Air Canada Accident in YHZ

[Rockie]

Rockie, you're not obligated to continue the approach with 1/2 the required vis, you are legal to do so. This is in no way an obligation. And, as you point out,it is in no way a good idea.
Missed approaches are good for the soul.
Illya

I agree completely. My point is the crew shouldn't be in that position with that visibility in the first place. The only reason they are is because Transport Canada permits it when every other regulator in the world prohibits it. They all prohibit it for a reason that TC alone seems unable to see.

[FICU]

Perhaps the ban does occasionally contribute to an a/c not being able to land where maybe some rockstar who's used to the local environment could land, but that's not really the best criteria for designing an approach IMO.

An example of the nonsense of the approach ban in one circumstance ...

Going into YYT the rvr was below the ban limit and Air Canada diverted to YDF. We were right behind them on vectors and had extra gas so ATC put us on an extended downwind and after a few minutes we did the approach once rvr was at the limit.

The funny thing... the approach lights and runway threshold lights with some centerline lights were completely visible in the clear night sky. The fog bank was well beyond the threshold and covered the rest of the airport. We did the approach to landing in clear skies and with visual reference to the runway. Air Canada had the same visual reference but had to divert because the rvr was too low and they didn't have the extra gas.

Now back to you regularly scheduled program...

[Rockie]

Here's another case. RVR is below limits but the crew can clearly see everything from altitude. They decide to do the approach because after all...the approach ban is just a bunch of bullshit. Everything goes swimmingly until just above the runway when they enter low lying fog and lose all visual reference.

Anecdotes work both ways. And basing policy and regulations on anecdotes is not a good idea.

[FICU]

Maybe this crew did not know they were below minimums when they flew into the ground?

The first question to be answered is did they fly into the ground or fall out of the sky.

Seriously? Like, as in....there was a total vacuum at the end of the runway. Jesus mate, they pooched it.
Illya

... engine thrust roll back, windshear, other major mechanical issue. Can't rule those out. Planting the jet 1100 feet short of the runway and 2600 feet short of the normal touch down point could be something other than CFIT.

[whoop_whoop]

I'm of the opinion that TC shouldn't legislate further restrictions on approach bans because of this accident.

The way I see it, companies and crew hold a joint responsibility to mitigate risks in operations. When vis is at 50% of the CAP recommended value, there is an increased inherent risk of having an accident. Let's imagine, for arguments sake, that you saw a light and descended but it turned out to be headlights instead of ODALS (assuming you're flying a SCDA NPA).

I'm primarily against further legislated restrictions because companies and crew should be mature and knowledgeable enough to mitigate the risks. The people making decisions to mitigate or accept risks need to balance many factors which can often change in the span of a few minutes. Having a further restriction placed on the industry will further increase the occurrences where an aircraft is prevented from attempting an approach when they could have reasonably carried out a successful landing.

[FICU]

Anecdotes work both ways. And basing policy and regulations on anecdotes is not a good idea.

And taking decision making out of pilot's hands is a good idea? How far will it go? Approach bans based on wind strength and crosswinds? Approach bans based on snow fall or rain intensity?

[ditar]

And taking decision making out of pilot's hands is a good idea? How far will it go.

All the way to pilotless airliners, of course!

[Rockie]

Anecdotes work both ways. And basing policy and regulations on anecdotes is not a good idea.

And taking decision making out of pilot's hands is a good idea? How far will it go.

In this case as far as the published visibility for the approach...consistent with the rest of the world.

[FICU]

And taking decision making out of pilot's hands is a good idea? How far will it go.

In this case as far as the published visibility for the approach...consistent with the rest of the world.

This... http://avherald.com/h?article=484c306e&opt=0. recently happened in another part of the "safer" world.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

The recent glut of such incidents does raise eyebrows. If, however, you have ever taken a CFIT or CRM course you would know that I am talking about

CFIT and CRM courses have been around for a long time, they are not some recent marvelous invention that defy the laws of common sense.

Maybe these crews that Illya just mentioned that stuffed it up big time in the last few weeks did not take these courses so they had no idea about situational awareness?

I am starting to get afraid to go to the ticket counter of any Canadian airline after reading all this stuff.

