A Boeing 777 Has Crash-Landed At San Francisco International

[shimmydampner]

"If only there was some way for us as pilots to control the engines' thrust and if only this damn airplane had moveable surfaces at its extremities that we as the pilots could manipulate in concert with that thrust in order to alter the aircraft's orientation and trajectory through space!"

[RB211]

There is much discussion about visual approaches as related to this incident/accident.

SFO use visual approaches to maximise the traffic handled. They can use less space for landing on both runways than if they use IFR approach criteria. Even if the ILS had been on the air, with the weather conditions of the day, they would still issue visual approaches.

Once cleared for and accepted, ATC doesn't really care how you carry out the approach. If the ILS is on, use it. In the case of 28L, there is an RNAV (GPS) approach published which provides a very nice VNAV Path as reference. Use it.

The talk of what aids were available, ATC procedures and the functionality of the aircraft, specifically the A/T system, as reasons for this accident are really secondary issues. As far as we know right now, all the tools were available to successfully complete the approach. Maybe the final report will reveal some new issues.

The two more significant items that will likely be discussed are CRM and aircraft handling.

To me, of those two items, it is an issue of energy management and adhering to stabilisation criteria. The larger the airplane the greater the inertia. This becomes a significant factor when correcting a high/fast profile. Getting 'down" and 'slowing down' at the same time can be a challenge. It also means it can quickly become 'low and slow' if mishandled. That is why Boeing discusses the stabilisation criteria in the FCTM. In VMC, if you do not meet the criteria by 500', then it is time to go around and do it again. Good CRM should have intervened by this point.

Stabilized Approach Recommendations from Boeing:

Stabilized Approach Recommendations

Maintaining a stable speed, descent rate, and vertical/lateral flight path in landing
configuration is commonly referred to as the stabilized approach concept.
Any significant deviation from planned flight path, airspeed, or descent rate
should be announced. The decision to execute a go-around is no indication of poor
performance.

Note: Do not attempt to land from an unstable approach.

Recommended Elements of a Stabilized Approach

The following recommendations are consistent with criteria developed by the
Flight Safety Foundation.
All approaches should be stabilized by 1,000 feet AFE in instrument
meteorological conditions (IMC) and by 500 feet AFE in visual meteorological
conditions (VMC). An approach is considered stabilized when all of the following
criteria are met:
• the airplane is on the correct flight path
• only small changes in heading and pitch are required to maintain the
correct flight path
• the airplane should be at approach speed. Deviations of +10 knots to – 5
knots are acceptable if the airspeed is trending toward approach speed
• the airplane is in the correct landing configuration
• sink rate is no greater than 1,000 fpm; if an approach requires a sink rate
greater than 1,000 fpm, a special briefing should be conducted
• thrust setting is appropriate for the airplane configuration
• all briefings and checklists have been conducted.

I underlined for emphasis.

We can all, especially after a long day/night, get behind the 8 ball on the approach. It is recognising things are not right and making the safe decision that is vital.

[RB211]

Looks like problem solved!

FAA Places Restrictions on Foreign Pilots Landing at San Francisco

Posted 2013-07-29 03:30:21

Ezra Shaw/Getty Images
(SAN FRANCISCO) -- The Federal Aviation Administration is no longer allowing visual approach landings at San Francisco International Airport to foreign airlines landing there, ABC News has learned.

“Apparently the FAA is seeing that foreign carriers are not able to handle this visual approach at SFO and they're no longer allowing anybody except U.S. crews to hand fly approaches into SFO," says ABC News aviation consultant Col. Steve Ganyard.

Ganyard says the new policy is no doubt a result of the July 6 Asiana Airlines crash landing in which three people died.

The Boeing 777, which originated in Seoul, South Korea, was carrying 291 passengers and 16 crew members when it crash-landed on the airport runway and burst into flames.

The National Transportation Safety Board has not yet determined the cause of the crash. However, investigators have said Flight 214 was flying "significantly below" its target speed during approach when the crew tried to abort the landing just before the plane crashed onto the runway.

Ganyard says the policy change is also in response to an increase in "go arounds" by foreign crews landing at the airport.

“Apparently in the past couple weeks we've seen more of these visual approaches that have not gone as well as they should have and these aircraft have done what's called waving off, which means they go around...bring up the gear and they go around and they try again,” he says.

Ganyard notes that the FAA is only focusing on foreign carriers, not U.S. carriers: “They're saying they’re only seeing these problems with foreign carriers which raises the question: Are foreign carriers trained to the degree they need to be to fly within U.S. airspace?”

