WestJet Sunwing merger and seniority

[flyingjerry]

As someone on the outside here's what I think is fair.

There will be a date decided when the WS/WG deal was effective. Anyone hired at WG after that date will be BOTL.

Everyone hired before that date will be date of hire with 3 protections:
- Pilots are base protected for x number of years
- Pilots are seat protected for x number of months, just to smooth out training and shuffling during the transition.
- Pilots are pay protected with 0% raise/COL adjustment until they catch up on the new CBA.

[alkaseltzer]

As someone on the outside here's what I think is fair.

There will be a date decided when the WS/WG deal was effective. Anyone hired at WG after that date will be BOTL.

Everyone hired before that date will be date of hire with 3 protections:
- Pilots are base protected for x number of years
- Pilots are seat protected for x number of months, just to smooth out training and shuffling during the transition.
- Pilots are pay protected with 0% raise/COL adjustment until they catch up on the new CBA.

Base and seats should be protected at a minimum. Relative base seniority should then be negotiated. Just my opinion and it's like an a*hole, everyone has one.

An arbitrator should not disadvantage one group over another, lest they risk losing their own license.

[flyingjerry]

Base and seats should be protected at a minimum. Relative base seniority should then be negotiated. Just my opinion and it's like an a*hole, everyone has one.

An arbitrator should not disadvantage one group over another, lest they risk losing their own license.

Why seats though? As long as pay is protected it's better for the whole pilot group. The WG pilot now an FO holds onto the captain pay that they signed up for when deciding to work at WG and the WS FO now gets captain pay, resulting in the pilot group taking home more money overall as a group.

[daedalusx]

Base and seats should be protected at a minimum. Relative base seniority should then be negotiated.

What would relative base seniority means to you ?

Are you saying that a SWG YYC Capt/FO who's up on the top 25% of their own YYC base seniority list should be also up on the top 25% of the Westjet YYC base seniority ? Cause that would means the Sunwing crews would gain several years worth of seniority.

[cloak]

well in my opinion.....
Everyone holds what there seniority number can hold period. Merge DOH is fine but NO ONE out of seniority! We did this already with swoop and we all know how that went.

Likely it will be pretty close to this as precedent has been set with Swoop. Although SW pilots will be better off than Swoop because they will be pay-protected at higher rates. It'd also require no fences which is a good thing. The more the fences, the less balanced is the deal, therefore requires more fences to hold it together for a while. The sticking points will likely be the "one list" for SW pilots, and for WJ, YOS for those that didn't participate in SW seasonal flying. Whether a ratio (which would be around 4 or 4.5 to 1?) or DOH, almost certainly those hired after the merger announcement will be arranged by DOH and will likely only be protected for pay, not position or base, as they were hired after the announcement. It would be akin to buying lottery tickets AFTER the draw. Whether one considers the merger a good thing or not, the point is that it was already known.

The missing link for WJ pilots is going to be missed new opportunities. It was said, SW traditionally had 18 tails and usually brought around 24 tails in winters in a combination of dry and wet leases. The good news was that WJ said between them, WO and SW, there was enough lift to keep those extra tails year-round and thereby create around 250 upgrades immediately, plus the extra growth they were promising. Unfortunately for WJ pilots, the opportunity to negotiate to include those positions in their contract was missed that for instance displaced WO pilots, or any other WJ pilots for that matter, would have access to these positions. Now that SW had to hire/upgrade for these seasonal aircraft, it's bringing too many pilots (i.e. captains) for the actual number of full-time tails it's bringing to the deal (i.e. 18).

[MaxAuto]

I don't think anyone should be bumped out of their seat or base. The list will merge is some sort of way with no out of seniority shuffling.

All new upgrades and base vacancies post merger will be awarded through new vacancies as required by the companies staffing needs. Regardless of an established fence or not.

So don't switch your base or downgrade yourself if you can't re-hold it post merger.

[Tony Soprano]

well in my opinion.....
Everyone holds what there seniority number can hold period. Merge DOH is fine but NO ONE out of seniority! We did this already with swoop and we all know how that went.

