767 Overrun Miami KMIA

[BTD]

Eric,
Above you mentioned in the 340 with the tailwind you would have about 1800 remaining. Does that include a margin? Or is that straight numbers. The numbers I posted above would include the 15% margin.

Seems that’s pretty good for the 340. Mind you, there are a few extra wheels on the ground. The 67 can stop fast if needed, but you are going to be waiting a while for the chocks to be put in with the brake temps so high.

[Airbrake]

https://youtu.be/2W1rcP3R6Qs


CVR will be interesting.

[rudder]

https://youtu.be/2W1rcP3R6Qs


CVR will be interesting.

Yup. NTSB releases everything.

Will be looking to see if “No speedbrakes” (vs speedbrakes up) and “No reversers” (vs reverse normal) calls were made by the PM. And then what actions (if any) were taken by the PM. The NTSB has already indicated that someone initiated a go-around sequence (cancelled braking and thrust levers to TOGA) and then reversed those actions (full braking and thrust levers to idle).

Also where the PF/PM roles were for approach and if there was any change of control during either the approach/landing/overrun.

[Cessna 180]

As expected, the plane was super light. Take off weight was 252,182 lbs, expected landing weight of 231,236 lbs. This plane has an MTOW of 412,000 lbs (usually for a 767-300).

Rough factored calculations for landing (wind 190/17, temp 30, altimeter 29.94 inhg), Flaps 25, ref 126 kts (add 5 kts, 131):

Max Auto: 6551 feet
Autobrakes 3: 7631 feet
Autobrakes 4: 6668 feet
Max Manual: 3990 feet

Autobrakes 1 and 2 exceed the field length.

This is without calculating that they were probably way over their ref speed.

Adding 15 knots (appears to be at least 20 knots over ref), the most allowable without a tailwind, Autobrakes 4 is 7381 feet and max auto is around 7241 feet.

Flaps 30 would lower these numbers, but I'm not sure which setting they used.

[Daniel Cooper]

There are some similarities between this accident and the Cargojet accident in Vancouver 2 years ago. What were the TSB findings for that?

The findings this time will likely be similar to the 2019 Amazon Prime accident in Houston, systemic deficiencies in the aviation industry's selection and performance measurement practices. Including things like DEI.

[rudder]

CVR transcript is out and it is shocking.

Too high. Too fast. Selected landing flap below 100’ AGL. No ‘BEFORE LANDING’ checklist completed.

CVR
Investigative Update - Sept. 9, 2026

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pag ... MA352.aspx

A summary of select events captured on the CVR during the final few minutes of the recording is provided below. All times are referenced relative to the end of the CVR recording. The times and descriptions are preliminary and subject to change.
.
-6:02 A pilot called for flaps to be set to 1 degree.
-4:18 The flight crew checked in with Miami tower and were cleared to land on runway 30.
-2:53 A pilot called for flaps to be set to 5 degrees.
-2:37 The flight crew lowered the landing gear.
-2:14 A pilot called for flaps to be set to 15 degrees.
-1:42 A pilot called for flaps to be set to 20 degrees, and the other pilot cautioned they were too fast. The other pilot made additional comments regarding the aircraft’s excessive speed throughout the remainder of the recording. There was not a consistent verbal response to the comments about speed.
-1:23 Sounds consistent with autopilot disconnect.
-1:12 Electronic “one thousand” callout.
-1:04 Electronic “sink rate sink rate” callout.
-0:58 Electronic “five hundred” callout.
-0:57 Electronic “sink rate sink rate” callout.
-0:54 Electronic “one hundred” callout.
-0:50 Electronic “minimums” callout.
-0:48 Electronic “too low terrain” callout. Annunciated four times.
-0:41 A pilot called for flaps to be set to 30 degrees.
-0:40 Electronic “forty” callout.
-0:39 Electronic “too low terrain” callout.
-0:36 Electronic “ten” callout.
-0:31 Sounds similar to the aircraft touching down.
-0:15 A pilot called for a go-around.
-0:10 Sounds similar to the aircraft departing the paved surface.
0:00 The CVR recording ended.