Copyright 2013 ABC News Radio

[YYZSaabGuy]

A slightly different take on the FAA response in this story from Air Traffic Management (see http://www.airtrafficmanagement.net/201 ... pproaches/. The headline may be misleading - the story below characterizes it as a recommendation to use RNAV approaches, not an outright ban on visuals.

FAA bans foreign pilots from visual approaches at SFO
Posted on July 30, 2013 by Aimee Turner

The United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is reported to have advised all foreign airlines to use a GPS system instead of visual approaches when landing at San Francisco International Airport in the wake of the Asiana Airlines crash.

The San Francisco Chronicle reports the FAA has issued a recommendation that the airlines use the GPS system when landing on main runways instead of relying on just their eyes and cockpit instruments.

Pilots on Asiana Airlines Flight 214 had been cleared to make a visual approach when the Boeing 777-200ER aircraft crash-landed on a runway at the San Francisco airport July 6. Three girls died, and 180 people were injured.

The FAA says that since then, pilots for Asiana and other foreign carriers have had more aborted landings than usual while trying to make visual approaches. The agency didn’t provide exact numbers.

Typically, pilots would use visual approaches if the weather was clear, or they would use an instrument system known as a glide slope indicator to help them land.

However, the glide slope indicator has been out of service since June 1 due to an expansion project and is not scheduled to be available again until August 22.

The GPS-based instrument system, known as RNAV, is an alternative, and the FAA decided to make the temporary change “out of an abundance of caution,” the agency said in a statement.

The Asiana Airlines crash is under investigation, and it’s unclear exactly how its pilots – who had been cleared for a visual approach – tried to land. Federal investigators said the plane was flying far too slowly when it crashed, with the pilots reporting that they believed they had engaged an automatic throttle.

[raven54]

I don't even know what to say about the above. Really??? Wow...not the dreaded visual approach!!!!

[CID]

Interesting. FedEx flight 80, an MD-11F crashed in Narita a few years back. The pilots landed hard causing the airplane to porpoise, flip over and burst in to flames. Both pilots were killed and they were "foreign" pilots. Perhaps they didn't have the proper training in their country of origin which was the USA.

FedEx flight 14 was another MD-11F that had an almost identical accident. It also porpoised after a hard landing, flipped and burst into flames at the Newark airport. The flight crew was luckier on that one. They all walked away with relatively minor injuries. But wait....this crash was on US soil and was caused by "pilot error" by pilots who were born, raised and trained in the USA.

So doesn't that make you think that perhaps the nationality of the pilots isn't the main factor in play here? How about that 747 that recently crashed in the middle east? American company, American pilots. Or the Southwest 737 that busted the nose wheel last week? American company, American pilots doing a manual visual approach.

Like I said weeks ago, it's not very useful or productive to pin this on ethnic "cultural" differences or "foreign" pilots. But it sure is easy. The FAA, US pilot groups and the media at large find it quite an easy sell to tell people that "foreign" pilots are inferior. Not only easy, it sure takes the focus off their own foibles.

But I have a solution. On every international flight, have 2 sets of flight crew. Chinese pilots will take off and land in China. US pilots will take off and land in the US. Canadian pilots will take off and land in Canada. So a flight originating in Chicago and flying to Montreal will use the US pilots to take off and operate the airplane until control is handed over to a Canadian control center. Then the Canadian pilots will take over for the rest of the trip.

Of course there would be different "Canadian" pilots if they were going anywhere but Quebec because the huge cultural differences and language issues. Newfoundland can be a challenge as well....

[white_knuckle_flyer]

CID, you might just have to give up on this one. It might not be the kind of world you want, but the fact that this advisory has come into place is very telling.

Unless you monitor every airport in the U.S., are you suggesting you have access to more information that the FAA ?

[CID]

Unless you monitor every airport in the U.S., are you suggesting you have access to more information that the FAA ?

Absolutely not. But I don't have an agenda like the FAA does either.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

America is the most racist country on earth, proof of that is there are no non white people in any government positions...they only vote white Christians in...is Carlos Danger a christian?

[boeingboy]

Interesting. FedEx flight 80, an MD-11F crashed in Narita a few years back. The pilots landed hard causing the airplane to porpoise, flip over and burst in to flames. Both pilots were killed and they were "foreign" pilots. Perhaps they didn't have the proper training in their country of origin which was the USA.

