Airlines Operating under the Guise of Corporate Operations

[patrickairlie]

Please enlighten me on this issue.

Jazz operates numerous CRJs under the rules of CARs705. Regional 1 and Voyaguer also do the same. These operators are allowed to have the anonymous public buy tickets and travel. Operations under 705 require pilots to be trained under 725.124, require SOPs and compliance to them and numerous other restrictions to ensure that the travelling public is safe and risk is mitigated/minimized.

Calgary has two corporate operators flying airline equipment, RJ900's and an EMB170 (I think that is the model). They operate these aircraft under CARs 604. Their passengers may not be the anonymous public, but think about this. If you were unemployed in the Maritimes and were offered a job in northern Alberta, would you squawk about the company paying for you to fly on some aircraft to enable you to get to work? Neither would I. However, I would expect that the government would provide sufficient oversight and regulation to ensure I'm as safe on the company provided transport as I would be with a 705 operator. I have heard that Suncor flies with their cockpit doors open. Jazz has bullet proof doors with a strict protocol on when/how they can be opened. Wish I could do that.

I'm very happy that occasionally I get to fly into Albion, Horizon or Firebag for these companies. At the same time, I cannot understand how TC stands by and takes on the risk of these companies flying these aircraft without the mitigations found in 705. In the same breath, I believe that the pilots working there are doing the best job they can with the tools they have. It isn't their problem. If only they understood that their company is only providing them with the most basic of tools and a veneer thin backup of management without the benefit of a requisite SMS system.

I have no idea how to get oil out of the ground. I leave that for those who have spent their working lives in the industry. They know exactly how to make the most of their business and at the same time manage the risks. The petroleum industry although closely tied to aviation is not best served by CARs 604 operations.

[704type]

After readfing the novel that you spent so long thinking about, I can only say this. Have you ever looked at 704 regulations? Not a hell of a lot different than 604 regs, and where is the "safe cockpit door" there? If you don't like the ride that is being provided for up to the muskeg, maybe consider driving next time. Oh and by the way, I just hope you have enough gas, other than what comes out your mouth! Hope you are enlightened now.

[patrickairlie]

Interesting reply, but you haven't addressed the point. Large aircraft fall under CARs 705.

[BverLuver]

patrickairlie,

Large aircraft do fall under 705 but they also, in a corporate flight department, fall under CARS 604. As pointed out, the regulations are very similar.

Perhaps they don't need to lock the door because it is the corporations own employees that are traveling aboard the airplanes.

BL

[tx'd]

PA: Suncor has an SMS, the CRJ's have strict SOP's, as well as locked, bullet-proof cockpit doors. Next?

[ajet32]

If you were to fly on a Suncor Aircraft you would see that they are equipped wit a TC approved ballistic door. The door is locked during flight using a procedure similar to that used by "705" carriers.
The other large corporate operator of the EMB175 also has a door as does their Dornier 328.

If you wish to slag Calgary based corporate flight departments then get your facts straight.

[patrickairlie]

Don't see the slagging, it wasn't meant that way. It was a question. Why the difference in the rules for similar aircraft? Why not allow Jazz or Regional One to operate under the same rules?

[cv990]

The general public does not buy seats on Suncor a/c, or Shell, or whatnot... the passengers on those aircraft are vetted company employees. The company controls their own employees, and Transport allows that. We ahve the same at Jazz. The general public are separated from the cockpit by various security measures, but we allow company employees to ride up front in our jumpseat. Our procedures for this, and other major security issues are outlined in our operations manual and are strictly overseen by Transport. The cockpit door is to separate the flight deck from the general public, not from company employees.... it is no different than with Suncor; they just don't have the general public buying tickets on their aircraft.

[NovaBoy]

Also the corporate 604 operators have been using SMS longer than the 705 operators.

[patrickairlie]

My point is still made. Same type of equipment should be regulated by the same rules.
Further, if a 604 operator went to the effort and expense of instituting and SMS, there is obviously risk in the operation that must be managed through the SMS. Otherwise, why bother with it at all?
Sounds like the operation would be better regulated under 705.

