Canada spending some $$$ to assert sovereignty

[Donald]

Harper announces northern deep-sea port, training site

Harper announces northern deep-sea port, training site
Last Updated: Friday, August 10, 2007 | 3:14 PM CT
CBC News
Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced Friday the government will install two new military facilities in the Arctic to boost Canada's sovereign claim over the Northwest Passage and signal its long-term commitment to the North.

Resolute Bay is located near the eastern entrance for the Northwest Passage.

He said the Canadian Forces will build a new army training centre in Resolute Bay and refurbish an existing deepwater port at a former mining site in Nanisivik.

"Canada's new government understands that the first principle of Arctic sovereignty is: Use it or lose it," said Harper, who made the announcement in Resolute Bay.

"Today's announcements tell the world that Canada has a real, growing, long-term presence in the Arctic."

With a mid-summer temperature of 2 C when Harper spoke, Resolute Bay will be home to a new army training centre for cold-weather fighting that houses up to 100 military personnel.

The training centre will use existing government buildings, which will be refurbished at a cost of $4 million, said a government news release.

Harper, who made the announcement with Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor, also announced an expansion of the Canadian Rangers by 900 members.

The reserve unit of the Canadian Forces patrols remote, isolated and coastal communities. There are roughly 4,100 Canadian Rangers in 165 communities across the country.

Former mine site of deep-sea port
A deep-sea port to be used for military and civilian purposes will be built in Nanisivik, the site of a former lead and zinc mine on northern Baffin Island.

Nanisivik's existing port already has basic docking platforms and a fuel tank storage facility. Used by the occasional cruise ship and Canadian Coast Guard vessels, the port is near Lancaster Sound, the eastern entrance for the Northwest Passage.

Ottawa says it will cost an estimated $100 million to refurbish the port site. Construction is slated to begin in 2010, with an end date of 2015.

Heavy equipment operators are busy cleaning up the site of the former mine, which shut down five years ago. It's contaminated with heavy metals from more than 25 years of operation.

A spokesman for the mine's owner, Breakwater Resources, said contaminated soil has been removed from the port site.

"We've actually removed all the contaminated soil that was associated with the dock cell," said Murray Markle.

"There was some hydrocarbons there that we excavated last year, there was metal contamination in the soils. We're in the process of cleaning that up."

Markle said the port is ice-filled in the winter but gets a lot of use in the summer.

"All the big cargo ships use it, there's 50 feet of water right at port side, so there's really not much of a limitation there. It is a deep-sea port," he said.

Harper said both installations will help back up Canada's claim to the Northwest Passage — a claim disputed by numerous countries including the United States, Japan and the entire European Union.

The pressure is on Arctic nations because of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which gives them 10 years after ratification to prove their claims under the largely uncharted polar ice-pack. All but the United States have ratified the treaty.

Denmark will send a scientific expedition to the Arctic on the weekend to try to cement its claim on the region. Led by Danish and Russian icebreakers equipped with sonar to map the seabed, the team includes 40 scientists, 10 of them Danish.

"We will be collecting data for a possible [sovereignty] demand," said expedition leader Christian Marcussen. "It is not our duty to formulate a demand of ownership."

Earlier this month, Russia sent an icebreaker to the North Pole to conduct scientific experiments and plant a Russian flag on the seabed, a symbolic claim to undiscovered oil and gas supplies, as well as undersea mineral riches.

Earlier this year, Canadian hydrographers were sent to Alert to complete underwater mapping research in support of Canada's sovereignty claim.

Russia, Canada and Denmark all claim they are physically connected to the Lomonosov Ridge, a 2,000-kilometre underwater mountain range that stretches to an area between northern Ellesmere Island and Greenland from Siberia.

[invertedattitude]

The thing is if Russia says "We're taking it"

there's not really SFA we can do about it

[tofo]

boycott russian vodka.

