Herc replacement with a twist: Airbus

[WJflyer]

http://www.sfu.ca/casr/bg-airlift-tactical.htm

DND’s Tactical Airlift Competion – Off the Rails in Less Than a Month?
In Nov. 2005, DND announced that it would order 16 new transport aircraft to replace the CF’s 19 aged CC-130E Hercules. It was widely assumed that a $4.6B contract (including 20-years in-service support) was being written around Lockheed Martin’s late model C-130J Hercules. Eager for a scandal, journalists and industry cried unfair. But the Air Force saw few options for aircraft that had to enter service by 2010. Then two bombshells burst: CDS, Gen Rick Hillier, announced that CC-130Es needed to be replaced within 3 years, and LM revealed that the ’J couldn’t arrive until 2010.

Good New/Used Airlifters For Sale – Airbus Rejoins Canada’s Tactical Airlift Race
What had pundits crying foul was DND insistence that tactical airlifter candidates be certified by May 2007. With the first flight of its A400M not scheduled until 2008 at the earliest, Airbus had a problem – it also had a very clever solution. Airbus now proposes that its maintenance division provide refurbished ’H-model Hercules to the CF as interim solutions to both the CC-103E’s ticking clock and Airbus’ certification problem. The A400M won’t be certified in time but the rebuilt ’H-model Hercs will be. The tables turn. Now, instead of offering only an unknown quantity, Airbus also offers proven ’Hs while the bloom is partly off the ’Js.

The Airbus move has put DND in an advantageous position. Rebuilding ’Hs has been suggested before. The difference this time, is that the supplier will be responsible for finding, rebuilding, and maintaining the Hercs. A supplier will also be highly motivated to take back these interim Hercules as trade-ins for the newer model. Airbus is in the position to argue the well-known merits of the ’H model while offering to maintain both Hercs and A400Ms during a phased replacement. Now, will Lockheed Martin offer Canada a similar deal?

Lockheed Martin is in an excellent position to make a counter-offer – after all, it is LM to whom most operators want to trade-in ’H-model Hercs. By simply offering interim, rebuilt ’Hs until brand-new ’Js are available (and hopefully bug-free), LM is even with Airbus again. So, why didn’t LM make such an offer earlier? Readers may remember that Britain offered to lease 10 ex-RAF ’Js to Canada early in 2005. That deal lost its appeal when LM offered a lease arrangement on brand-new ’Js – LM’s key interest was keeping ’J production lines open, something not helped by Canada taking on used British ’Js. But DND wants to own and that’s just fine by LM. Who wants to sell ’Hs?

Still, Airbus may have shown LM the way. Let’s assume that both of these firms will offer refurbished ’Hs followed by ‘new-built’ products. Is their an advantage? If the contract was handled aggressively, DND could assure its advantage in either case.[2] But one criticism levelled at Hercs raises an interesting point. Planned combat vehicles (like the MMEV) are too tall to fit into either the ’H or ’J. But MMEVs could be accommodated in the slightly larger A400M. And, as it happens, both MMEV and the first two CF A400Ms would be delivered in 2010 – not enough to tip the contest in Airbus’ favour but still food for thought.

Note: Airbus was not the only one feeling shut out. Boeing also believes that its C-17 should be considered. We will examine the tactical capabilities of the large C-17 separately. Also see: Strategic Airlifter Comparisons including A400M , C-17 , and An-124 , among others.

Now there's a twist with the Herc replacement. Airbus offering rebuilt model H's to replace our E's until A400M's arrive. Anyways, let's hope the dunderheads at NDHQ look at their options carefully.

[EI-EIO]

What the article doesn't mention but as far as I recall, those RAF Js were the unloved short Mk 5s. After the Upholder fiasco it would be a brave defence minister who sanctioned the purchase of second hand UK equipment.

(oh and the C-17 line is dead in 2008 according to Flight with the capping of the USAF fleet and C-5 re-engining, unless the RAF, RAAF and CF get orders in smartly.)

[teacher]

This article states that in the long run it would be cheaper to operate C-17s due to the fact that they carry 4 times or so the amount as a 130. The article also stated that ALL of Canada's Katrina relief supplies could have been sent on 1 C-17!!

