Midair at DCA

[Dry Guy]

Is it acceptable to keep Biden aides current on Blackhawks just because?

[OneYonge]

Remember the Heli pilot never heard the controller switch the CRJ to 33! Different frequencies! And the controllers callout to the Heli….vague. Brutal. “Do you see the RJ?” WTF? No distance or altitude?

no distance or altitude? he was clearly told the exact position over the bridge at 1200 feet. setting up for 33.

what’s so vague about that? did you miss that? you guys have no business flying in class B if you can’t listen to basic radio position reports.

let’s stop pretending they were not clearly told to pass behind the plane as soon as it was obvious they were getting close.

i also wish ATC had thought to vector them away much earlier…. but these heli VFR routes are questionable.

unless that chopper obviously diverted from the standard route earlier, the controller really had no chance to see that coming.

[pelmet]

Remember the Heli pilot never heard the controller switch the CRJ to 33! Different frequencies!

Is that for sure? I haven't heard the NTSB briefings but sometimes one can hear the controller give instructions on another frequency but not hear the reply.

[Daniel Cooper]

Most obvious DEI crash in quite some time. Liberals be like sometimes accidents just happen.

//takes mod hat off for a moment.

Not the smartest take I've seen on this. By "DEI" you mean the dogwhistle that because a woman was one of the crewmembers on board the helicopter, without some special policy she wouldn't have been there, and also that she was the cause of the accident. That's just sad cringe, and it needs to be called out for what it is. In addition, assigning blame before even the interim report has come out is unprofessional, lowbrow and speaks to the character of the person doing the blaming.

Also, that somehow 'liberals' were at fault. Trump literally disbanded the Aviation Security Advisory Committee on his second day in office, and there will be a price to be paid for that down the road.

You can do better. Enjoy your day, and safe flights. There but for the grace...

That's so nice of you. You enjoy your day too.

[rookiepilot]

Remember the Heli pilot never heard the controller switch the CRJ to 33! Different frequencies! And the controllers callout to the Heli….vague. Brutal. “Do you see the RJ?” WTF? No distance or altitude?

no distance or altitude? he was clearly told the exact position over the bridge at 1200 feet. setting up for 33.

what’s so vague about that? did you miss that? you guys have no business flying in class B if you can’t listen to basic radio position reports.

let’s stop pretending they were not clearly told to pass behind the plane as soon as it was obvious they were getting close.

i also wish ATC had thought to vector them away much earlier…. but these heli VFR routes are questionable.

unless that chopper obviously diverted from the standard route earlier, the controller really had no chance to see that coming.

Yeah. One call. Then after when they got close, “do you see the RJ”. (Compounded by the fact the RJ never heard it) Inadequate. No positive separation. Heli saying they had them in sight and asking for visual separation is irrelevant IMO

The RJ didn’t sign up to be hit on final approach, was not operating VFR, and paid the price.

[OneYonge]

Yeah. One call. Then after when they got close, “do you see the RJ”. (Compounded by the fact the RJ never heard it) Inadequate. No positive separation. Heli saying they had them in sight and asking for visual separation is irrelevant IMO

The RJ didn’t sign up to be hit on final approach, was not operating VFR, and paid the price.

The CRJ never heard what? They were cleared to land. Blackhawk shouldn't be there!

Positive separation? They were told to pass behind traffic. Did you miss that?
Are you telling us that guys like you would crash too because you think that's inadequate?

Do you even know what visual separation means? If you request that, it means you as PIC are responsible.

There is a case to be made that maybe this procedure and these training flights should not be available at the aerodrome.

I think we can all agree at this point you have not made a single case what else the ATC could have realistically done other than be a psychic who can watch where your eyeballs are pointed or remote control a bunch of airplanes.

[pdw]

They were told to pass behind traffic.