Likely it will be pretty close to this as precedent has been set with Swoop. Although SW pilots will be better off than Swoop because they will be pay-protected at higher rates. It'd also require no fences which is a good thing. The more the fences, the less balanced is the deal, therefore requires more fences to hold it together for a while. The sticking points will likely be the "one list" for SW pilots, and for WJ, YOS for those that didn't participate in SW seasonal flying. Whether a ratio (which would be around 4 or 4.5 to 1?) or DOH, almost certainly those hired after the merger announcement will be arranged by DOH and will likely only be protected for pay, not position or base, as they were hired after the announcement. It would be akin to buying lottery tickets AFTER the draw. Whether one considers the merger a good thing or not, the point is that it was already known.

The missing link for WJ pilots is going to be missed new opportunities. It was said, SW traditionally had 18 tails and usually brought around 24 tails in winters in a combination of dry and wet leases. The good news was that WJ said between them, WO and SW, there was enough lift to keep those extra tails year-round and thereby create around 250 upgrades immediately, plus the extra growth they were promising. Unfortunately for WJ pilots, the opportunity to negotiate to include those positions in their contract was missed that for instance displaced WO pilots, or any other WJ pilots for that matter, would have access to these positions. Now that SW had to hire/upgrade for these seasonal aircraft, it's bringing too many pilots (i.e. captains) for the actual number of full-time tails it's bringing to the deal (i.e. 18).

But with Swoop, the re-bid happened immediately. With Sunwing, there's 1 year no-bump/flush in the CBA. Would the re-bid happen after the Sunwing guys have been in their seats for a year?

[J Roc]

I completely disagree Rudder, Arbitrators have the latitude to do whatever they like, once you hand over the process to them. The ALPA Merger Policy isn't worth the paper it is written on.

Remember there is three parties to this (and all) mergers, the two Pilot groups and the Employer.

100%

An arbitrator will work with ALPA to follow and respect their policy manual, but not at the risk of ignoring past case precedent(s) or placing one group in hardship over another. Based on what I know of this process and the people occupying these roles, it's doubtful that an arbitrator will risk their reputation or a judicial review in the name of an ALPA policy manual. All bets are off when this goes to arbitration; the best deals are always reached at the table. Hopefully, a deal can be reached through negotiations.

[cdnavater]

well in my opinion.....
Everyone holds what there seniority number can hold period. Merge DOH is fine but NO ONE out of seniority! We did this already with swoop and we all know how that went.

Likely it will be pretty close to this as precedent has been set with Swoop. Although SW pilots will be better off than Swoop because they will be pay-protected at higher rates. It'd also require no fences which is a good thing. The more the fences, the less balanced is the deal, therefore requires more fences to hold it together for a while. The sticking points will likely be the "one list" for SW pilots, and for WJ, YOS for those that didn't participate in SW seasonal flying. Whether a ratio (which would be around 4 or 4.5 to 1?) or DOH, almost certainly those hired after the merger announcement will be arranged by DOH and will likely only be protected for pay, not position or base, as they were hired after the announcement. It would be akin to buying lottery tickets AFTER the draw. Whether one considers the merger a good thing or not, the point is that it was already known.

The missing link for WJ pilots is going to be missed new opportunities. It was said, SW traditionally had 18 tails and usually brought around 24 tails in winters in a combination of dry and wet leases. The good news was that WJ said between them, WO and SW, there was enough lift to keep those extra tails year-round and thereby create around 250 upgrades immediately, plus the extra growth they were promising. Unfortunately for WJ pilots, the opportunity to negotiate to include those positions in their contract was missed that for instance displaced WO pilots, or any other WJ pilots for that matter, would have access to these positions. Now that SW had to hire/upgrade for these seasonal aircraft, it's bringing too many pilots (i.e. captains) for the actual number of full-time tails it's bringing to the deal (i.e. 18).

But with Swoop, the re-bid happened immediately. With Sunwing, there's 1 year no-bump/flush in the CBA. Would the re-bid happen after the Sunwing guys have been in their seats for a year?

No bump in who’s CBA, Sunwing?
I believe what happens first is a vote for representation, given WJ pilots outnumber Sunwing it is a foregone conclusion it will be ALPA representation and I believe the Sunwing pilots will be immediately under the ALPA CBA of the WJ pilots but I’m not a labour expert so take it with a grain of salt.
That being said the WJ CBA is far better and you can’t cherry pick what you like from yours, I’m will to bet your no bump or flush clause assumes you buy and merge not the other way around.

[Tony Soprano]

No bump in who’s CBA, Sunwing?

WJ scope clause.

