Pilots resign after Emirates A340-500 accident

[bmc]

I'd love to know the details behind this one.


http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/20 ... ident.html

DATE:01/04/09
SOURCE:Air Transport Intelligence news
Pilots resign after Emirates A340-500 accident
By Kieran Daly

The pilots flying the Emirates Airbus A340-500 that suffered a severe tailstrike at Melbourne on 20 March have left the airline.

A spokesman for the carrier says: "I can confirm that they have resigned." He declined to give any further explanation.

The aircraft (A6-ERG) remains in Australia after being extensively damaged on take-off from the 3660m (12,000ft) runway 16 during which it suffered at least one tailstrike and is reported to have struck antennas just beyond the runway end.

It climbed to an intermediate altitude before dumping fuel for about 30min and then returned to Melbourne instead of continuing to Dubai. It landed without further incident.

No further information on the cause of the accident has been released, although ATI understands that suggestions of a problem with one of the four Rolls-Royce Trent 500 engines have been ruled out, despite passenger reports of seeing sparks or flame from one of them during the take-off run.

[Flying Low]

Hmmm...did they "jump" or were they "pushed"?

[Donald]

viewtopic.php?f=5&t=51903

Some good stuff on Pprune about this one.

Quote:
An Emirates Airlines Airbus A340-500, registration A6-ERG performing flight EK-407 from Melbourne,VI (Australia) to Dubai (United Arab Emirates) with 225 people on board, experienced a tail strike on takeoff from Melbourne's runway 16 (length 3657 meters/12000 feet) at around 22:30 local (11:30Z), hit the runway end lights and the localizer antenna past the end of runway 16. The airplane climbed out safely, went to dump fuel overhead the ocean at Port Phillip Bay but returned for an immediate emergency landing when smoke started to fill the cabin about 30 minutes after takeoff. The airplane landed heavily on Melbourne's runway 34 and was able to taxi to the apron after being checked out by emergency services.

Severe abrazions occured to the tail skin and several access panels were ripped off during the tailstrike, the landing reportedly caused additional damage to the gear.

The Melbourne Airport confirmed, that several runway end lights were damaged in the accident, too, and needed to be replaced. NOTAMs (NOTices for AirMen) state, that the ILS runway 16 will not be available until March 23rd: "F2248/09 - ILS RWY16 'IMS' FREQ 109.7 NOT AVBL. 20 MAR 16:10 2009 UNTIL 23 MAR 07:00 2009 ESTIMATED. CREATED: 20 MAR 16:10 2009"

In daylight Saturday morning it was established, that the airplane was still on the ground when it passed the runway end during takeoff, according gear tracks were found in the soft ground past the runway end.

[Inverted2]

That'll rub right off with a little Turtle Wax!

[kevinsky18]

[Widow]

The Devil is in the Data (link to original)
The Australian
Sept. 12, 2009

A small error can have horrendous consequences in aviation. Now the story of Australia's worst near miss can be told

AT 10.31pm, on Friday, March 20 this year, those on duty in the control tower at Melbourne airport witnessed one of the most frightening moments in the history of Australian aviation.

An Emirates Airlines Airbus A340-500 bound for Dubai was roaring down the floodlit runway for take-off when it became clear that something was wrong.

"My members told me the aircraft was not accelerating normally," says Rob Mason, president of the air traffic controller's union, Civil Air. "Then they saw sparks coming from the back of the aircraft as its tail struck the ground as it tried to become airborne."

Those in the tower watched in horror as the struggling Airbus ate up the entire runway and limped into the air, narrowly clearing the airport's perimeter fence. Even after leaving the airport it struggled to gain altitude quickly, flying so low that the control tower could no longer see it.

"The aircraft was lost to sight against the lights of the industrial estate to the south, it was not high enough to be seen," Mason says. Because the jet was flying too low, it also did not initially show up on the tower's radars.

For these few terrifying moments, Emirates Airlines flight 407, carrying 257 passengers and 18 crew, simply vanished from official record, leaving those in the tower to pray that they would not hear an explosion in the suburbs to the south.