[NovaBoy]

Yes, but it is still a private operation, the pax are not paying for their tickets and are employed by Suncor. It's no different than when I take fellow employees on trips in our Falcon 2000.

Should the rules for 604 be the same as 705? I don't know, but TC is slowly, I mean slowly coming out with a new set of CARS to deal with their takeover from CBAA. But that is a whole other issue.

[ahramin]

Patrickarlie, I'm afraid the reason you aren't getting serious answers to your question is because you are labouring under a large delusion. While the size of the equipment does have some bearing on what regulations apply, it is not the only consideration; it isn't even the most important one. What matters most is the type of operation. The biggest dividing line is private vs commercial operations. If I buy a C182 and want to fly around in it, there are some rules i have to follow. If I want to set up a scheduled airline with the same airplane and sell people tickets to go YVR-YYJ a whole different set of rules apply. This is for a good reason.

However, it isn't reasonable for a large corporation to fly their employees around on airliners without some extra rules, hence 604 regulations. Leave the fuselage hugging to the amateurs, get over how big the plane is. There are corporate King Air operations out there that are safer, better trained, and more professional than wide body airlines. Same airplane doesn't mean same operation and doesn't mean same rules.

Oh, and to clear up another delusion: locked cockpit doors don't improve safety, they reduce safety.

[Canoehead]

Oh, and to clear up another delusion: locked cockpit doors don't improve safety, they reduce safety.

How do you figure that safety is reduced?

[ahramin]

Think about crew interactions before the doors were locked and the convoluted processes for opening them were put in place. F/As used to feel that the flight deck was part of the airplane. If there was a problem or a question they would come up and talk face to face about it. Communication was easy and for the most part unimpeded. Problems were solved as a crew working together.

Now cabin crews tend to view the flight deck as a locked cage stuck on to the front of the aircraft. There is very little rapport between the pilots and the cabin crew. 99% of communication between the two are done over the interphone. Generally pilots have little to no idea what is going on in their aircraft.

This has lead to an increase in incidents where F/As had important information about a situation but didn't communicate it to the pilots. I see this all the time in mixed training scenarios where the task of getting the aircraft safely to the ground is compromised because rather than working together as a team to solve the problem, anything rear of the door gets delegated to the in charge F/A while the pilots deal with anything forward of the locked door, with little communication going on between the two and no support from the front to the back. Pick up any airline safety magazine and you'll see that more and more incident investigations are pointing to lack of CRM between the front and the back as a risk factor.

Because of this airlines have had to put in mandatory reporting clauses that force the F/As to let the pilots know about certain situations. Absent these requirements it's simply easier for them to ignore us as making these reports is simply one more thing to do while dealing with a situation and they simply aren't counting on assistance from the pilots.

These problems are real, recurring, and on the rise, but as with everything else after 9/11, security circus has a veto over everything else, with no risk assessment on any of it.

[DanJ]

patrickairlie,



Perhaps they don't need to lock the door because it is the corporations own employees that are traveling aboard the airplanes.

BL

Because no company employee has tried to hijack their own company's plane

[Canoehead]

Think about crew interactions before the doors were locked and the convoluted processes for opening them were put in place. F/As used to feel that the flight deck was part of the airplane. If there was a problem or a question they would come up and talk face to face about it. Communication was easy and for the most part unimpeded. Problems were solved as a crew working together.

Now cabin crews tend to view the flight deck as a locked cage stuck on to the front of the aircraft. There is very little rapport between the pilots and the cabin crew. 99% of communication between the two are done over the interphone. Generally pilots have little to no idea what is going on in their aircraft.

This has lead to an increase in incidents where F/As had important information about a situation but didn't communicate it to the pilots. I see this all the time in mixed training scenarios where the task of getting the aircraft safely to the ground is compromised because rather than working together as a team to solve the problem, anything rear of the door gets delegated to the in charge F/A while the pilots deal with anything forward of the locked door, with little communication going on between the two and no support from the front to the back. Pick up any airline safety magazine and you'll see that more and more incident investigations are pointing to lack of CRM between the front and the back as a risk factor.