[Bede]

https://www.hrreporter.com/focus-areas/ ... sts/287575

Arbitrators can face an especially invidious task in deciding on an equitable outcome when blending seniority lists, especially after the merger of giant organizations. Air Canada’s purchase of Canadian Airlines is a recent example of this challenge. In a policy manual devoted to merger issues, one of the pilots’ unions notes that there may be “no consensus of what is fair and equitable” in seniority merger cases. As the arbitrator in the case noted, “I can safely attest to that.”

In fact, what may seem a workable solution at the time can be torpedoed by subsequent events. The arbitrator mentioned an “extraordinary letter of regret” another arbitrator wrote after his attempts to balance equities unexpectedly failed and left a group of pilots without prospects for the work he had tried to guarantee for them. In that situation, after CP Air purchased Eastern Provincial Airways, the arbitrator tried to balance length of service with several other factors “peculiar to the merger.” He discounted the full service of Eastern Provincial pilots but granted them a “fence” around their positions in Halifax. Unfortunately, “within months, the new, merged airline decided to close the base at Halifax, and the intended balance…was gone.”

The takeover of Canadian Airlines by Air Canada meant that several seniority lists had to be merged, the most contentious were the lists of pilots. In fact, as the arbitrator in the case involving the pilots’ associations observed, “the historic rivalry between Canada’s two mainline air carriers runs particularly deep on the pilot side.” The underlying reason is that seniority ranking governs the life of pilots. Seniority determines the type of aircraft they fly, the salary they earn and their “domicile” rights, through which they can bid on routes and exercise their rights for vacation and time-off.

Complicating the issue were two other factors. One was the circumstance of the merger: By Christmas of 1999, Canadian Airlines was only two days away from bankruptcy and unable to meet the payroll of 16,000 people. Because of this, “the die was…dramatically cast against Canadian with respect to it own independent prospects for survival,” said the arbitrator.

Using a strict date of hire method to determine seniority would have meant that most of the pilots of the successful purchasing airline would have lost their seniority to the group from the stagnating airline. Not only that, but a large number of pilots on the Air Canada roster were older pilots with many years of service — just not many years with Air Canada (pilots lose seniority when they move from one airline to another).

“This is simply one of those cases where ‘date of hire’ cannot be made to fit,” said the arbitrator.

The other fact was “the disparity in hiring patterns and thus current seniority lists.” Canadian Airlines’ hiring to all intents and purposes ended in 1990. The recession of the early ’90s vitiated Canadian Airline’s efforts to re-structure financially. Even when the economy improved, Canadian Airlines “was too cash-strapped to plumb the opportunities.” As the arbitrator notes, “the result was a huge imbalance” in the current demography: with the majority of pilots in a stagnant airline bearing dates of hire of 1990 or earlier and a “fast-growing, increasingly prospering airline” with almost half its employees hired after 1995.

In the face of these circumstances, the challenge to be fair and equitable is daunting indeed.

The arbitrator drew attention to the decisions of several other arbitrators who dealt with similar issues in the airline industry both in Canada and in the United States. Some solutions he cited included dovetailing the lists, discounting service, using a ratio or applying a “fence” to protect the interests of one group for a limited duration of time. He concluded that “there is no established principle that points to ‘date of hire’ as the model of choice.”

Knowing that despite an arbitrator’s best efforts, things may go awry, the arbitrator in this case noted the principles on which he based his decision. In the first place, he realistically observed that the “matter falls to be determined on the basis of what happened; not what might have been.” The employees of the failing organization also had to admit that realistically they could not win everything they wanted. Although the place to start was with the dates of hire, it was not the only criterion. The arbitrator had to look at all criteria especially the equities at the time when the merger occurred.

His goal was two-fold: to try to “neutralize the disparities in the dates of hire” and to “fairly evaluate the contributions made by each of the groups to the ongoing enterprise.” In addition, he had to take into account the no-layoff policy in the collective agreement, which extended on the Canadian Airlines side until 2005, but he also warned that pre-existing Air Canada employees should not be laid off as a result of the Canadian Airlines-rescuing merger. “It is necessary for me to build into this award a protection against that for some time in the future,” he wrote.

His solution was a ratio based on the number of Air Canada pilots compared with the number of Canadian Airlines pilots — but with a few wrinkles that would build in what he termed an appropriate balance between the two groups.

