the LH engine. The crew then declared an emergency with ATC and
requested to return for Runway 08. While maintaining visual contact with the ground, the crew
navigated and conducted a single engine landing on Runway 08. Upon landing on the wet runway,
the aircraft continued beyond the end of the runway, striking two runway end lights and coming to a
stop on the paved surface, approximately 30 feet beyond the runway end lights. Both flight crew
and 3 passengers were uninjured.

.....Runway is over 11,000 feet long.

[Donald]

From TSB.....

C-GBYN, a Beech B200 King Air registered to Keewatin Air LP, was conducting flight KEW201
MEDEVAC from Goose Bay Airport (CYYR), NL, to Ottawa/Macdonald-Cartier International Airport
(CYOW), ON, with a planned enroute fuel stop at Québec/Jean Lesage International Airport
(CYQB), QC. Shortly after departure from Runway 26, the flight crew received a LH engine fire
indication. The crew arrested their climb, actioned the appropriate checklist memory items which
led them to shut down the LH engine. The crew then declared an emergency with ATC and
requested to return for Runway 08. While maintaining visual contact with the ground, the crew
navigated and conducted a single engine landing on Runway 08. Upon landing on the wet runway,
the aircraft continued beyond the end of the runway, striking two runway end lights and coming to a
stop on the paved surface, approximately 30 feet beyond the runway end lights. Both flight crew
and 3 passengers were uninjured.

.....Runway is over 11,000 feet long.

Final report:

https://tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/ ... a0014.html

[Eric Janson]

Final report:

https://tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/ ... a0014.html

1000 hour King Air Captains? Times have certainly changed!

If they'd just climbed to the MSA - taken a few extra minutes and flown the ILS this would have been a non event - jmho.

[drop]

C-GEOW, a Pilatus PC-12/45 aircraft operated by North Star Air Ltd., was conducting a flight from
Sioux Lookout Airport (CYXL), ON to Kasabonika Airport (CYAQ), ON. During the landing on
Runway 03, the aircraft experienced a runway excursion when it overran the end of the runway.
The aircraft came to rest approximately 350 feet past the departure end of the runway and the
aircraft was substantially damaged. The pilots and passengers were uninjured. The ELT activated.

Was EOW scrapped? It was the highest cycle PC-12 in the world and even went back to Switzerland once for Pilatus to do non-destructive testing on it. What an incredibly reliable machine.

[pelmet]

Final report:

https://tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/ ... a0014.html

1000 hour King Air Captains? Times have certainly changed!

If they'd just climbed to the MSA - taken a few extra minutes and flown the ILS this would have been a non event - jmho.

Read the report.

To be honest, it looks like a panic return after an engine fire indication where all else, was pretty much cast aside in a panic.

On the initial climbout, there was an engine fire warning and the engine was shut down. It turned out that it was a false warning. According to the report, the crew(which I assume means plural and applies to both crew members) PERCEIVED the smell of smoke from this false warning. This perception led them to believe that there was no doubt that it was an actual fire which then led to their subsequent actions(or inactions - lack of following through on SOP procedures, including discharging the fire bottle).

The idea that both of them smelled smoke does seem like a bit of a stretch to me but the TSB even put in a paragraph on ‘cross-modal linkage between the olfactory and visual senses”. I still think that it is a stretch.

It would have been nice if the TSB had interviewed the passengers to see if they smelled any smoke but if they did, they did not give us any info. Which leads to a complaint about the TSB and their lack of related info given as compared to the NTSB. The NTSB has links in reports to a docket with all kinds of easily accessible reports regarding the accident, including interviews and studies. The TSB does refer to a couple of laboratory reports but to get them, you would have to contact them and none of the reports are interviews. In addition, we never get the CVR reports in Canada and while the TSB could always say that this is because there is a federal law prohibiting it, they could petition for the law to be changed if they truly believed in the public getting more information the way they can in the US. How about it TSB? Dockets at least. It almost seems like the TSB only wants us to see what they have determined is fit for us to see, while the NTSB is an open book. A good example can be found in section 2.4(last paragraph on page 32) where the TSB discusses the pilots not activating the fire extinguisher and whether it was a conscious decision not to do so because no flames were visible or because they were not aware that the aircraft had engine fire extinguishers. But they don't tell us what the actual reason was or if they asked this question to the pilots. Did they ask? What was the reason?

Anyways, with the crew possibly in panic mode and not completing their checklists and doing an immediate return, they ended up very high on final approach. According to the report, the crew at this point had two options which were to basically dive down in a very unstabilized manner and land(which is what they did) or do a single-engine go-around(which entails potentially significant handling/performance issues from a low altitude) for another approach. But wasn't there a third option? This was to simply do a 360 degree descending turn soon after turning final when they were well above 1000' agl(or could have been a 270 degree left turn from their base leg). It could be at a fairly low with minimal controllability issues, as altitude is being lost with minimal minimal power required. Instead, the nose was pushed down and the cross the threshold of the 11,000’ runway at 400’ but also at 200 knots. Idle power on PT-6 engines does give lots of drag but one engine had been feathered which reduces the drag significantly.

One could bring up the supposed terrain issues as ATC had initially offered vectors with a climb to 3000 as their minimum vectoring altitude but the crew was happy to stay at 2200' and eventually navigate back themselves. The report does not state how familiar they were with the airport but if they were, they would know that there is no close-in terrain.

Bottom line, they touched down with not much runway left and hydroplaned on the wet runway and had directional issues with what was likely a selection of close to or at maximum reverse on one engine.

