Rejected Takeoff or "Go & Touch"?

[High and Behind]

Since none of us were there why not congratulate a job well done.

They deserve it

Good Job pilots of Perimeter 621

[Big Pistons Forever]

However, there are Reject Items established by the manufacturer and the regulators that are the go/no-go items. I don't fly a Dash-8 but I really doubt that a stall protection system malfunction is a reject item. Particularly a high speed reject item. You might elect to reject at 30 kts if a generator kicks off, but certainly at higher speeds it's reject items ONLY. Not only were these guys above V1, they were actually Airborne! A stall protect system on most Bombardier products is a vane hooked up to a transducer. If they get stuck in a full up or down position or fail you get a few warnings and flashing lights, maybe the shaker. But if you're at the correct airspeed and haven't over-rotated, you are not stalled. This should have been clearly obvious to the crew that they were safely flying. If in doubt, they could have referenced the other SPS vane indicator to see it's in the normal position and AOA is not approaching critical angle. I've had the SPS flash a bunch of malfunction warnings around V1 and we continued, as per our brief - as this is not a reject item.

.

I have never flown the Dash 8 but as I understand this situation the stick shaker was on. With the airplane just lifted off it would still be close to the runway and with an obvious probably 6 thousand + feet of runway ahead of me and an aircraft that was indicating it didn't want to fly I think my inclination would be reduce power and land rather than try to figure out whether it was a false indication of high AOA or something was actually wrong.

However just because this particular circumstance was handled by deviating from the V1 SOP doesn't mean that SOP's are, as some posters seem to continually imply, just crutches for "modern" pilots to mindlessly apply because they do not know any better. Todays SOP's have a proven track record of reducing accidents and deviations from them should be relatively uncommon events, usually generated from very unusual circumstances. The bottom line is the buck stops at the left hand seat and this Captain made a decision. Was it the right one, well the out come certainly suggests it was, but should not following SOP's this time have any impact on his decision to carry out a reject the next time he has a serious problem....... well I would say no.

[Colonel Sanders]

doesn't mean that SOP's are, as some posters seem to continually imply, just crutches for "modern" pilots to mindlessly apply because they do not know any better

Hm. The Air Transat flight that had a fuel imbalance in an Airbus - I believe they followed their SOP religiously, and pumped all their fuel over to the engine which was furiously leaking fuel due to improper maintenance. They ran out of gas, a glider over the North Atlantic, and somehow miraculously managed to land at the Azores.

I don't think that was a success story for SOP's. The pilots mindlessly applied the SOP for their fuel imbalance with horrible consequences. SOP's are not a replacement for a brain, because aviation is more complicated than that.

IMHO this dash-8 crew used their brain, with good results. I am sure they will be crapped on from a great height by all sorts of chairborne authorities for not following their SOP, but regardless they did the right thing.

I am also reminded of the BA pilot that lost both engines on short final at Heathrow due to a design defect in the 777 fuel heater. He was crapped on from a great height and was eventually fired. His sin was that he raised some flap on short final to reduce drag, which was a huge paperwork no-no. However, if he hadn't done that, they wouldn't have made it over the obstacles short of the runway, and likely more people would have died. He made the right decision, even if it cost him his career, his house, etc.

[Cat Driver]

Dammit Colonel you have to stop using logic and common sense in your posts because you run the risk of getting some of these pilots thinking....and if that happens there will be a real shortage of pilots in aviation as they will realize there are better ways to earn a living than " Living the dream " in aviation.

[Big Pistons Forever]

doesn't mean that SOP's are, as some posters seem to continually imply, just crutches for "modern" pilots to mindlessly apply because they do not know any better

Hm. The Air Transat flight that had a fuel imbalance in an Airbus - I believe they followed their SOP religiously, and pumped all their fuel over to the engine which was furiously leaking fuel due to improper maintenance. They ran out of gas, a glider over the North Atlantic, and somehow miraculously managed to land at the Azores.
.

Actually no they did not follow the QRH SOP for this problem, which requires that they consider the possibility of a fuel leak before opening the cross feed valves. While weak systems knowledge contributed to this incident using all of the SOP resources would have in all likelyhood prevented this accident. Yes some outstanding stick and rudder work prevented a catastrophe, but the fact remains that SOPs did exist, that had they been fully utilized, may have prevented the engine out scenario. The BA crash is another story. This is truly a case of the crew doing what needed to be done in very exceptional circumstances, and is credit to the profession of piloting....but I bet this was the first time in the Crews career where he had a problem that utilizing the SOP's was not the appropriate and best solution to his situation.