In the first place, the arbitrator gave a premium to the Air Canada pilots by making the ratio 1.92:1 rather than the straight ratio of 1.73:1 called for by the strict application of the math — 2,180 pilots on the Air Canada side divided by 1,258 on the Canadian side. For all intents and purposes, this would mean on the seniority list there would be two Air Canada pilots, followed by one Canadian Airline pilot, until the list was exhausted.

He further massaged the ratio by creating four categories of employees based on decreasing seniority levels. First, he integrated the two lists of pilots flying wide-bodied jets in a ratio of three Air Canada pilots to one Canadian Airlines pilot. This is the most senior group of pilots, some — from Air Canada in particular — with dates of hire extending back to 1976. Then, he put the next groups of pilots from the two airlines into a category with a ratio of 1.55 to 1, a decision by which he intended to enhance the position of the Canadian Airlines pilots.

The third category encompassed the next 400 pilots (300 from Air Canada to 100 from Canadian Airlines). This three to one ratio favoured the Air Canada group. Finally, noting the break in the hiring dates at Canadian Airlines occurring from the end of the ’80s to early 1997, he created the fourth category consisting of all “pilots from Canadian who were not on the property at Canadian until 1997 or later.”

He added two more protections for the Air Canada pilots. Those that could fly wide-bodied planes would continue to have sole bidding rights for positions until Jan. 1, 2006, according to the ratioed list. Not only that, but no former Air Canada staff were to be laid off until 442 former Canadian Airlines pilots were let go.

In trying to avoid the blunt stick of end-tailing, which would have given the Canadian Airline pilots an overwhelming advantage due to their years of seniority, the arbitrator constructed a formula which he hoped would balance the equities and lead to a fairly seamless integration of the two workforces. The long-term outcome remains to be seen, but as with almost every other seniority merger of this type, immediate reactions from the associations representing the pilots and from individual pilots themselves have been decidedly mixed, with Canadian Airlines pilots unhappy with the ruling.

[FurHat]

The article mentions that the Canadian pilots were unhappy with the deal, but not that they challenged it and won. A new agreement with a more favorable ratio was awarded.

[braaap Braap]

https://www.hrreporter.com/focus-areas/ ... sts/287575

Arbitrators can face an especially invidious task in deciding on an equitable outcome when blending seniority lists, especially after the merger of giant organizations. Air Canada’s purchase of Canadian Airlines is a recent example of this challenge. In a policy manual devoted to merger issues, one of the pilots’ unions notes that there may be “no consensus of what is fair and equitable” in seniority merger cases. As the arbitrator in the case noted, “I can safely attest to that.”

In fact, what may seem a workable solution at the time can be torpedoed by subsequent events. The arbitrator mentioned an “extraordinary letter of regret” another arbitrator wrote after his attempts to balance equities unexpectedly failed and left a group of pilots without prospects for the work he had tried to guarantee for them. In that situation, after CP Air purchased Eastern Provincial Airways, the arbitrator tried to balance length of service with several other factors “peculiar to the merger.” He discounted the full service of Eastern Provincial pilots but granted them a “fence” around their positions in Halifax. Unfortunately, “within months, the new, merged airline decided to close the base at Halifax, and the intended balance…was gone.”

The takeover of Canadian Airlines by Air Canada meant that several seniority lists had to be merged, the most contentious were the lists of pilots. In fact, as the arbitrator in the case involving the pilots’ associations observed, “the historic rivalry between Canada’s two mainline air carriers runs particularly deep on the pilot side.” The underlying reason is that seniority ranking governs the life of pilots. Seniority determines the type of aircraft they fly, the salary they earn and their “domicile” rights, through which they can bid on routes and exercise their rights for vacation and time-off.

Complicating the issue were two other factors. One was the circumstance of the merger: By Christmas of 1999, Canadian Airlines was only two days away from bankruptcy and unable to meet the payroll of 16,000 people. Because of this, “the die was…dramatically cast against Canadian with respect to it own independent prospects for survival,” said the arbitrator.

Using a strict date of hire method to determine seniority would have meant that most of the pilots of the successful purchasing airline would have lost their seniority to the group from the stagnating airline. Not only that, but a large number of pilots on the Air Canada roster were older pilots with many years of service — just not many years with Air Canada (pilots lose seniority when they move from one airline to another).

