Widow writes another letter

Widow · Post by **Widow** » Thu May 10, 2007 12:07 pm

The witnesses didn't go to the media. They contacted MJM, the police and the JRCC after they heard about it on the media. It was on the six o'clock news.

As for why no-one called anyone to find out what they'd heard (aircraft), the one's that have contacted me have felt pretty darned guilty. I think this witness explains it pretty clearly:

I write this with a heavy heart filled with anger and guilt.

Like millions of other people, I watched W5 and was dumfounded by what I heard.

On that sad morning, my daughter and I were living on our sailboat in Heriot Bay, I was up early and took pictures of the ferry in a fog bank, it was calm and later I distinctly heard the Beaver go over my head, it was sputtering and I knew there was a problem. So much so that I asked another boater if he had heard the same thing. He had. The plane got quieter and the "miss" seemed to disappear.

It bothered me enough that I left my moorage with the sailboat and headed out towards Read Island, which is where I thought the plane was heading. I roamed around the harbour and Sutil for about an hour before I had to return. There was no traffic on the VHF and I had nothing to report, I was convinced I had imagined it all and my daughter wanted to get ashore. We never headed towards Village Bay or the Breton Islands and we were under power, not sail, so we would not have heard anything.

The reason I can't sleep is that we had our boat within sight of the crash and nobody told us, we had a 38ft sailboat in the water and no mayday was ever issued by MJM, it leaves me sick. The thought of them getting out will never leave my mind.

Nobody asked anybody on the wharf if they had seen anything and we moved soon after, we're now in Montréal and W5 was the first time I found out the truth, until then I had assumed they had died on impact.

I knew Arnie and being from Montréal we always said hi when our paths crossed, I am left without words, when I think that if MJM had taken responsibility and made one lousy call, a hundred people would have been on the water and this would have been a story for the grand kids, told by the survivors.

I am so sorry I did not stay out that day, but there was no reason to, the Coast Guard, RCMP, SAR, even the new water taxis at the HBI all were in the dark, nobody had a clue anything was wrong. Except for the people directly under that Beaver and none of us knew what we had heard.

As for the witness who heard calls for help, you can read his letter below ...

My property is on Quadra Island approximately 4 nautical miles directly west of where the plane was recovered. .

On the moming the airplane went missing I was cutting wood on my property from approximately 10:00 until noon. At approximately 13:00 I was weeding in a garden above my house and heard clearly. Not faintly, what I thought was "help-help". I stopped and listened but heard nothing further. About fifteen minutes later I agaln heard "help-help". I was concerned enough to go down to my house, which is on the water to look through my binoculars and spotting scope. I went out on my deck and also out to the beach , recall that the visibility was clear for at least four miles, but could have been even more. .

The calls I thought I'd heard were not frantic or desperate just stated plainly. They did not seem shouted. I remember wondering if what I'd heard was a call for help why it so calmly made? I was therefore inclined to look for a boat broken down. There were no boats, nor were there any sign of plane wreckage that I saw, nor were there any planes in the air. I did not see anyone in the water. I saw nothing that indicated anyone might be in distress The weather was fair and there was no chop on the water. I realized later that if what I heard was a call for help it wasn't calmly made but fatigued.

What I heard was not soft or loud and sounded to me to be fairly close to the Quadra shore. The sounds seemed to come from a direction slightly north of my property. After hearing the first sound (call?) I tried to judge the direction which seemed to be 1/4 - 1/2 mile north and perhaps a mile or more east. The second time I heard the noise I again heard it trom that direction. I do not think that if what I heard was a call for help that the person was more than two miles off shore.

I looked and listened for a long time. i did not hear the call again. I have no explanation for what I heard, I thought perhaps it was a cormorant or people from a passing boat gone before I arnvsd though there was no wake, or maybe people on the beach though I didn't see anyone.

I was not aware until the evening of the following day that a plane had disappeared. After being told about the plane I mentioned to my wife what I might have heard. She told that to a friend who talked
with some official. After that I was contacted by the RCMP and made a statement.

This was given to us the evening before our meeting with the TSB in December 2005.

Mitch Cronin · Post by **Mitch Cronin** » Thu May 10, 2007 12:26 pm

binderdundat wrote:Yet not one came forward in time to save these souls? It was February and their only chance of survival was to be removed from the frigid water within minutes, yet all twenty people heard either choking, sputtering, cutting inand out, splashing of aircraft or cries for help yet reported nothing until the media came to town. I find this unconscionable! … or a convenient way to get their proverbial 15 seconds of fame.