"This would have been the worst civil air disaster in Australia's history by a very large margin," aviation expert Ben Sandilands says. "There would have been no survivors from that plane and it would have gone down in (the Melbourne suburb of) Keilor Park, so there would have been deaths on the ground also."

"It was an incredibly serious incident," says Dick Smith, a former head of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. "They were very lucky that they did not end up in a major accident with a lot of people losing their lives."

SO how did Australia so nearly suffer such a disaster on this clear, mild autumn night? Until then it had been a typical Friday night in Melbourne, with bars and restaurants in full swing. The city's newsrooms were largely empty, with hundreds of journalists and editors partying at the annual media awards night, the Quills, at Crown Casino, oblivious to the huge news story about to unfold on their doorstep.

At Melbourne airport, a 42-year-old Danish pilot was sitting in the cockpit of his Emirates Airbus with his Canadian co-pilot running through their preflight checklist in preparation for their 14 1/2-hour flight to Dubai.

The captain had been flying for 22 years, including almost five years with Emirates and was familiar with Melbourne airport, having flown there at least four times in the previous six months.

He was also familiar with the Airbus, having clocked up 1372 hours on it. But he was tired. He had flown 98.9 hours in the past month, more than Qantas pilots are allowed to fly and barely short of Emirate's monthly limit of 100 hours. The pilot would later claim to have had only 3 1/2 hours sleep in the previous 24 hours because he was "out of whack" despite spending the previous 24 hours resting in Melbourne.

His Canadian first officer was less experienced, having spent 425 hours on the A340-500, but he would be responsible for take-off.

In the cockpit with them were two other Emirates pilots, who would take the second half of the long-haul flight. Behind them the wide-bodied jet was beginning to fill up with passengers. It was the usual assortment of holiday-makers, businesspeople and those for whom Dubai was a transit to other parts of the globe.

One of these was Roman Korobitson, who was travelling with his wife Irena and their two-year-old son to a family reunion in Russia.

At 10.18pm the Airbus pushed back from the gate and taxied to runway 16 for a take-off to the south. The weather was clear and calm for the take-off, which would take the plane over the heavily populated suburb of Keilor and a defence explosives factory in Maribyrnong before turning to the northwest.

The plane was making a reduced-power take-off, which means it was not taking off at full thrust, a common practice among airlines to save fuel, wear and tear and to reduce noise.

At 49 seconds past 10.30pm the Emirates plane began its roll to the south down the illuminated 3657m runway. In the tower, air traffic controllers became alarmed by the plane's slow speed as it neared the take-off point, but cockpit recordings suggest the pilots did not notice anything wrong.

Yet the crew's actions in the next 11 seconds would save the lives of all those on board.

As the plane roared towards the end of the runway the first officer moved his sidestick to rotate, or lift, the plane's front wheel.

When it did not respond, the captain yelled "rotate" again, and the first officer pulled it at a steeper angle.

Three seconds later the front wheel lifted, but the rest of the plane remained glued to the tarmac. At the same time there was a thump as the plane's tail hit the runway, sending showers of sparks into the night.

For six terrifying seconds the Airbus hung suspended, half up, half down, as it gobbled up what remained of the runway. "I knew we couldn't stop," the captain said later. "At that point I knew we just had to go. I thought I was going to die, it was that close."

The tail of the Airbus hit the tarmac twice more and had reached the end of the sealed runway when the captain took over the controls and threw the engines into full thrust using a rapid acceleration procedure known as TOGA (take-off go-around). For another four seconds the plane still refused to fly. It had now run out of sealed runway and was roaring across the grass leading to the airport perimeter fence, hitting its tail twice more on the grass.

At the last possible moment, the whole plane left the ground, clipping a strobe light and flattening a navigation antenna, before clearing the 2.4m airport perimeter fence and thundering low over the roofs of suburban houses.