They also mentioned it was a wiser move to purchase a smaller number of C-17s, keep the H models and purchase completely seperate SAR aircraft rather than using a more expensive 130 for the job.

More food for thought.

2010 too late for new planes, government document shows
By MICHAEL DEN TANDT

Globa and Mail

Tuesday, December 20, 2005
Posted at 12:26 AM EST

OTTAWA -- The first of 16 new military transport planes is not scheduled for delivery until 2010, two years after the Department of National Defence says its aging Hercules fleet will be inoperable, an internal government document obtained by The Globe and Mail shows.

The document, which the Defence Department submitted to the Treasury Board last month, raises fresh questions about the federal government's approval in the last days of its mandate of the $4.6-billion aircraft purchase.

DND officials for weeks have insisted that the procurement had to be completed urgently because the Hercules fleet must be replaced in about 36 months, or the lives of pilots and crew will be at undue risk.

"We know that three years and a little bit more than that, the fleet starts to become almost completely inoperational," General Rick Hillier, Chief of Defence Staff, said last month.

Advertisements







He added that Canadian troops need new planes "not another 15 years from now, not 10 years from now and actually not even five years from now."

Gen. Hillier reiterated the statement in a private briefing several weeks ago with the Bloc Québécois and New Democratic Party defence critics.

"They're trying to explain to us that if nothing is done today, the whole fleet will fall apart in three years," Bloc MP Claude Bachand said at the time.

The Treasury Board document thus raises new questions about DND's bidding process, which until now has effectively shut out competitors other than Lockheed Martin.

Asked about the document, the Defence Department said it has no comment. Defence Minister Bill Graham also declined to comment.

The accelerated process and in particular the contract specifications have been widely understood in the defence industry to favour Lockheed Martin over other potential contenders such as Airbus and Boeing.

Gen. Hillier and Mr. Graham have insisted that DND's conditions for the contract do not make the process uncompetitive, because the necessity for speedy delivery is incontrovertible.

They say any company is free to satisfy those conditions, if it can.

But according to a secret DND timetable and cost projection to the Treasury Board, dated Nov. 21 and signed by Mr. Graham, the timing of the delivery of the first aircraft is not three years out, but nearly five, in May, 2010. A copy of the document was obtained by The Globe and Mail.

A detailed table in the document sets out a schedule that would deliver four aircraft a year in each of 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013, for a total of 16.

A table, entitled Project Milestones, says that, given "preliminary project approval" in November of this year, the contract will be awarded in May, 2007.

The apparent two-year delay is significant. The Defence Department has been told by Airbus that the company can deliver two A400M transports by 2010, and the balance by 2014, as well as provide refurbished Hercules transports in the interim, should that be necessary.

"That is guaranteed," said Martin Sefzig, director of programs at EADS-Casa, Airbus's major shareholder.

"The production line has been designed to accommodate extra orders."

Although it remains unclear which aircraft bests suits DND's needs, this casts into doubt the most compelling argument against the Airbus craft, which is that it could not be available in time to meet DND's schedule.

Last month, after a plan to buy $12.2-billion worth of 50 military aircraft was criticized by industry insiders and opposition politicians for perceived unfairness of the bidding process, the Defence Minister announced an abridged plan, for transport planes only. Of the total $4.6-billion cost, $3-billion is directly related to procuring the aircraft, with $1.6-billion for servicing costs over 20 years.

At a news conference on Nov. 22, Mr. Graham and Gen. Hillier dismissed allegations that contract requirements were tailored so that only one plane, Lockheed Martin's Hercules C-130J, could fulfill them.

"The procurement process will be competitive, fair and transparent," Mr. Graham said. A spokesman for Mr. Graham reiterated this recently.

Interviews with industry and government insiders -- all of whom insisted on anonymity for fear of missing out on future government work or suffering other reprisals -- confirm that the transport contract, whatever it may evolve into in future, has not been designed to produce a competition.

Defence Department officials have acknowledged that a requirement that the new transport fleet number at least 16 effectively rules out the C-17, an aircraft that carries four times the payload of a Hercules and costs twice as much, about $260-million apiece.

Buying 16 would far exceed the military's needs, and its limited budget.

