feb 01 westjet rejects t/o..

GRK2 · Post by **GRK2** » Sat Feb 27, 2016 9:41 pm

You do that tough guy...but do me one favor? Let me know when you're flying? I'll stay in the bar and watch the fun and maybe catch the next flight...

Cheers!

#37 · Post by **#37** » Sun Feb 28, 2016 7:19 am

While you guys go on about stopping with a flat tire at V1, remember we are talking about YVR, and there are NO numbers for successfully completing a TO on the rims, or climb out with the gears hanging (which you are almost assured it will be in this case), let alone an actual engine failure alone with the mix.

Just me, prior to V1 much happier rejecting for an unknown failure (in this case I believe it was more than just the tires) even with the outside chance of a little slide of the end.
Remember there is no "tire failure" light, the indications are either so minor the pilots don't notice or "scare the shitouttaya" shaking and vibration.

Rockie · Post by **Rockie** » Sun Feb 28, 2016 9:22 am

#37 wrote:While you guys go on about stopping with a flat tire at V1, remember we are talking about YVR, and there are NO numbers for successfully completing a TO on the rims, or climb out with the gears hanging (which you are almost assured it will be in this case), let alone an actual engine failure alone with the mix.

Just me, prior to V1 much happier rejecting for an unknown failure (in this case I believe it was more than just the tires) even with the outside chance of a little slide of the end.
Remember there is no "tire failure" light, the indications are either so minor the pilots don't notice or "scare the shitouttaya" shaking and vibration.

There are numbers about stopping with the loss of one brake in the form of takeoff weight penalties which are significant. Rejecting close to V1 with a tire failure in a balanced field and you are going off the end. Common sense dictates you continue for a few more seconds until airborne, reduce your weight and land on the longest runway you can find with the entire length at your disposal to come to a stop. Not insignificantly it is also the unanimous recommendation of every manufacturer and operator out there. They have countless performance engineers, countless hours of test flight and almost 100 years of experience behind that recommendation.

But, you keep on being happy with the way you think it should be done.

Illya Kuryakin · Post by **Illya Kuryakin** » Sun Feb 28, 2016 9:31 am

Rockie wrote:
#37 wrote:While you guys go on about stopping with a flat tire at V1, remember we are talking about YVR, and there are NO numbers for successfully completing a TO on the rims, or climb out with the gears hanging (which you are almost assured it will be in this case), let alone an actual engine failure alone with the mix.

Just me, prior to V1 much happier rejecting for an unknown failure (in this case I believe it was more than just the tires) even with the outside chance of a little slide of the end.
Remember there is no "tire failure" light, the indications are either so minor the pilots don't notice or "scare the shitouttaya" shaking and vibration.
There are numbers about stopping with the loss of one brake in the form of takeoff weight penalties which are significant. Rejecting close to V1 with a tire failure in a balanced field and you are going off the end. Common sense dictates you continue for a few more seconds until airborne, reduce your weight and land on the longest runway you can find with the entire length at your disposal to come to a stop. Not insignificantly it is also the unanimous recommendation of every manufacturer and operator out there. They have countless performance engineers, countless hours of test flight and almost 100 years of experience behind that recommendation.

But, you keep on being happy with the way you think it should be done.

We're these guys near, or at, V1? You have maybe two "steamboats" to make the go-no go decision. Not the week we've spent here? It's BANG....what you gonna do? Right NOW? That's a big part of it.
Flame away. It's what we do.
Illya

oldncold · Post by **oldncold** » Mon Feb 29, 2016 11:52 pm

I will reiterate , kudos to the crew that everyone walked away in one piece. There have been 2 tragic accidents that I can remember in the last 20 years. One a metro that had overheated brakes and incorrect hydraulic fluid which resulted in a brake fire upon landing gear retraction after take off, then spar failure and wing separation and the Concorde .

Both Scenarios have been debated . The lessons ( take away) most intelligent folks I think would say to them selves is; if im ever in that situation and more than half of a 12000 feet of runway I am going to do my best to stop.

We can hypothesize all day and quarterback in hindsight, many here are experts at such things , arm chairing about what should be or could have been done better. The correct one always with out a doubt is the one where the passengers and crew walk away. Was this accomplished YES.