[ditar]

CFIT and CRM courses have been around for a long time, they are not some recent marvelous invention that defy the laws of common sense.

Maybe these crews that Illya just mentioned that stuffed it up big time in the last few weeks did not take these courses so they had no idea about situational awareness?

You missed my point entirely. What I am saying is that these courses usually discuss the statistical decrease in CFIT accidents since the middle of the last century. Therefore we must have been doing something right since then for the rate to have decreased.

[Illya Kuryakin]

... engine thrust roll back, windshear, other major mechanical issue. Can't rule those out. Planting the jet 1100 feet short of the runway and 2600 feet short of the normal touch down point could be something other than CFIT.

If that was an issue, somebody would have made a comment by now. Keep looking for excuses though.
Illya

[iflyforpie]

And keep looking through those rose-coloured glasses to how much better everything was way back when. It IS Roy Orbison's birthday today, after all.

[Illya Kuryakin]

And keep looking through those rose-coloured glasses to how much better everything was way back when. It IS Roy Orbison's birthday today, after all.

How has this got anything to do with "way back when...."?
Two trained, pilots flying for our Flag airline descended through conditions that clearly called for, either a missed approach, or for them not being there in the first place, ad you make a "rose coloured glasses" remark about way back when?
I say again, "keep looking for excuses...." I'm sure we can find some PC bullshit that will give you a warm fuzzy feeling.
Illya

[55+]

Well one thing is for certain, this crew ran out of ROC aprx 1000 ft back from runway threshold and were aprx 280 ft below MDA. How they ended up there shall be known at a later date.

[FICU]

... engine thrust roll back, windshear, other major mechanical issue. Can't rule those out. Planting the jet 1100 feet short of the runway and 2600 feet short of the normal touch down point could be something other than CFIT.

If that was an issue, somebody would have made a comment by now. Keep looking for excuses though.
Illya

No excuses but I'm not ready to condem the pilots so fast. The TSB knows and we will in a few years.

[sportingrifle]

My first wish is that we could all play a little nicer and respectfully on this forum.

Disclaimer...I work for "Big Red." I am not going to speculate on the cause as they always seem way more complex than at first thought. My gut feeling is that there will be lotsa brown smelly stuff sticking to multiple entities when this report comes out.

Having said that, I have to agree with Rockie on this one - and I don't usually agree with Rockie! All non precision instrument approaches become either go arounds, or subsequent visual approaches. If you have the ceiling and visibility that is charted, you should hopefully see the actual runway when it comes time to decide which option to exercise. But for some reason, we allow and encourage the legal transition from an instrument procedure to a visual one in weather we otherwise wouldn't even consider flying visually in. If you see the faint glow from two approach lights you can legally continue, the unwritten/unspoken assumption being that on the aircraft's current stable trajectory all will be revealed momentarily. Most of the time it works but mainly by luck. Especially when you consider that once you are over the nice bright approach lights, all you can (hopefully) see are the dim runway edge lights. And the required visual reference to ensure you are somewhere near the approach lights and the required visual reference to descend precisely over a black hole in windshear, can be two very different things in reality. If the instrument approach terminates X miles from the runway at Y feet AGL, then they should be the ceiling and visibility limits to fly the approach. That way, when you break out, you should be able to see the actual runway you are trying to hit. Just my $0.02,
Cheers Sportingrifle.

[co-joe]

Perhaps the ban does occasionally contribute to an a/c not being able to land where maybe some rockstar who's used to the local environment could land, but that's not really the best criteria for designing an approach IMO.

An example of the nonsense of the approach ban in one circumstance ...

Going into YYT the rvr was below the ban limit and Air Canada diverted to YDF. We were right behind them on vectors and had extra gas so ATC put us on an extended downwind and after a few minutes we did the approach once rvr was at the limit.

The funny thing... the approach lights and runway threshold lights with some centerline lights were completely visible in the clear night sky. The fog bank was well beyond the threshold and covered the rest of the airport. We did the approach to landing in clear skies and with visual reference to the runway. Air Canada had the same visual reference but had to divert because the rvr was too low and they didn't have the extra gas.

Now back to you regularly scheduled program...

Isn't that basically the definition of a localised phenomenon? Or do rvr a and b and/or tower reported vis have to be disagreeing for that to apply?