DND officials have also privately conceded that a requirement that the new aircraft be "certified to aviation certification standards" by the expected contract award date effectively rules out Airbus's A400M transport.

Although far closer to DND's price range than the C17, the A400M remains in development and won't make its first flight until early 2008.

This condition on certification is a first in Canadian military procurements. In the past, the department has required certification by the delivery date.

The upshot is that Lockheed Martin's C130J is the only known aircraft in the world that meets the Defence Department's current requirements for so-called tactical, short-haul transports.

DND officials have privately offered various explanations for this, including that the Hercules C130J would be easier to integrate than other types of aircraft because the military operates 31 Hercules craft now.

Another explanation is that Gen. Hillier and his senior staff, by virtue of their combat experience in places such as Afghanistan and the former Yugoslavia, simply know which equipment is best for the forces, and have decided what they need.

"Indecision only benefits lobbyists, vested interests and ex-generals," a senior Defence Department official, who supports the Hercules option, said last month.

But the C130J has neither the same engine nor avionics as the Canadian military's 31 C130H and E models, which negates many of the mechanical synergies, industry sources contend.

The C130J is not big enough to transport some versions of the military's new Stryker mobile gun system. Nor can it carry the new Multi-Mission Effects armoured anti-tank vehicle, unless it's partly disassembled. Industry sources unrelated to any of the potential bidders confirm this.

In addition, a report last year by the Pentagon's Office of the Inspector General found that the C130J "is not operationally effective or suitable," as a replacement for older Hercules transport.

Moreover, the C130J lacks the range for strategic or long-haul lift. That necessitates a continuing reliance on rented Antonov transports, which are sometimes in short supply, and cannot land on the short, rough runways typical of Afghanistan.

"The two other aircraft are dual-role," said a source familiar with the process, and unconnected to either Airbus or Boeing.

"They can do both strategic and tactical. They should be allowed to compete."

An internal air force report circulated within DND this year but never made public said there was "no rationale for CF [Canadian Forces] fixation" on replacing the old Hercules craft with a newer Hercules model.

The report, a copy of which has been obtained by The Globe, raises concerns about the availability of leased Antonovs in a crisis.

It then recommends buying six Boeing C17s, keeping the military's nine newer H model C130s, and buying a fleet of dedicated search and rescue aircraft, rather than getting new C130Js.

That report fell on deaf ears, a source familiar with the situation said, because "months ago they had already decided on Hercs."

Neither Boeing nor Airbus is complaining publicly, sources say, because both companies hope to secure future Canadian government contracts.

Boeing makes the CH-47 Chinook helicopter, of which DND hopes to buy 15 -- total cost, $4.2-billion -- should the Liberals be re-elected. Airbus is 80-per-cent owned by Netherlands-based EADS NV, which continues to hold out hope of landing a $3-billion-dollar-plus Canadian purchase of its C-295 search-and-rescue plane.

Critics of the process continue to believe it is deeply unfair, and will remain so unless DND's specifications for new transport aircraft are rewritten. Only a true competition based on new specifications, they say, will deliver the best product to the Canadian military.

"The A400 costs 15 per cent more [than the C130J], but has twice the payload and twice the range," said a source familiar with the situation, but unconnected with the Airbus bid. "So why wouldn't they allow it to compete?"

Likewise, defence experts say, there is no compelling reason a smaller number of Boeing C-17s couldn't meet all of Canada's airlift needs, were the specifications written to allow it. The stipulation for 16 aircraft, they say, is artificial, for the simple reason that one big aircraft can do the work of several small ones. A single C-17, a source familiar with Canadian military procurements said, could have airlifted all the Canadian aid that was shipped to victims of Hurricane Katrina earlier this year.

"Performance-based is you get yourself from home to work in X time," said one critic of the current process. "You're not out there deciding whether you want to drive in a Lamborghini or a Toyota Corolla."

Public Works Minister Scott Brison has promised to appoint a "fairness monitor" to examine both DND's written requirements for new transport planes and the selection process.

Officials in the Defence Department are strongly resisting an independent review of their specifications, according to sources, saying that there is no time to delay.

Shopping for planes

Canada's Defence Department is preparing to spend $4.6-billion on new military transport planes. Here are a few of the options being considered.