[. ._]

edited because I'm normally not that nasty

[hazatude]

The thing is if Russia says "We're taking it"

there's not really SFA we can do about it

GWB FTW!

[GilletteNorth]

The Liberals (and others) have bitched and moaned in the press saying the government wasn't protecting our sovereignty in the north. Disregarding the fact they themselves never gave a shit about arctic sovereignty before now, they have made great hay on this while bashing the Conservatives as uncaring. Now Harper takes em up on their BS ranting and commits to a new arctic training base and deepwater port and all you can say is

This is all bullshit for next year's federal election. (Bookmark this page.) They're ramping up on the promises and hollow rhetoric. Fucking bastard politicians.

I'll bookmark it and next year you can print this thread up and eat those words if the Conservative win the election and continue with their plans. I'll eat mine if they don't.

[Siddley Hawker]

You're not the only one to think that way GilletteNorth.

http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news ... c305fa79df

[shitdisturber]

The thing is if Russia says "We're taking it"

there's not really SFA we can do about it

Actually while the Russians can bluster with the best of them, they're ability to take anything is pretty limited and has been for years; witness Chechnya. The Russian military for all it's size has even less money to spend than our does; which is why you'll see pictures from any Russian military base of equipment rotting away in the fields.

[WJflyer]

Looks like Harper is actually listening to the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence... see these reports:

The Government's No. 1 Job, Securing the Military Options It Needs to Protect Canadians (June 2006)
http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/1/parlbus/comm ... un06-e.htm

Wounded: Canada’s Military and the Legacy of Neglect (September 2005)
http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/comm ... ep05-e.htm

Key notes:

Falling Behind

The majority of federal spending is mandatory – it automatically flows into legislated programs, such as old age security. The Government cannot make spending adjustments to these kinds of programs without passing further legislation. Defence spending, on the other hand, is largely discretionary. Without pressure from the public to maintain a healthy military over the past number of years, politicians have withdrawn funds from defence whenever they wanted money for other causes.

The Department of National Defence has then been expected to do what it could with the money it had been granted. The cart was put before the horse. Rather than defining the security needs of the Canadian people and finding the funds to meet them, the needs were almost always expected to adjust themselves to the money forthcoming in any given budget.[9]

The 1994 White Paper on Defence should have been followed by a revitalization of Canada’s military. Instead it was followed by a series of cutbacks in military spending. In 1983-84, defence spending constituted 1.7 per cent of Canada’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). By 2000-01, it had plunged to 0.9 per cent. It took until 2004-05 for it to rise to 1% of GDP again.

One can argue that there was good reason for two decades of spending cutbacks – two successive governments decided to fight Canada’s mounting deficit and debt and had strong public support in doing so. The battle against debt has had a long and extremely successful run, and Canada’s finances are in good order. We need to continue to be fiscally responsible, but continuing to starve essential programs cannot be part of that responsibility. There is no more onerous duty for any government than the protection of its citizens.

The impact of underfunding

The government relies on the Canadian Forces to protect Canadians and their vital interests at home and abroad and to enforce Canadian sovereignty. These are vast and critical responsibilities. They cannot be met as long as Canada’s military continues to be underfunded. The Government’s options for performing these core tasks are going to be limited for at least the next decade – and for longer if the underfunding continues. The Government’s options for performing these core tasks are going to be limited for at least the next decade, even if the appropriate amount of funding were to be invested right away. The Government’s options will be much more limited if the underfunding persists.


The consequences have not been dire yet, but neither have they been pretty:

- Underfunding of personnel coupled with a high operational tempo led to burnout and forced the previous Government to declare an operational pause;
- Underfunding of tactical airlift has led to the permanent grounding of 2 aircraft and the general deterioration of the entire Hercules fleet;
- Underfunding of the Navy will mean the loss destroyer-based Command and Control capabilities before they can be replaced;
- Underfunding of recruiting and training has created an organization that does not have the flexibility to grow extremely quickly; and,
- Underfunding of infrastructure has led to a deferred maintenance bill over the last five years alone of almost $1 billion.