They (arriving sooner to that place /crabbing right now as well) would have had a much increased speed in tailquartering groundspeed at that point within ATC’s “pass behind” option/judgement. “They”, as some suspect, might also not have had actual intended “traffic” there yet as per controller expectation, since the CRJ now also arriving somewhat different (slower) in that same ‘increased’ component (see surface/SPECI “peak wind 0108z”).

There’s the fluctuating altitude in the video of the radar from 300 to two hits of 200 then back to the one 300 hit only a few secs prior. Last nite news (fox tv) there is “some kind of altitude issue “ being studied (ie perhaps if actual helo alt steady in between those ATC-hundreds … closer 250?) , as imo those “200” on-screen could be seen as ‘deviation underway’.

[khedrei]

The heli and CRJ both heard the instructions from ATC as that was broadcast on both bands. Neither of them heard the response from the other.

As OneYoung said, there is an argument that visual separation shouldn't exist. There is no evidence that the controller didn't do his job or violated anything.

Yes the RJ paid the price for the mistakes of the heli and the shortfalls and riskiness of the procedure. I hope they fix it so it doesn't happen again.

Stop blaming ATC without any evidence.

Stop blaming DEI without any evidence. And I hate DEI. I just don't see any evidence it played any role at this point. If some becomes available, I'll happily change my tune.

[digits_]

Stop blaming ATC without any evidence.

ATC did not provide the CRJ with the traffic separation that should have been provided when giving them a class B clearance. That's the evidence.

The CRJ was not involved in the decision of ATC to hand over separation responsibility to the PIC of another aircraft.

Note that this does not necessarily mean the individual controller technically did anything wrong. But ATC as a service definitely dropped the ball.

[khedrei]

Stop blaming ATC without any evidence.

ATC did not provide the CRJ with the traffic separation that should have been provided when giving them a class B clearance. That's the evidence.

The CRJ was not involved in the decision of ATC to hand over separation responsibility to the PIC of another aircraft.

Note that this does not necessarily mean the individual controller technically did anything wrong. But ATC as a service definitely dropped the ball.

I see what you're saying, but show me where the procedure says that when authorizing a heli to visually separate themselves, they must involve all parties in the decision.

I agree the procedure needs to change. That's a different argument than "the controller should have done more".

[rookiepilot]

Stop blaming ATC without any evidence.

ATC did not provide the CRJ with the traffic separation that should have been provided when giving them a class B clearance. That's the evidence.

The CRJ was not involved in the decision of ATC to hand over separation responsibility to the PIC of another aircraft.

Note that this does not necessarily mean the individual controller technically did anything wrong. But ATC as a service definitely dropped the ball.

I see what you're saying, but show me where the procedure says that when authorizing a heli to visually separate themselves, they must involve all parties in the decision.

I agree the procedure needs to change. That's a different argument than "the controller should have done more".

Its called Class Bravo airspace. What part of Class B isnt understood.

Show me proof the RJ explicity agreed to VFR procedures on this approach and waived their right to separation and I will change my tune.

Until then it is ATCs fault as much as the Heli. Nitpicking whether its this particular controllers fault, they were short staffed, the guy was on the crapper, is irrelevant. Stop extending sympathy to the only guy who lived through this, safe and secure in his tower.

I hate on these threads everyone is more concerned with someones feelings than the fact 70 people are dead.

[digits_]

Stop blaming ATC without any evidence.

ATC did not provide the CRJ with the traffic separation that should have been provided when giving them a class B clearance. That's the evidence.

The CRJ was not involved in the decision of ATC to hand over separation responsibility to the PIC of another aircraft.

Note that this does not necessarily mean the individual controller technically did anything wrong. But ATC as a service definitely dropped the ball.

I see what you're saying, but show me where the procedure says that when authorizing a heli to visually separate themselves, they must involve all parties in the decision.

I agree the procedure needs to change. That's a different argument than "the controller should have done more".