You're really beginning to sound like a fella with a stake in this... are you worried? ...otherwise, why so negative?

The whole story can never be told until the engine is looked at. The TSB should have the bloody thing scooped out of the water for analysis! I don't understand why it's not already done!

xsbank · Post by **xsbank** » Thu May 10, 2007 12:36 pm

God that's sad - so close yet so far away. I would have called 911 (because I am perfect) but even then that sort of report is so vague...just none of the small parts of the path of an accident would unravel for you, none. It seems impossible that everything would fail, but everything did. And you still don't have that lousy engine to drop on the owner's foot.

Widow · Post by **Widow** » Thu May 10, 2007 12:40 pm

Even when we get the engine, unless TCCA decides to do some enforcement, nothing will happen to the owner of MJM.

CID · Post by **CID** » Thu May 10, 2007 12:57 pm

This strikes me as a complete contradiction. If you are having a tough time, CID, why don't you use your influence to get TSB to raise the damned engine!!!!!! That should resolve one very critical issue

Sorry sport. I have no influence with the TSB. Did I ever imply that I did?

If you believe the engine does not require being raised, then you have pinned the accident on the pilot. And that is slanderous.

I don't agree that I've "pinned" the failure of the engine on the pilot. I have raised some questions regarding the actions of the pilot with respect to the weather. I really don't think you can call a discussion about an unresolved accident "slander". As a matter of fact if this wasn't an anonymous forum, your comments towards me would be much more slanderous.

You have pestered the heck out of everyone, trying to pin this on the pilot. You believe that nobody should be flying single engine aircraft on the coast.

Pestored? I've politely conducted myself in this discussion and raised good questions. If you feel "pestored" it is of your own accord. As far as single engine airplanes, I made no such broad general statement. As a matter of fact I have little problem with an airplane like an IFR equipped 208 flying around the coast.

The Beaver has been out flying now for fifty years, or thereabouts.

Good point. Maybe its time to retire it. Maybe it's getting too tough to keep that old radial flying. You know, many people enjoy flying their DHC-1 Chipmunks but you don't find too many with the original Gypsy engine. When does something pass from being "old and proven" to just being "old"? Maybe in part when the major component manufacturers end support.

Case in point, rememeber that CADOR with the Otter I was talking about? It was a turbine conversion machine. Here's the follow-up;

UPDATE / Add Info from TSB: A07P0133: The Whistler Air Services Ltd. DHC-3T float equipped Turbo Otter aircraft took off from Whistler and was on the Orca transit, VFR at 700 feet for Victoria Harbour. The latest METAR for Victoria gave a ceiling of 800 feet broken and pireps indicated the visibility was 6 miles. At 10 nm north of Active Pass the aircraft flew into IMC. As the aircraft was flying in mist and rain and glassy water conditions existed, the pilot began a climb to 3,000 feet and contacted Victoria terminal for assistance. The aircraft was issued vectors to the south and after about 10 minutes in IMC was advised of improving weather conditions in the area. The pilot descended and at about 600 feet, encountered VMC. The aircraft continued to Victoria Harbour where it landed without further difficulty.

Don't some of the statements sound eerily similar? I'm sure we can all imagine the possible outcome if the engine failed.

Statistically, it is safe. Things become less safe when other factors are thrown in. You feel that a flight should not be undertaken if sea conditions are not perfectly suitable for an imagined forced landing. Does putting your sock on the wrong foot in the morning first qualify for cancelling the day?

I don't have any of those fancy socks that have left and right feet.

Statistics are a method of measuring the effects of regulation not for determining the level of saftey. You say "it" is safe statistically. If yoy mean flying 703 on the west coast, I think widow has information proving otherwise.

The level of safety is imposed by the regulations. Beavers have proven to be great work horses but from a level of saftey perspective, it's no coincidence they are restricted to VFR for commercial ops and its no coincidence that when they are regularily operated beyond those limits that there are accidents.

Should B-777 crews apply the same prohibition to flight if they are planning to fly over hostile terrain or weather....remember, there are only two engines.

Snaproll20, I'm sure you know that a B-777 is designed and certified for a far different role and a extremely higher level of safety than a Beaver. Thats why a Beaver is restricted to VFR under commercial ops and a B-777 isn't. Your question is ludicrous.