None of these failings in themselves are likely to cause the collapse of Canada’s defence capacity. But collectively they present a worrisome picture.

Estimating the Department of National Defence’s 2011-2012 Budget

They laughed at us when we sat down to play the piano

In 2002, the Committee recommended a $4 billion dollar increase to the Department of National Defence baseline and an operational pause in the Canadian Forces. Its recommendations were roundly criticized as unrealistic.

Within four years, both recommendations have been or are being implemented.

In our last report, Wounded, the Committee estimated that a reasonable annual cost for the military that Canadians need is around $25 Billion to $35 Billion a year.

That was before the current government promised to create a range of new capabilities – including the capacity to protect Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. The Committee now believes that the annual realistic cost is at the high end of this range – around $35 billion a year.

No one expects an increase of this magnitude to appear overnight. That having been said, the Forces will require an urgent infusion of funds this year and a sustained growth to higher baseline budget levels over several years thereafter to push Canada’s military capabilities to where they need to be.

The critical assumptions underlying the Committee’s calculations are that the Government needs to – and should:

- Create a Canadian Forces with an authorized strength of 90,000 personnel;
- Address the critical shortfalls facing capital equipment and infrastructure;
- Enhance the strategic mobility of the Forces; and,
- Continue moving forward aggressively with Transformation.

A $35 Billion National Defence Budget is not unreasonable

If increasing the defence budget over the next five to six years to double its current level seems unreasonable, consider the per-capita defence spending of the following countries, calculated in Canadian dollars:

United Kingdom: $903
The Netherlands: $658
Australia: $648
Canada: $343

If any of these (necessary) steps are not taken, the cost estimate will, of course, shrink. But we are dealing with what should happen and what we feel must happen, which is not always the same as what does happen.

The Committee estimates that the Department of National Defence budget needs to stabilize at our target in fiscal year 2011-2012, around the same time that the Forces reach the authorized strength of 90,000 that we will recommend in Chapter 3.

We do know that true and lasting rehabilitation is going to cost a lot more than a one-time infusion of $12.8 billion as committed by the last government in Budget 2005, or than the additional $5.3 billion promised by the new government in Budget 2006.

Developing military capabilities often costs more than what has been estimated. There are unforeseeable costs to new pieces of equipment, despite best efforts to minimize them. Contracts pushed out far into the future always have an inherent cost risk.

Moving Forward

The Committee’s estimate of the funding needed to make the Canadian Forces competent to perform their onerous responsibilities prompted a lot of shaking of heads when we first published them, but there has been a more realistic nodding of heads since then. It is important to put these numbers in context, starting with what the previous government had promised and what the current Government says it has in mind for revitalizing the Canadian Forces.

The Government has promised to allocate $5.3 billion over and above what the previous government promised. As Minister of National Defence Gordon O’Connor testified: “We are building on the Liberal plan. Everything is on top of the Liberal plan.”

This means that the Department of National Defence’s budget will be approximately $15.19 billion this year and approximately $15.9 billion next year.[12] The Government did not announce in the budget the year-on-year increases for the remaining three years of its commitment. But Mr. O’Connor did testify that: “If we stay on track with our current plans, out at the fifth year, which I think is 2011, we expect our budget to be about $20.3 billion.”

Another important area:

Fix The Procurement Process

Many more people and a lot more money are clearly going to be needed if the Government is going to implement the recommendations that the Committee is making in this report. Then again, it should also be recognized that many more people and a lot more money are going to be needed if the current Government going to implement the previous government’s Defence Policy Statement as well as its own election commitments. (The Minister of National Defence has stated clearly that the new Government’s commitments comprise the old Government’s commitments plus his Government’s additional over and above those earlier commitments.)

More people and money will not translate into better security for Canadians if the acquisition process cannot be fixed. Unless it is reformed, the young men and women serving in the Canadian Forces are too often going to come up short of equipment they need to do their jobs, perhaps at their peril.