Lockheed Martin Hercules C130J

Payload: 19,500 kg

Range: 5,100 km

with 18,155 kg

Cost: $135-million

Boeing C-17

Payload: 76,644 kg

Range: 9,630 km with 58,967 kg,

can be refuelled

in flight

Cost: $260-million

Airbus A400M

Payload: 37,194 kg

Range: 6,950 km

with 20,000 kg,

can be refuelled in flight

Cost: $155-million



http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/ ... TopStories

[WJflyer]

The main issue with the C-17 is that it is too big, and price is a major sticking point. The Canadian Forces is weaning out equipment that will need a transport that large, namely the Leopard tanks and the M109A4 self-propelled guns. Price is also a major sticking point with the C-17: in 1990, the price per unit for a C-17 was around 300 million US each. In fact, the per unit costs were so high that the Americans seriously considered cancelling the C-17 and going for new production C-5 Galaxy's instead. It has been estimated that six C-17s would cost DND $1- to-$1.6B, a price sticker that the Canadian Forces do not want for so few aircraft. Also, the Canadian Forces wishes to purchase significant quantities to spread out fleet usage and flight time. The false economy of buying fewer frames for less initial cost is clear to the DND; the key example within the DND was the premature demise of the CC-137 Husky (Boeing 707) due to high flight time, which required that the DND purchase 5 Airbus A310's from Canadian Airlines as replacements (which are now underthreat from the same problems of high usage and flight time due to small numbers, especially with the tasking of air to air refueling).

With the retirement of the M109A4's (replaced by the new BAE Systems M777 155mm towed howitzers), and the pending retirement of the Leopard tanks, as the Leopard fleet is plagued with problems relating to the hull of the tanks; most tanks now require excessive welding at the unit-level to keep the tanks in working order, though the tanks were upgraded in the 1990's, only the turret recieved major refurbushment (infact, the Canadian Forces purchased ex-Bundeswehr Leopard 1A5's, and swapped the turrets), mostly related to the sights, and armour of the turrets, the Canadian Forces do not need large transports like the AN-124's or the C-17. Aircraft of a more modest size and budget should be aquired instead.

[w squared]

The retirement of the M109 and the Leopard doesn't really have anything to do with the selection of a transport aircraft. The 109 and the leopard have never been deployed as part of a peace support operation, and they don't really have a role in modern peace support. If you need to bring MBT's and 155mm SP howitzers, you're going to war. Period. It's been a long time since Canada has spent the money needed to be prepared to go to war. Contributions to the effort in 1991 and Afghanistan notwithstanding, our military is not prepared or equipped for high intensity combat operations. We don't have the personnel to replace the casualties, we don't have the equipment or ammunition to maintain high-intensity combat, and we don't have the political will to see coffins coming back from overseas. Realistically speaking, we're overextended by keeping two battalion groups overseas while engaged in low intensity peace support.

The bottom line is that nobody has the airlift capacity to effectively move "heavy" (meaning armored or mechanized) units. Two MBT's is all that you're going to fit into an aircraft. Let's do the math. One mechanized brigade group is going to have two mechanized batallions, an armored regiment, combat engineers, artillery, air defense, and a logistics train.

That means that you've got a minimum of 60 heavy (40 tons and over) tracked vehicles, 84 vehicles in the 15 to 25 ton range (and still very large from a dimensional point of view), and all of the "lighter" vehicles in the 7 to 15 ton range (SP mortars, C3 vehicles, ambulances, recovery vehicles, SPSAM or SPAAG), and then a number of large and medium "soft" vehicles that is equal or greater to the total of the above.

If you look back to the Gulf War in '91, the vast majority of the "heavy" divisions were delivered via ship. The first units were airborne and airmobile divisions - and delivering and supplying them taxed the American airlift capacity to the limit.

[Disco Stu]

5 Airbus A310's from Canadian Airlines as replacements (which are now underthreat from the same problems of high usage and flight time due to small numbers, especially with the tasking of air to air refueling).

Don't think you will see the 310s doing air-to-air refueling anytime soon. Apparently the one that has been converted already is sitting on the ramp in Trenton doing nothing. The installation of the refuelling drogues causes aileron flutter apparently!

