W-Five

[Pratt X 3]

Does nobody actually read a post and try to comprehend it anymore?
CID said:

Second, if you think that ELTs are a saftey device, think again. It's a crash recovery device. You can equip the airplane with the biggest best ELT in the world but the main focus must remain on accident prevention rather than accident recovery.

He is saying that an ELT will not prevent an accident; that it doesn't contribute to a normal flight. It only comes into play when there is an accident. That's it. Plain and simple if you take a second to read it. So why insult him/her?

[snaproll20]

CID

Once again you have proven your twisted thought processes.

I was not suggesting a type of ELT would prevent accidents.

It would be to save survivors. In this case, it almost certainly would have increased Widow's husband's chances enormously. (especially if the Beaver had floated for twelve hours.)

So, even if such a device cost a couple of thousand dollars, it is still not a huge cost imposition to operators. If COPA don't want it, screw them, charge their members for any search . But all revenue-earning wilderness 703, 704 operators should have it.

Years ago, I spent thousands of hours thousands of miles from help. It would have been some comfort to know that a piece of equipment onboard could summonse help if I needed it.

[CLguy]

I missed the W5 show but just watched it on CTV's website and must say I am dumbfounded. Makes one real proud to be a Canadian. A billion spent on a useless gun registry and our government officials can't free up $30k to raise the engine. I smell a rat here and after the airing of the show I would bet there will be more money spent trying to ensure that engine remains at the bottom of the ocean than it would cost to raise it and get some closure.

Being the anti-authority that I am, I also will be heading to the bank to match the other posters $100. I also encourage everyone to step up and send what you can. Remember 5 $20 dollar bills adds up to a $100 and it only takes 300 of them to raise the $30k.

Lets not let the bureaucrats win this one!

[Hedley]

our government officials can't free up $30k

This is total horsesh1t. Transport is rolling in dough. This is the inescapable conclusion from observing how they spend their money over the years.

[CID]

And what about the people who survived the accident? A functioning ELT may have saved my husband's life as much as airworthy floats, active flight following or a call from a witness.

Widow, I think we may be closer in agreement than you think even if it’s just subliminally.

You used the word “saved” when you spoke of ELTs. Nobody needs their life “saved” unless they are in some sort of peril or serious threat of losing their life. ELTs save people once they are in peril because the airplane crashed. They don’t prevent accidents.

Having an ELT however doesn’t make the airplane safer.

So let’s review the chain of events as my “twisted” mind sees them so we can split this issue into the “safety” events and the “SAR” events.

Based on what I have learned about the accident, in my opinion the possible factors that prevented continued flight MAY have included;

1) Engine failure or decrease in performance.
2) Loss of control due to pilot incapacitation or spatial disorientation (Not uncommon when flying in cloud with a failure of instruments or lack of IFR experience)

The factors that MAY have contributed to difficulty in landing the aircraft safely;

1) Oil on the windscreen (poor visibility)
2) Glassy water conditions during landing
3) Weather (Fog/Mist/Cloud) (Flight in IMC or “marginal” weather)

(Notice I said nothing about the engine. I think most will agree that without complicating factors, its not tough to deadstick a float equipped Beaver on the water.)

The factors that MAY have complicated the recovery operation and the search (lives not airplane);

1) Delay in flight following action due to equipment limitations.
2) Lack of an extended ELT signal or ability to receive it due to equipment limitations.
3) Delay in witness reporting (Many “heard” the airplane but none “saw” it - possibly because of poor weather)
4) Extensive damage to airplane (due to impact forces and/or poor maintenance) causing it to sink rapidly.
5) Lack of personal floatation devices on 4 of 5 persons on board.

Recommended changes that may prevent further similar accidents;

1) Educate west coast operators about the risks associated with flying single engine VFR airplanes in IMC (its already against the law) or “marginal” weather. If its not right to do it Saskatoon, why should it be common practice on the west coast?
2) Look at changes that can be made (to this 50 year old proven design) that would prevent engine failures.
3) Put more emphasis on training floatplane pilots to deal with engine failures.
4) Review the maintenance procedures used by operator and operators of similar equipment to identify issues and correct them if required.

Recommended changes that may improve search and rescue;

1) Improved “satellite” or similar continuous flight following systems.
2) Improved ELT systems

Now we have to ask ourselves if it we need to implement all of the recommendations or if concentrate on the prevention of accidents or on the recovery of accident victims.