FDR for comparison (times not synchronized with CVR)

[7ECA]

From AvHerald, likely from the NTSB briefing:

According to the FDR 30 seeconds before the end of the recording the nose and right main landing gear touched down at 158 KIAS. 23 seconds prior to end of recording brakes were applied at 146 KIAS. 19 seconds prior to end of recording the left main gear touched down at 134 KIAS, 15 seconds prior to end the brakes were released at 120 KIAS and throttles were increased consistent with go around thrust, 11 seconds before end of recording the thrust levers were reduced to idle again, brakes were reapplied at 117 KIAS, 7 seconds before end of recording lateral, longitudinal and vertical accelerations changed, ground speed was 96 knots at that point, final ground speed was 65 knots. There is no indication in the FDR that speed brakes or thrust reversers were deployed.

[pdw]

BTD, the peak wind registered at 1:52pm at the terminal (beginning of rwy) 26kts tail ….. which travelled to mid-runway within that next minute where meets touchdown point of “158kts IAS” (above post) given at 1:53pm in the applicable metar. We add that to IAS … which shows the baulked landing trap here happens in just a couple of seconds … be interesting to see what winds numbers were given pre-touchdown.

(Touchdown point IS 1:53pm coincidence with 1:53pm metar issue time)

[rudder]

BTD, the peak wind registered at 1:52pm at the terminal (beginning of rwy) 26kts tail ….. which travelled to mid-runway within that next minute where meets touchdown point of “158kts IAS” (above post) given at 1:53pm in the applicable metar. We add that to IAS … which shows the baulked landing trap here happens in just a couple of seconds … be interesting to see what winds numbers were given pre-touchdown.

(Touchdown point IS 1:53pm coincidence with 1:53pm metar issue time)

This crew missed every single gate for a stabilized approach. They likely also failed to comply with a half dozen or more provisions of the AOM.

The microburst induced tailwind is a detail not the cause of the overrun.

[Nauclerus]

be interesting to see what winds numbers were given pre-touchdown.

When 7598 checked on with Tower the controller did not give them a wind check with the landing clearance and none was requested.

At the time of the accident the current ATIS M issued at 1713Z reported the winds as VRB03KT

The last KMIA TAF issued at 1448Z and valid 1700Z-1900Z was 23006KT P6SM VCTS SCT030CB SCT060

South Tower reported winds

1701Z = 250 at 07
1713Z = 240 at 06
1727Z = 290 at 11
1728Z = 280 at 09
1729Z = 280 at 09
1733Z = 260 at 09
1739Z = 210 at 12
1742Z = 210 at 14
1745Z = 190 at 19G22

North Tower reported winds

1729Z = 270 at 09
1742Z = 210 at 14
1744z = 200 at 17G22
1745Z = 200 at 19G22
1805Z = 200 at 12G22

(source ATC.com)

METAR KMIA 061653Z 26005KT 10SM SCT030CB SCT039 BKN250 32/23 A2991 RMK CB S-SW MOV E TCU W
SPECI KMIA 061713Z VRB03KT 10SM TS SCT030CB BKN050 BKN250 32/22 A2992 RMK TSB12 OCNL LTGICCG S TS S MOV E
METAR KMIA 061753Z 19017G26KT 10SM TS SCT020CB BKN048 BKN150 BKN250 30/22 A2994 RMK PK WND 18026/1752 WSHFT 1737 TSB12 OCNL LTGICCG E-S TS E-S MOV E CB DSNT NW
SPECI KMIA 061813Z 20012G17KT 10SM TS SCT025CB BKN048 BKN100 BKN250 30/23 A2992 RMK OCNL LTGICCG NE-SE TS NE-SE MOV E

The preceeding 3 aircraft all reported a smooth ride with moderate rain on the approach. This info was given to 7598 prior to the handoff to Tower. At no time while 7598 was in contact with Approach were the surface winds mentioned to any aircraft.

[co-joe]

I feel like rudder is correct that the wind is basically irrelevant here. If you want AI to take our jobs, doing dumb shit like this is a great way to help that process.

[Eric Janson]

Eric,
Above you mentioned in the 340 with the tailwind you would have about 1800 remaining. Does that include a margin? Or is that straight numbers. The numbers I posted above would include the 15% margin.