CID - You keep harping about this accident - however it had completely different circumstances to Asiana it was not a simple calm day - the Fedex crew was dealing with windshear on that day. As you know - windshear is unpradictable, and in fact - the approach was stabilized down untill 50 ft where it got a little rough. Then at 20ft RA they got in trouble. I have no time in the MD-11 but a lot of pilots with time on type have said it is notoriously difficult to land in those conditions. Once an occilation (in any aircraft) starts - its extreamly difficult (if not impossible) to stop before something breaks.

The Asiana crew never had their approach stabilized even 11 miles back in calm sunny skies. The approach got even worse when they passed below the glideslope. There was ample time to abort the situation.

To me you are comparing apples to oranges.

[CID]

boeingboy, I thought somebody would bring up windshear. The reports from the Asiana accident state that the flight crew was dealing with an unexpected "lateral deviation". So the FedEx boys had a "vertical deviation". And according to the accident report the FedEx crew had time to abort and go-around but they chose not to.

In my opinion, it's not apples and oranges.

Keep in mind that both the 777 and the MD-11 are wide body aircraft. The MD-11 was derived from the DC-10. A high degree of automation was introduced that reduced the required flight crew from 3 to 2. Many MD-11 pilots have said it was a tricky airplane to fly manually and if things go wrong in the cockpit, the work load rises pretty quickly. There was no FBW but there was some kind of pitch stabilization system that inserted itself between the control column and the tailplane.

All indications that the airplane, like the 777, really wasn't designed to be primarily handflown. If things look sketchy on the approach, don't take matters into your own hands, break off the approach and re-configure.

[boeingboy]

I disagree with you about the FedEx accident. However I do not want to thread drift. Each to his own. Basicly I feel that no matter what country you come from - you should be able to do a basic approach and landing while handflying. End of story.

All indications that the airplane, like the 777, really wasn't designed to be primarily handflown. If things look sketchy on the approach, don't take matters into your own hands, break off the approach and re-configure.

For this - I agree with you completely. Wether it was handflown or not. I think the basic idea in this (Asiana) accident is no matter how they got there - they were way outside a stabilized approach for so long that a go-around should have been a no-brainer. I don't know what they were doing - but they were not flying the airplane period.

[pdw]

The reports from the Asiana accident state that the flight crew was dealing with an unexpected "lateral deviation". So the FedEx boys had a "vertical deviation".

The "lateral deviation" was the distraction; as I understand they only got slow a couple of miles further along the approach, and where the deviation altered from being more "lateral"/side-drift to increasingly longitudenal (following) ... well-after the course deviation diverted attention.

"Vertical deviation" ... that describes the actual event, KLGA/Jul22-2013/17:45L as it happened. The metar was similarly "calm" on landing. Station info suggests reasonably stable air around KLGA for that time. The cause of a "deviation" is usually easy to spot if it's weather related and a good number of stations have history-data available in the vincinity, as is the case in New York. The previous metar was 12kts, but a sharper reduction than that must have applied in late descent if WX is said to have caused a pitch deviation to that extent.

[Eric Janson]

GPS approach is illegal?? Someone better tell....everyone.

Using GPS isn't going to help as a lot of Asian carriers do not have approval to fly RNAV/GPS approaches.

[Diadem]

The "lateral deviation" was the distraction; as I understand they only got slow a couple of miles further along the approach, and where the deviation altered from being more "lateral"/side-drift to increasingly longitudenal (following) ... well-after the course deviation diverted attention.

"Vertical deviation" ... that describes the actual event, KLGA/Jul22-2013/17:45L as it happened. The metar was similarly "calm" on landing. Station info suggests reasonably stable air around KLGA for that time. The cause of a "deviation" is usually easy to spot if it's weather related and a good number of stations have history-data available in the vincinity, as is the case in New York. The previous metar was 12kts, but a sharper reduction than that must have applied in late descent if WX is said to have caused a pitch deviation to that extent.

pdw, I'm very curious to know if one of your hypotheses has ever proven to be correct. Have you ever gone through an accident report and compared it to your speculation immediately after the accident? Has anything you've written ever actually been a contributing factor?

[pdw]

Have you ever gone through an accident report and compared it to your speculation immediately after the accident? Has anything you've written ever actually been a contributing factor?

As a contributor have never officially seen it recognized as a contributing factor, yet how can someone in that authority give credance to such idea if never hearing of it or not convinced. Here a small shear becomes a big deal at a weak moment (a perfect sequence/timing), but mostly if it happens is no big deal.