It appears that the current government, the Department of National Defence, and the Minister of National Defence are all committed to streamlining the capital procurement process.

In his testimony to the Committee on May 8, 2006, Mr. O’Connor outlined a number of ideas for reforming procurement including minimizing Canadianization and avoiding equipment that is not mature in its design wherever possible. The Committee supports him on these issues and believes that more can be done.

A History of Molasses

The key problem – which the Committee identified in Report 1 – is that the procurement process takes too long to translate a military need into equipment that is combat-ready in the hands of its operators. The approval and procurement process affects all capital equipment projects (for a description of the process please see Appendix VIII). The Committee focused most of its attention on Major Crown Projects (projects costing $100 million or more).

On average, it takes more than 15 years to acquire equipment in Major Crown Projects. During that time, the Canadian Forces are left to make do with what they have. Many pieces of equipment are obsolete – or at least are becoming so – over 15 or 20 years. That means that the Canadian taxpayer may only be getting a few years of optimal use out of a piece of equipment that should be delivering a lifetime’s worth of use. That inevitably reduces their ability to serve Canadians, either in terms of how much they can do (capacity), or what they can do (capability). Slow procurement is not only dangerous, it is extremely wasteful.


Consider the long, tortuous and continuing process to replace the antiquated Sea King helicopters. Designed with 1950s technology and acquired around 1963, the Sea Kings should have been replaced years ago. Not only have they become obsolescent, they require far too many hours of maintenance for every hour they spend in the air.

The decision to replace them should have been based on need plus intelligent analysis of the options available to replace them. Instead it became a political football over costs. Meanwhile the capabilities of both the Canadian Air Force and the Canadian Navy have been diminished for far too long. By the time the Air Force’s new fleet of Maritime Helicopters becomes operational around the end of the decade, Canadians will have been waiting almost a quarter century for these new aircraft.

We do not believe that there is one Canadian who would disagree with the Committee’s conviction that:

An average fifteen-year waiting time for major equipment to be used in the defence of the nation and its citizens – often in life-and-death situations for people on the front lines – is both ludicrous and unconscionable.

Canadians can't wait fifteen years for new equipment because of:

- The poor state and rapid-aging of the Canadian Forces’ current equipment;
- The increased frequency of natural and man-made threats to Canada;
- The duty of care we have to the people serving on the front lines; and,
- The Government’s stated goal of increasing Canada’s place of pride and influence in the world.

The current process – known as the Defence Planning and Management process and introduced in 2002 – is the fourth attempt to rationalize defence procurement planning since the Second World War.

The 2003 Minister of National Defence’s Advisory Committee on Administrative Efficiency is but one of a number of studies critical of the procurement process.

Senior defence officials have been unusually blunt in conceding that Canada’s procurement cycle is far too slow. The Department of National Defence’s Assistant Deputy Minister for Materiel, Alan Williams, told the Committee in 2005 that the Department’s goal is to reduce the average procurement time by about a third, to 11 years.

Political Will: A Quick and Effective Catalyst

Although most large projects can take more than a decade to complete, there have been exceptions. The acquisition of the CF-18, the Iltis jeep, the Airbuses and the Challenger jets spring to mind. These cases were fast-tracked, either because of an injection of political will, or desperate operational urgency, or circumstantial rapid-delivery opportunities. Sometimes all these factors came into play, but the main catalyst has been political will.

So Many Spanners in the Works

There are a number of reasons for the arduous length of the military procurement process. Some are internal to the Department of National Defence. Some arise from regulations imposed on the department from elsewhere in government. And some, unfortunately, involve the difficulties that all countries face in making purchases for their militaries. There are times when a piece of equipment that a country wants, and urgently needs, isn’t immediately available. All the more reason that our country should be quick and efficient where it can.