Seems that’s pretty good for the 340. Mind you, there are a few extra wheels on the ground. The 67 can stop fast if needed, but you are going to be waiting a while for the chocks to be put in with the brake temps so high.

Straight numbers - no 15% margin. airbus flysmart will generate both distances.

The A340 is an extremely capable aircraft with excellent stopping capability.

[BTD]

Eric,
Above you mentioned in the 340 with the tailwind you would have about 1800 remaining. Does that include a margin? Or is that straight numbers. The numbers I posted above would include the 15% margin.

Seems that’s pretty good for the 340. Mind you, there are a few extra wheels on the ground. The 67 can stop fast if needed, but you are going to be waiting a while for the chocks to be put in with the brake temps so high.

Straight numbers - no 15% margin. airbus flysmart will generate both distances.

The A340 is an extremely capable aircraft with excellent stopping capability.

Thanks for the info.

[pdw]

From AvHerald, likely from the NTSB briefing:

According to the FDR 30 seeconds before the end of the recording the nose and right main landing gear touched down at 158 KIAS. 23 seconds prior to end of recording brakes were applied at 146 KIAS. 19 seconds prior to end of recording the left main gear touched down at 134 KIAS, 15 seconds prior to end the brakes were released at 120 KIAS and throttles were increased consistent with go around thrust, 11 seconds before end of recording the thrust levers were reduced to idle again, brakes were reapplied at 117 KIAS, 7 seconds before end of recording lateral, longitudinal and vertical accelerations changed, ground speed was 96 knots at that point, final ground speed was 65 knots. There is no indication in the FDR that speed brakes or thrust reversers were deployed.

Is it possible here that just before the “158 knots” (touchdown) the airspeed was staying steady (only groundspeed reducing as it is then already on the backside of the “microburst”).. thus triggering an ill fated TOGA ?

[pdw]

From AvHerald, likely from the NTSB briefing:

According to the FDR 30 seeconds before the end of the recording the nose and right main landing gear touched down at 158 KIAS. 23 seconds prior to end of recording brakes were applied at 146 KIAS. 19 seconds prior to end of recording the left main gear touched down at 134 KIAS, 15 seconds prior to end the brakes were released at 120 KIAS and throttles were increased consistent with go around thrust, 11 seconds before end of recording the thrust levers were reduced to idle again, brakes were reapplied at 117 KIAS, 7 seconds before end of recording lateral, longitudinal and vertical accelerations changed, ground speed was 96 knots at that point, final ground speed was 65 knots. There is no indication in the FDR that speed brakes or thrust reversers were deployed.

Is it possible here that just before the “158 knots” (touchdown) the airspeed was staying steady (only groundspeed reducing as it is then already on the backside of the “microburst”).. thus triggering an ill fated TOGA decision which added speed at a ‘wrong time’ ?

(looks like speed is dropping off steeply ONLY during TOGA moments as rwy disappears here before power again withdrawn as per second thought)

[jpilot77]

From AvHerald, likely from the NTSB briefing:

According to the FDR 30 seeconds before the end of the recording the nose and right main landing gear touched down at 158 KIAS. 23 seconds prior to end of recording brakes were applied at 146 KIAS. 19 seconds prior to end of recording the left main gear touched down at 134 KIAS, 15 seconds prior to end the brakes were released at 120 KIAS and throttles were increased consistent with go around thrust, 11 seconds before end of recording the thrust levers were reduced to idle again, brakes were reapplied at 117 KIAS, 7 seconds before end of recording lateral, longitudinal and vertical accelerations changed, ground speed was 96 knots at that point, final ground speed was 65 knots. There is no indication in the FDR that speed brakes or thrust reversers were deployed.

Is it possible here that just before the “158 knots” (touchdown) the airspeed was staying steady (only groundspeed reducing as it is then already on the backside of the “microburst”).. thus triggering an ill fated TOGA decision which added speed at a ‘wrong time’ ?

This approach was off the rails far before touchdown. At the FAF, at 1000’, at 500’ etc… The approach should have resulted in a go around way before they got to the flair halfway down the runway. A bit of tailwind didn’t cause this accident, continuing a very un-stabilized approach did.