Dreamliner Down in India

[Dias]

Yeah accusations demean pilots, not killing your passengers, or raping kids.

[7ECA]

I think it is settled that the first officer was PF. I would like to know when normal went to abnormal in the crew conversation. [snipped]

From AvHerald's excerpt of the preliminary report from the AAIB:

As per the EAFR data, the aircraft crossed the take-off decision speed V1 and achieved 153 kts IAS at 08:08:33 UTC. The Vr speed (155 kts) was achieved as per the EAFR at 08:08:35 UTC. The aircraft air/ground sensors transitioned to air mode, consistent with liftoff at 08:08:39 UTC.

The aircraft achieved the maximum recorded airspeed of 180 Knots IAS at about 08:08:42 UTC and immediately thereafter, the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF position one after another with a time gap of 01 sec. The Engine N1 and N2 began to decrease from their take-off values as the fuel supply to the engines was cut off.

In the cockpit voice recording, one of the pilots is heard asking the other why did he cutoff. The other pilot responded that he did not do so.

As per the EAFR data both engines N2 values passed below minimum idle speed, and the RAT hydraulic pump began supplying hydraulic power at about 08:08:47 UTC.

As per the EAFR, the Engine 1 fuel cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN at about 08:08:52 UTC. The APU Inlet Door began opening at about 08:08:54 UTC, consistent with the APU Auto Start logic. Thereafter at 08:08:56 UTC the Engine 2 fuel cutoff switch also transitions from CUTOFF to RUN. When fuel control switches are moved from CUTOFF to RUN while the aircraft is inflight, each engines full authority dual engine control (FADEC) automatically manages a relight and thrust recovery sequence of ignition and fuel introduction.

The EGT was observed to be rising for both engines indicating relight. Engine 1’s core deceleration stopped, reversed and started to progress to recovery. Engine 2 was able to relight but could not arrest core speed deceleration and re-introduced fuel repeatedly to increase core speed acceleration and recovery. The EAFR recording stopped at 08:09:11 UTC

At about 08:09:05 UTC, one of the pilots transmitted “MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY”.

The ATCO enquired about the call sign. ATCO did not get any response but observed the aircraft crashing outside the airport boundary and activated the emergency response.

At 08:14:44 UTC, Crash Fire Tender left the airport premises for Rescue and firefighting. They were joined by Fire and Rescue services of Local Administration.

• The 777 is airborne at 08:08:39 UTC.

• Maximum airspeed of 180KTS IAS is recorded at 08:08:42 UTC - 3 seconds after takeoff.

• Within 1 second of each other the cutoff switches are moved to the CUTOFF position - 4 - 5 seconds after takeoff.

• No timestamp given, the conversation regarding the cutoffs is recorded.

• The RAT deployed at 08:08:47 UTC - 8 seconds after takeoff.

• Engine one's cutoff switch goes back to RUN at 08:08:52 UTC - 13 seconds after takeoff.

• The APU door begins opening at 08:08:54 UTC - 15 seconds after takeoff.

• Engine two's cutoff switch goes to RUN at 08:08:56 UTC - 17 seconds after takeoff.

• MAYDAY transmitted at 08:09:05 UTC - 26 seconds after takeoff.

• EAFR recording ceases at 08:09:11 UTC - 32 seconds after takeoff.

The assumption that the Captain switched the fuel off seems reasonable, as the FO is PF and is dealing with the takeoff and initial climb. The Captain seems to have the means and opportunity to manipulate the cutoff switches, as they are not something in the immediate field of view of the FO who should be focused outside the aeroplane...

The WHO is extremely important, the WHY is just as important - but if this does indeed turn out to be a suicide or even just a very very unfortunate mistake, it's highly unlikely we will ever be able to understand WHY it happened.

Think about it this way, how reasonable would it be for any PF in a 777 (or any other jet, really) to reach down and pull the cutoffs on both engines during the rotation and early climb phase of flight? How reasonable would it be for the PM or someone in the jump seat to do the same action?

[itsgrosswhatinet]

I believe the mistake theory is possible, for one switch. After you flipped the first one to cutoff you would realize what you just did.

[airway]

From the preliminary report, quoted from AvHerald:



Also:



Finally:







https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2gy78gpnqo

Yes, there is lots of description of the switch positions in the report. That's not my point. There is no indication anywhere that the accident aircraft switches were checked for proper function. Particularly the possibility of a problem with the lock out gate.



.

The accident aircraft's switches have been recovered and observed by the FAA, with no defects found, presumably.
https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/faa-air-i ... -1.7593295

That article was the reason I made my first post about this issue. It doesn't say the accident aircraft switches were recovered and observed by the FAA.

This article adds more information.
https://www.flyingmag.com/faas-bedford- ... dia-crash/

"He said FAA employees have tested the devices and inspected them on working aircraft."

I can say with a high level of confidence that the FAA has not tested the accident aircraft fuel switches for proper function.



.




.

[flieslikeachicken]

That article was the reason I made my first post about this issue. It doesn't say the accident aircraft switches were recovered and observed by the FAA.

This article adds more information.
https://www.flyingmag.com/faas-bedford- ... dia-crash/

"He said FAA employees have tested the devices and inspected them on working aircraft."

I can say with a high level of confidence that the FAA has not tested the accident aircraft fuel switches for proper function.