Cat Driver · Post by **Cat Driver** » Thu May 10, 2007 1:39 pm

widow and gang, I have seen this same senario evolve before with CID, he will keep putting forth seemingly harmless or just plain dumb comments until he gets you to say something that allows him to use this lever to control you with.

I don't agree that I've "pinned" the failure of the engine on the pilot. I have raised some questions regarding the actions of the pilot with respect to the weather. I really don't think you can call a discussion about an unresolved accident "slander". As a matter of fact if this wasn't an anonymous forum, your comments towards me would be much more slanderous.

I find it sad that something as important as searching for answers to your loss degenerates into such personal thinly veiled intimidation.

You be very careful " sport" (widow )

CID · Post by **CID** » Thu May 10, 2007 1:50 pm

Sorry Cat, I can't be held responsible for "dumb" comments from you or anyone else.

Your theatrics are quite amusing though. I don't see how any of my comments can be construed as "intimidation". If anything, you're the master of that "sport". Ever consider answer my questions I posed earlier in this thread? Yah, I didn't think so. You're too busy inventing conspiracy theories or insults.

snaproll20 · Post by **snaproll20** » Thu May 10, 2007 2:28 pm

CID

There you go again..

"I don't agree that I've "pinned" the failure of the engine on the pilot. "

Nobody has accused you of that. Still, you are willing in your own nasty little way to bring the matter up.

You are without doubt the most stupid, cantankerous, negative, insinuating and dubious posters I have ever seen on this forum.

CID · Post by **CID** » Thu May 10, 2007 2:58 pm

Snaproll20, didn't you state:

If you believe the engine does not require being raised, then you have pinned the accident on the pilot.

You structured your sentence in such a way that there are two possibilities. One, the engine caused the accident or two, the pilot caused the accident. In reality it was a classic "chain of events". And if you further include what caused the deaths of the occupants, the chain gets longer.

If you don't like me response, then put some more thought into your questions.

As far as the rest of your tirade, I ask that you calm down and try to act like the professional you claim to be.

I have no interest in slinging mud with you or anyone else.

Cat Driver · Post by **Cat Driver** » Thu May 10, 2007 3:20 pm

I have no interest in slinging mud with you or anyone else.

Widow · Post by **Widow** » Thu May 10, 2007 3:24 pm

CID ... snaproll said "If you believe the engine does not require being raised, then you have pinned the accident on the pilot." not "you have pinned the failure of the engine on the pilot. " as you indicated in your response.

The point is (and I know you see it, even as you keep throwing sand in my eyes) that without the engine, we WILL NEVER KNOW what happened that day. And since five guys died, we really should find out ALL the reasons.

It is not acceptable to say "there was no engine failure" with all the evidence to the contrary. Nor is it acceptable to say "well, maybe there was an engine failure, but the pilot didn't handle it well" ... how the hell can anyone know how well the pilot handled anything without KNOWING what caused the plane to go down in the first place? What if it was a faulty stud, or improper maintenance, or some new problem that is only now developing with 50 year old cylinders?

Without KNOWING, corrective action cannot be taken, and that could cost more lives.

Cat Driver · Post by **Cat Driver** » Thu May 10, 2007 3:53 pm

widow, the P&W 985 is one of the most reliable piston engines ever made. Yes, there will be degrading of strenght in metal after millions of firing shock cycles and thousands of thermal shock cycles.....

...However there is no real indication that we have reached a critical state reliability wise with either the P&W 985 or the DH Beaver. I have thousands of hours on the 985 in the Stinson SR9, Anson Mk5, Beech 18 and Beaver to name some I can remember and never had a complete engine failure due to mechanical failure of a part.

As an example right here in Nanaimo we have Baxter Air who have been flying many sked flights daily for over 20 years and I can not remember ever hearing about one having an engine failure that resulted in an emergency water landing ( or land landing )

Raise the fu.kin engine and lets see what they find.

My personal feelings are that that pilot was faced with an engine failure over glassy water, the fact that the people were not killed on impact shows he did his best, I sure as hell would never want to be faced with that situation.

It is also quite possible that the float was structurally unsound enough to have made the difference between the airplane staying afloat and the airplane cartwheeling due to failure of the float on contact with the water.