[HiFlyChick]

Wow - you guys have given me a lot to think about (and some of it has to do with how people need to at least be more civil on this forum - rudeness does NOT give your opinion more weight!)

That being said - I get where Rockie is coming from, but it seems to relate more to a non-precision approach (i.e. step-down method) - perhaps there should be clarification that for approaches without glideslope the pilots must see the runway environment as opposed to the approach lights. IF AC had had WAAS capabilities, then the visual reference to approach lights could be backed up by the glideslope of the LPV. I think that sometimes folks get in trouble at DH when they have a reasonable view of the lights (i.e. the required visual reference) and totally abandon the glideslope info provided by whatever nav aid in favour of ducking down based on staring at the ground lights.

And then there's the whole visibility discussion - vis can vary quite widely from one area within the fog bank to another (especially around Halifax). A reported vis of 1/2 mile from the tower position can indeed be totally different out at the end of 05 (they're something like 1.5 miles or more apart - can't give a precise measurement - too lazy to go get the plate and do the math, but 05 is now 10,000+ ft long and the tower is adjacent to the approach end of 32). Attempting an approach in any visibility should be safe, because in the end the onus is on the pilot to not continue if it isn't. To say that we should try and legislate out any sort of judgement is a flawed argument because pilots will always need to be able to elect to overshoot based on judgement - you can't always define every situation, and even the term "stabilised approach" is not something that can be totally nailed down. Is the approach stabilised if at a certain point there is shear that momentarily drifts me a dot below the approach? So how long is that "moment" allowed to be before the approach is no longer considered stabilised? 2 secs? 10 sec? 30 sec? And does not airplane speed also play into this (i.e. the slower you are going the longer it takes for you to get off the GP and the longer you have to make corrections)

Also, with regards to vis, the time of day will also play a factor - under the old rules when I could do an approach at 1200 RVR (no fancy FD in my little aircraft), I've made it in after dark on an ILS due to the brightness of the lights. I've also missed with the RVR at 1600 on a foggy day with the sun shining onto the fog bank.

There are so many different factors that affect whether or not an approach will be successful that the rules can't be so tight as to prevent certain airplanes/equipment and crews from even trying just because there are others that won't be able to make it, or worse yet, will continue into an unsafe situation.

<Let the flaming begin!>

Oh wait - forgot to say - saw the discussion on something fishy with the approach - it may be possible that windshear played a part. If I recall, during that brief period when they landed the gusts increased to something like 54 kts....

<OK - so NOW you can continue the flaming >

[Mach7]

At the chance of being very unpopular, I feel the real culprit in this accident is the SCDA, (or CDA) approach.

This "elephant in the room", in my opinion is not as 'safe' an approach as a step down, (unless one is connected to a VNAV or has some sort of vertical guidance other than "dialing" in an estimated vertical speed).

The SCDA begins with a number of mental gymnastics to calculate the FAF crossing and rate of descent based on groundspeed, (easy for 05 Halifax as it is depicted on the chart, but some approaches are not so straight forward). You then must consider the changing aircraft ground speed in windy conditions and perform a missed approach at either the Decision Altitude or the MAP point WHICHEVER comes first.

As Pilots, were are programmed to see something of the Airport environment when we reach the DA, and many times the missed approach point has only been considered prior to the approach, but is (somewhat) ignored once we here the "100 above" call followed by "decide".

On an ILS you have a good idea where you will be when you get to minimums.....On a CDA, if you have NOT been doing the mathematical crosscheck inside the FAF and adjusting your VS accordingly (3 X dist + elev for 3 degree path)....or have NOT been concious of the missed approach point (DME), then it is a gamble what you are going to see when you get to your DA, but chances are you are not going to be right bang on profile.

On a step down, you get to MDA early and motor along until you get to the missed approach point...no math, no worry.

You also get a good taste of what the visibility is doing once level and are VERY aware of what you are supposed to see before you start down to the runway. If you see lights at 4 miles from the missed approach point, chances are its not the runway. Conversely if you start to see some of the airport environment at 1 or 2 miles back, well...you get the idea.