Inside the cabin, there was confusion but no panic. Some passengers towards the rear of the plane claim to have seen sparks and heard several bumps, but others were oblivious to the near disaster.

"I didn't feel any bump during take-off,' the Russian passenger Korobitson says. "But I was under the impression that it took too long (to take off)."

In the cockpit, having now gained full control of the aircraft, the crew frantically tried to work out what had gone wrong. They slowly climbed to 2100m before they noticed a message saying the plane's tail had been damaged during take-off.

In fact, the strike had caused significant structural damage to the rear bulkhead, which would cause pressurisation problems as the plane gained altitude.

The crew told the Melbourne tower that they would be returning to the airport, and flew out across Port Phillip Bay to dump fuel in order to lighten the plane for an emergency landing.

As they dumped fuel, the pilots reviewed their notes to solve the mystery of the take-off. To their horror, they noticed that the calculations they had used to set the parameters for take-off had inadvertently used a take-off weight that was 100 tonnes below the weight of the aircraft.

The Emirates Airbus contained a laptop that calculated take-off speeds based on the manual input from the pilots of various parameters including take-off weight, temperature, air pressure and wind. The pilot's calculations are then checked by the captain as part of what Emirates says is a four-part process of cross-checks.

Somehow, during the preflight calculations, one of the Emirates pilots -- it's unclear who -- entered the aircraft's weight as being 262 tonnes when in fact it was 362 tonnes.

But a colleague, whose identity is also unclear, failed to pick up the mistake during the cross-checks.

This 100-tonne difference was the equivalent to the aircraft having an extra 20 African elephants on board, or a fully grown adult blue whale.

It meant that the preset take-off speed would never have lifted the plane off the ground had the captain not intervened at the last second to order full thrust.

As the ramifications of their mistake began to sink in, the Emirates crew faced another drama when passengers reported smoke in the cabin. Whether it was smoke or just dust from the substantial damage to the plane's tail is unclear, but the first officer requested an immediate emergency landing despite the fact that the fuel dump was not yet completed.

Six minutes later, with eight emergency vehicles waiting for it, flight 407 touched down with a heavy but safe landing.

After being checked by fire and rescue services, it taxied to the terminal where the passengers emerged, still oblivious to just how close they came to death.

The next day investigators from the Australian Safety Transport Bureau questioned the Emirates pilots at their Melbourne Hotel. The captain said in a later interview that he was on the verge of a breakdown after the incident. "One of my friends almost admitted me to hospital I was so stressed," he said. "If you have a near-death experience your body reacts in a particular way."

After the pilots were interviewed by Australian authorities, they were flown back to Dubai, where they say Emirates handed them prepared letters of resignation. The captain and the first officer have resigned, but not the reserve pilots.

Although the accident received modest media coverage at the time, it was not until three weeks after the accident, that a report in Melbourne's Sunday Herald Sun revealed how serious it was.

In late April the ATSB released its preliminary report, which confirmed the wrong data entry was the likely cause of the accident.

Fearful that its brand would be tarnished, Emirates has responded robustly, placing additional checklist safeguards including using two computers to calculate take-off settings. "The EK407 Melbourne event continues to be treated very seriously with the highest priority at the most senior level in the company," an Emirates spokesman tells Inquirer.

Smith says the key lesson from the Emirates near miss is for pilots not to over-rely on computers. "It is a warning for all pilots to be very careful when they put something in a computer and we have to be careful not to overly rely on computers for calculations in aviation. Emirates is a very good airline with very high standards but it employs human beings and all humans can make errors from time to time."

Sandilands, author of the blog Plane Talking, believes that Emirates, one of the most successful and fastest growing global airlines, has responded well to the incident.

"Did they learn lessons from Melbourne? You bet they have, they realised they could have completely trashed the value of their brand in Australia (if they crashed)."

The ATSB is continuing its investigation into the incident, but says there is no proof that pilot fatigue played a part in the accident. The ATSB says it will release its interim report on the accident at the end of next month.