Anyhow I for one am not satisfied with the TSB findings.

justplanecrazy · Post by **justplanecrazy** » Thu May 10, 2007 4:00 pm

Pardon my ignorance on this subject, I've only seen and heard a few parts of the story at any time, but what exactly would pulling up the engine prove? Accident investigations are there to help prevent future accidents not lay blame.

If this beaver did in fact experience a catastrophic engine failure, discovering that would not help prevent future accidents. The beaver's engine is time tested and proven as a safe engine. Can it fail, sure even the PT6 has had issues but the fact that this isn't a reoccuring phenomenon like an exploding ford gas tank, doesn't make it worth the 1,000's of dollars needed to be spent on recovery. The chances of discovering why this engine failed are very minimal but given the off chance that they do discover the reason for the failure to be something as simple as wrong sized main bearings being installed on the rebuild, or a failed oil pump, what would that help? AME's make mistakes, production line assemblies have errors, products fail. Unfortunately these things happen. Does this operator have a history of poor maitenance? If so, why not investigate their maitenance history rather than focusing on one piece of evidence that is most likely destroyed to a point that it won't reveal anything.

I do understand your emotional struggle and how you obviously want to alleviate the pilot from most or all of the blame. Unfortunately an accident investigation is not there to lay blame, it is there to stop another similar incident from happening in the future. To fault them for not investigating further an accident that appears to be an isolated incident with no correlation to any other accidents, doesn't seem fair.

I don't mean to write this to spark debate, I only want to discover why there is such a focus on the engine and what recovery may accomplish. I couldn't understand what point the W5 report was trying to prove. Aren't there many reports out there that state the engine failed, but don't provide the specifics as to why? Isn't it only airliners or reoccuring accidents on light craft, that they investigate to that extreme???

Widow · Post by **Widow** » Thu May 10, 2007 4:06 pm

Cat, everyone I have talked to who flies with or works on the R-985's agrees with you. It is a damn fine engine provided it is maintained properly.

Which is why the SDA pleased me so much. I'm told that when TCCA M&M did finally look into the R-985 cylinder SDR's, they found that there seemed to be more instances here on the wet coast. I would be interested to know why there were more on the west coast ... is it salt water? is it lack of maintenance (a particular culprit, or a string of them)? is it a cylinder overhauler/supplier? or are there more of them here on the west coast than in other parts of Canada?

PS. justplanecrazy, I don't want the TSB to assign blame. I want them to consider all the factors (like that TCCA did discover this recurring problem with R-985 cylinders - with a little help from us) that contributed to this accident (as is their job) so that the RCMP, WorkSafe BC and the Coroner can then do their jobs. These other agencies are all relying on the TSB to tell them what happened that day.

Cat Driver · Post by **Cat Driver** » Thu May 10, 2007 4:20 pm

widow, I'm in complete agreement with you.

BUT...WE.. WILL NEVER KNOW UNLESS.... as I stated above:

Raise the fu.kin engine and lets see what they find.

snaproll20 · Post by **snaproll20** » Thu May 10, 2007 4:49 pm

just plane crazy

You have two choices.

1. the pilot screwed up (not an option on the evidence.)
2. the engine failed, for reasons unknown.

Why would you not want to raise it , discover the truth and provide everyone with the MEANS to ensure it does not happen again?
As previously pointed out, BLAME is not the primary issue here. We are looking for a causitive factor as to why this Beaver met the sea short of destination.

BUT, if it is proven that the floats and the engine of this particular Beaver had problems that had not been fixed, is not SOMEBODY responsible? Any kind of maintenance bulletin from the engine manufacturer might lead to the eradication of future possible failure (possibly from this wreck). An inadequate repair or replacement, perhaps based on cost might be indictable. Certainly, the floats on this particular aircraft, and the business approach of this company have been called into question by an expert.

A badly maintained aircraft can fly (almost) forever, but the least outside influence can reveal its shortcomings and then, somebody pays.

I believe we need to know whether this engine failed. Experts hired by the families concur with my humble opinion.

Please consider this view.

(Oh, and your contribution of $100 would be appreciated too.)

I guess, to put my thought in perpective, maintenance get information and also file Service Difficulties with TC. Are we looking at some kind of dedicated response here, or a deeper concern with the cost?

Cheers, Snaproll 20

carholme · Post by **carholme** » Thu May 10, 2007 5:39 pm

One of the good reasons to get this engine up is to ensure that we do not have a recurring situation of the previous cylinder problems as ecountered by one overhaul agency.