So on the contrary, I remained hopeful that writing about 'rapid airspeed loss during an insignificant shear' can contribute to a reduction in accidents where such sequence is at risk of completion. Here in KSFO the groundspeed was 1/4mile in six seconds so the gentle shearzone turns big in only 8 seconds at 800fpm after steeper/1400fpm descent (don't blink). The notion there's lots of time, is the biggest misconception there. Once the glide flattened, looking away 5 seconds became an eternity as decay progressed so fast.

An accident investigation cannot describe without the experience what the sequence was, so have never seen this signature/sequence referred-to, yet they do keep happening. So I continue to go "through an accident report" to see if there's been a breakthrough in identifying a similar sequence.

To me this was never speculation. I've "compared it" the other way around (after) and see the eerie repetitiveness of this sequence. I've pointed out many single-turbine accidents, mostly Caravans on the old Van-forum in the past, that so often had the signature troughs present ... and those accidents now have stopped happening (the safety meetings worked well ... knock on wood).

I got into an accident like this with the Cardinal, was at the end of the trip (lower fuel level), with full pax. With the recent accidents confirming low fuel confirms the looser levels may have some bearing on pitch stability when so slow and pitch/power is altered abruptly. Thinking you're golden when lighter ... it's all about the drag too; when so much lighter means drag slows a lot more while entering the shear in suddenly-flat glide-attitude and the low-power 'lingering'.

[Sidebar]

Did everybody get that?

[tbaylx]

Interesting. FedEx flight 80, an MD-11F crashed in Narita a few years back. The pilots landed hard causing the airplane to porpoise, flip over and burst in to flames. Both pilots were killed and they were "foreign" pilots. Perhaps they didn't have the proper training in their country of origin which was the USA.

FedEx flight 14 was another MD-11F that had an almost identical accident. It also porpoised after a hard landing, flipped and burst into flames at the Newark airport. The flight crew was luckier on that one. They all walked away with relatively minor injuries. But wait....this crash was on US soil and was caused by "pilot error" by pilots who were born, raised and trained in the USA.

So doesn't that make you think that perhaps the nationality of the pilots isn't the main factor in play here? How about that 747 that recently crashed in the middle east? American company, American pilots. Or the Southwest 737 that busted the nose wheel last week? American company, American pilots doing a manual visual approach.

Like I said weeks ago, it's not very useful or productive to pin this on ethnic "cultural" differences or "foreign" pilots. But it sure is easy. The FAA, US pilot groups and the media at large find it quite an easy sell to tell people that "foreign" pilots are inferior. Not only easy, it sure takes the focus off their own foibles.

But I have a solution. On every international flight, have 2 sets of flight crew. Chinese pilots will take off and land in China. US pilots will take off and land in the US. Canadian pilots will take off and land in Canada. So a flight originating in Chicago and flying to Montreal will use the US pilots to take off and operate the airplane until control is handed over to a Canadian control center. Then the Canadian pilots will take over for the rest of the trip.

Of course there would be different "Canadian" pilots if they were going anywhere but Quebec because the huge cultural differences and language issues. Newfoundland can be a challenge as well....

Some of those accidents you may have an argument, not that I agree with you, but you can at least argue your point somewhat intelligently.

However the UPS 747 crash in Dubai can hardly be put anywhere in the same class. It's a bit sh*tty of you to even suggest pilot error was in anyway contributing to the outcome. As a matter of fact i'd argue the crew did a pretty good job considering the sh*t sandwhich they were dealt. To even bring it up in the same sentence as pilot error either reduces your credibility to zero or shows you never read the recent final report.

[CID]

However the UPS 747 crash in Dubai can hardly be put anywhere in the same class. It's a bit sh*tty of you to even suggest pilot error was in anyway contributing to the outcome. As a matter of fact i'd argue the crew did a pretty good job considering the sh*t sandwhich they were dealt. To even bring it up in the same sentence as pilot error either reduces your credibility to zero or shows you never read the recent final report.

First of all, I wasn't referring to the 747 that crashed in Dubai 3 years ago due to a cargo fire. I was referring to the recent accident in Bagram Afghanistan.

Regardless it wasn't my intent to imply it was due to pilot error but re-reading my post, I can definitely see your point. I should have said "flight crew" instead of "pilot". Yes, I researched it right from the start and the generally accepted suspicion is that a load shift caused the accident.

