Dreamliner Down in India

[sportingrifle]

Setting 0 in the MCP altitude will result in the autothrust system taking the engines to idle, but not shutting them down. Additionally, the thrust levers can easily be pushed up manually if that were to happen.

The RAT deployment and apu autostart wouldn’t have occurred if the engines just rolled back to idle.

[Rooster69]

Setting 0 in the MCP altitude will result in the autothrust system taking the engines to idle, but not shutting them down. Additionally, the thrust levers can easily be pushed up manually if that were to happen.

The RAT deployment and apu autostart wouldn’t have occurred if the engines just rolled back to idle.

Agreed. Only way RAT comes out is if both engines fail or manually deployed. Engines did roll back. Did RAT come out because the engines failed or was RAT manually deployed by someone doing the dual engine failure drill? Whether they failed or went to idle is what we are waiting to find out.

“Thrust levers can easily be pushed up”. There already has been an accident where the pilots did not notice that the thrust levers had not moved forward during a go around. Not saying that this is the case. Just saying that it happens.


Anyhow, just going to sit back and wait for the silence to be broken.
Fly safe.

[goldeneagle]

So my question for a 787 driver, cuz I've never seen the front end of one of those. Where are the fuel cutoffs located ?

Thinking back to an accident report I read years ago, seat lock let go, seat slid back just as person flying pitched up into the climb. Instinct reaction was to reach out and grab something to stabilize oneself, ad in that case, they reached and grabbed onto a mixture control, which basically got yanked out to the 'engine very quiet' setting.

So, in a 787, are the fuel cutoff handles in a spot where a seat suddenly sliding back could be what gets grabbed accidentally ? If so, would they go to the cutoff position if that happened ? If so, what would happen if they got pushed right back immediately ? I know in some cases engines will pick up where they left off, in others, engines will be very 'not happy' if you just put the fuel cutoff back to on after unintentionally putting it to the off position without going thru a few other steps for the restart.

[Eric Janson]

https://www.alamy.com/stock-photo-boein ... 58013.html

The fuel control switches are located just aft of the thrust levers. They are the black round switches marked "Run" and "Cutoff"

You need to pull them out and lift them over a gate to switch their positions - moving them is a deliberate act. It's not something that can be done accidently. Jmho

[pdw]

OK, you gotta remember though, the main reason why an operator wants to go easy on their engines is for their longevity; but also sometimes for fuel savings, emissions reductions and noise reduction.

[boeingboy]

The switches are close together there, just like the intakes from the two fuel lines are closest together when sucking from the centre tank; so both engines would have been getting their fuel from basically the same area of the airframe’s supply. That way any contamination possibility would affect each engine equally, given the high rate of fuel flow at that time.

The other thing is still, suppose if having entered the 5-10 knot tailwind along with the TO2/CLB2 fixed computation on instead of 5knots headwind, and 10C hotter for the actual temp. Would it still work to be enough thrust if 5-10 percent is lost in a contamination (or other further loss) incident?

Jesus......please just stop.

[Old fella]

The switches are close together there, just like the intakes from the two fuel lines are closest together when sucking from the centre tank; so both engines would have been getting their fuel from basically the same area of the airframe’s supply. That way any contamination possibility would affect each engine equally, given the high rate of fuel flow at that time.

The other thing is still, suppose if having entered the 5-10 knot tailwind along with the TO2/CLB2 fixed computation on instead of 5knots headwind, and 10C hotter for the actual temp. Would it still work to be enough thrust if 5-10 percent is lost in a contamination (or other further loss) incident?

Jesus......please just stop.

+++ 1

[mijbil]

https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safe ... -switches/ Good pic of the switches (and the guards on the sides).

[Eric Janson]

OK, you gotta remember though, the main reason why an operator wants to go easy on their engines is for their longevity; but also sometimes for fuel savings, emissions reductions and noise reduction.

Reduced thrust take-offs and climbs cost fuel. It lowers the maximum temperatures in the engine - reducing wear- but at the cost of using more fuel.

[pelmet]

OK, you gotta remember though, the main reason why an operator wants to go easy on their engines is for their longevity; but also sometimes for fuel savings, emissions reductions and noise reduction.

Reduced thrust take-offs and climbs cost fuel. It lowers the maximum temperatures in the engine - reducing wear- but at the cost of using more fuel.

TO2 > CLB

[jpilot77]

https://www.reuters.com/world/india/in ... 025-07-08/

Looks they are focusing on the fuel switches, they say not looking like mechanical failure…

[shamrock104]

It would appear they are hiding their findings; no really surprised here.

[CpnCrunch]

It would appear they are hiding their findings; no really surprised here.

Why do you say that? The prelim report is scheduled to be released in the next day or two.

[Dias]

As long as they get to people first with their version of events they can spin its interpretation. People are less likely to find out what happened if presented with new evidence after having formed their initial opinion.
Like 80% of people find it impossible to change their opinion even when presented with evidence that proves the contrary.

[cncpc]

As long as they get to people first with their version of events they can spin its interpretation. People are less likely to find out what happened if presented with new evidence after having formed their initial opinion.
Like 80% of people find it impossible to change their opinion even when presented with evidence that proves the contrary.

Well said.

