55+ wrote:The aircraft was well outside the final approach design trapezoid for obstacle clearance
I agree completely. The first officer's statements indicate he was likely aware of this, or at least aware that things were going bad quickly and they needed to bug out. On the other side of the cockpit, the captain's statements and actions indicate he likely was not aware they were outside the obstacle clearance area.
Trematode wrote:... if he was so focused on the lateral deviation from the localizer then he should have been acutely aware that his minimum IFR altitude MUST still have been MSA (or perhaps an appropriate proc turn altitude).
The key words in your analysis are "he should have been." Yes, he should have been, but was he?
Let's assume for a moment the captain was indeed aware that his min IFR altitude was MSA. In that case, one can expect that he would do a go-around and climb. However, the reality is that he did not respond in this expected way, despite prompts from the first officer. Why not? The fact that the captain continued the approach suggests to me that he likely wasn't thinking about the obstacle clearance trapezoid or MSA, but was instead determined to find the runway and land.
From the TSB report:
Section 2.8.2.2
The captain's mental model was likely that the autopilot would re-intercept the localizer from the right and a landing would follow.
Section 2.8.7
The captain's statement at 1640:54.3 that he could not go left occurred between his calls for flaps 25 and flaps 30. At this time, his attention was likely becoming focused on aircraft configuration and airspeed control, to the detriment of other parameters. As indicated by the rate of descent change and ballooning above the glideslope, his attention to flying the ILS approach was negatively affected. This situation is a strong indication that the captain was affected by attentional narrowing.
Section 2.11.3
The communications between the 2 pilots were ineffective. The captain was task-saturated and was likely influenced by plan continuation bias. Despite the FO’s communication efforts, concerns about FAB6560’s flight path were not incorporated into the captain’s decision-making process.
Section 2.11.5
... the FO’s mental model was that a go-around was necessary, while the captain’s mental model was that the approach could be salvaged and a landing could be made.
Findings as to causes and contributing factors
14.Due to attentional narrowing and task saturation, the captain likely did not have a high-level overview of the situation. This lack of overview compromised his ability to identify and manage risk.