The psychology of that crew is only known on that day by them and the critical incident team, that are charged with figuring out how to prevent things like that from reoccurring. Questions like was it a new tire or a recap , did the maintenance crew working on the last shift notice anything unusual ,did the crew notice anything on the visual inspection and other human factors.

At the end its two qualified crew with a really big load of gas and a big swimming pool called the 'Georgia strait' water temp 3or 4c and it wasn't a smooth "hudson river like day" You hear loud bang something that not been covered in the sim or you many not have experienced in your career. In the pit of your gut with 5- 8 k of runway left are you really going to put that injured bird in the air.? Honestly after all the replays of the Concorde tire blown then punctures fuel tank . Again kudos guys Terra firma is a lot better place to argue it out.

pelmet · Post by **pelmet** » Tue Mar 01, 2016 7:45 pm

oldncold wrote:I will reiterate , kudos to the crew that everyone walked away in one piece. There have been 2 tragic accidents that I can remember in the last 20 years. One a metro that had overheated brakes and incorrect hydraulic fluid which resulted in a brake fire upon landing gear retraction after take off, then spar failure and wing separation and the Concorde .

Both Scenarios have been debated . The lessons ( take away) most intelligent folks I think would say to them selves is; if im ever in that situation and more than half of a 12000 feet of runway I am going to do my best to stop.

We can hypothesize all day and quarterback in hindsight, many here are experts at such things , arm chairing about what should be or could have been done better. The correct one always with out a doubt is the one where the passengers and crew walk away. Was this accomplished YES.

The psychology of that crew is only known on that day by them and the critical incident team, that are charged with figuring out how to prevent things like that from reoccurring. Questions like was it a new tire or a recap , did the maintenance crew working on the last shift notice anything unusual ,did the crew notice anything on the visual inspection and other human factors.

At the end its two qualified crew with a really big load of gas and a big swimming pool called the 'Georgia strait' water temp 3or 4c and it wasn't a smooth "hudson river like day" You hear loud bang something that not been covered in the sim or you many not have experienced in your career. In the pit of your gut with 5- 8 k of runway left are you really going to put that injured bird in the air.? Honestly after all the replays of the Concorde tire blown then punctures fuel tank . Again kudos guys Terra firma is a lot better place to argue it out.

As I stated more than once, no comment on the WJ flight in YVR as not all details are known.

While it doesn't surprise me that at least one individual here will reject at very high speed near V1 every time for blown tires, I will stick with what the detailed FAA information I posted recommends along with Douglas, Boeing, and Airbus also recommend.

You may be happy arguing on terra firma with the end of the runway approaching at 80 knots with a nice little dropoff(or whatever is there). I'll sort it out at 180 knots in the air and land at a nice light weight with all the runway ahead of me.

av8ts · Post by **av8ts** » Wed Mar 02, 2016 5:10 pm

Unless of course that noise was not what you thought it was, then instead of landing your light plane on a long runway you end a smoking hole like the concord or metro

Rockie · Post by **Rockie** » Wed Mar 02, 2016 6:09 pm

There is no dissenting opinion from any manufacturer, operator or safety organization on the recommended way to handle a tire failure near V1. Airbus even recommends continuing the takeoff once past V1 - 20 kts with a single tire failure. Plenty to read on the topic as well:

https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviatio ... safety.pdf
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeroma ... story.html
http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Rejected_Take_Off
http://www.airbus.com/fileadmin/media_g ... -SEQ04.pdf

J31 · Post by **J31** » Thu Mar 03, 2016 11:42 am

av8ts wrote:Unless of course that noise was not what you thought it was, then instead of landing your light plane on a long runway you end a smoking hole like the concord or metro

Almost 9000 Boeing 737 built over the last 49 years, over 500 million hours, and millions of takeoffs.

I could not even guess at the number of tire failures that have continued into the air and safely landed.

Boeing, Airbus, and the like have millions of pages of operational data and have given direction on how to handle tire failures. The Boeing 737 data indicates that it is safe to continue the takeoff for a high speed tire failure.

And you are comparing it to 14 operational Concorde!? Read the report, they were way past V1 on a balanced field limit when the trouble started.

We do not have many details and I will not question the Westjet Captain's decision to reject the takeoff. It all worked out and everyone was safe.

goingnowherefast · Post by **goingnowherefast** » Thu Mar 03, 2016 1:11 pm

You are rocketing down the runway, everything going well. 80kt passes, keep accelerating. Then some strange noise is heard, both pilots are thinking, perhaps saying "what the hell was that". There are no alarms going off. V1 is getting close, and eating up runway fast. This unknown noise has made you question the airworthiness of the aircraft. Decision was made to reject. It was done successfully. Everybody is alive and well, happy to complain about it on the internet...a month later!