I would put most of my money on preventing accidents. That’s not to say that the flight following and ELT recommendations should be abandoned, but they won’t do a thing to prevent accidents in the first place. Personally, I don’t think there is any value added to looking at the engine beyond in support of litigation against the operator. It's been around a loooonnng time.

Without an ELT, how long would it have been until Rowdy was found? Or would it have been too late for him too?

Widow, I don’t recall saying ELTs shouldn’t be on airplanes. When the requirement was introduced, ELTs revolutionized the job of finding accidents sites. In Rowdy’s case it worked as advertised and we’re all glad it did. It doesn’t negate the fact that it didn’t make the airplane any safer. I don't know the details of his accident but I bet he would trade his ELT for a gizmo that could have helped him avoid the accident in the first place.

As I've said here before, I'm sure I'm coming across as insensitive but I'm just trying to help you focus and put things in proper context.

In the end, its just advice and opinion and you of course are free to take it or not.

Cheers

[Widow]

CID - I understand what your saying, and completely agree that preventing the accidents in the first place is of critical importance. That being said - accidents will always happen, no matter how well trained, maintained, regulated, etc. People who do fall victim to such "unpreventable" accidents deserve every chance of survival. If a commercial operation cannot afford an ELT that actually works, then they should not be in business. A "culture of safety" must include all aspects, from the preventative measures to effective SAR.

This is from a letter I sent to various officials in Janauary ... much of it co-ordinates with what you have said.

The following is a summary of what the families involved, their expert representatives, and their communities believe should be addressed by the Transportation Safety Board.


Findings to be addressed in TSB report:


1. Lack of Transport Canada oversight. Mr. Schoenberger, Transport Canada/ Aviation, Regional Manager, Maintenance and Manufacturing states in his January 17, 2007 email: "The Frequency of Inspection Policy Document directs Transport Canada to audit Air Taxi operators every 2.32 years and complete a mandatory inspection every 1.75 years. CAD 20 allows adjustments to these inspection and audit intervals based on the available resources and the risk indicators as listed in appendix “A” in CAD 20". As such, it is wholly unacceptable that, as far as we can tell from documents provided through Access to Information and Privacy, there were no audits or inspections of the operator between November 2001 and the fall of 2005, four years later or six months after this plane's disappearance.

2. Improper maintenance. From the Transport Canada Inspection Report dated December 20, 2006: "Due to concerns regarding technical records an enforcement action has been initiated with a Detection Notice alleging that major repairs were performed without required data and without required certification." As the families have proven that we were correct with regards to improper maintenance on the floats, we insist that closer attention be given to maintenance records regarding the engine. The Inspection Report stated: "That the aircraft flew with this hole in the firewall is certain however it has not been shown that the hole was present at the last inspection of the area. One of the repairs appears to have used aluminum rivets to fasten a stainless steel patch to the stainless steel firewall." *** Edited *** Furthermore, knowing that in order to comply with applicable airworthiness directives it is necessary to remove the baffles and exhaust shrouds and do a visual and torque inspection of ALL the cylinder hold-down studs (90 in all), about a whole days work, it seems unlikely to us that the owner approved the cost of manhours at least 9 times in 2004 (given its 937.5 hours flown in 2004). This should be verifiable by looking at the AMO logs and financial records. In addition to this, there are the many witnesses we can provide who will speak to how poorly the engine had been running, and the various observed attempts to rectify the problems during the previous several months. It should also be noted that conversations with the owner of one of MJM's leased and recently returned aircraft C-GHZP indicate he was sorely disappointed with the condition in which it was returned.

3. Management factors. Safety in Air Taxi Operations, Final Report (1998) SR30 also recommended that TSB “evaluate the management factors that contributed to the accident during the accident investigation.” In the letter to the coronor dated September 21, 2005 this issue was not addressed. We believe that there is no question that the attitude of management towards safety was a huge contributing factor to this non-fatal incident ending with five fatalities. Most specifcally we refer to MJM owners' responsibility in the fatal WCB investigated accident of Ryan Hudson. We have contributed significant evidence to this effect already, and trust that the TSB will review this information, and their own, in their final analysis. If necessary, we would be happy to reiterate our findings.