I can say with a high level of confidence that the FAA has been kept at arms length of the investigation but have not been let within one arms length of any wreckage.

[cncpc]

I mentioned above that something might be learned from the rest of the CVR, beyond the small bit about who turned off the fuel. We don't know yet which pilot said that. I felt that knowing if the Captain called positive rate, and the First Officer called for the gear, might give us some small insight into the suicide question.

This link discusses the lack of all the details on the CVR.

https://www.eplaneai.com/news/call-to- ... -recording

[DanWEC]

I had understood that article initially as referencing the accident aircraft, my mistake.

[airway]

I had understood that article initially as referencing the accident aircraft, my mistake.

Yeah, the wording is not great.

[pdw]

It seems more than fair to say that if by now every similar switch on the planet has been checked in all directions/conditions that even these possibly accident-damaged switches have earned their clean bill of health after-the-fact.

[pdw]

No timestamp given, the conversation regarding the cutoffs is recorded.

This is right where positive rate is to be called, and a plausible engine stumble would be felt by him who is flying just before automatic relight responds (which apparently includes/initiates-with the momentary fuel cutoff) to sequence for restart, this model.

FO asked and PM replied ‘negative’; if the engine computer instantly catches it — if engines slowed-enough suddenly, makes sense. Pilots can override that with switches?

Speculation is about engines’ function disruption right there; seeing the white smoke on the tkof video, it is very obvious by around the moment(s) of rotation and well before this now-famous pilot exchange.

[SpyPilot]

Consider rolling over and going back to sleep for a few more hours before you tap out another one of your incomprehensible posts.

[Pacqing]

I thought this poster was going to be banned from here. Did you read what he said his background was?

[cncpc]

I thought this poster was going to be banned from here. Did you read what he said his background was?

Why would he be banned?

[Pacqing]

Used to sell tree diggers now watches grandkids, Don't know about you but I'm tired of reading his dribble.

[cncpc]

Used to sell tree diggers now watches grandkids, Don't know about you but I'm tired of reading his dribble.

And you'd ban him for that? Is there now a approved range of employment to post on AvCanada?

[GyvAir]

Employment background may not be a reason for banning a poster, but a long track record of trolling the forum could be. It wouldn't be the first time a poster was banned from here for nonsensical posting. It wouldn't be the first time pdw got a time out for it.

[CL-Skadoo!]

You guys know there is an ignore list, right?

[55+]

Employment background may not be a reason for banning a poster, but a long track record of trolling the forum could be. It wouldn't be the first time a poster was banned from here for nonsensical posting. It wouldn't be the first time pdw got a time out for it.

I look at it differently in that nonsensical drivel posted here gives a certain credence as informed opinion which can be seen as a reflection on this particular Aviation site by those who do have knowledge of the topics at hand.

Shall leave it at that.

[Eric Janson]

I believe the mistake theory is possible, for one switch. After you flipped the first one to cutoff you would realize what you just did.

Not sure I'd agree - the normal sequence is one off then the other one off.

This happened on a 767 at United.

https://asn.flightsafety.org/wikibase/147073

[pelmet]

I suppose it is possible that the captain accidentally selected the switches off and also is another one of these types that doesn't want to admit a mistake and denied doing so while scrambling to do a re-light.

I haven't been reading much of the endless threads on the accident. Is there any more of the CVR of what happened in the last few seconds.

[Dry Guy]

Not sure I'd agree - the normal sequence is one off then the other one off.

This happened on a 767 at United.

https://asn.flightsafety.org/wikibase/147073

"The pilot said he had intended to switch to manual control by hitting an electronic engine control button, but instead he pulled two fuel cutoff knobs on the console about two inches away."

What the heck manual control switch was that? The auto throttle disconnect on top of the thrust levers?

[Tbayer2021]

Not sure I'd agree - the normal sequence is one off then the other one off.

This happened on a 767 at United.

https://asn.flightsafety.org/wikibase/147073

"The pilot said he had intended to switch to manual control by hitting an electronic engine control button, but instead he pulled two fuel cutoff knobs on the console about two inches away."

What the heck manual control switch was that? The auto throttle disconnect on top of the thrust levers?

Yeah, something is odd here. The EEC on the 767 is on the overhead panel. Middle left side if I remember correctly. Not entirely sure why he'd be wanting to turn off the EECs at all and odd to confuse two momentary action overhead switches with the fuel shut-off switches.........


I don't recall any abnormal or emergency situation that called for turning the EEC off but it has been a while. Maybe those first generation 767s had something different.

[GyvAir]

I believe the mistake theory is possible, for one switch. After you flipped the first one to cutoff you would realize what you just did.

Not sure I'd agree - the normal sequence is one off then the other one off.

This happened on a 767 at United.

https://asn.flightsafety.org/wikibase/147073

Significant difference betwen the switches then and now though. From the ASN report:

"This was reportedly the second similar occurrence. After this event guards were introduced. "

The switch and guard setup looks identical to the 787.

[Dry Guy]

It looks like you are correct, GyvAir. Though the 787 doesn't seem to have those switches there.

246246.jpeg (57.43 KiB) Viewed 265 times

[Tbayer2021]

It looks like you are correct, GyvAir. Though the 787 doesn't seem to have those switches there.


246246.jpeg

I'll be dammed. I looked up the high resolution version of this picture and those sure are the EEC's right under the fuel switches.