“This is simply one of those cases where ‘date of hire’ cannot be made to fit,” said the arbitrator.

The other fact was “the disparity in hiring patterns and thus current seniority lists.” Canadian Airlines’ hiring to all intents and purposes ended in 1990. The recession of the early ’90s vitiated Canadian Airline’s efforts to re-structure financially. Even when the economy improved, Canadian Airlines “was too cash-strapped to plumb the opportunities.” As the arbitrator notes, “the result was a huge imbalance” in the current demography: with the majority of pilots in a stagnant airline bearing dates of hire of 1990 or earlier and a “fast-growing, increasingly prospering airline” with almost half its employees hired after 1995.

In the face of these circumstances, the challenge to be fair and equitable is daunting indeed.

The arbitrator drew attention to the decisions of several other arbitrators who dealt with similar issues in the airline industry both in Canada and in the United States. Some solutions he cited included dovetailing the lists, discounting service, using a ratio or applying a “fence” to protect the interests of one group for a limited duration of time. He concluded that “there is no established principle that points to ‘date of hire’ as the model of choice.”

Knowing that despite an arbitrator’s best efforts, things may go awry, the arbitrator in this case noted the principles on which he based his decision. In the first place, he realistically observed that the “matter falls to be determined on the basis of what happened; not what might have been.” The employees of the failing organization also had to admit that realistically they could not win everything they wanted. Although the place to start was with the dates of hire, it was not the only criterion. The arbitrator had to look at all criteria especially the equities at the time when the merger occurred.

His goal was two-fold: to try to “neutralize the disparities in the dates of hire” and to “fairly evaluate the contributions made by each of the groups to the ongoing enterprise.” In addition, he had to take into account the no-layoff policy in the collective agreement, which extended on the Canadian Airlines side until 2005, but he also warned that pre-existing Air Canada employees should not be laid off as a result of the Canadian Airlines-rescuing merger. “It is necessary for me to build into this award a protection against that for some time in the future,” he wrote.

His solution was a ratio based on the number of Air Canada pilots compared with the number of Canadian Airlines pilots — but with a few wrinkles that would build in what he termed an appropriate balance between the two groups.

In the first place, the arbitrator gave a premium to the Air Canada pilots by making the ratio 1.92:1 rather than the straight ratio of 1.73:1 called for by the strict application of the math — 2,180 pilots on the Air Canada side divided by 1,258 on the Canadian side. For all intents and purposes, this would mean on the seniority list there would be two Air Canada pilots, followed by one Canadian Airline pilot, until the list was exhausted.

He further massaged the ratio by creating four categories of employees based on decreasing seniority levels. First, he integrated the two lists of pilots flying wide-bodied jets in a ratio of three Air Canada pilots to one Canadian Airlines pilot. This is the most senior group of pilots, some — from Air Canada in particular — with dates of hire extending back to 1976. Then, he put the next groups of pilots from the two airlines into a category with a ratio of 1.55 to 1, a decision by which he intended to enhance the position of the Canadian Airlines pilots.

The third category encompassed the next 400 pilots (300 from Air Canada to 100 from Canadian Airlines). This three to one ratio favoured the Air Canada group. Finally, noting the break in the hiring dates at Canadian Airlines occurring from the end of the ’80s to early 1997, he created the fourth category consisting of all “pilots from Canadian who were not on the property at Canadian until 1997 or later.”

He added two more protections for the Air Canada pilots. Those that could fly wide-bodied planes would continue to have sole bidding rights for positions until Jan. 1, 2006, according to the ratioed list. Not only that, but no former Air Canada staff were to be laid off until 442 former Canadian Airlines pilots were let go.

In trying to avoid the blunt stick of end-tailing, which would have given the Canadian Airline pilots an overwhelming advantage due to their years of seniority, the arbitrator constructed a formula which he hoped would balance the equities and lead to a fairly seamless integration of the two workforces. The long-term outcome remains to be seen, but as with almost every other seniority merger of this type, immediate reactions from the associations representing the pilots and from individual pilots themselves have been decidedly mixed, with Canadian Airlines pilots unhappy with the ruling.

Interesting stuff! Thanks for sharing! It's important to be aware of the history so that it can provide context to the shaping of present day events.

[alkaseltzer]

Base and seats should be protected at a minimum. Relative base seniority should then be negotiated. Just my opinion and it's like an a*hole, everyone has one.