I bet if you asked either pilot that morning what the procedure is for a tire failure at V1-10, they would say continue take-off.

linecrew · Post by **linecrew** » Thu Mar 03, 2016 2:36 pm

Back in 1995 a Canadian Airlines DC-10 rejected after V1 but it wasn't just a tire thing, the lost engine power. They rejected and the nose wheel collapsed in the ensuing overrun.

This part caught my attention:

"All the members of the flight crew reported that the sound was unlike anything they had heard before. Not only was the bang very loud, but it was difficult to specify its point of origin. None of the crew saw the engine fail light illuminate<23>, nor did they notice the drop in N1. The only cue the captain received to indicate that the take-off was no longer normal was the loud bang, followed by a series of thuds and vibrations. Because the situation did not match any of the captain's previous training or actual flying experience, he was required to respond instantly to the situation by drawing on whatever knowledge or other experience he had."

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-repor ... 5h0015.asp

goingnowherefast · Post by **goingnowherefast** » Thu Mar 03, 2016 6:49 pm

Looks like things turned out pretty well for them too. Some bent metal, but that's it. Around V1 is always risky. Not only because it pushes the performance limits of a potentially broken airplane, but because you have VERY limited time to make a potentially deadly decision based on failure modes that can't always be predicted and can easily be mis-interpreted.

GRK2 · Post by **GRK2** » Thu Mar 03, 2016 8:29 pm

Engine surge/stall in a heavy DC10 v tire failure at V1 v tire failure in a B737 at a much slower speed. Both require quick analysis by the crew to be sure, but as I am familiar with the DC 10 incident, and know the skipper, and not familiar with the WS reject it wouldn't be easy to compare the two acts. Suffice it to say, the differences in the initial indications (tire v surge/stall) are miles apart in the actions that need to follow. The engine surge/stall has memory items attached to the act of recognizing and securing the affected engine, the tire failure has none...(if the 737 does have I'd be happy to be corrected) I will stick with the TC/FAA/CAA/GCAA/Boeing/Airbus/Douglas well recognized and practiced actions of going flying at V1 rather than stopping for a tire failure with a heavy jet with short runway length remaining, get airborne, (yes it WILL fly, even with the gear down.) find out the problem, make a decision and return/divert with a lighter weight and use 4000M instead of 350M to stop...risking brakes fusing or catching fire, blowing tires, blocking a runway, leading to a possible evacuation, (and believe me,THAT'S a real ball breaker! They'll ask tons of hard question at the inquest!) To use the Concord accident as an example isn't right, those poor buggers were way past V1 when it happened.

Donald · Post by **Donald** » Thu Mar 03, 2016 8:54 pm

Re the DC10

The captain's decision to reject was based on the fact that he did not recognize the initial sound and subsequent thumping noises, and that, because he thought the bang could have been a bomb, he had concerns about the integrity of the aircraft and its ability to fly. Also, the captain stated that, based on the rejected take-off provisions in the DC-10 Flight Manual and on a fatal DC8 accident that he had witnessed, he had developed a mental rule to not take an aircraft into the air if he suspected that there was aircraft structural failure.

V1 was 164 (but calculated at 167)

Reject was called for at 172

fish4life · Post by **fish4life** » Thu Mar 03, 2016 9:14 pm

Ok was it single or double tire failure?

pelmet · Post by **pelmet** » Fri Mar 04, 2016 9:03 pm

av8ts wrote:Unless of course that noise was not what you thought it was, then instead of landing your light plane on a long runway you end a smoking hole like the concord

Are you not aware that accidentally shutting down a second engine on the same side tends to lead to smoking holes on heavyweight takeoffs. That is what happened to the Concorde. Completely different situation. Keep going and perhaps consider keeping the gear down.

J31 · Post by **J31** » Sun Mar 06, 2016 3:30 pm

pelmet wrote:
av8ts wrote:Unless of course that noise was not what you thought it was, then instead of landing your light plane on a long runway you end a smoking hole like the concord
Are you not aware that accidentally shutting down a second engine on the same side tends to lead to smoking holes on heavyweight takeoffs. That is what happened to the Concorde. Completely different situation. Keep going and perhaps consider keeping the gear down.