[EI-EIO]

During the last election campaign, Harper proposed helicopter carriers and promptly this got turned into "aircraft carriers" by the media and Libs/NDP when at around the same time the British assault ship HMS Ocean seemed to be doing a fine job in Sierra Leone. Ocean carries Chinook and other choppers for 3 Commando Brigade as well as acting as Brigade command centre. If you need to be lugging heavy stuff around, this is the platform type CF should be looking at.

If CF went down the road of acquiring C-17 for its own purposes, that would probably be too much - but if CF joined more UN taskings (just for airlift) and had them pay to keep the aircraft busy (essentially competing with the private 124s which rake it in every time there's a calamity somewhere) then maybe it would make some sense.

[WJflyer]

The retirement of the M109 and the Leopard doesn't really have anything to do with the selection of a transport aircraft. The 109 and the leopard have never been deployed as part of a peace support operation, and they don't really have a role in modern peace support. If you need to bring MBT's and 155mm SP howitzers, you're going to war. Period. It's been a long time since Canada has spent the money needed to be prepared to go to war. Contributions to the effort in 1991 and Afghanistan notwithstanding, our military is not prepared or equipped for high intensity combat operations. We don't have the personnel to replace the casualties, we don't have the equipment or ammunition to maintain high-intensity combat, and we don't have the political will to see coffins coming back from overseas. Realistically speaking, we're overextended by keeping two battalion groups overseas while engaged in low intensity peace support.

The bottom line is that nobody has the airlift capacity to effectively move "heavy" (meaning armored or mechanized) units. Two MBT's is all that you're going to fit into an aircraft. Let's do the math. One mechanized brigade group is going to have two mechanized batallions, an armored regiment, combat engineers, artillery, air defense, and a logistics train.

That means that you've got a minimum of 60 heavy (40 tons and over) tracked vehicles, 84 vehicles in the 15 to 25 ton range (and still very large from a dimensional point of view), and all of the "lighter" vehicles in the 7 to 15 ton range (SP mortars, C3 vehicles, ambulances, recovery vehicles, SPSAM or SPAAG), and then a number of large and medium "soft" vehicles that is equal or greater to the total of the above.

If you look back to the Gulf War in '91, the vast majority of the "heavy" divisions were delivered via ship. The first units were airborne and airmobile divisions - and delivering and supplying them taxed the American airlift capacity to the limit.

Most of the CF equipment in service or planned to be in service can fit within a C-130, either fully combat ready or partially ready, and with the case with partially combat ready transport, all that is needed is that the turret be pulled. The premier CF land vehicle is the LAV III ISC, a 17 ton vehicle, which is well within what a C-130 can upcarry. All other CF vehicles that are currently in service (not due to be retired shortly) or planned are 17 tons or lighter. All can fit within a C-130 in some sort of combat readyness. Therefore, the purchase of the large C-17's is completely unnecessary for the Canadian Forces. The reason why the Canadian Forces leases the big Antonov's and Ilyushin's is due to the C-130 fleet's issues with age and aviability. C-130 avaiability in the CF is less than stellar, hence the current race to replace the aircraft, and Hiller's demands that the C-130's get replaced in 3 years. With both Airbus and Lockheed unable to replace the C-130's in a reasonable time (except for the current Airbus proposal), everyone who is bidding is left scrambling to find solutions.

As for transporting our forces around by ship, the Canadian Forces is already looking into aquiring sealifters. Three major projects come into mind: The current CF JSS proposal (http://www.sfu.ca/casr/101-navalsc.htm), purchasing US Navy surplus new build San Antonio LPD's (http://www.sfu.ca/casr/bg-sealift-antonio.htm), or the Dutch/Spanish Rotterdam Class LPD's (http://www.sfu.ca/casr/bg-sealift-rotterdam.htm and http://www.sfu.ca/casr/mp-sealift-rotterdam.htm)

[cyyz]

Why do we need 16???

[WJflyer]

Why do we need 16???

To replace 19 model E Hercs that are pushing 40 years of age. In otherwords, old enough to be your parent. Also, C-130's are used heavily by the CF. Spreading out fleet hours across many airframes is a good idea, a example of fleet management.

[cyyz]

Why do we need 16???