An arbitrator should not disadvantage one group over another, lest they risk losing their own license.

Why seats though? As long as pay is protected it's better for the whole pilot group. The WG pilot now an FO holds onto the captain pay that they signed up for when deciding to work at WG and the WS FO now gets captain pay, resulting in the pilot group taking home more money overall as a group.

What is good for the "whole pilot group" is not up to you or me. Please realize, both sides will not come out of this completely satisfied. Just because "westjet/alpa" is bigger doesn't mean jack, and likewise because "Sunwing/unifor" is smaller, doesn't put them at a disadvantage. Relative seniority to a base is something an arbitrator will have to decide, or both parties, but not me.

Maybe there are Sunwing captains that want their seat, that's how they've run their show all these years. QOL in a sense.

Do you think it's reasonable to punt another carrier's pilots, by way of an acquisition, for the Westjet pilots to lick their lips and expect to not only turnover the Sunwing lifestyle of north-south flying, deployments, AND THEN also punt those from the left seats and/or bases?

Do you think a reasonable arbitrator would decide that? DOH is ALPA policy. Not Unifor's. And a vote wouldn't really hold water unless the unions agreed to bring it to their own "sides" for ratification, imho.

Clearly, it sounds like Westjet pilots value seats over pay, and betting the Sunwing pilots value pay over seats. Almost sounds like what ACPA would have done with Transat.

Not up to me or you to decide. I do think it's positive for both groups and not gloom and doom.

[rudder]

Base and seats should be protected at a minimum. Relative base seniority should then be negotiated. Just my opinion and it's like an a*hole, everyone has one.

An arbitrator should not disadvantage one group over another, lest they risk losing their own license.

Why seats though? As long as pay is protected it's better for the whole pilot group. The WG pilot now an FO holds onto the captain pay that they signed up for when deciding to work at WG and the WS FO now gets captain pay, resulting in the pilot group taking home more money overall as a group.

What is good for the "whole pilot group" is not up to you or me. Please realize, both sides will not come out of this completely satisfied. Just because "westjet/alpa" is bigger doesn't mean jack, and likewise because "Sunwing/unifor" is smaller, doesn't put them at a disadvantage. Relative seniority to a base is something an arbitrator will have to decide, or both parties, but not me.

Maybe there are Sunwing captains that want their seat, that's how they've run their show all these years. QOL in a sense.

Do you think it's reasonable to punt another carrier's pilots, by way of an acquisition, for the Westjet pilots to lick their lips and expect to not only turnover the Sunwing lifestyle of north-south flying, deployments, AND THEN also punt those from the left seats and/or bases?

Do you think a reasonable arbitrator would decide that? DOH is ALPA policy. Not Unifor's. And a vote wouldn't really hold water unless the unions agreed to bring it to their own "sides" for ratification, imho.

Clearly, it sounds like Westjet pilots value seats over pay, and betting the Sunwing pilots value pay over seats. Almost sounds like what ACPA would have done with Transat.

Not up to me or you to decide. I do think it's positive for both groups and not gloom and doom.

DOH is NOT ALPA policy. It is not even mentioned in the ‘factors’ that must be considered when integrating seniority lists.

Read the policy.

[Rom]

[MaxAuto]

I value my seat and pay along with the pay steps that expected to have in the following years rather than being frozen until the pay scale catches up my current pay.

Sitting in the left seat is not just about pay, it's an honor to take command of a commercial airliner. It's what we all work hard and study hard to do along with putting in the years of service rather than jumping from airline to airline looking for a quick upgrade.

[pacman007]

I agree .

But when one company the upgrades are a decade and the other is 2 years or less…. How is that comparable?

[frog]

I agree .

But when one company the upgrades are a decade and the other is 2 years or less…. How is that comparable?

Not everyone at SWG got an upgrade in 2 years or less.

[cdnavater]

I agree .

But when one company the upgrades are a decade and the other is 2 years or less…. How is that comparable?

Not everyone at SWG got an upgrade in 2 years or less.