Even overhauled cylinders which are supposed to be marked with the UT stamp (Ultrasonic Testing) is not enough to ensure that it has been complied with. I have talked to an O/H agency in the US who claims that they black light the cylinders as they don't trust the UT. Does this indicate that they are not complying with the UT? I cannot say that here for fear of legal pursuit but I do know that a cylinder which failed on our Beech had the UT stamp and I questioned how they could have UT'd the particular area when the area was still pebbled rather than being completely smooth to get maximum results from the UT.

As well, it is well known how long it takes to completely and accurately check torque the cylinder hold down nuts at the times required. What remains of this engine should indicate whether there was any looseness of the cylinder hold down nuts, which will be evidenced by fretting at the case to cylinder attachment. Another good reason for re-emphasizing to the operators, the need to actually perform the hold down nut checks.

There are many good reasons to get this engine up and the most important would be to show that maybe the pilot did his very best, did get the aircraft to the water safely and possibly a surviveable accident. If the floats were found to have irregularities, TC will have to deal with that.

Regards

carholme

Widow · Post by **Widow** » Fri May 11, 2007 7:44 am

Families seeking probe
Denise Sharkey, Courier-Islander
Published: Friday, May 11, 2007

CAMPBELL RIVER - The families of the victims of a 2005 floatplane crash are asking the Ministers of Labour at both the provincial and federal levels to investigate the "disgraceful lack of importance placed on the loss of five working souls."

Kirsten Stevens, who lost her husband David when an MJM Air plane crashed Feb. 28, 2005 off eastern Quadra Island, has written to federal Labour Minister Jean-Pierre Blackburn and Olga Ilich, B.C. Minister of Labour and Citizens' Services, demanding an investigation. North Island MLA Claire Trevena recently entered the fray as well, writing to Transportation Minister Kevin Falcon and Public Safety Minister John Les asking them for help.

Stevens said she's hoping all the letter-writing will have some results. The families' efforts in the months after the crash resulted in the recovery of the missing plane from the bottom of the ocean, but they have been unable to retrieve the plane's engine from the ocean floor so far. They believe the engine may provide answers about why the accident happened.

David Stevens, 40, along with pilot Arnold Feast, 52, Doug Decock, 39, Trevor Decock, 34 and Fabian Bedard, 32, died in the crash.

Vanouver Sun

Widow · Post by **Widow** » Fri May 11, 2007 11:36 am

carholme wrote:One of the good reasons to get this engine up is to ensure that we do not have a recurring situation of the previous cylinder problems as ecountered by one overhaul agency.

There is evidence that the overhauler of the engine was using parts not made to spec. When I did a search through the TCCA/FAA SDRs I discovered that there seemed to be a high number of incidents with engines from this particular overhauler. In February 2007, the TSB got a batch of said parts and the "word on the street" is that the parts, while not made to spec, were not so badly off spec that they were going to do anything about it. We have word that the FAA has gone through their records, and since this particular part problem has never killed anyone, they are not too concerned either - unless it is found that our engine failed as a result of this failed part - then they will be concerned.

In the meantime, an unknown number of aircraft (privately and commercially, worldwide) whose R-985's were last overhauled by this facility are in danger a cylinder hold-down stud failure ... which may not happen on a calm clear day with prime conditions for an emergency landing.

Oh yes, the AMO for AQW is also the Western Canada distributor for the overhauler's engines. Wonder why they don't believe it was engine failure?

justplanecrazy · Post by **justplanecrazy** » Sun May 13, 2007 10:34 am

Well if there seems to be a consistent problem related to these engines failing, then by all means, spend as much tax money as it takes to lift that engine.

I have mixed emotions on the subject though as TC won't investigate any home builts that suddenly drop from the sky and end up a burning ball of flame even if one particular model is blowing up weekly. To not spend the money to investigate these accidents at all, but to fork out thousands of dollars to lift a time tested and proven engine that has failed in a rare case, seems to be contradictory.

Snaproll20, an accident very rarely results in a clear and consistent single finding of cause. In this case, the evidence surely points to a far grayer area then 100% pilot or 100% engine.

Engines fail all the time and there is no loss of life or even damage resulting from it. They were in a float plane and landed on what sounds like a suitable landing surface. (correct me if I'm wrong, but it was my belief that the water was actually quite calm at the time.) The weather was marginal from the sounds of it and it definitely sounded like there were in fact some engine issues. To me it sounds like it was a combination of all of these factors.