Whether that procedure exists or not is irrelevant to the point if ATC is to blame or not. ATC has to provide separation. How they do that, is the responsibility of ATC. Procedures -or lack of procedures- to deal with that, fall within the purview of ATC. The procedures that allowed this were either followed and faulty, not followed, or non existent. In each case ATC is to blame for not providing separation services to the CRJ.

The details however might affect whether or not the controller is to blame. And the details would be very important to understand how/why this happened, and to prevent it in the future if so desired.

To add, I also don't think there's any procedure or regulation that would have prevented the controller from issuing a heading or a hold to the helicopter. But we've covered that before.

[khedrei]

I'm the last person that would spare someone's feelings if they were at fault.

Nothing that I have seen says this controller is at fault. Even if I wanted to spare his feelings and even though it's not his fault, he will live with this horrible tragedy for a long time. He may never return to work. Who knows.

It appears (and this is an assumption based on how regular this seems to be) that the RJ didn't need to waive or agree to anything. This is normal procedure in class B. You might not like it, yoy might think class B should not work this way. You might have thought it didnt work this way, but that doesn't change the fact that this is how it works.

It's not an individual controllers fault that the system lined up the holes in the Swiss cheese.

Everything I've seen shows that the heli is at fault. I'm sure ATC workload, and poor procedure design could likely be contributing factors.

[khedrei]

Also, you want to talk about feelings...

Seems like you are letting your feelings for the RJ victims who did nothing wrong get in the way of seeing things objectively. You don't like the procedure, so you want to blame one of the people who follow (support) it by giving the visual separation.

Forget about the 10000's of times visual separation was granted and no accident happened...

[digits_]

Forget about the 10000's of times visual separation was granted and no accident happened...

True but irrelevant. Every accident in aviation has occurred on flights and conditions that have happened 10000s of times without accidents. Yet those accidents still may cause some necessary and highly overdue changes (phraseology, CRM, TCAS, radar, procedural changes, deicing culture, ...)

[cdnavater]

I'm the last person that would spare someone's feelings if they were at fault.

Nothing that I have seen says this controller is at fault. Even if I wanted to spare his feelings and even though it's not his fault, he will live with this horrible tragedy for a long time. He may never return to work. Who knows.

It appears (and this is an assumption based on how regular this seems to be) that the RJ didn't need to waive or agree to anything. This is normal procedure in class B. You might not like it, yoy might think class B should not work this way. You might have thought it didnt work this way, but that doesn't change the fact that this is how it works.

It's not an individual controllers fault that the system lined up the holes in the Swiss cheese.

Everything I've seen shows that the heli is at fault. I'm sure ATC workload, and poor procedure design could likely be contributing factors.

Based on the below reading material, I believe the controller may have some fault, of course it will come out once everything has been evaluated but with the information so far, there was an obligation to inform the RJ crew about the “converging traffic” and when the targets were likely to touch


“ATC will separate VFR traffic from all other VFR and IFR aircraft. They’ll provide at least 500 feet of vertical separation. Lateral separation will be at least 1 ½ miles for jets and large aircraft or target resolution for small aircraft. ATC may allow visual separation at its discretion”

TARGET RESOLUTION- A process to ensure that correlated radar targets do not touch. Target resolution must be applied as follows:
Between the edges of two primary targets or the edges of the ASR-9/11 primary target symbol.
Between the end of the beacon control slash and the edge of a primary target.
Between the ends of two beacon control slashes.
Note 1: Mandatory traffic advisories and safety alerts must be issued when this procedure is used.
Note 2: This procedure must not be used when utilizing mosaic radar systems or multi-sensor mode