4. Floats. The families continue to maintain that had the aircraft floats been in better condition, the men on board would have had a much better chance of surviving and being rescued. Remember, they all got out. Passenger Stevens’ always wore his floater coat, and had recently done the classroom work for underwater egress training. In fact, his backpack was found the day of the accident, at a time and place that would have made it impossible for it to travel from the crash site with the tides, indicating that it may have fallen out when the door was opened during flight. So they were prepared for a crash landing. But no life jackets were taken and the debris field 253 metres (830 feet) below the surface was very contained. Everything, including the detached wing which would have had some buoyancy, was within about 15 square metres (150 square feet). This would indicate that the plane sank rapidly. Recent examples such as the Twin Otter seaplane (mark C-GGAW - A00P0210) crash out of Coal Harbour in November 2000, the float-equipped Cessna (mark C-GNRJ - A02O0287) in Ontario in September of 2002 and another Cessna on floats (mark C-GVYE - A04W0114) in the NWT June of 2004 show what might have happened had the aircraft floated for even a few minutes. A fourth example (C-GQHT - A04C0098), where although the occupants did not survive, the damage to the airframe and floats (now owned by “our” expert Jim Hayton of North Sound Aviation and available for your viewing) is almost identical and yet the aircraft remained inverted and afloat for some considerable time. Our investigations have led to the conclusion that the maintenance guidelines for these floats are wholly inadequate, especially noting how extensively they are still used despite their age. (*** Edited ***) Although floats are considered landing gear, and therefore integral to the safe operation of the aircraft, there is no mandatory overhaul and reskinning requirement after so many flight hours, with salt water and other corrosive effects taken into consideration. The maintenance of aircraft floats however, is covered only by Canadian Aviation Regulation 571.02(1) “Maintenance and Elementary Work Performance Rules”, which applies to all aeronautical products. Other reference material for maintaining EDO 4580 floats, (original Beaver manuals), are unclear and outdated.

Significant Safety Issues

1. Emergency communications and "Type D flight following" on the West Coast. Given the technological advances of the last several years, it is unacceptable that communications standards have not been changed. Waterproof personal locater beacons for pilots, GPS, satellite and services such as "Skytrack" are all relatively inexpensive ways of improving emergency notification if in fact the pilot is unable to make radio contact. Due to the known degree of variability in weather and communications, it should be essential for commercial operators and their aircraft to be able to maintain contact at all times - or at least at 15 minute intervals. Safe operations already do these things willlingly, and to mandate it would weed out the marginal operators.

2. Lack of formal maintenance and overhaul guidelines for landing gear (floats).

3. Reiteration of proper operating and maintenance procedures for cylinders on R985's (whether this turns out to be the case with our engine or not). (Note: TCCA issued a Safety Bulletin Feb. 2007)

4. Reiteration of the importance of notifying SAR as soon as possible, especially in regions where weather and communications are extremely variable.

5. Reiteration of the importance of TC oversight of the West Coast air taxi industry, especially in light of its importance to other industries.

6. Reiteration of weight and balance control. Although the weight for this flight was estimated to be within the guidelines, the facts that there were no scales on site with which to weigh the cargo, that there were many items aboard of which the dispatcher was unaware (e.g. cases of beer), and that the cargo appeared unrestrained are of great concern.

[snaproll20]

I am too busy to look for the thread quotes, but I swear several float pilots said deadsticking a floatplane is a tough job.

If that is indeed the case, would you guys please post and shut this pontificating clown CID up.
Thanks.

[Kilo-Kilo]

I was not suggesting a type of ELT would prevent accidents.

It would be to save survivors. In this case, it almost certainly would have increased Widow's husband's chances enormously. (especially if the Beaver had floated for twelve hours.)

The plane would have to be upright, on its floats (in which case we wouldn't have had missing persons, plane, or engine) because as we all know, radio waves don't travel under even an inch of water.

As soon as a float plane flips and is hanging from its floats - no more transmissions.

[Lommer]

Hence why floatplanes should be equipped with jettisonable ELTs that activate and jettison themselves when they hit the water. These already exist. I'm not saying that all floatplane ops should be legally required to make these expensive upgrades tomorrow, but there should be some sort of push to adopt them.

[Kilo-Kilo]

The only reason I brought that up is because it astounds me how many people can drive into the Massey Tunnel and just accept the fact that there radio won't work till they get to the other side, but are in stubborn disbelief when you tell them radio waves don't travel through water.