Here’s how I would look at this situation as an arbitrator, Swoop pilots who could not hold their seat in a merger lost it, why would it be any different for another merger. The precedent was set, it would be pretty hard to justify anything else with a group who recently integrated and lost.
Someone mentioned a no bump or flush clause in the WJ CBA, I’d put money that it says in the event of purchase by another airline, not if they purchase another airline.
My guess is Sunwing pilots who can hold their seat will but the others will be pay protected, besides the fact if you do hold your seat, any upgrades will parachute in above you, keeping you perpetually at the bottom on reserve. Life is going to change, your boss sold your company and you should make your peace with it.

[rudder]

I agree .

But when one company the upgrades are a decade and the other is 2 years or less…. How is that comparable?

Not everyone at SWG got an upgrade in 2 years or less.

Here’s how I would look at this situation as an arbitrator, Swoop pilots who could not hold their seat in a merger lost it, why would it be any different for another merger. The precedent was set, it would be pretty hard to justify anything else with a group who recently integrated and lost.
Someone mentioned a no bump or flush clause in the WJ CBA, I’d put money that it says in the event of purchase by another airline, not if they purchase another airline.
My guess is Sunwing pilots who can hold their seat will but the others will be pay protected, besides the fact if you do hold your seat, any upgrades will parachute in above you, keeping you perpetually at the bottom on reserve. Life is going to change, your boss sold your company and you should make your peace with it.

SWOOP/WJ was not a merger. No different than Rouge/AC. Rules for filling of assignments are a function of the CBA.

[cdnavater]

Not everyone at SWG got an upgrade in 2 years or less.

Here’s how I would look at this situation as an arbitrator, Swoop pilots who could not hold their seat in a merger lost it, why would it be any different for another merger. The precedent was set, it would be pretty hard to justify anything else with a group who recently integrated and lost.
Someone mentioned a no bump or flush clause in the WJ CBA, I’d put money that it says in the event of purchase by another airline, not if they purchase another airline.
My guess is Sunwing pilots who can hold their seat will but the others will be pay protected, besides the fact if you do hold your seat, any upgrades will parachute in above you, keeping you perpetually at the bottom on reserve. Life is going to change, your boss sold your company and you should make your peace with it.

SWOOP/WJ was not a merger. No different than Rouge/AC. Rules for filling of assignments are a function of the CBA.

Separate company and separate AOC, difference between Swoop and Rouge, Rouge was always AC pilots, Swoop was off the street until they weren’t.
I guess we’ll see, in a year or so when the dust settles but I stand by my opinion that Swoop pilots would be disadvantaged if Sunwing pilots continue to hold their seat out of seniority, you can bet WJ pilots will fight to have the same outcome.

[alkaseltzer]

Why seats though? As long as pay is protected it's better for the whole pilot group. The WG pilot now an FO holds onto the captain pay that they signed up for when deciding to work at WG and the WS FO now gets captain pay, resulting in the pilot group taking home more money overall as a group.

What is good for the "whole pilot group" is not up to you or me. Please realize, both sides will not come out of this completely satisfied. Just because "westjet/alpa" is bigger doesn't mean jack, and likewise because "Sunwing/unifor" is smaller, doesn't put them at a disadvantage. Relative seniority to a base is something an arbitrator will have to decide, or both parties, but not me.

Maybe there are Sunwing captains that want their seat, that's how they've run their show all these years. QOL in a sense.

Do you think it's reasonable to punt another carrier's pilots, by way of an acquisition, for the Westjet pilots to lick their lips and expect to not only turnover the Sunwing lifestyle of north-south flying, deployments, AND THEN also punt those from the left seats and/or bases?

Do you think a reasonable arbitrator would decide that? DOH is ALPA policy. Not Unifor's. And a vote wouldn't really hold water unless the unions agreed to bring it to their own "sides" for ratification, imho.

Clearly, it sounds like Westjet pilots value seats over pay, and betting the Sunwing pilots value pay over seats. Almost sounds like what ACPA would have done with Transat.

Not up to me or you to decide. I do think it's positive for both groups and not gloom and doom.

DOH is NOT ALPA policy. It is not even mentioned in the ‘factors’ that must be considered when integrating seniority lists.

Read the policy.

Do I have to read it? Or can I look at Westjet/Swoop, GGN/Jazz, Skyregional/Jazz.....

[rudder]

What is good for the "whole pilot group" is not up to you or me. Please realize, both sides will not come out of this completely satisfied. Just because "westjet/alpa" is bigger doesn't mean jack, and likewise because "Sunwing/unifor" is smaller, doesn't put them at a disadvantage. Relative seniority to a base is something an arbitrator will have to decide, or both parties, but not me.