I've landed countless times with a simulated engine failure and never dumped. On the other hand, I've been surprised with a few glassy landings that were pretty ugly. If the beaver did lose an engine and the weather was acceptable to be flying in with no large swells at the time, then there must have been something more than just the engine failure that caused the accident. Retrieving the engine will have allowed a little more insight into the reason for the crash but it still doesn't reveal why the plane crashed exactly. If it does reveal an issue with ultrasonic testing of cylinders or something that is appearing to be a consistent issue, then that is a viable reason to lift the engine. To absolve the pilot of all blame is not as a proven engine failure in an otherwise workable craft, still doesn't absolve the pilot of blame as engines don't land airplanes. It is but one part of a chain of events.

Widow · Post by **Widow** » Sun May 13, 2007 10:38 am

glassy water, faulty floats

justplanecrazy · Post by **justplanecrazy** » Sun May 13, 2007 10:43 am

Did they recover the floats, have they determined that the floats were faulty? If so, then that is what I'd be following up on not just the engine. What was faulty about them? Should that not have been discovered during the last inspection? These are the questions that will help prevent another accident. If the engine and the floats both failed, has there been evidence of poor maintenance with the operators entire fleet? Push for inspections on the rest of his craft and maintenance records. This is the path you should be following.

With the amount of money you will spend pulling up that engine with a good possibility of not producing any obvious answer, it may be better focused elsewhere. Push for TC to start following up on the companies maintenance records if you feel that is the main cause for this accident.

Glass water and no engine provide a difficult landing but it isn't the sole cause of the crash. Why was a precauitionairy landing not performed when the engine was running rough but had not yet failed? There will always be questions, the important thing for you to do is to follow those questions that may lead to a cause that should not have been part of the chain of events. ie. poor maintenance. As hard as it is, you have to keep following that path rather than trying to show everyone that the pilot isn't at fault.

Widow · Post by **Widow** » Sun May 13, 2007 10:58 am

The floats were recovered with the rest of the wreck. One broke off as the aircraft surfaced, but was "caught". TSB said they did not have the knowledge to look at the floats. TCCA's report concluded "Due to concerns regarding technical records an enforcement action has been initiated with a Detection Notice alleging that major repairs were performed without required data and without required certification." We do not know if the TSB is doing another letter/report that will include this information.

This is from our expert's report:

Float Observations/lssues

In conjunction with Transportation Safety Board of Canada Senior Air Investigator W.R. (Bill) Kemp in November 2006, and Transport Canada (Safety) Inspectors Mr. Norm Chalmers and Mr. Murray Nelson in early December 2006, I again thoroughly examined both floats off Beaver C-GAQW complete with all their attachment hardware, struts, etc. which connect the floats to the aircraft itself. I found the followinq:

a) The aft ends of both floats have almost identical upward deformation of the bottom skins surfaces, indicating that the aircraft was descending at high rate and in a tail low and wings level condition, immediately prior to landing on the water.

b) Each float is divided into five compartments with sealed water-tight bulkheads separating the compartments. Each compartment has a hatch cover which is attached with approximately 57 10/32" machine screws and their associated internal nutplates. The removal of these covers allows access to the compartments for inspection and maintenance. These hatch covers are supposed to be sealed after each removal, since without the sealer rainwater would enter the floats from above under normal conditions, and if the floats were partially submerged (in an accident situation, for instance) water would pour into the compartment and the plane would rapidly sink. In our case, we found numerous screws missing on many of the hatch covers, due to missing or rusted-out nutplates. The resulting holes were not plugged.

The three center compartments on the left-hand float had recently been opened up with the covers cleaned and freshly painted with Super Koropon epoxy/chromate primer, and with new repairs to the bottom skins in these areas. (Incidentally, we water-tested these fresh repairs to the bottom skins, and found all to slowly leak). None of these covers had any sealer applied since the fresh reprime. The type of primer on the covers was the same as that on the new bottom repairs. All the remaining hatch covers on both floats had old, cracked sealer installed. Water leakage past these seals was evident in several areas. It also appeared that some of the hatch covers had been removed and reinstalled without removing the old sealer and installing new. (None of these covers had been removed post accident and before the above-mentioned inspection). I also noted several areas where water had been leaking past the bulkheads previous to the accident. This is shown by watermarks on both sides of the bulkhead in question. Thus, if one compartment is breached to the outside, you lose two or more compartments.