Internal Clogging

#1 – Setting out requirements takes too long

The 2003 Report of the Minister on National Defence’s Advisory Committee on Administrative Efficiency strongly criticized the Department’s internal process for defining the requirements of capital projects.[81] The Advisory Committee concluded that the internal process – which may eat up nine years on an average procurement – is too long, involves too many reviews and takes up too much senior management time for little value added.

#2 – The three horsemen of delay

During the days when the Department had no money, it put in place painstaking processes to ensure that it spent the money that it did have prudently. As a result, there are now at least three levels of review before a project even gets to the Minister for approval. Each, of course, causes delay.

#3 – Lack of experienced personnel to manage major projects

Major capital projects are complicated and managing these projects is difficult. It gets even more difficult when you don’t have experienced people in place. Because of cuts to the Department of National Defence budget in the 1980s and 1990s, and because the Forces slowed the pace at which they were acquiring equipment during that time, many of the people with the skill sets needed to help manage acquisition projects left the Department. Such people are now in short supply.

Canadian Forces Director General of Strategic Planning, Major General Doug Dempster, testified to the Committee in April 2005:

“In the 1990s, we reduced our project management capacity by about half: that is to say, our expert staffs that can work the documents and do the analysis required. In the mid-1990s, we had 1,600 Project Management person years of resources assigned to that task and today we have about 800. We have less staff to move a large number of projects.”

#4 – Too many projects pouring into the funnel

The length of the list of equipment that the Canadian Forces requires is a further complicating factor. Because of the state of the Forces’ equipment, there are simply far more projects with concurrent needs than funds available. Therefore, the senior leadership of the Department of National Defence has no choice but to prioritize a number of urgently needed projects, delaying some in order that others might be completed. Too many dogs end up scrapping over too few bones.

With more money and more people, the Canadian Forces could increase the number of acquisitions they could undertake simultaneously. With more money, the Department could also initiate innovative solutions – like using private sector contractors – to expand its capacity to manage acquisitions.

The Committee recommends that

16. The Department hire experienced private contract personnel to quickly expand its project management capacity.

External Clogging

#1 – Non-military priorities affect military purchases

Sticky red tape is only part of the problem. When these other government departments get involved they do so to carry out their governmental mandates, which may have little or nothing to do with getting military personnel the right equipment to do their job.

The Committee (as it mentioned in Part II above) believes this must change. Enabling the purchase of equipment by a department whose sole job description is “to protect Canadians” ought to be recognized as paramount within the federal bureaucracy. Under the current process, too many peripheral concerns get in the way:

- Treasury Board oversees the process of government expenditure
- Public Works & Government Services Canada wants value for money
- Industry Canada promotes competition and industrial benefits
- Indian and Northern Affairs Canada promotes First Nations interests
- Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency looks out for the East Coast
- Western Economic Diversification Canada looks out for the West
- Canada Economic Development for Quebec Regions looks out for Quebec

And so on. These are all worthy institutions, pursuing prescribed mandates. But when it comes to acquiring the right equipment to provide Canada’s armed forces with the tools required to defend the country, they too often see trees (their individual mandates) rather than the forest (Canada’s national security). The Committee believes this must change.

The Committee recommends that:

17. The Government eliminate duplication of approval levels between the Department of National Defence, Public Works and Government Services Canada, and the Treasury Board to reduce the average time between the identification of a deficiency and award of a contract by two-thirds.

#2 – So many cooks

The Department of National Defence is never alone in pursuing its large projects. It must run the gauntlet of the entire federal bureaucracy as other departments – involved because of their mandates – play a role in decision-making at various points in the process. These may include:

- Public Works and Government Services Canada
- Treasury Board
- Justice Canada
- Industry Canada
- Privy Council Office
- Heritage Canada
- Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency
- Western Economic Diversification Canada
- Canada Economic Development for Quebec Regions
- Indian and Northern Affairs Canada
- Other government departments depending on the project

The sheer friction of bureaucracy resulting from arranging consultation, meetings and conferences for the purpose of coming to any sort of joint agreement on the way ahead often makes this a cumbersome process.