To replace 19 model E Hercs that are pushing 40 years of age. In otherwords, old enough to be your parent.

Okay, okay, why do we have 19 atm, and why will 16 be enough to replace 19??

What's with 16, what's the operational reasoning with 16, why not 10, 12.

Why do we have 19 atm? 3 per base?

[WJflyer]

Why do we need 16???

To replace 19 model E Hercs that are pushing 40 years of age. In otherwords, old enough to be your parent.

Okay, okay, why do we have 19 atm, and why will 16 be enough to replace 19??

What's with 16, what's the operational reasoning with 16, why not 10, 12.

Why do we have 19 atm? 3 per base?

Why we have 19: We originally purchased 24 C-130E's in 1964-67. In 1987, the remaining 22 E's were upgraded to H model engines and undercarriage. Since then, avionics were also extensively upgraded. We now have 19 left, as 3 of the Hercs were wrecked in crashes. The reason why 16 will be enough is because of the fact that the CF are looking into getting either the stretched C-130J's or the A400M's, both larger than the current E's. In short, we are getting more capable and larger aircraft to replace smaller and less capable aircraft.

[cyyz]

Many thanks, so 19 really wasn't enough, it's all that we had left, but the 16 logistcally = 19 at present.

Many thanks..

[WJflyer]

Since the purchase of the 24 C-130 E's, we also purchased 14 C-130H's in 1974. We lost one in a crash, and we then purchased 2 H's from Abu Dhabi in 1991, and then we purchased 2 ‘stretched’ ’H-30s in 1997. The J's we are looking at will be the same size as the stretched H-30's, adding capacity. Since CF loads rarely max out weight-wise, having a larger airplane that can carry more volume-wise makes more sense.

[scotothedoublet]

The J's we are looking at will be the same size as the stretched H-30's, adding capacity.

I don't remember reading that they have a higher max t/o weight. If the stretched J models are longer, the weight of the empty a/c would be higher thereby reducing capacity (MCTOW-BEW).

[w squared]

WJflyer:

The point of my post was not that of fitting specific vehicles into specific aircraft. It was that an airlift is not a feasible method of deploying an armored/mechanized force of any substantial size.

As far as removing turrets goes, it negates the benefits of a tactical airflift. The equipment necessary to lift a turret out of an armored vehicle and then put it back in is not something that you can just casually take along with you. The whole idea of an airlift as opposed to a sealift is to have vehicles and men arrive quickly, ready to be deploy for service. If we want to have some of our vehicles air-deployable, then let's choose vehicle and aircraft combinations that will allow full-fledged air demployment. If we're not going to do that, then there's no point in worrying about half-measures.

As far as 17 tons goes as a magic number, that doesn't tell the whole story. The CF needs to have an MBT. Yes, the Leopard needs to be retired. No, we don't have any need for M1A2s. But we do need to have a vehicle with a high-velocity gun capable of defeating MBT's. The 105mm wheeled system that we're currently in the process of acquiring certainly has a place in a mobile battle group. It's a highly mobile direct fire support vehicle, and more than adequate for dealing with antiquated or lightly armored AFV's in low threat environment. However, anyone that knows about modern armor will tell you that a rifled 105mm is no longer adequate if you're facing anything more advanced than a bone-stock T-72. There's a reason that the other NATO nations are all deploying MBT's that have 120mm cannon. Some (like the Germans and French) are also switching to long-barreled 120mm to improve muzzle velocity with APFSDS ammunition (the primary tank-killing round).

The only pieces of equipment currently in our inventory that have a reasonable chance of knocking out a modern MBT anywhere in the frontal arc are the TOWII and the Eryx. Both are ATGM's. The Eryx is a short range missile (it stops guiding at 600m), and is handheld. The TOWII is an effective long-range ATGM, but we don't have an effective platform to launch it from. The "TOW Under Armour" is an obsolescent system designed for the original TOW. The M113 APC that it is based on has substantial failings in both mobility, protection, and ability to conduct long road moves when comapred with the Kodiak/Coyote/Bison platforms that our current motorized battle broups are built around.