I lumped this accident in to make the point that aircraft accidents are not all on aircraft with "foreign" flightcrews regardless of the cause. That is "foreign" as defined by the geniuses who are painting the picture that there is a significant difference in the abilities of pilots on international flights. The load master, who IS part of the crew, on that Bagram crash may be the focal hear although the jury is out on whether the load was not secured properly or if straps (etc) that were used simply failed.

The FAA however, quickly prepared and released a SAFO (Safety Alert for Operators) regarding the loading and securing of large vehicles in aircraft.

http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation ... O13005.pdf

The point is that in the class of international major airlines that enjoy operating rights in places like the US and Canada, I haven't found any convincing evidence that they have higher accident/incident rates than US/Canadian or even European counterparts.

Just hearsay and isolated anecdotes. And let's keep this in context. We're not talking about Russian or Chinese or Central African domestic service. We're talking about international airlines.

[white_knuckle_flyer]

I think this is a very interesting and relevant read.

From the title, you might assume it is going to be typical pro-Western fare, but the last 10% of the article should meet with CID's approval.



http://brushtalk.blogspot.ca/2012/08/wh ... n-air.html

[CID]

white_knuckle_flyer, yes, certainly a relevant article. I have mentioned in this thread that Korean Airlines had a dreadful accident rate before they were pretty much forced to "fix it".

But so did ValueJet who dumped their tarnished name in favour of Air Tran before they sold out to Southwest.

As far as language issues go, don't think it's not a more "domestic" problem as well. Ever flown to airports in Quebec? How about Newfoundland?

And how about the deep south in the US?

There was a study done that not only addressed non-standard English in ATC situations internationally, it covered variations in countries where English is the "native" language. Think about a pilot who grew up in small town Texas trying to understand a controller in Quebec or Newfoundland. Or Regina for that matter.

Here's an excerpt:

For pilots and controllers alike (regardless of their country of origin or aircraft registry), some English dialects and accents are more difficult to understand, add workload, and require more of the listeners’ attention
be directed towards what is being heard.

Another excerpt:

Depending on where native English-speaking controllers are from, my workload goes up slightly when
I’m listening to their accents. So, we anticipate what we’re going to hear. Parts of the U.S. definitely have
dialects—like the Deep South, Boston’s airspace, or Houston—[and] differ from other areas. Also, my
own native English-speaking environment is New York. They say we have an accent, but I don’t hear
it. To me it’s no problem

For the entire report, go here:

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA534673

[YYZSaabGuy]

Looks like the NTSB is assessing whether and to what extent to cite Boeing's design as a factor in the Asiana accident at SFO last July. Unsurprisingly, Boeing and Asiana have slightly different views on what the findings should be. (Copied below from Bloomberg.com for those without high-speed connections).

Asiana Crash Debate Goes Beyond Pilots to Automation
By Alan Levin Jun 22, 2014 11:00 AM ET

U.S. investigators are debating whether to blame a Boeing Co. (BA) jetliner’s design for helping cause a cascade of pilot mistakes in last year’s Asiana Airlines Inc. (020560) crash that killed three Chinese teenagers.

The sticking point within the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, in the days before its final decision is due, is over the extent to which Boeing’s automatic throttle contributed to the plane’s loss of speed before it slammed into a seawall in San Francisco on July 6, said three people with knowledge of the discussions. They asked not to be identified because they weren’t authorized to speak.

The safety board tomorrow will decide on the probable cause and other factors leading to Seoul-based Asiana’s crash, the first in the U.S. with passenger deaths in more than four years. While there’s little doubt the pilots made multiple mistakes, a finding that equipment on the 777-200 jet confused them could open Chicago-based Boeing to greater liability in lawsuits and shade public opinion.

“There’s quite a flurry of activity” in the days leading up to the NTSB’s findings in a major accident, Peter Goelz, who served as managing director of the agency during the 1990s, said in an interview. Such debate is consistent with prior investigations as the NTSB’s five-member board and staff hammer out nuances of what caused tragedies, Goelz said.

The NTSB has several options to address the role of the auto-throttle design. It can include it as part of the cause, list it as a “contributing factor,” or make recommendations for safety improvements that mention the equipment’s role.

The plane crashed after the Asiana pilots allowed it to get almost 40 miles (64 kilometers) per hour slower than the target speed as they neared the runway.

Both Boeing and Asiana, which gave their recommended conclusions to the NTSB in March, laid primary responsibility for the accident on the pilots. The airline and planemaker differ over whether other issues were at play.