Maybe there are Sunwing captains that want their seat, that's how they've run their show all these years. QOL in a sense.

Do you think it's reasonable to punt another carrier's pilots, by way of an acquisition, for the Westjet pilots to lick their lips and expect to not only turnover the Sunwing lifestyle of north-south flying, deployments, AND THEN also punt those from the left seats and/or bases?

Do you think a reasonable arbitrator would decide that? DOH is ALPA policy. Not Unifor's. And a vote wouldn't really hold water unless the unions agreed to bring it to their own "sides" for ratification, imho.

Clearly, it sounds like Westjet pilots value seats over pay, and betting the Sunwing pilots value pay over seats. Almost sounds like what ACPA would have done with Transat.

Not up to me or you to decide. I do think it's positive for both groups and not gloom and doom.

DOH is NOT ALPA policy. It is not even mentioned in the ‘factors’ that must be considered when integrating seniority lists.

Read the policy.

Do I have to read it? Or can I look at Westjet/Swoop, GGN/Jazz, Skyregional/Jazz.....

There were just 2 ‘mergers’ involving Jazz(ACR). The original Austin Airways/Air Ontario Ltd merger and then the airOntario/airNova/airBC/CRA merger. The lists were constructed on a DOH basis (consensually).

I will say it again - WestJet/Swoop was not a ‘merger’ under the definition of the ALPA Merger Policy. It was simply the resolution of CBA related matters.

There have been several negotiated/arbitrated seniority integrations since the advent of the latest ALPA Merger Policy. None were DOH.

I could probably write what the outcome will be at WJ/SW and not miss by much. It will be a ratioed list with potentially more than one ratio. There will be language that fences the WB positions to former WJ pilots which will likely be time limited. If WJ ceases to operate WB aircraft, problem solved.

None of this is rocket science. But often the parties directly involved cannot see clearly.

Not sure who is on the SW Merger Committee but the Chair of the WJ Merger Committee is actually just about as close as you can get to a rocket scientist. He has the right temperament, knowledge, and situational awareness to be both an effective negotiator and - if necessary - effective advocate for his pilot group before an arbitration panel.

I doubt very much that he will propose anything outrageous. As I said previously, take a good look at the AS/VX award. Except for the WB issue, it could easily be stamped on the WJ/SW merger with nominally different ratios applied.

FYI - the AS and VX Merger reps agreed on methodology (variable ratio). They simply could not agree on the formula. That matter was referred to an arbitration panel.

[CaptDukeNukem]

What is good for the "whole pilot group" is not up to you or me. Please realize, both sides will not come out of this completely satisfied. Just because "westjet/alpa" is bigger doesn't mean jack, and likewise because "Sunwing/unifor" is smaller, doesn't put them at a disadvantage. Relative seniority to a base is something an arbitrator will have to decide, or both parties, but not me.

Maybe there are Sunwing captains that want their seat, that's how they've run their show all these years. QOL in a sense.

Do you think it's reasonable to punt another carrier's pilots, by way of an acquisition, for the Westjet pilots to lick their lips and expect to not only turnover the Sunwing lifestyle of north-south flying, deployments, AND THEN also punt those from the left seats and/or bases?

Do you think a reasonable arbitrator would decide that? DOH is ALPA policy. Not Unifor's. And a vote wouldn't really hold water unless the unions agreed to bring it to their own "sides" for ratification, imho.

Clearly, it sounds like Westjet pilots value seats over pay, and betting the Sunwing pilots value pay over seats. Almost sounds like what ACPA would have done with Transat.

Not up to me or you to decide. I do think it's positive for both groups and not gloom and doom.

DOH is NOT ALPA policy. It is not even mentioned in the ‘factors’ that must be considered when integrating seniority lists.

Read the policy.

Do I have to read it? Or can I look at Westjet/Swoop, GGN/Jazz, Skyregional/Jazz.....

Also, for the record, Sky/Jazz was not a merger. Sky shut down operations because AC moved their flying to Jazz.

Jazz needed the embraer pilots in “two shakes of a Lamb’s tail” in order to make the effing thing fly. If you’re gonna throw in 25 tail numbers of a new type and want people to fly them tomorrow, it’s not gonna be the ones currently on property.

Edited once for footnote:

Look how that turned out for jazz.