The biggest problem is that those making the spending decisions don't understand the fundamentals. The role of armour on a modern battlefield is to provide shock by virtue of firepower, armour, and mobility. No matter how advanced, a lightly armoured gun system or ATGM system can never replace that.

[WJflyer]

With the retirement of the Leopard MBT, what is really being shed is a unilateral warfighting capability. Purchasing the Stryker MGS is a step towards the CF Medium-Weight Force’ made up of fast-moving wheeled LAV's that the CF has planned. TUA (using the new TOW 2B Aero and TOW 2 bunker buster) and MMEV both fit in within that plan. Army strategy assumes that future operations will be multilateral – coalitions made up of niche forces. TUA is still a very effective system as the turrets are being modified before installation with the addition of the Raytheon Improved Target Acquisition System. As its name suggests, Raytheon ITAS is intended to improve field performance. ITAS includes an improved Fire Control Subsystem allowing the use of all existing (and future) TOW missile variants. Infact, TUA was evaulated by the USMC to replace the Emerson turrets after Gulf War I. TUA is a system seen by many to compare well M1134 Strykers (is less complex and less prone to malfunction), and is superior to the USMC LAV-AT system. The CF is also looking to field a Advanced Lightweight Anti-armour Weapon System (ALAWS), which the current canidates are the Raytheon Javelin missile system and the Bombardier/Rafael Spike-LR missile. Testing was done with the British military as they were also evaulating both systems. It seems very likely that Canada will purchase Javelin, as the British signed a order for Javelin after the tests.

Many other nations field MGS type vehicles, namely the French with their AMX-10RC and Vextra 105, Italy with Centauro MGS tank destroyer, and South Africa with their Rooikat LMT-105. All of them field 105mm low pressure guns, but with the Italian Centauro, a smooth-bore low-recoil 120mm gun is under development. One wonders why Canada is developing a whole new system when already there are other options that perform just as well and are avaiable now for the Canadian Forces.

[w squared]

What is being shed is more than just a unilateral warfighting capability.

If you notice, every single nation that you mentioned as examples (in every part of your post) of developing new techology has one thing in common. Regardless of their ATGM approach, regardless of what they have for wheeled gun systems, every nation there has an MBT in service. There's a good reason for this.

The best weapon to have if you want to kill an MBT is an MBT. With modern gunnery and high first-round hit percentages, the high velocity cannon remains the #1 preferred tool for killing tanks. At long ranges, the flight time associated with an older system such as TOW is a substantial liablilty. Add to that the need to stay in one position in order to guide the missile and the relatively large launch signature, and your weapons platform becomes vulnerable.

It's won't be all that long before fire-and-forget top attack missiles become available - but an EFP top-attack warhead is just as vulnerable to ERA as a HEAT warhead is. How long before top-mount ERA becomes the "must-have" accessory?

The bigger problem with eliminating the MBT from our inventory is that it's a one-way process. One of the things that defines a professional military is the corporate body of knowledge passed from one senior NCO to the next. Lessons that were learned the hard way in WWII, and have been handed down from generation to generation of soldiers. If we remove MBT's from our inventory, a subset of these lessons will be removed with them. If (when) we determine that an MBT capability is vital to our national interests, we'll be in much the same situation as a third world country that is purchasing MBT's for the first time. We'll be there, cap in hand, asking the country that is manufacturing our new tanks to loan us a bunch of their tankers (or retired tankers) to bring our troops back up to a level where they can effectively fight the vehicles.

No matter how many bells and whistles we have on a wheeled 105mm gun platform, or how great an ATGM we find to mount on a LAV, neither system can be used as an MBT. If we ever want the ability to fight a real war (and we'd be foolish to abandon that ability), having MBT's and the ability to use them is vital.

[Expat]

If it was me paying for these planes, I would certainly buy Antonovs (Антонов). They are good, reliable, sturdy as rock and cheap to operate. They can land in any field and take-off with full load.
The UN uses them all over the world...The only thing against them is that do not have a lobby group in Ottawa.
Да сведаня!

[grimey]

The main issue with the C-17 is that it is too big, and price is a major sticking point. The Canadian Forces is weaning out equipment that will need a transport that large, namely the Leopard tanks and the M109A4 self-propelled guns.