[ply-wood]

CID YOU ARE A ONE OF THE FINEST PEOPLE i KNOW!!!! how can you say that deadsticking a fully loaded beaver in shity conditions onto glassy water didnt contribute to this accident! it has everything to do with it you retard! if the engine didn't quit it simply would not have happened! CID please tell me what you consider are "complicating factors"

[Widow]

I am too busy to look for the thread quotes, but I swear several float pilots said deadsticking a floatplane is a tough job.

This is a pretty darn good one: Floats Engine Failure Scenario

[CID]

CID YOU ARE A ****** IDIOT!!! how can you say that deadsticking a fully loaded beaver in shity conditions onto glassy water didnt contribute to this accident! it has everything to do with it you retard! if the engine didn't quit it simply would not have happened! CID please tell me what you consider are "complicating factors"

plywood,

Take a deep breath. I never said deadsticking a fully loaded Beaver in shitty conditions on glassy water was easy. I said;

I think most will agree that without complicating factors, its not tough to deadstick a float equipped Beaver on the water.

I certainly do consider oil on the windshield and an glassy water and “shity” conditions complicating factors. If that wasn’t clear in my post, I apologize.

But now ask yourself, how did this guy find himself in this situation with the “complicating factor” of “shitty conditions”. Was he pushing the weather?

[rfcPilot]

We all push the weather from time to time. Its a roll of a dice. And it'll drop on the right (or wrong, depending on your point of view) number at some point. And then the swiss cheese theory takes into effect.

Was the weather really that bad at the time? I dont think we'll ever get a true answer. Its a mostly relative answer anyways. Not all pilots feel comfortable flying at VFR minimums. Some do, so may push lower. To each their own.

[ply-wood]

CID are you on crack? i'm not sure how to use the quote function but you said "notice I said nothing about the engine, I think most will agree that withou complicating factors it's easy to deadstick a -2", sure but when are you going to be deadsticking a -2, or any airplane for that matter without complicating factors? what you said has absolutly nothing to do with this! seeeeeesh! In this tradgedy there was a pile of complicating factors, that is why it happend.

WIDOW: don't get discouraged by whatever B.S. CID comes up with, i think he might still be a little wet behind the ears! you are doing a hell of a good thing for your self, and the many thousands of good people in aviation industry! hopfully you will find all the un answered questions that you and the other family members deserve.

[rfcPilot]

plywood, [ quote ] and [ / quote ] But without the spaces.

[CID]

Widow,

Much of the discussion in thread you referenced deals with extenuating circumstances such as engine loss without a water path. There are plenty of circumstances that would complicate a water landing in a float plane with an engine failure. However, deadsticking a floatplane in VMC in the middle of a large body of water should not result in death and destruction. I think we can agree on that.

plywood,

Again, I agree there were complicating factors in this accident. But let’s retain focus. How did this airplane end up in a situation where the complicating factors were overwhelming?

I don’t think VFR flight over water in a float equipped Beaver is inherently dangerous. So what happened here? Perhaps the VFR flightplan wasn’t being done in VMC.

It's been hinted at here that west coast operators often operate in "marginal" weather knowing full well that the weather can change (for better or worse) quite quickly.

Why is that?

[oldenoughtoknowbetter]

It's been hinted at here that west coast operators often operate in "marginal" weather knowing full well that the weather can change (for better or worse) quite quickly.

Why is that?

The issue of the witness report near the start of the program hasn't been addressed here as yet since I queried about it...the comment was describing the departure..... "and then it disappeared into the fog"

What's your information widow....not looking for rough edges here however "if" that witness report was accurate, should the same witness if knowledgable on VMC, not expect to soon see the nose of the -2 returning?

[Widow]

As I've said before, if this pilot was flying in unacceptable conditions, so was every VFR pilot on the "wet coast". I am not an expert, but you can hardly accuse this pilot of erring in his decision to fly that day without encompasing all similar ops in the area. If one called a day like that unacceptable, then you'd only be able to fly about once a week - and only in the summer (an exaggeration, but you get my point)!

In my opinion, the condition of the floats was a vital complicating factor which turned this incident into a fatal accident. Despite the oil on the windscreen, the low cloud sitting in the Channel, the glassy water, the inability to communicate a Mayday - despite all these things my husband escaped relatively unharmed and survived for several hours .... and everyone else got out surviving and wait for help for an unknown amount of time. This in itself is a testament to the pilot's abilities, not a debasement.