[Colonel Sanders]

I bet this was the first time in the Crews career where he had a problem that utilizing the SOP's was not the appropriate and best solution to his situation

and it was his career-defining moment. You don't get paid the big bucks just to drink coffee and fly when the wx is good and the equipment is working perfectly.

You get paid the big bucks to decide when to follow the company rules, and when not to.

Anyone remember the looney tune that lost an engine departing LAX, and continued on his merry way to England? I am sure that he was doing what the company told him to do

Immediately after the aircraft took off on a night flight from Los Angeles to London, a banging sound was heard and passengers and ATC reported seeing flames from the No 2 engine. The symptoms and resultant turbine over-temperature were consistent with an engine surge; the crew completed the appropriate checklist, which led to the engine being shut down. After assessing the situation, and in accordance with approved policy, the commander decided to continue the flight as planned rather than jettison fuel and return to Los Angeles. Having reached the east coast of the USA with no indications of further abnormality and with adequate predicted arrival fuel, the crew decided to continue to the UK. The winds and available flight levels were subsequently less favourable than anticipated and, nearing the UK, the crew decided to divert to Manchester in order to maintain the required arrival fuel reserve.

As I recall, the FAA was unimpressed with the manner in which the left-seater delegated his PIC authority to the accountants on the ground, and charged him with careless and reckless.

[Eric Janson]

doesn't mean that SOP's are, as some posters seem to continually imply, just crutches for "modern" pilots to mindlessly apply because they do not know any better

I am also reminded of the BA pilot that lost both engines on short final at Heathrow due to a design defect in the 777 fuel heater. He was crapped on from a great height and was eventually fired. His sin was that he raised some flap on short final to reduce drag, which was a huge paperwork no-no. However, if he hadn't done that, they wouldn't have made it over the obstacles short of the runway, and likely more people would have died. He made the right decision, even if it cost him his career, his house, etc.

He wasn't fired - he resigned.

The crew of this flight was exonerated by the final report. The reduction of flap allowing them to to reach the airport was specifically mentioned.

This Captain has since been rehired by BA - keeping his seniority.

[Big Pistons Forever]

You get paid the big bucks to decide when to follow the company rules, and when not to.
.

You won't get any argument from me on that. Suggesting that following SOP's is not a good idea is where we part ways, as is the tacit assumption the fact that somebody choosing not to follow the SOP is somehow always exhibiting higher skills levels. There are lots of examples where people died because the pilot thought he knew better than the "company rules".

The starting point for any situation IMO is the SOP. That means truly understanding the "what" and the "why" of the SOP. The Captain will always have the choice to deviate from the SOP's, best choose wisely......

[Eric Janson]

Our SOP is very clear about V1. After V1 you continue the take-off and solve the problem in the air.

This is for large jets where we frequently operate at Maximum weight and Maximum thrust. V1 can be as high as 152 knots. We are at 70' at the end of an 11000' runway.

Anyone remember the looney tune that lost an engine departing LAX, and continued on his merry way to England? I am sure that he was doing what the company told him to do

A 4 engined aircraft is very different than a twin where you land at the nearest suitable airport in case of an engine failure.

I don't fly the 747 but on the 4 engined aircraft I fly there are no restrictions on 3 engine operations.

We still have 3 generators plus APU remaining
All Electrical busses are fully powered
Depending on the engine we may lose 1 of 3 Hydraulic systems
Both packs continue to operate normally
Autopilot/Autothrust available
We can still autoland (Cat IIIb or Cat IIIa depending on which engine has failed).

None of the above require a landing at the nearest suitable airport.

That said I wouldn't operate across the Atlantic on 3 Engines but I'd have no issue continuing on to a suitable airport where an Engine/Replacement aircraft is available.

[Airborne28]

Gannet167 had the best post on page 1. Well written. In complete agreement, V1 is V1... continue. There have been numerous other cases of guys trying to land again after V1 with horrible results.

[lot lizard]

He did solve the problem in the air! Im pretty sure the SOP for a stick shaker is to lower the nose....He did and landed. Investigation over, next.