VISUAL SEPARATION
Visual separation may be applied when other approved separation is assured before and after the application of visual separation. To ensure that other separation will exist, consider aircraft performance, wake turbulence, closure rate, routes of flight, known weather conditions, and aircraft position. Weather conditions must allow the aircraft to remain within sight until other separation exists. Visual separation is not authorized when the lead aircraft is a super.
REFERENCE-
FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 2-1-20, Wake Turbulence Cautionary Advisories.
FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 2-1-21, Traffic Advisories.
FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 3-1-9, Use of Tower Radar Displays.
FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 5-9-5, Approach Separation Responsibility.
FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 7-4-1, Visual Approach.
FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 7-4-2, Vectors for Visual Approach.
FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 7-4-4, Approaches to Multiple Runways.
FAA Order JO 7210.3, Para 4-3-2, Appropriate Subjects.
FAA Order JO 7210.3, Para 10-3-9, Visual Separation.
P/CG Term - VISUAL APPROACH.
P/CG Term - VISUAL SEPARATION.
TERMINAL. Visual separation may be applied between aircraft up to but not including FL180 under the following conditions:
Tower-applied visual separation.
Maintain communication with at least one of the aircraft involved or ensure there is an ability to communicate immediately with applicable military aircraft as prescribed in paragraph 3-9-3, Departure Control Instructions, subparagraph a2.

The tower visually observes the aircraft, issues timely traffic advisories, and provides visual separation between the aircraft.
Issue control instructions as necessary to ensure continued separation between the applicable aircraft.
Do not apply visual separation between successive departures when departure routes and/or aircraft performance preclude maintaining separation.
The use of tower-applied visual separation is not authorized when wake turbulence separation is required.
ATCTs at adjacent airports may be authorized to apply visual separation between their traffic and the other facility's traffic. All provisions of FAA Order JO 7110.65, paragraph 7-2-1a1, still apply.
NOTE-

Additional requirements are listed in FAA Order JO 7210.3, paragraph 10-3-9, Visual Separation.
Pilot-applied visual separation.
Maintain communication with at least one of the aircraft involved and ensure there is an ability to communicate with the other aircraft.
The pilot sees another aircraft and is instructed to maintain visual separation from the aircraft as follows:
Tell the pilot about the other aircraft. Include position, direction, type, and, unless it is obvious, the other aircraft's intention.
Obtain acknowledgment from the pilot that the other aircraft is in sight.
Instruct the pilot to maintain visual separation from that aircraft.
PHRASEOLOGY-
(ACID), TRAFFIC, (clock position and distance), (direction) BOUND, (type of aircraft), (intentions and other relevant information).
If required,
(ACID), REPORT TRAFFIC IN SIGHT or DO YOU HAVE IT IN SIGHT?
If the pilot reports traffic in sight, or the answer is in the affirmative,
(ACID), MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION
NOTE-
Towers must use the procedures contained in paragraph 3-1-6, Traffic Information, subparagraph b or c, as appropriate.
If the pilot reports the traffic in sight and will maintain visual separation from it (the pilot must state both), the controller may “approve” the operation instead of restating the instructions.
PHRASEOLOGY-
(ACID), APPROVED.
NOTE-
Pilot-applied visual separation between aircraft is achieved when the controller has instructed the pilot to maintain visual separation and the pilot acknowledges with their call sign or when the controller has approved pilot-initiated visual separation.
REFERENCE-
FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 5-4-5, Transferring Controller Handoff.
If aircraft are on converging courses, inform the other aircraft of the traffic and that visual separation is being applied.
PHRASEOLOGY-
(ACID), TRAFFIC, (clock position and distance), (direction) BOUND, (type of aircraft), HAS YOU IN SIGHT AND WILL MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION.
Advise the pilots if the targets appear likely to merge

[khedrei]

I'm the last person that would spare someone's feelings if they were at fault.

Nothing that I have seen says this controller is at fault. Even if I wanted to spare his feelings and even though it's not his fault, he will live with this horrible tragedy for a long time. He may never return to work. Who knows.

It appears (and this is an assumption based on how regular this seems to be) that the RJ didn't need to waive or agree to anything. This is normal procedure in class B. You might not like it, yoy might think class B should not work this way. You might have thought it didnt work this way, but that doesn't change the fact that this is how it works.

It's not an individual controllers fault that the system lined up the holes in the Swiss cheese.

