cdnavater wrote: ↑Sat Apr 26, 2025 2:26 am
This is insane, first why do the auto throttles not disengage as soon as someone overrides them by manually adjusting them, I would have thought this. Admittedly, I don’t have experience with auto throttle.
Second, the two hands for the flair drives me nucking futs, from either seat I can manage to flair with one hand on the thrust levers, this should be absolutely mandatory. If you can’t do this, go back to the bush. How did this captain not realize the thrust levers move forward again after deploying the working reverser, both hands back on the controls?
They don’t disconnect to allow you to help the auto throttles out. Sometimes they don’t react as quickly as you would like and you can help them along without them disconnecting completely. I know the A220 disconnects as soon as you touch them and most people find it quite annoying.
I can see how that might be annoying, but if you touch them on the 220 and it disconnects I imagine it’s just a matter of a button to re-engage.
I think I would prefer that to something I can override but it goes right back, this being said, you should be aware of how your systems work!
We're forgetting that the PF was also exhausted. Errors were made and not trapped. Had the pilot been better rested, the outcome would likely have been different.
goingnowherefast wrote: ↑Sun Apr 27, 2025 4:41 am
We're forgetting that the PF was also exhausted. Errors were made and not trapped. Had the pilot been better rested, the outcome would likely have been different.
It may very well be true but that doesn't change the reality of what needs to be done to prevent an accident when exhausted. The argument almost seems to be....if exhausted, there is not much one can do, that's it, that's all. When you are there and eu are exhausted, it is too late to change that aspect.
In addition, one could divert and do an autoland if exhaustion is that bad or get the other pilot to fly(he had much more rest on this particular flight). If exhausted, one might not want to go around as there have been quite a few go-around accidents from non-exhausted pilots. One could consume a bunch of coffee(I carry energy drinks with me).
While the report does talk about the pilot's lack of rest, it is unfortunate that there is nothing in the report about specific questions asked to the pilot such as "Did you feel fatigued on approach or were you feeling fairly alert".
goingnowherefast wrote: ↑Sun Apr 27, 2025 4:41 am
We're forgetting that the PF was also exhausted. Errors were made and not trapped. Had the pilot been better rested, the outcome would likely have been different.
It may very well be true but that doesn't change the reality of what needs to be done to prevent an accident when exhausted. The argument almost seems to be....if exhausted, there is not much one can do, that's it, that's all. When you are there and eu are exhausted, it is too late to change that aspect.
In addition, one could divert and do an autoland if exhaustion is that bad or get the other pilot to fly(he had much more rest on this particular flight). If exhausted, one might not want to go around as there have been quite a few go-around accidents from non-exhausted pilots. One could consume a bunch of coffee(I carry energy drinks with me).
While the report does talk about the pilot's lack of rest, it is unfortunate that there is nothing in the report about specific questions asked to the pilot such as "Did you feel fatigued on approach or were you feeling fairly alert".
The idea is to avoid being exhausted on approach in the first place. It's a 3 piece puzzle:
1. The regulator creates fatigue regulations. Was the accident pilot in compliance with the fatigue regs? I think so. Do the regs need to be adjusted? TSB doesn't think so.
2. Operator has a fatigue program. Do they track fatigue book off rates and adjust fatiguing pairings? Can pilots report unfit for duty without consequence? TSB didn't make any mention of issues here.
3. Get adequate rest with the opportunities available. You're on reserve at 5am? Don't watch TV until midnight. Flying a red-eye? Then have a good afternoon nap prior to work.
I'll make the argument is the majority of the responsibility rests with the pilot. The regulator and the operator can only create the framework and ensure rest opportunities are available. The pilot has to be the one who actually goes to bed at appropriate times.
goingnowherefast wrote: ↑Sun Apr 27, 2025 4:41 am
We're forgetting that the PF was also exhausted. Errors were made and not trapped. Had the pilot been better rested, the outcome would likely have been different.
It may very well be true but that doesn't change the reality of what needs to be done to prevent an accident when exhausted. The argument almost seems to be....if exhausted, there is not much one can do, that's it, that's all. When you are there and eu are exhausted, it is too late to change that aspect.
In addition, one could divert and do an autoland if exhaustion is that bad or get the other pilot to fly(he had much more rest on this particular flight). If exhausted, one might not want to go around as there have been quite a few go-around accidents from non-exhausted pilots. One could consume a bunch of coffee(I carry energy drinks with me).
While the report does talk about the pilot's lack of rest, it is unfortunate that there is nothing in the report about specific questions asked to the pilot such as "Did you feel fatigued on approach or were you feeling fairly alert".
The idea is to avoid being exhausted on approach in the first place. It's a 3 piece puzzle:
1. The regulator creates fatigue regulations. Was the accident pilot in compliance with the fatigue regs? I think so. Do the regs need to be adjusted? TSB doesn't think so.
2. Operator has a fatigue program. Do they track fatigue book off rates and adjust fatiguing pairings? Can pilots report unfit for duty without consequence? TSB didn't make any mention of issues here.
3. Get adequate rest with the opportunities available. You're on reserve at 5am? Don't watch TV until midnight. Flying a red-eye? Then have a good afternoon nap prior to work.
I'll make the argument is the majority of the responsibility rests with the pilot. The regulator and the operator can only create the framework and ensure rest opportunities are available. The pilot has to be the one who actually goes to bed at appropriate times.
Legally perhaps. Practically speaking, it's mainly the operator that controls fatigue by creating a schedule that would be too exhausting.
If a pilot calls fatigue that means he has been fatigued for way too long. Lots of pilots are flying schedules that nobody would ever doubt are too exhausting, yet companies are asking/expecting the crew to fly them.
This is not aimed at flair specifically, it's a general reply to your above statement.
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As an AvCanada discussion grows longer:
-the probability of 'entitlement' being mentioned, approaches 1
-one will be accused of using bad airmanship
Although, I do see your point. I know of one company's fatigue program (not speaking to Flair) that only allows a person to be "fatigued" if there was a duty reg violation. If one "calls in fatigued", and no violation is found, that pilot loses a sick day. Only allowed to be fatigued if one wasn't allowed to work anyway, what a dysfunctional pile of garbage!
It's 100% on the operator to accurately track and record legitimate instances of fatigue. Then use the data to reduce the likelihood of fatiguing assignments.
goingnowherefast wrote: ↑Mon Apr 28, 2025 4:47 am
Then remove one's self from duty.
Although, I do see your point. I know of one company's fatigue program (not speaking to Flair) that only allows a person to be "fatigued" if there was a duty reg violation. If one "calls in fatigued", and no violation is found, that pilot loses a sick day. Only allowed to be fatigued if one wasn't allowed to work anyway, what a dysfunctional pile of garbage!
It's 100% on the operator to accurately track and record legitimate instances of fatigue. Then use the data to reduce the likelihood of fatiguing assignments.
I have no issue with fatigue management.
My posts are based on the reality that the fatigue management did not work for whatever reason and you are now exhausted. It is too late to discuss with the other crewmember about how the regulations should be changed as one is briefing for the approach. Now the question is.....how to get down safely and not make the errors. Knowing(or reviewing once in a while) how to operate the autothrottle quickly(which is pretty much natural), ensuring that ones hand stays on the throttles, and having run through this scenario(accidental TOGA activation) once in a while are suggestions. Some might have some other suggestions such as a go-around if the aircraft becomes destabilized(or some other reasons) or one is having issues resolving the situation, etc.