The Hercs have trouble hauling a fully equiped and crewed LAV-III/Stryker any significant distance. This is a major complaint in the US against using the Stryker and Herc in combination.

http://www.gao.gov/htext/d04925.html

We should have a few heavier transport aircraft, not just C-130s. And I don't think that renting the Antonovs when required is a responsible policy. I've got nothing against the aircraft, just that it's rented rather than owned.

[EI-EIO]

Why does CF need MBTs anyway? Let the US, UK haul around the heavy stuff and instead concentrate on light armoured/airborne. As long as someone has them that will be fine, it just doesn't have to be CF.

[Expat]

I disagree. Leasing of any equipment from other governments puts us in a vulnerable position. War is business and diplomacy also is. One has to be able to stand up and do its own thing, including the Canadians. Otherwise we might be at the mercy of the Brits or US for a deployment or movement of troops.

[EI-EIO]

expat

where do you think we'd be going without US/UK support into an MBT environment? I'm not suggesting leasing, I'm suggesting "you bring the chips I'll bring the beer" kind of arrangement.

[w squared]

Armour is a fundament part of a modern army. To say that we don't need it is like saying that we as drivers don't need to learn how to change a flat tire because we have a CAA card. It's a convenient way out, but you've got to know that it's going to bite you in the ass at some point.

The bottom line is that in today's global climate, if you want to partake in peace support operations, you need to send troops that are trained and equipped for war. If you don't, you're going to end up with dead soldiers. If you disagree with me, then read "Ghosts of Medak Pocket" by Carol Off, and "Shake Hands with The Devil" by Romeo D'Allaire. Lewis MacKenzie's book about his tour in Sarajevo would also be worth reading.

A well equipped, well trained army that is prepared for war has all of the tools and skills at their disposal to function well in a peace support environment. It's kind of like practicing to play basketball against Kobe Bryant every day, and then when game day arrives, Gary Coleman shows up. Sure, you over-prepared...but boy, look at how much you won by.

But what about the flip side. What if you practice against Gary Coleman all the time? Sure, he's the guy you end up playing against a lot of the time. But every now and then Kobe Bryant shows up, and he leaves you crying your eyes out in the corner of the court, bruised, bleeding, and you've lost. Do you really want that to happen when soldier's lives are at stake?

Indlulge me for a moment here. Let's say that the government of Paragualia has collapsed. Anarchy is the order of the day, and their Presidential Guard is sitting in their barracks, sucking their thumbs. They've got a batallion of infantry and a company's worth of T-72's. Doesn't sound like much, but Paragualia isn't all that big.

The UN wants to do some thing about it, and do something about it now. People are starving, order is breaking down, and there are some nasty little ethnic disputes coming to the surface. The French don't want to get involved because of their colonial past there. The Brits and Americans won't send anyone because they're already overextended in Iraq. The Russians are too bloody poor to send anyone.

Are we supposed to sit there with our thumbs up our collective behinds because we don't have a company of MBT's to send to back up our infantry based battle group? If we don't send any MBT's, we have the potential for lots and lots of dead Canadian soldiers. The bottom line is that with Canada's current purchasing plan, we simply don't have an effective counter to even obsolescent MBT's. TUA upgrade packages mounted onto LAV's is nice to talk about, but the SP ATGM is a one-trick pony.

If we give up on MBT's, we're giving up on one of the three basic elements that make up an effective combat arms force. Given how little we train in concert with other countries now, and the level of combined arms integration that our doctrine calls for (down to the combat team level), we'd be idiots to tet the MBT vanish from our inventory altogether. But that's just what we're doing.

[EI-EIO]

If your MBT's are crawling through city streets to get to the PP while bad guys are lobbing things down on the hatch covers, again not ideal. Best ask the Yanks or the Brits to send in a sublaunched TLAM (no overstretch in that department) at the fixed target if no friendlys on site. No PP to protect and the tanks will find somewhere else to disappear to.

There's a difference between light armour to support infantry operations and deploying M1 Abrams/Challenger II to charge across the desert at Saddam's T72s or to block up the Fulda Gap. For mountainous terrain operations (Balkans, Afghanistan) mobility is key - thus the G-Wagens in the Stan. The Soviet armour certainly didn't do them much good in Afghanistan from 79-89.