They did not accidentally shut down an engine. Number 2 failed and was secured with engine 2 fire handle.

goingnowherefast · Post by **goingnowherefast** » Sun Mar 06, 2016 5:46 pm

There was a lot going wrong with that Concorde flight. Engine #2 failed and was shut down, engine #1 failed, the gear didn't retract, and the wing was starting to fall apart.

pelmet · Post by **pelmet** » Mon Mar 07, 2016 7:29 am

J31 wrote:
pelmet wrote:
av8ts wrote:Unless of course that noise was not what you thought it was, then instead of landing your light plane on a long runway you end a smoking hole like the concord
Are you not aware that accidentally shutting down a second engine on the same side tends to lead to smoking holes on heavyweight takeoffs. That is what happened to the Concorde. Completely different situation. Keep going and perhaps consider keeping the gear down.
They did not accidentally shut down an engine. Number 2 failed and was secured with engine 2 fire handle.

The accident report glosses over this part of the accident. There were engine surges which recovered.

http://www.askthepilot.com/untold-concorde-story/

As stated here in this article, "Under normal circumstances Marty still had enough speed to climb away safely; however, he no longer had enough power. One engine had been badly damaged due to ingestion of foreign material — not only pieces of exploded tire, but debris from a runway edge light the jet had run over during the skid. A second engine, meanwhile, was shut down completely by the cockpit flight engineer — at a time and altitude when he was not supposed to do this, when remaining thrust from that engine was desperately needed for survival."

Anyways, once again, I stick with the manufacturers advice on reasons to do an RTO.

pdw · Post by **pdw** » Thu Mar 17, 2016 11:33 am

Askthepilot shows Marty had minus 8kts component, last minute info "ignored"

This RTO feb 01, a negative component starting during departure (also recent change/wx hist yvr). If the pilots are aware, that higher groundspeed by the time of rotation heats up tires so much more in extended roll, then IMO it plays into the decision of 'one's already gone'.

CL-Skadoo! · Post by **CL-Skadoo!** » Thu Mar 17, 2016 1:13 pm

pdw wrote:Askthepilot shows Marty had minus 8kts component, last minute info "ignored"

This RTO feb 01, a negative component starting during departure (also recent change/wx hist yvr). If the pilots are aware, that higher groundspeed by the time of rotation heats up tires so much more in extended roll, then IMO it plays into the decision of 'one's already gone'.

I'm curious to know, how much time do you have on large jet aircraft?

pdw · Post by **pdw** » Thu Mar 17, 2016 1:27 pm

None as pilot, yet we're only talking about the tires here now; thousands and thousands of miles, as they ended up used on farm equipment. Have you ever been beside one when it goes BANG! No? I haven't either ...

That's because when one exploded it doesn't go bang, it goes K A B O O M ! ! Big mushroom cloud.
So just that if speed & length of run is proportional to heating ... i know what's often spoken of is a long taxi they can already get warm. Only 5 tonnes per tire on the farm recaps but they did heat up and sometimes the steel aftermarket rims would blow out at the rim edge too. Only at 100-120lbs inflation. The speed limits were on the sidewall, so groundspeed matters there not airspeed.

What are the explosions like in the cabin when blowout delays to inside the tirewell?

Rockie · Post by **Rockie** » Thu Mar 17, 2016 4:05 pm

Jet transport tires are inflated up around the 250 psi range and you really don't want them going kaboom anytime or anywhere. That's why they're fitted with fuse plugs that melt and let the air out before that happens. I don't think it's heat that makes them fail but I could be wrong.

BTD · Post by **BTD** » Thu Mar 17, 2016 6:11 pm

Regarding Air France:

I never trust articles about reports. Just go to the report itself.

Ignition of the leaking fuel by an electric arc in the landing gear bay or through contact with the hot parts of the engine with forward propagation of the flame causing a very large fire under the aircraft’s wing and severe loss of thrust on engine 2 then engine 1.

http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/371.pdf

boeingboy · Post by **boeingboy** » Thu Mar 17, 2016 7:23 pm

The WestJet RTO actually consisted of both tires gone. When the aircraft was recovered the wheels were ground away and the brakes damaged.

I don't know the sequence of the failure but they both went in very short order.

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