I cant imagine what it would be like to fly around with the stick shaker going off. The Captain has the final authority to do whatever is required to land the aircraft safely, that is in every aircraft manufacturers FCOM and every regulatory authority's air regs that Ive known.

Im sure he was well aware its after V1, assessed and landed. He did an outstanding job, I think we still call that airmanship?

Stick shaker, Terrain, TA and Windshear warnings are time critical warnings designed for a quick action response and not for troubleshooting. I cant imagine what it would be like to fly around with the stick shaker going off trying to figure out if its unreliable airspeed, unreliable warning system or something else, even for a circuit.

The BA 777 capt is back at BA.

[grimey]

Would we be having this conversation if the center 6000' of the runway was a plowed field?

[Colonel Sanders]

center 6000' of the runway

That's a pretty wide runway! Was it used for the space shuttle?

[grimey]

center 6000' of the runway

That's a pretty wide runway! Was it used for the space shuttle?

ok pedantic man, you know what I meant.

[Gannet167]

My point is simply this: they took off in a completely safe airplane that had a fairly minor system failure (a warning system, not even a system critical to flight). Anyone qualified on their machine ought to know when it is flying perfectly safely and properly. A lousy SPS system is nothing - remember there are TWO of them and they were not in agreement. These guys should have understood that they had a minor systems problem (albeit, with some annoying warnings going off) and nothing critical to flight safety. They should have understood how their SPS system worked and realized what was happening.

They could have climbed up to a safe altitude, ran the checklist which would have likely lead them to turn off one SPS switch and/or pull the SPS circuit breaker (as it does on other Bombardier products) and they would have been completely ops normal - possibly even legal to continue the flight to destination (and certainly safe). This was a minor, non event that had no imminent flight safety implications. That would have been SOP - and for a damn good reason. It's the safest thing to do.

Instead, they elected to do something that introduced many new danger factors, in an unplanned, non-briefed, non-standard procedure for which there is no performance data, no procedures, they didn't train for, etc. etc. etc. The Co-jo may have been putting the gear up and looking for the yellow page checklist as the left-seat decided to put the plane back down. They could have departed the runway due to length, they could have been in a completely different energy state and trim setting and config (all for takeoff) that may have resulted in a balked landing, a hard touch down, etc. etc. There may have been traffic behind them on short final cleared to land as they started to roll. As they tried to flare and put the plane back down, they could have had the pusher activate as the AOA increased and driven the airplane into the ground (this is why other Bombardier products have you land at a higher speed and reduced flap setting with SPS failures) Who knows? They hadn't run any checklists or even diagnosed what was going on. All of these and many more issues all were danger factors that they introduced into an otherwise COMPLETELY safe situation. And for what? What did they solve? Nothing. The fact is if you're at a good airspeed and in a stabilized climb, you're not stalled. This should be obvious. These guys made a safe situation far less safe - and achieved nothing, prevented nothing, helped nothing. They just took on a bunch of extra risks. Yep, Lucky. Just because it worked this time isn't proof of concept. They're being congratulated on here for breaking SOP - when in fact all they did was increase risk and make a safe situation unsafe. THAT'S WHY WE HAVE SOPS.

If a light bulb burns out, and it's completely irrelevant to the airplane flying in a safe state, do you flinch and put it back down in panic? An SPS is not even required on many airplanes. It's far safer even if (and PARTICULARLY if) you have something as severe as an engine fire, after V1 you continue the takeoff, climb out to safe altitude and run a checklist to make sure you get everything, there's no obscure system side effects you haven't thought of, and ensure the crew is on the same page and the airplane is in the right state, then return on a stabilized approach to land. This is safer - that's why the airplane is certified to be operated that way and lessons learned in previous accidents have demonstrated this.

Let me put it another way - they carried out essentially a VERY VERY late rejected takeoff (although, really it was a take off and landing). This procedure (if you can call what they did a procedure) is only done for extreme system malfunctions (and normally never after V1.) The type of emergency that necessitates this type of maneuver is the SAME type of emergency that in a single engine ejection seat aircraft dictates an immediate ejection. So - if these guys were flying a bang-seat airplane, would these guys, having thought that they're stalled at rotation done the emergency recovery procedure for that type of airplane - and ejected?