Everything I've seen shows that the heli is at fault. I'm sure ATC workload, and poor procedure design could likely be contributing factors.

Based on the below reading material, I believe the controller may have some fault, of course it will come out once everything has been evaluated but with the information so far, there was an obligation to inform the RJ crew about the “converging traffic” and when the targets were likely to touch


“ATC will separate VFR traffic from all other VFR and IFR aircraft. They’ll provide at least 500 feet of vertical separation. Lateral separation will be at least 1 ½ miles for jets and large aircraft or target resolution for small aircraft. ATC may allow visual separation at its discretion”

TARGET RESOLUTION- A process to ensure that correlated radar targets do not touch. Target resolution must be applied as follows:
Between the edges of two primary targets or the edges of the ASR-9/11 primary target symbol.
Between the end of the beacon control slash and the edge of a primary target.
Between the ends of two beacon control slashes.
Note 1: Mandatory traffic advisories and safety alerts must be issued when this procedure is used.
Note 2: This procedure must not be used when utilizing mosaic radar systems or multi-sensor mode

VISUAL SEPARATION
Visual separation may be applied when other approved separation is assured before and after the application of visual separation. To ensure that other separation will exist, consider aircraft performance, wake turbulence, closure rate, routes of flight, known weather conditions, and aircraft position. Weather conditions must allow the aircraft to remain within sight until other separation exists. Visual separation is not authorized when the lead aircraft is a super.
REFERENCE-
FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 2-1-20, Wake Turbulence Cautionary Advisories.
FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 2-1-21, Traffic Advisories.
FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 3-1-9, Use of Tower Radar Displays.
FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 5-9-5, Approach Separation Responsibility.
FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 7-4-1, Visual Approach.
FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 7-4-2, Vectors for Visual Approach.
FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 7-4-4, Approaches to Multiple Runways.
FAA Order JO 7210.3, Para 4-3-2, Appropriate Subjects.
FAA Order JO 7210.3, Para 10-3-9, Visual Separation.
P/CG Term - VISUAL APPROACH.
P/CG Term - VISUAL SEPARATION.
TERMINAL. Visual separation may be applied between aircraft up to but not including FL180 under the following conditions:
Tower-applied visual separation.
Maintain communication with at least one of the aircraft involved or ensure there is an ability to communicate immediately with applicable military aircraft as prescribed in paragraph 3-9-3, Departure Control Instructions, subparagraph a2.

The tower visually observes the aircraft, issues timely traffic advisories, and provides visual separation between the aircraft.
Issue control instructions as necessary to ensure continued separation between the applicable aircraft.
Do not apply visual separation between successive departures when departure routes and/or aircraft performance preclude maintaining separation.
The use of tower-applied visual separation is not authorized when wake turbulence separation is required.
ATCTs at adjacent airports may be authorized to apply visual separation between their traffic and the other facility's traffic. All provisions of FAA Order JO 7110.65, paragraph 7-2-1a1, still apply.
NOTE-