c) There were several unauthorized repairs to both floats; mainly to the deck coamings. These are the structural longitudinal fore-aft members, which form the upper inboard and outboard corners where the side skins meet the top skins. The float manufacturer allows no repairs to these members, nor is there any Federal Aviation Administration or Transport Canada approved repair. In our case, numerous repairs had been made to these members. On the right-hand float (the most badly damaged float), failures occurred in these repaired areas, definitely influencing the extent of damage to the right-hand float which occurred in the area where the front strut and spreader bar attach to the float. On the 4580 float, which was the type on C-GAQW, this attachment area is in the middle of a compartment area and not near a bulkhead. Thus, the integrity of all other members is extremely important. In our case, with numerous unapproved repairs evident in this area, the float was structurally weakened which significantly contributed to the extent of damage to the right-hand float.

d) Non-aviation approved silicone sealer was found in the badly damaged area of the right-hand float shortly after the floats were originally recovered from the ocean's floor. To me, this indicates that the right-hand float had been leaking at some previous time, and that an attempt to make a temporary repair had been made. Because of the extensive structural damage to this float in this area, I do not think it possible to determine the total influence this sealer may have had in this accident. Corrosion occurs in the area where silicone is applied next to aluminum, but it appeared to me that the failure in this compartment started in areas other than where the silicone was found.

e) The front approximately 10" of the right-hand float has been chopped off and is still missing. It appears that the aircraft's turning propeller was the chopping method. Minor smoke and fire damage were also observed in this area.

f) There did not appear to be any pre-impact damage to any of the float attach structures.

Float Discrepancies and Failure Conclusions:

a) Unapproved (old) float deck rail coaming repairs influenced the extent of damage the right-hand float sustained in the accident. This significantly influenced the time Beaver C-GAQW stayed on the surface before sinking.

b) The quantity of missing hatch cover screws and resulting holes, total lack of sealer under the three center compartment hatch covers of the left hand float, as well as a lack of good sealer under the remainder of the hatch covers on the both floats, contributed to a large extent in how fast Beaver C-GAQW sank after hitting the water surface. Had the sealer been there properly, (taking into consideration the structural damage to the floats) the aircraft probably would have stayed at the surface for at least 1 hour, thus providing a place for the occupants to get out of the cold water and rest, and a place to stand on while attracting attention for rescue. I base this judgment on two other accidents involving Beaver float planes which suffered similar float damage and which I now own. these two examples are cited below.
1. Beaver C-FOBZ crashed 10-13-2000 with the damage to both floats very close to that of Beaver C-GAQW and which floated at least twelve hours. This allowed the occupants to be safely rescued by standing/sitting on the overturned floats and yelling for attention.
2. Beaver C-FQHT also crashed May 18, 2004 with the float damage to both floats being as great as, if not worse than those of Beaver C-GAQW. In this case, the floats supported the plane on the surface for at least twenty-four hours. It was still floating when found and recovered.
Additional Background Information Regarding the Floats

In the fall of 2003 and early spring of 2004, Jim Hartwell (MJM Air General Manager and Chief Pilot) contacted me regarding leasing a pair of Beaver floats from me for use on Beaver C-GAQW. He told me that the Beaver C-GAQW floats were leaking badly, needed new bottom skins, corrosion control and repainting, etc. He estimated that the float repairs would take from two to three months, so that is how long he would need to use mine. I quoted him a price of $3,000 U.S. D. for that 3-month float lease, but he later told me the MJM Air owner would not pay that kind of price.

*** (edited)

In fall of 2004 Mr. Hartwell again contacted me regarding the lease of some Beaver floats. I was surprised that they had not repaired the floats the previous year and told him so. He told me that the MJM Air owner refused to spend the money, but that now the floats were leaking so badly that it had to happen. I again offered Mr. Hartwell the same deal as the previous year - he told me he would get back with me. He contacted me again in early January 2005, this time wanting to lease a complete Beaver with floats since Beaver C-GAQW needed an engine change and other work. We agreed to meet in Campbell River about the middle of January 2005 and discuss the matter further. I was in Campbell River on 1-16-2005 and spoke with a MJM Air pilot who told me Mr. Hartwell was not available. I looked over the MJM Air operation and Beaver C-GAQW including its rough running engine, oil streaks down the right-hand side of the fuselage, and overall poor condition. I made up my mind right then that I did not want to lease one of my planes to MJM Air.