"It is useless to blame any one airline or flight crew," Smiths says. "Human beings can make errors so double-checks and triple-checks must be done. Unfortunately, it was not done on this occasion."

[AMM]

Depending on the font, a 2 can easily look like a 3, especially after 3.5h of sleep.
Nevertheless, IMHO, they should have flown back to Dubai with a letter of resignation in their briefcase.

Sigh.

[Rockie]

IMHO, they should have flown back to Dubai with a letter of resignation in their briefcase.

Why?

[AMM]

Because accepting responsibility is always more dignified then being forced to accept responsibility.
I suppose you think it should have only been the PIC's?
...maybe you're right, maybe not.

[Pretend-A-Jet]

AMM,

Accepting responsibility does not have to be as severe as resigning, or worse, being "forced to resign" (fired).

Pilot error has been the cause of incidents in the past and the outcome from the event is changing the system to ensure whatever happened doesn't happen again. In the majority of these cases, people don't loose their jobs. Firing someone is just a knee-jerk reactionary measure that doesn't fix the problem and unfortunately in this case, it's a symptom of the backwards thinking at this particular airline.

If you've never missed something and think it will never happen during your career and further believe anyone who makes a mistake should resign, then you should resign right now, because as a human being, its going to happen. Check your arrogance.

[Widow]

The ATSB is continuing its investigation into the incident, but says there is no proof that pilot fatigue played a part in the accident.

What, exactly, constitutes "proof"? What does Qantas know that Emirates doesn't?

At Melbourne airport, a 42-year-old Danish pilot was sitting in the cockpit of his Emirates Airbus with his Canadian co-pilot running through their preflight checklist in preparation for their 14 1/2-hour flight to Dubai.

The captain had been flying for 22 years, including almost five years with Emirates and was familiar with Melbourne airport, having flown there at least four times in the previous six months.

He was also familiar with the Airbus, having clocked up 1372 hours on it. But he was tired. He had flown 98.9 hours in the past month, more than Qantas pilots are allowed to fly and barely short of Emirate's monthly limit of 100 hours. The pilot would later claim to have had only 3 1/2 hours sleep in the previous 24 hours because he was "out of whack" despite spending the previous 24 hours resting in Melbourne.

His Canadian first officer was less experienced, having spent 425 hours on the A340-500, but he would be responsible for take-off.

For a pilot to make an error this serious - and for the error to go unnoticed by the "colleague" during cross-checks ... leads one to believe something more than "over-reliance on computers" was at play - like, maybe, fatigue!!!

How rested was the Canadian first officer? I look forward to the ATSB report - was the FO's training also examined?

Most of all, I feel sorry for the pilots involved - forced to resign before any conclusion about how operational factors may have resulted in their error. Where was/is their union???

[AMM]

I'm sure they anticipated the reaction Emirates would have. I'm not justifying it. But if I was in their situation, I would have rather resigned then be forced to (because the forceful part was bound to happen).
I don't support Emirates' stance. I think you misunderstood me.

If you've never missed something and think it will never happen during your career and further believe anyone who makes a mistake should resign, then you should resign right now, because as a human being, its going to happen. Check your arrogance.

Maybe you should yours.

[Widow]

AMM, if the article is correct in its inference, the pilots didn't have much time to make the decision for themselves ...

After the pilots were interviewed by Australian authorities, they were flown back to Dubai, where they say Emirates handed them prepared letters of resignation

[AMM]

If they didn't have time to write 2-3 paragraphs while is Melbourne, then the 14.5h flight back would have sufficed.
Either way, when walking through that office door in Dubai, they would have had one in hand.

[tonysoprano]

Where was the union or pilot association in all this? Right.

[Jastapilot]

I believe the answer is 'what union', as I don't think they have one, do they?

[Colibri]

I think unions are illegal in the UAE.

[Rockie]

I'm sure they anticipated the reaction Emirates would have. I'm not justifying it. But if I was in their situation, I would have rather resigned then be forced to (because the forceful part was bound to happen).
I don't support Emirates' stance. I think you misunderstood me.