Additional requirements are listed in FAA Order JO 7210.3, paragraph 10-3-9, Visual Separation.
Pilot-applied visual separation.
Maintain communication with at least one of the aircraft involved and ensure there is an ability to communicate with the other aircraft.
The pilot sees another aircraft and is instructed to maintain visual separation from the aircraft as follows:
Tell the pilot about the other aircraft. Include position, direction, type, and, unless it is obvious, the other aircraft's intention.
Obtain acknowledgment from the pilot that the other aircraft is in sight.
Instruct the pilot to maintain visual separation from that aircraft.
PHRASEOLOGY-
(ACID), TRAFFIC, (clock position and distance), (direction) BOUND, (type of aircraft), (intentions and other relevant information).
If required,
(ACID), REPORT TRAFFIC IN SIGHT or DO YOU HAVE IT IN SIGHT?
If the pilot reports traffic in sight, or the answer is in the affirmative,
(ACID), MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION
NOTE-
Towers must use the procedures contained in paragraph 3-1-6, Traffic Information, subparagraph b or c, as appropriate.
If the pilot reports the traffic in sight and will maintain visual separation from it (the pilot must state both), the controller may “approve” the operation instead of restating the instructions.
PHRASEOLOGY-
(ACID), APPROVED.
NOTE-
Pilot-applied visual separation between aircraft is achieved when the controller has instructed the pilot to maintain visual separation and the pilot acknowledges with their call sign or when the controller has approved pilot-initiated visual separation.
REFERENCE-
FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 5-4-5, Transferring Controller Handoff.
If aircraft are on converging courses, inform the other aircraft of the traffic and that visual separation is being applied.
PHRASEOLOGY-
(ACID), TRAFFIC, (clock position and distance), (direction) BOUND, (type of aircraft), HAS YOU IN SIGHT AND WILL MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION.
Advise the pilots if the targets appear likely to merge

Based on the info you posted, I would agree. According to those procedures It looks like the last call he should have made was to the CRJ instead of the heli.

Thanks for finding that.

[OneYonge]

Based on the info you posted, I would agree. According to those procedures It looks like the last call he should have made was to the CRJ instead of the heli.

Thanks for finding that.

Wouldn't that require more reaction time? And unless ATC was going to instruct a go around, what would that accomplish?

The CRJ was cleared to land and had right of way. Shouldn't the blackhawk be the one to move out of the way?

[pdw]

Reaction time would have been more abundant if not for the helicopter’s unusually rapid groundspeed then … where the CRJ took longer (the slower groundspeed in that “peak wind”) turned NW.

“Out of the way” was ‘being complied with’ but not easy to see how the directive to “go behind” would have worked before it went wrong. What’s that diagram look like ... heading (vector) , track(s) as seen on radar, and altitude (alt-setting correction was changing upward 50ft per hour prior … all Altimeters).

[canadianfly]

Anyone with night vision goggles experience to shed some light on how they would interact with a bright landing lights ??

[7ECA]

Trump administration begins firing FAA staff, in so-called efficiency drive lead by "DOGE" team. Apparently hundreds of probationary workers have, or are, being fired at the FAA and numerous other Federal agencies...

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cly9y1e1kpjo

[flyguy73]

Most obvious DEI crash in quite some time. Liberals be like sometimes accidents just happen.

I assume you're referring to the white male in the instructor seat that said he had the traffic in sight? Yeah, he sure did.

Perhaps they should stop hiring stereotypical, unqualified, entitled white males as helicopter pilots? Nah, they just hired one as their Secretary of Defense.

[mmm...bacon]

Trump administration begins firing FAA staff, in so-called efficiency drive lead by "DOGE" team. Apparently hundreds of probationary workers have, or are, being fired at the FAA and numerous other Federal agencies...

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cly9y1e1kpjo

Don't think that bodes well for the future of ATC in the USA. My understanding of 'probationary' there - from what i've read elsewhere (perhaps anecdotally) - is that you could have 5, 10, 20 years in, but if you recently shifted classifications, you are deemed 'probationary' in that new classification. So, you could have 20 years behind the mic as an ATCO, and then have moved up to supervisor, and now you're probationary, and hit the road jack! Government efficiency is a great thing, but if you have people who don't know the first thing about the system they are making 'efficient' pulling the strings, then it's going to be a sh!tshow...

[Outlaw58]

MAPHA: Make America Pre-Historic Again...

58

[rookiepilot]

*Walter Bloomberg
@DeItaone
·
32s
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION ISSUES PERMANENT RESTRICTIONS ON HELICOPTER TRAFFIC AROUND WASHINGTON AIRPORT AFTER FATAL COLLISION


…..always afterwards. Never before.

And so many professionals seem to think this was just an instance of failed see and avoid.

If so why is the change needed?

Even this dumb weekend warrior saw the insanity in this airspace.