Really guys, it's a lousy SPS. Big F deal. Climb out and come around to land. Non-event.

[Cat Driver]

Instead, they elected to do something that introduced many new danger factors, in an unplanned, non-briefed, non-standard procedure for which there is no performance data, no procedures, they didn't train for, etc. etc. etc.

Am I to understand that the next time I get in a Dash 8 I might be trusting my life to a crew who are so poorly trained they would not be able to land straight ahead on a runway that is long enough to safely land straight ahead because in their minds it is beyond their ability as pilots to perform such a simple task?

I find it frightening to know that mindset might be behind the controls of the next airline airplane I get on.

[Gannet167]

Your assertion is a straw man argument. They didn't simply land on a runway long enough to land on. They did a modyfied rejected takeoff. I guess if they've made some sort of TOLD card that calculates takeoff, some level of climb, then start an approach and re-land, and this is calculated, understood, briefed, etc. that this might be safe, ensuring the runway is long enough. They were in a grey area of performance data, they didn't know what would happen and they took a risk. What for? They actually lowered safety by busting SOP. I'd say they're pretty poorly trained if that's the decision they make. If they'd increased safety by deviating from SOP, that'd be great, SOP's cant capture every situation - but they didn't increase safety. They risked people's lives unnecessarily.

I'd be pretty pissed if I were a passenger on an aircraft that took off and then landed - for anything but especially something as ridiculous as a faulty flashing light and shaker.

How was what they did SAFER than following the SOP? I don't get it. For what type of thing would you follow the SOP for? When is it ok to follow SOP, climb out as briefed, trained and the aircraft was designed and certified to by operated, and run the checklist? Believe it or not, Bombardier thought of this scenario and they didn't intend for the crew to do this. There is a checklist for it and if you follow that checklist, you'll be safer than what they guys did.

If you take a very risky course of action and no one dies, you're not a genius or hero, you're just dangerous, poorly trained but lucky. What would have shown better airmanship is following the safest course of action. In this case, these guys did something MORE dangerous - but yeah, they were lucky.

[TopperHarley]

I'd be pretty pissed if I were a passenger on an aircraft that took off and then landed - for anything but especially something as ridiculous as a faulty flashing light and shaker.

I can understand your arguement if the problem was just a faulty light, but how is it any safer to continue the take off while the shaker is going off?! To me that is a far more risky maneuver than land straight ahead on a 2 mile runway on a dash 8.

As KAG pointed out earlier, these kinds of situations depend on many factors, especially the type of a/c and the runway, along with the type of emergency. In this case, I agree with the likes of Cat Driver and Doc. I would not want to try to continue the takeoff with a stick shaker going off, when I know there is enough runway to land and stop right in front of me.

[Canoehead]

The Co-jo may have been putting the gear up and looking for the yellow page checklist as the left-seat decided to put the plane back down.

Pretty sure the shaker started as the aircraft was rotated/lifting-off. I would hope nobody was reaching for anything, including a gear handle, or a QRH at that point.

As they tried to flare and put the plane back down, they could have had the pusher activate as the AOA increased and driven the airplane into the ground (this is why other Bombardier products have you land at a higher speed and reduced flap setting with SPS failures) Who knows?

It was a Dash 8 100 series. There is no pusher on it. And no, that isn't why Bombardier products have higher approach speeds with 'stall system failures'. Can't speak for the CRJ or Q400, but a DH8-300 has a pusher, and it is deactivated below 400', or anytime the independent stall systems are in disagreement (or above 200 KIAS).

There is no "SPS" system on a 100 series airplane, only a warning system.

Believe it or not, Bombardier thought of this scenario and they didn't intend for the crew to do this. There is a checklist for it and if you follow that checklist, you'll be safer than what they guys did.

What type of Bombardier product do you fly?

[Siddley Hawker]

After reading some of the responses on this thread and I'm reminded of one fixed wing pilot's definition of a helicopter:

"...Now why would you want to bundle up all that trouble and lift it off the ground with your ass attached to it?"

[Colonel Sanders]

something as ridiculous as a faulty flashing light and shaker

Ah, the 20/20 hindsight of the armchair quarterback.