Boeing maintains the accident was solely the crew’s fault and would have been avoided if the pilots had aborted the landing, as required under airline procedures, Miles Kotay, a spokesman, said in a June 20 e-mail. “The airplane and all airplane systems were functioning as expected prior to impact and did not contribute to the accident,” Boeing said in its submission to the NTSB earlier this year.

Asiana urged the safety board in its March submission to find that the auto-throttle was a cause of the pilots’ mistakes. It also said the NTSB should recommend that the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration require Boeing to add a cockpit warning when speeds get too slow.

Groups with a stake in the outcome have met with the safety board’s politically appointed members in recent weeks in an attempt to influence the process, as is often the case before conclusions are announced on major accidents, one person familiar with the proceedings said.

The 777, like Boeing’s 737 and 787, has a suite of computer-driven tools in the cockpit to help reduce pilots’ workload. Such automation, which has also been adopted in similar ways by Airbus Group NV, is credited with helping reduce accidents and improve efficiency. At the same time, pilot misunderstandings about automation have been studied for 20 years and linked to accidents, David Woods, a systems engineering professor at Ohio State University, said in an interview. “This is an old story,” Woods said.

Recent accidents, such as the Feb. 25, 2009, crash of a Turkish Airlines Inc. Boeing 737-800 on approach to Amsterdam that killed nine, have been linked to confusion over automation, he said. Woods called it the “creeping complexity” of the cockpit.

A FAA study released last year found that pilots’ reliance on cockpit automation systems has led to occasional confusion and new safety risks.

In the San Francisco accident, Captain Lee Kang Kuk, a veteran with Asiana who was being trained on the 777 wide-body, accidentally switched off the jetliner’s automatic speed control as he was trying to descend, according to NTSB documents. The plane’s tail broke loose as it hit the seawall, and the fuselage then bounced and spun down the runway. The three girls who died may have been flung from the jet because they weren’t wearing seatbelts, according to statements to investigators by unidentified witnesses traveling with them. More than 200 people were taken to hospitals. The plane held 291 passengers, 12 flight attendants and four pilots.

In almost all settings, the plane’s auto-throttle will prevent it from getting too slow, even if it’s switched off. Lee, 45, didn’t realize he’d put the jet into a rare mode that disabled this safety measure by making a series of changes to the auto pilot and throttles. He “believed the auto-throttle should have come out of the idle position to prevent the airplane going below the minimum speed” for landing, the NTSB said in a summary of an interview with him. “That was the theory at least, as he understood it.”

Another Asiana captain, Lee Jung Min, 49, an instructor, was seated in the co-pilot’s seat.

The pilots neglected to notice a runway light system showing they were too low, didn’t monitor their speed and didn’t follow airline procedures to abort a landing if they weren’t properly lined up for touchdown, according to information released already by the NTSB.

The 777, the world’s largest twin-engine jetliner, entered commercial service in 1995. Last year’s accident was the first involving fatalities, and only the third serious enough to destroy a 777. A fourth 777 presumed destroyed is the missing Malaysian Air 777-200ER model, the same as the Asiana jet.

Boeing designed the auto-throttle to aid crews while not replacing them, John Cashman, the company’s chief pilot on the 777 program, told an NTSB board of inquiry on Dec. 11. The crew is “ultimately responsible for the safe conduct of the flight,” Cashman said.

[amraam]

Report abstract has been released:

http://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/2014/as ... tract.html

Full report will be posted online in the next several weeks.

amraam

[PilotDAR]

Boeing designed the auto-throttle to aid crews while not replacing them, John Cashman, the company’s chief pilot on the 777 program, told an NTSB board of inquiry on Dec. 11. The crew is “ultimately responsible for the safe conduct of the flight,” Cashman said.

Yup, that says it all.

My cynical self says this is a long way from over, with the blame game going around.

It also said the NTSB should recommend that the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration require Boeing to add a cockpit warning when speeds get too slow.

Doesn't a 777 have slow speed warnings? I'm sure that Boeing made it compliant with 25.207 Stall Warning

[Old Dog Flying]

Boeing designed the auto-throttle to aid crews while not replacing them, John Cashman, the company’s chief pilot on the 777 program, told an NTSB board of inquiry on Dec. 11. The crew is “ultimately responsible for the safe conduct of the flight,” Cashman said.

Yup, that says it all.

My cynical self says this is a long way from over, with the blame game going around.

It also said the NTSB should recommend that the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration require Boeing to add a cockpit warning when speeds get too slow.

Doesn't a 777 have slow speed warnings? I'm sure that Boeing made it compliant with 25.207 Stall Warning

Stall warning...what is that noise?