Because of this airlines have had to put in mandatory reporting clauses that force the F/As to let the pilots know about certain situations. Absent these requirements it's simply easier for them to ignore us as making these reports is simply one more thing to do while dealing with a situation and they simply aren't counting on assistance from the pilots.

These problems are real, recurring, and on the rise, but as with everything else after 9/11, security circus has a veto over everything else, with no risk assessment on any of it.

That certainly can be a factor, but I think that a properly trained crew should be able to work around a locked door.
Having an open door doesn't necessarily allow for uninterrupted CRM between the front and the back. Air Canada 797 is an example off the top of my head.

Overall I don't think the Kevlar has reduced safety, and until some zealot manages to get through the door and pull off another cowardly act, I'll be fine with my door being locked.
That being said, the fact that I cannot bring my wife or kids into the jumpseat is definitely a 'security circus'. And that's off topic

[ahramin]

Canoehead I totally agree with you, and work hard to make this happen exactly as you say. But I'm not talking about possibilities or wishes, I'm talking about what is actually happening right now.

In this day and age passengers are not going to allow their aircraft to be hijacked. The terrorists know this and are basing their attacks on this. Security rules don't apply to CATSA personnel, and we are often reading about theft rackets being run by these people. It would be extremely easy to smuggle a gun onto a plane with the help of a CATSA screener. Cockpit doors are not fool proof, and personally I'd prefer to leave them open.

[ahramin]

I have a terrible memory for numbers but just ran across a paper while cleaning out my todo folder. These are from a paper in the 2011 FAA Journal of Applied Aviation Studies looking into pilot F/A communication:

55% of flight attendants surveyed indicated that they had been hesitant to report a problem and 16% responded that had failed to report a problem to the flight crew because they assumed the crew would already be aware of the problem.

41% of pilots surveyed indicated that they had situations where a flight attendant did not report a problem.

The survey also detailed the security risks posed by lack of communication by highlighting the underwear bomber incident in 2009 where the flight crew was unaware that they had had an attempted terrorist attack on board until after they landed and pulled up to the gate.

[patrickairlie]

The issue isn't only CATSA and cockpit doors.
We should have one set of rules and one standard for these sorts of aircraft. Bring 705 to the 604 world, or the other way around.

[BverLuver]

Patrickairlie,

Standardizing and generalizing only solves problems for some but creates problems for others where no problem need be created nor previously existed. Are you suggesting that Suncor should also operate their Citation X or their Citation Bravo under 705? Generalizing in this case would force this company to obtain a secondary AOC. I fail to see how the need to turn everything into 705 or split the OC would solve problems that do not exist in the 604 world.

You have not made a single valid point that would suggest air travel would be safer or on a "level playing field" between operators of the 704/705/604 world by implementing what you suggest. It seems as though your only goal is to be able to make people disagree with you and that alone gives you some satisfaction. That is the only semblance of sense that I can conjure in your posts.

BL

[ahramin]

The issue isn't only CATSA and cockpit doors.
We should have one set of rules and one standard for these sorts of aircraft.

Fortunately most people - including TC - can see that this doesn't make any sense.

[Cat Driver]

SMS......PDM.....CRM and all the other buzz words do not make for safe flight.

What makes for safe flying is company culture and crews who understand common sense and how to operate their aircraft safely.

[patrickairlie]

Cat Driver, I agree, notwithstanding all of these programs safety is safety. My whole point is this: same rules for the same type of airplane. Give everyone the benefit of the manditory training, flight following, dispatch and everything else required by regulation. Simplify the regulations, lets all have the same rules. I haven't yet seen a reply other than a seemingly personal attack that dissuades me from this point.

[ahramin]

You've seen lots of replies, which clearly and patiently explain to you that different types of operations have different types of rules.

Do you think someone who buys a Cessna 172 to fly on weekends for fun should have to get an operating certificate because the guy next door has one to fly charters?

[patrickairlie]

We aren't talking 172's here. We are talking about heavier metal, more extensive risk mitigations required, SOPs, the works.
"Patiently explaining" (see the first response) doesn't require me to be swayed on this particular issue.
Perhaps we have to agree to disagree. Let's talk about foreign pilots instead, ok?