Reminds of the definition of an accident investigation board: six guys that take six months to decide what 2 guys should have done in 20 seconds

It really pisses me off when airchair quarterbacks crap on pilots, like the BA 777 driver who went through hell after he lost both engines, or Don Cameron. I doubt many people here remember it, but Don was crucified by the chairborne warriors who all claimed that they would have done a better job than Don in the cockpit.

[Airborne28]

A couple years ago, a B1900 rejected in Alberta because of the stall warn after V1. The end result was 100' off the end of the runway. Thankfully everyone was ok. Everyone in that forum was 'pro V1 continue'. You can't just choose sides dependent on the results. This is basic multi eng training. V1 go.

[Cat Driver]

If you take a very risky course of action and no one dies, you're not a genius or hero, you're just dangerous, poorly trained but lucky.

So based on the above opinion I have over thirty thousand hours accident free in spite of the fact I was poorly trained and am a dangerous pilot with a lot of luck.

Should I quit flying now before my luck runs out?

[Doc]

So, after a couple of days to rehash the incident, 48 posts on two pages of an avcanada forum, the "jury" has decided the crew should have continued to fly their airplane over the city of Winnipeg? They're problem, you have all decided was a simple malfunction of an unnecessary waring system, unimportant to the safety of the flight. I'm guessing they spent three "steamboats" of time making this error in judgement. But, since the self proclaimed experts on this thread have "proved" them wrong, they were wrong. Even though, the airplane had probably 8 or 9 thousand feet of perfectly dry runway in front of it? C'MON MAN!
Has common sense been outlawed in this industry???

Way rather be on the ground thinking I should have gone flying, than in the air, thinking, I shouldn't have gone flying.....

[Gannet167]

Should I quit flying now before my luck runs out?

That's not what I said, you're quoting out of context. I said if you take the MORE risky course of action and it works, it doesn't mean it was a good idea. If there's a less risky course of action that you didn't follow, then you made a bad decision and took on undue and unnecessary risk. I still don't understand how these guys improved upon safety by introducing a bunch of unnecessary risk, when they had a non-critical warning system failure.

It was a Dash 8 100 series. There is no pusher on it. And no, that isn't why Bombardier products have higher approach speeds with 'stall system failures'. Can't speak for the CRJ or Q400, but a DH8-300 has a pusher, and it is deactivated below 400', or anytime the independent stall systems are in disagreement (or above 200 KIAS).

There is no "SPS" system on a 100 series airplane, only a warning system.

Believe it or not, Bombardier thought of this scenario and they didn't intend for the crew to do this. There is a checklist for it and if you follow that checklist, you'll be safer than what they guys did.

Like I said, I don't fly Dash-8's. But any of those could be reasons why re-landing is riskier in general than climbing out safely and running the checklist. Add to my shopping list of reasons not to re-land is whether or not you're below max landing weight (also probably irrelevant on a Dash-8, but could be important in other situations) A higher approach speed and reduced flap setting is the procedure for an SPS fail on other Bombardier products like Challengers, after simply selecting one of the SPS switches off to kill the shaker and warnings. Bombardier makes more than airplanes than Dash-8s.

If these guys had a bad landing, everyone would be extorting the benefits of continuing after V1. This forum's opinions changes like the weather, and follows the end result as justification.

These guys should have realized during the takeoff more than any other point in the flight whether or not their airplane truly was stalling. Known parameters like power, pitch, increasing airspeed, starting to climb should have indicated that there was no stall.

They either flinched and put the plane back down out of fear that it was about to stall (in this case, likely with little regard for calculating the runway required or remaining), OR, took the time to think to themselves "you know, this stall warning system seems to be acting up, darn, well anyway, looks like we have about x thousand feet left, so yeah, lets just put her back down on the runway and go get fixed. We should have enough room to safely land and we're more or less in landing config. There's no one on short final."

If they were unaware of whether or not they were stalled, then they need more training. Now, on the other hand If they realized that it was merely a warning system malfunction, then they ought to have realized it was no big deal, climbed out, completed the post takeoff check, then the yellow page in the QRH, setup and configured for landing and come back for an uneventful landing, while taking into consideration everything Bombardier's experts have to say about this type of malfunction.

Either way, I can't see how the pilots could claim this was a good idea regardless of what was on their minds. In either instance, they introduced a bunch of risk factors and didn't improve the safety of the situation. Luckily, no one got hurt, but the risk of someone getting hurt was higher than if they'd continued the takeoff.