[rigpiggy]

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=4n2FtOiQqQ4
Easier to fool

[birdsofafeather]

Was there a jumpseater on this flight? Unfortunately it wouldn't be the 1st time a jumpseater caused issues ie Fed Ex DC10

[CpnCrunch]

Prelim report here:

https://aaib.gov.in/What's%20New%20Asse ... VT-ANB.pdf

Their website is a bit like going back to the 90s dialup, watching images slowly load, so it takes a while to download. Here are the pertinent facts:

As per the EAFR data, the aircraft crossed the take-off decision speed V1 and achieved 153
kts IAS at 08:08:33 UTC. The Vr speed (155 kts) was achieved as per the EAFR at 08:08:35
UTC. The aircraft air/ground sensors transitioned to air mode, consistent with liftoff at 08:08:39
UTC.
The aircraft achieved the maximum recorded airspeed of 180 Knots IAS at about 08:08:42
UTC and immediately thereafter, the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned
from RUN to CUTOFF position one after another with a time gap of 01 sec. The Engine N1
and N2 began to decrease from their take-off values as the fuel supply to the engines was cut
off.
In the cockpit voice recording, one of the pilots is heard asking the other why did he cutoff.
The other pilot responded that he did not do so.
The CCTV footage obtained from the airport showed Ram Air Turbine (RAT) getting deployed
during the initial climb immediately after lift-off (fig. 15). No significant bird activity is observed
in the vicinity of the flight path. The aircraft started to lose altitude before crossing the airport
perimeter wall.

As per the EAFR data both engines N2 values passed below minimum idle speed, and the
RAT hydraulic pump began supplying hydraulic power at about 08:08:47 UTC.

As per the EAFR, the Engine 1 fuel cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN at about
08:08:52 UTC. The APU Inlet Door began opening at about 08:08:54 UTC, consistent with
the APU Auto Start logic. Thereafter at 08:08:56 UTC the Engine 2 fuel cutoff switch also
transitions from CUTOFF to RUN. When fuel control switches are moved from CUTOFF to
RUN while the aircraft is inflight, each engines full authority dual engine control (FADEC)
automatically manages a relight and thrust recovery sequence of ignition and fuel introduction.
The EGT was observed to be rising for both engines indicating relight. Engine 1’s core
deceleration stopped, reversed and started to progress to recovery. Engine 2 was able to
relight but could not arrest core speed deceleration and re-introduced fuel repeatedly to
increase core speed acceleration and recovery. The EAFR recording stopped at 08:09:11
UTC
At about 08:09:05 UTC, one of the pilots transmitted “MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY”. The
ATCO enquired about the call sign. ATCO did not get any response but observed the aircraft
crashing outside the airport boundary and activated the emergency response.
At 08:14:44 UTC, Crash Fire Tender left the airport premises for Rescue and firefighting. They
were joined by Fire and Rescue services of Local Administration.

[dustyroads]

Do the fuel cutoff switches have known issues moving on their own? The fleet should be grounded worldwide until a solution is implemented.

[DanWEC]

Do the fuel cutoff switches have known issues moving on their own? The fleet should be grounded worldwide until a solution is implemented.

100%! You cracked the code! You should probably consult for Boeing.

In the meantime, maybe stop your trolling on dead serious threads and stick to making up your bullshit on employment topics. Or just go away.

Back to the topic- a very telling factor is the 1 sec split between switches. Very strongly aligns with what it would normally be to manipulate them with one hand.
The timing also correlates with when the gear would be raised, and it wasn't. Just bizarre. No mention of the call or its chronology in the sequence as of yet however.

The long question now will be why. Wonder if we'll ever fully know.

Here's a mirror link as the Indian one seems fried.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1yLPR3g ... sp=sharing

[dustyroads]

Do the fuel cutoff switches have known issues moving on their own? The fleet should be grounded worldwide until a solution is implemented.

100%! You cracked the code! You should probably consult for Boeing.

In the meantime, maybe stop your trolling on dead serious threads and stick to making up your bullshit on employment topics. Or just go away.

Back to the topic- a very telling factor is the 1 sec split between switches. Very strongly aligns with what it would normally be to manipulate them with one hand.

The long question now will be why. Wonder if we'll ever fully know.

You’re saying the switches can’t move by themselves? If so how did they move if neither of the 2 crew moved them? Not trolling, I’m asking legit questions that anyone would ask if they read what was presented in the report. You have no proof they didn’t move themselves.

[digits_]

Back to the topic- a very telling factor is the 1 sec split between switches. Very strongly aligns with what it would normally be to manipulate them with one hand.

You can't conclude there was a 1 second split if the positions are sampled (or recorded) at 1 Hz. It could be anything from a 1 microsecond to just under 2 seconds difference.

[DanWEC]

I don't really think that would change anything materially.

They were switched off individually at essentially positive rate, just a few seconds after liftoff, and they were switched back on within 4 seconds.

[digits_]

I don't really think that would change anything materially.

They were switched off individually at essentially positive rate, just a few seconds after liftoff, and they were switched back on within 4 seconds.

It increases the probability of them being moved at the same time due to an external force.

If it really is 1 second apart, it significantly increases the chance that it was done by a pilot.

I am now wondering, do FOs ever use those switches? If they don't, it would likely take longer to move them for the first time. Which could support the theory that the sim instructor captain moved them by some partial muscle memory action.

[DanWEC]

These switches can't just be bumped. They have to very deliberately be lifted and moved. Each.
As far as FO's using them, I'm only making assumptions on Air India's SOP's but should be plenty in the sim, but also starting and shutting down engines on single engine taxi in and out, etc.

Will probably be a while till more info comes out, but I'll be interested in hearing if they were moved after a positive rate call.
If the call wasn't yet made, then it's extremely suggestive of a malicious action. If it was made, well, could still very well be malicious but there's an infinitecimal chance that some other wild human factor came into play. But extremely remote and bizarre.

However, something doesn’t sit right with me with the immediate reply of "I didn't do that" or whatever. I feel like a suicidal person wouldn't have replied at all, or would have made some sort of unrelated personal statement.... Just a gut feeling. This is all just utterly bizarre.
Time may tell. RIP.