One can certainly make the argument that there is no time to waste for a fire indication, if you smell smoke but some runways have dangerous terrain or drop-offs just beyond the end of them.

The pilots were given bad info from their aircraft but the reality is that a lot of engine fire indications are false. Is the wing going to fall off if a 360 is done to lose altitude? This isn’t a DC-4/6 where that is a serious, immediate concern. Some might remember earlier threads(where I got the usual grief in responses) where I predicted this….

viewtopic.php?p=1033605#p1033605
viewtopic.php?t=230450

Fortunately, this overrun wasn’t catastrophic, but it could be some of the small, northern airports I have been to.

[Eric Janson]

But wasn't there a third option? This was to simply do a 360 degree descending turn soon after turning final when they were well above 1000' agl(or could have been a 270 degree left turn from their base leg). It could be at a fairly low power setting as altitude is being lost with minimal controllability issues. Instead, the nose was pushed down and the cross the threshold of the 11,000’ runway at 400’ but also at 200 knots. Idle power on PT-6 engines does give lots of drag but one engine had been feathered which reduces the drag significantly.

At night? Over unlit terrain below the MSA outside the obstacle survey area? Not a good idea imho.

Based on the crew performance - this may also have lead to a loss of control.

Are we at the point where people are being promoted well beyond their capabilities? Recent incidents say yes imho.

I've seen this at an Asian Flag carrier - they had an 80% failure rate on the Command upgrade. The Airline thought this mean't their training system was working - I saw it as an indication their training system was completely broken. People who could actually fly the aircraft failed the assessment and people who had no business in the cockpit of an aircraft passed the assessment. This Airline hasn't had a hull loss - that's certainly not due to lack of trying!

[pelmet]

But wasn't there a third option? This was to simply do a 360 degree descending turn soon after turning final when they were well above 1000' agl(or could have been a 270 degree left turn from their base leg). It could be at a fairly low power setting as altitude is being lost with minimal controllability issues. Instead, the nose was pushed down and the cross the threshold of the 11,000’ runway at 400’ but also at 200 knots. Idle power on PT-6 engines does give lots of drag but one engine had been feathered which reduces the drag significantly.

At night? Over unlit terrain below the MSA outside the obstacle survey area? Not a good idea imho.

Based on the crew performance - this may also have lead to a loss of control.

Are we at the point where people are being promoted well beyond their capabilities? Recent incidents say yes imho.

I've seen this at an Asian Flag carrier - they had an 80% failure rate on the Command upgrade. The Airline thought this mean't their training system was working - I saw it as an indication their training system was completely broken. People who could actually fly the aircraft failed the assessment and people who had no business in the cockpit of an aircraft passed the assessment. This Airline hasn't had a hull loss - that's certainly due to lack of trying!

The crew were already happy to be below the MSA as they rejected the offer from ATC to climb to their MSA. They said that they had the ground in sight(although looking through the report again, that may not have been overly clear).

Basically, they were doing a close-in visual approach(and night visual approaches certainly seem to be common).

That being said, and taking your point into consideration, and assuming that they were unfamiliar with the airport, they could have simply maneuvered to join a downwind leg for the departure runway and landed there instead of being close to 100 knots too fast over the threshold(and high).

Hopefully, that would not lead to a loss of control concern that was mentioned.

[pelmet]

To be honest, it looks like a panic return after an engine fire indication where all else, was pretty much cast aside in a panic.

On the initial climbout, there was an engine fire warning and the engine was shut down. It turned out that it was a false warning. According to the report, the crew(which I assume means plural and applies to both crew members) PERCEIVED the smell of smoke from this false warning. This perception led them to believe that there was no doubt that it was an actual fire which then led to their subsequent actions(or inactions - lack of following through on SOP procedures, including discharging the fire bottle).

The idea that both of them smelled smoke does seem like a bit of a stretch to me but the TSB even put in a paragraph on ‘cross-modal linkage between the olfactory and visual senses”. I still think that it is a stretch.

It appears that there can be a tendency to PERCIEVE issues that do not exist when there is a sudden event. False fire warning comes on....I believe that I smell smoke. Loud bang happens.....I believe that the flight controls are not working.

I just read this story on another forum this morning.....

"A glider wave flight expedition to Scotland...

A bunch of gliders was soaring the wave when the cloud started filling in. The pre-flight briefing was that if that started to happen then descend immediately through the gap before it closed.
This particular pilot in a Pilatus B4 did exactly that with all the others. But as he was descending through the gap in poor visibility, on a limited panel, he heard a load bang and the aircraft ceased responding to the controls. Assuming a mid-air he bailed out.

The B4 ended upside down in a field but the accident was a bit of a puzzle. All the control runs looked secure and all the control surfaces were where they should be. The only thing missing was the canopy. There was no sign of collision damage and no other glider reported a collision.

The conclusion was that the loud bang he heard was blasting from a nearby quarry (perhaps atmospheric conditions amplified this). The loss of control was imaginary as with no natural horizon and being half visual, half on instruments it is easy to get disoriented. The glider he bailed out of was perfectly fine."

Perhaps the TSB should extend their theory regarding cross-modal linkage from just olfactory senses to sense of touch. Or perhaps just be realistic and call it panic. I have experienced a panic situation when younger....all reason goes out the window. People encounter a snake and suddenly turn around and run across the street and get hit by a car, when they normally would have carefully looked both ways. I have a theory that this is why some people fall off a cliff when walking on a steep, rugged trail. Imagine suddenly grabbing onto something that you have a phobia of.