I understand what you're saying here, and honestly it would be a tough one for me. This is a small community and everyone you went to work for afterward would necessarily know the details anyway whether you quit or were fired. So it would come down to either salvaging whatever dignity you could by quitting pre-emptively, or forcing them to fire you. Being handed a resignation letter to sign is the same as getting fired AFAIC'ed, so I think I'm ornery enough that I would make them actually fire me. At least that way the rest of the crews could see how poorly they treat their people.

Either way, I'm glad it wasn't me. It is a downside to working offshore that you have no rights and no protection.

[sky's the limit]

It is a downside to working offshore that you have no rights and no protection.

True words.....

stl

[KAG]

Where was the union or pilot association in all this? Right.

In order to have that you need to have social freedoms. One of the many reasons I'd never work over there.

As for what happened, it's a huge mistake, but one that I can very easily see happening to a fatigued crew. I'm very glad there around to discuss what happened, and impart to us their lesson's in person rather then reading about it in an accident report.

[complexintentions]

heheh Makes me chuckle when people who don't live here make such sweeping statements, it's kind of quaint in a way. I live here and I can tell you, while I look forward one day to moving back to Canada for many reasons, the lack of "social freedoms" you mention won't be one of them...the lies and the arrogance do get to you sometimes but I haven't seen too many companies in Canada without those qualities either.

As far as MEL, unfortunately those guys screwed up, bigtime. Fatigue or no, if they had followed SOP's - the ones in place before the incident, forget the ones they hastily brought in as a kneejerk reaction - that wouldn't have happened. Fatigue is a very real problem at Emirates and getting worse, so I am not defending their asinine rostering practices that border on the criminal. But the A340 incident cannot be explained by fatigue.

[Obbie]

Not following SOP's is one of the classic signs that a crew is fatigued !!!!

CI...please don't tell me that you are buying the crap that comes
from the mouth of "the horse" !!!!!!

The clock eventually ran out on me while I waited for a course date in the
pool for almost a year. During that year I watched with each new month
something different get either degraded, disolved, fired, or withdrawn.

I now consider expiring in the hold pool one of those moments when fate
takes care of you, despite your blind ambition.

Emirates is an airline that is pounding it's pilots into the ground.
And as per management - "Emirates does not have a fatigue problem"
No of course not, because they fired the problem, along with 8 other problems
they fired this year for minor mistakes.

Keep Discovering

[Flightlevels]

Yikes.

[Lurch]

The Devil is in the Data (link to original)
The Australian
Sept. 12, 2009

It meant that the preset take-off speed would never have lifted the plane off the ground had the captain not intervened at the last second to order full thrust.

This got my attention

Having never flown a A340 I'm confused. Is this the normal screw up by the press or is this right?

I've always thought they calculated the Take-Off power and Vr somewhat stayed the same.

Lurch

[A330]

Fatigue is a big problem, especially on the Airbus, Boeing rosters from what I've seen are very reasonable.

Quite simply, the crew on the 340 incident did not follow the SOP's and paid the price; nearly a catastrophic one.

Obbie, sorry you aren't able to make it over but it sounds like a classic about face....

Let's be honest here, what airline hasn't revised it's contracts and increased it's workload on flight crew lately?

EK has changed it's contracts slightly, increased it's productivity and aren't doing any favors for internal morale, can't argue that one, but it's still a significantly better deal than most any other airline jobs in Canada. Sunwing? Ya right..WJ layovers in Sask? Winnepeg? AC has internal issues, pension shortfalls, among other problems and the list goes on....

It is what you make it and I played golf the other day and then went out for a sunsetter beverage. My last pairing was to civilized Europe sharing a bottle of Cab Sav outside with some exotic twenty something year old fun bunnies.

It's not nirvana by any stretch, and if I could make 200k living back home with half the month off, sign me up. BTW, I did work for mainline AC, and didn't think much of it. Admittedly some bad timing 8 years ago but that's the way it goes....