#3 – More restrictions: the knee-jerk reaction to scandal

Many of the stages of consultation and deliberation connected to the capital procurement process stem from the government’s obligation to ensure that Canadians are well served when taxpayers’ money is spent. That is to be commended. But the Committee believes that there are so many checks and balances now built into the Government of Canada’s procurement system that it has ceased to function efficiently in the acquisition of military equipment.

The system that has resulted from recent scandal seems based on the idea that most people are crooks and that only regulation can keep them from squandering or stealing the public’s funds. Treating everyone as a potential crook – instead of dealing firmly and harshly with crooks when they are found – slows the process of government to a snail’s pace. Military institutions cannot operate efficiently in the interests of Canadians that way.

Checks and balances are vital to the public’s confidence in government. Procurement of essential military equipment is vital to protecting Canadians and advancing their interests. But too many checks and balances means too much military equipment is delivered so slowly that it often hasn’t arrived when it is needed, and when it does arrive it may not be what is needed any more.

Almost all people in government are decent, honest public servants trying to do the best they can for their fellow citizens. Accountability is a fine watchword but so is common sense. The Committee believes that reduced regulation – coupled with a strict enforcement policy against wrongdoers – will provide sufficient oversight and accountability to serve the public interest.

Why should military spending be subject to fewer checks and balances than other government expenditures?

Because:

- The lives of the people serving their country are on the line
- Equipment delayed may turn out to be the wrong equipment by the time it arrives
- Decisions as to what is the right equipment are complex enough without piling on non-military complications

Should the Department of National Defence be exempt from check and balances? Of course not. Should the Government find ways of reducing unnecessary impediments to acquiring the right equipment at the right time? Of course. To fail to do so would be a) inefficient, b) wasteful, and c) morally wrong.

Further Complexities of Purchasing Military Capabilities

Another layer of complexity affecting the procurement of military equipment is external to both the government and the department. It is the nature of the defence industry itself. Because of the lack of capacity of Canadian industry, the pace of technological innovation and the scale of projects, procuring military equipment is not like making most acquisitions.

#1 – Capacity of Canadian industry

Canadian defence industrial capacity is not large, in international terms. There are some things that Canada just does not build. Take fighter planes. We stopped building our own decades ago. That limits the number of options within Canada that the government can turn to for fighters. A relatively small number of large firms dominate this industry, world-wide and it is often necessary to turn to those outside of Canada as a source.

#2 – Pace of development

The rapid pace of change and innovation in the defence industry can often outstrip our ability to procure needed equipment quickly.

#3 – Scale of projects

It takes time to design and build complex pieces of equipment. The purchasing process can often be shortened by buying products already in production, but the Committee recognizes that it isn’t always going to be possible to acquire the right piece of equipment within months – or even within a few years – of perceived need.

[KenoraPilot]

About bloody time the government started putting money back into the Military and figured that we should control the land that is ours.....if we don't look like we want it others will take it! Way to go Harper!

[2R]

IT may be too little too late

[LostinRotation]

It's about bloody time is all I can say


-=0=LiR=0=-

[Expat]

History will tell, but it looks like the Yanks told Harper to do this, because the US is not in a legal position to challenge the Russians. So much for our territorial sovereignty. The Tories have always been kissing their a*s anyway.

[2R]

What difference would it make who owns the North pole ???
It will be multi -national corporations that will exploit the resources .
Multi nationals that are not accountable to any Government or have any allegiance to any nation or it's people.

Why not sell it to the Afghan druglords so they can get out of the business of poisoning the worlds youth with opium

[w squared]

Ah...but multi-nationals still pay royalties on natural resources that they extract. And their workers pay taxes.

Big multi-nationals put a lot of dollars in Alberta's and by extension Canada's (NEP) coffers.