Mr. Hartwell never did contact me again and I do not know if the floats were worked on following the last conversation Mr. Hartwell and I had in early January 05 and before the accident of February 28, 2005. However, it is clear from looking at the floats now, that some work had been recently accomplished, including corrosion-control and reprime, and bottom patch type repairs to the lefthand float.

justplanecrazy · Post by **justplanecrazy** » Sun May 13, 2007 11:06 am

Sorry, I was too quick hitting submit and you were too quick with a reply. Like I had added on the above post, this is the path that you should be following. I really can't support your claims of TC corruption or incompetance for not pulling up the engine, but if there is an obvious maintenance issue that TC isn't following up on, then that is an obvious problem and something that you should be raising public attention for. Focus on that, not so much on the engine.

Good luck with your battle.

Widow · Post by **Widow** » Sun May 13, 2007 11:09 am

OK. This is from the TCCA M&M Safety Inspector's Report Dec. 2006:

Aircraft Inspection and Technical Review

To record observations, a skin map of both floats was made. These maps are in the form of notated copies of the applicable EDO parts drawing. The repairs to the floats are identified on the skin maps. For each repair there is a representative photograph identified by number.

The data plate attached to the front of the left float identified it as an EDO model 58-4580 serial number 1441. The front of the right float was missing. Type Certificate A22 approves this installation.

The required data for all major repairs to the aircraft must have met the requirements of Canadian Aviation Regulation (CAR) 571.06 which states “the major repair or major modification conforms to the requirements of the relevant technical data
(a) that have been approved or the use of which has been approved within the meaning of the term "approved data" in section 571.06 of the Airworthiness Manual; or
(b) that have been established within the meaning of the term "specified data" in section 571.06 of the Airworthiness Manual.”

The related specified data, as defined in Standard 571 Maintenance Section 571.06, can be found in the deHavilland DHC-2 Beaver Repair Manual PSM 1-2-3 and in the FAA document AC 43.13-1b. Excerpts from both these documents are attached.

Most of the repairs examined conformed to the specifications of one of the above mentioned documents.

Review of the aircraft’s technical record revealed that reference to required data relating to numerous observed repairs was missing.
There were numerous repairs to all the Deck Combings. When new, the combing part is a continuous unit from the back to the front of the float. The manual PSM 1-2-3 shows no repairs to the combing. Standard 571.06(1), regarding use of FAA AC43.13-1A, states “(iii) the data are appropriate to the product being altered, and are directly applicable to the alteration being made;” The AC does not contain data “directly applicable” therefore cannot be used.

The engine firewall between the accessory section and the cylinders contained several repairs and one hole of about one centimeter wide and eight centimeters long. That the aircraft flew with this hole in the firewall is certain however it has not been shown that the hole was present at the last inspection of the area. One of the repairs appears to have used aluminum rivets to fasten a stainless steel patch to the stainless steel firewall.

The aircraft’s technical records referred to some repairs to the floats however did not address all of the repairs on the floats or the firewall that were found.

From the Analysis

There were numerous structural patches and evidence of sealant being applied inside the right float however there is no documentation or visual evidence to prove the claim that they were “leakers”.

Inspection of the float access panels indicated that there was no sealant in place on the date and at the time of this inspection.

The required scheduled inspections at the time of the accident are found in the Maintenance Schedule approved on 19 August 2002. That document required the Periodic (100 hour) Inspections as specified in PSM 1.2.2. The Daily and Periodic Inspections in Appendix 2 require that the floats be checker for leaks “by applying a bilge pump to all stand pipes.”

The DHC-2 Beaver Maintenance Manual PSM 1-2-2 does address float leakage. Section 2.34 allows water seepage from one compartment to another of one cup in ten minutes. The Manual does not explain how this measurement is to be done.

PSM 1.2.2 Section 2.35 states that “Water tests should be make after every overhaul as well as for the general detection of leaks.” The Manual specifies a test procedure of filling compartments with water to check for leakage between compartments and to the exterior. It does not specify any period for this test.

The float bottoms had a thin coating of paint over corroded areas. Whether the paint was applied over the observed corrosion or the corrosion occurred after the paint job was not determined.