The point I am trying to make here is that you are waiting for one value to initiate a go-around on a step down procedure, the distance or point depicted on the approach plate to initiate a missed approach. If you pick up the runway environment prior to, then you have some time to decide if you are able to land safely off this approach. I usually wait until I identify the PAPIs (if available) and then start down on the two whites and two reds (and yes...there are PAPIs on runway 05)

I agree it may not be as 'stable' as the SCDA with respect to power and pitch changes for landing, but ask yourself how many well executed step downs have led to hull loss in the past 10 years, then look at the statistics on SCDA's.

Most Pilots are forced to do these SCDA's because it is the company policy, and consequently step downs approaches are frowned upon. The argument may be that it is not good to have full flap and gear down level at the MDA, but to do the SCDA you already had that same configuration prior to the FAF and that seemed to work pretty good (?).

[HiFlyChick]

Excellent point, Mach7 - I personally didn't see the problem with the step down vs the confusion of the SCDA, but since I only fly light twins I can't comment on the "dangers and difficulties" that are supposed to be intrinsic to a step-down on a large aircraft.

It's really only recently that TC mandated putting a SCDA approach into SOPs and I remember thinking at the time that SCDA may or may not have had a place 6 or 8 years ago, but WAAS has all but eliminated the need now. I never dreamt that a company the size of AC and flying the equipment they're flying would possibly have less capable equipment than what I am flying with in a Navajo!

Could someone who flies the big stuff comment on the difficulty of doing a step-down approach? Is it really as high risk as TC makes it out to be?

[rudder]

Could someone who flies the big stuff comment on the difficulty of doing a step-down approach? Is it really as high risk as TC makes it out to be?

It is because the MAP and the VDP (visual descent point) are different for an aircraft with an approach GS of 130-140 kts.

If you see the runway coincident with the MAP there is zero chance of a stabilized approach to landing. And big airplanes that are not stable on approach is a leading contributing factor to landing accidents.

[Mach7]

It is because the MAP and the VDP (visual descent point) are different for an aircraft with an approach GS of 130-140 kts.

Really? not the depicted on the approach plates we are using.

[HiFlyChick]

It is because the MAP and the VDP (visual descent point) are different for an aircraft with an approach GS of 130-140 kts.

If you see the runway coincident with the MAP there is zero chance of a stabilized approach to landing. And big airplanes that are not stable on approach is a leading contributing factor to landing accidents.

I guess I'm being obtuse today (why pick on today ), but I'm not sure I get what you are saying... The MAP on most non-precision approaches tends to be almost at the runway threshold and essentially too late to make a successful landing for most aircraft (except on extremely long runways and slow aircraft). In general, if you're going to get a landing out of a non-precision approach, it will happen well before the MAP, and I believe that the SCDA chart is such that the standard approach angle has you reaching the MDA well before the MAP. The whole concept of SCDA is that you act as if you are on an artificial glideslope and overshoot based on having reached the MDA and not waiting for the MAP.

That being said, I recall flying an approach that way one time to a runway without LPV but with SCDA info on the chart an executing the overshoot as proscribed at the MDA. On the second try, having reviewed the runway length and knowing the performance of our (light twin) aircraft, we came around for a second approach (two experienced captains flying together and having agreed on the second attempt) and levelled off at the MDA (i.e. only really half a SCDA an half a step-down, which I guess if you want to be picky is not really SCDA at all) and made it in - we saw it well before the MAP, but past the point where the 3 deg angle intercepts the MDA. I remember thinking at the time, though that the slow approach speed of the aircraft was what allowed us to complete the approach, other aircraft I fly that are faster would not have been able to do the slightly steeper angle required at the point where we went visual.

[trey kule]

CRM...PDM...SMS......

But some people seem to think (or not think at all), that they need TC to regulate what is safe....

Maybe TC should be putting some new regulations out that state..." If you are to stupid to know, or to figure out this approach is not a good idea.....then we will ban it"

TC has for years pushed the ideology that if it is not allowed, it must be unsafe, and ergo , if it is allowed it must be safe.

Pilot decision making? No no...it is all about what TC will allow.

while we are at it, why not get TC to ban all unitentional gear up landings...that should end a whole bunch of accidents according to this line of thinking

Own your mistakes. Pilots are not victims when they make bad decisions