Had the floats been in reasonable condition, and all other factors remained the same, the outcome would have been similar to that of the recent VI Air crash (or any of the others I mentioned in my letter above, or mentioned in Hayton's report) - everyone would have been saved.

[Widow]

The issue of the witness report near the start of the program hasn't been addressed here as yet since I queried about it...the comment was describing the departure..... "and then it disappeared into the fog"

What's your information widow....not looking for rough edges here however "if" that witness report was accurate, should the same witness if knowledgable on VMC, not expect to soon see the nose of the -2 returning?

I had to listen several times to figure out what you were talking about ... the closest I can come is the voiceover by Victor Malorek (the reporter) which says "...the beaver takes off, and vanishes in the morning mist". This, I'm afraid, would be "creative license", not understanding the possible implications of making such a statement. In fact, the weather around Campbell River that morning was relatively clear. There was a low cloud bank or fog (I don't know the right terminology so I'm trying to phrase this as clearly as I can - shaped like a flat island) which sat about a hundered feet over the water in the Sutil Channel (where the plane crashed) as there was over many other bodies of water, and is quite common especially in the winter and usually burns off by mid- late morning. This may clarify somewhat from the TSB letter:

Weather in the area was variable with respect to cloud bases, the presence of fog, wind speed, and water conditions. However, based on the pilot's stated concern that he may not be able to land at Frances Bay on the outbound leg of the trip, it is reasonable to conclude that weather represented a risk factor for his flight either enroute or in the vicinity of Frances Bay. Weather in the vicinity of Knight Inlet was reported to be
good for visual flight.

[carholme]

For those "experts" who seem to be indicating VMC/IMC improper operation of a float aircraft, I suggest you consider that the pilot had family and friends as well and how would any of you feel if it were your families reading this tripe.

Just because the aircraft may or may not have disappeared from the ground observers line of sight in no way indicates that the pilot did not have a clear line of sight in front of him. Whatever he was left with when things went for shit with the engine, I am sure you "experts" could have handled it but we will never know what this poor guy was dealt. He had a damaged aircraft and pax and I am sure he was very aware of his responsibilities to them and gave it his best shot.

Wherever he is at now, I am sure looking down on this garbage, he knows the real meaning of "pilot solidarity".

If there is a God, I hope he forbids it ever happening to any of you. I would have thought it may be prudent to get the engine up and see if it has anything to say about the circumstances he was facing.

Regards

carholme

[CLguy]

The one thing I have a hard time understanding and hopefully someone can clarify it, is how did the engine end up being torn off the aircraft if it wasn't a catastrophic landing. That being the case, regardless of the condition or age of the floats, they would never have remained intact during such a landing so I think arguing about the float maintenance is a mute point. Am I missing something here?

[oldenoughtoknowbetter]

The one thing I have a hard time understanding and hopefully someone can clarify it, is how did the engine end up being torn off the aircraft if it wasn't a catastrophic landing. That being the case, regardless of the condition or age of the floats, they would never have remained intact during such a landing so I think arguing about the float maintenance is a mute point. Am I missing something here?

Not in my mind, however I left that one alone.....seems those that "question" get the sarcastic "expert" label pretty quick.

[CID]

carholme,

If it was my family, I wouldn't want anyone to tip-toe around any of the information or issues. I think the quest for justice is also the quest for truth and before you get either, you must explore all the facts. Including the ones that make everyone uncomfortable.

Wherever he is at now, I am sure looking down on this garbage, he knows the real meaning of "pilot solidarity".

What do you mean about that? If a pilot makes a mistake (and I'm not saying this one did for sure) should all other pilots help cover it up? That does nobody any good either.

As I've said before, if this pilot was flying in unacceptable conditions, so was every VFR pilot on the "wet coast".

The million dollar question then is whether or not everyone was pushing the weather that day or if the weather was VMC after all. Or were some of them flying IFR with IFR equipped airplanes?

If everyone was pushing the weather, maybe we've stumbled on the reason 703 operators in BC have so many accidents. Is .. running part of the west coast culture?

[Rowdy]

Just a quick point on the ELT.

Useless when underwater and very very tricky when in the hills. Was a few hours before they had homed in on mine(and they had a very detailed route to help). Not sure how long someone can hang onto a float or tread water in that cold coastal . even if it was transmitting from some sort of jettisonable unit or pfd etc.