Halifax crash report coming Thursday

[Cat Driver]

I'm with Cat Driver on this one. Nothing in automation land has changed our responsibilities once we close the door and start the engines.

Regardless of the type of aircraft or the amount of or lack of equipment in the aircraft it is the responsibility of the pilot / pilots to maintain situational awareness, in this case two pilots had lost situational awareness big time and crashed before the runway.

My sympathy is with the crew, but that only goes so far.

My sympathy is for the injured passengers but at least they were not killed and they could have been.

[Rockie]

Well that settles it then. What did we need an investigation for?

[rookiepilot]

I'm with Cat Driver on this one. Nothing in automation land has changed our responsibilities once we close the door and start the engines.

Regardless of the type of aircraft or the amount of or lack of equipment in the aircraft it is the responsibility of the pilot / pilots to maintain situational awareness, in this case two pilots had lost situational awareness big time and crashed before the runway.

My sympathy is with the crew, but that only goes so far.

My sympathy is for the injured passengers but at least they were not killed and they could have been.

Oh, the passengers.

Self loading Cargo.

[Cat Driver]

2. The crew blew through the MDA for 23 seconds, and continued descending to the ground while watching the autopilot do it.

Like I said.

They lost situational awareness, big time.

And Air Canada called it a hard landing, which of course is true.

It is where they " landed " that caused them to wreck the airplane, but I admit I am a bit hard line when it comes to two pilots flying a passenger carrying jet into the ground before the have reached the runway, sorry for my poor attitude Rockie.

[CpnCrunch]

Try actually reading the report ..

[Cat Driver]

Try actually reading the report ..

That is not in the report?

They actually landed short of the runway and plowed through the approach lights and had situational awareness before the hard landing?

Maybe I am just to critical I guess.

[Bede]

Well that settles it then. What did we need an investigation for?

So that you can get on AvCanada and tell everyone to hold off on speculation until the report comes out.

Sorry couldn't resist.

[PositiveRate27]

Try actually reading the report ..

That is not in the report?

They actually landed short of the runway and plowed through the approach lights and had situational awareness before the hard landing?

Maybe I am just to critical I guess.

You sound like a bad high school baseball coach.

"You suck at batting because you aren't hitting the ball. So hit the ball."

"What am I doing wrong? Why aren't I hitting the ball?"

"Because you're not hitting it. Back in my day even the kid with polio hit the ball, and they were lead!"

"What are my weak areas that are causing me to miss the ball? My stance? My grip? My swing plane?"

"I told you, you aren't hitting the ball. You need to hit the ball. Am I being too critical?"



I don't think anyone is absolving these pilots of the responsibility they played in this accident, but the report does point to some glaring and frankly alarming deficiencies in AC's Airbus operation and TC's approach ban and lighting requirements. Why can't we acknowledge and fix all 3 issues?

[Cat Driver]

but the report does point to some glaring and frankly alarming deficiencies in AC's Airbus operation and TC's approach ban and lighting requirements. Why can't we discuss fix all 3 issues?

Of course these deficiencies must be fixed.

It will be interesting to see what changes are made and if the changes will help pilots maintain situational awareness.....without knowing where you are it is difficult to end up where you want to be.

When I flew IFR we had instruments that gave us fairly accurate position in relation to our height above the ground at least two altimeters to determine height, and at least a DME for distance to the runway and using those properly and following the approach plan for the approach being flown we did not fly into the ground.

But that was some years ago and maybe that way of flying is a thing of the past.


***********************

I will now bow out of this discussion.

[CpnCrunch]

That is not in the report?

I was referring to blowing through the MDA, which you quoted, and which didn't actually happen.

[Gilles Hudicourt]

That is not in the report?

I was referring to blowing through the MDA, which you quoted, and which didn't actually happen.

Almost immediately after this call, the aircraft crossed the calculated MDA at 1.2 nm from the threshold. The PM observed some approach lights and called, "Minimum, lights only," when the aircraft was about 1.0 nm from the threshold. The PF immediately called, "Landing," and began to observe some approach lights.

The aircraft crossed the MDA at 1.2 from threshold
The PM called minimum lights only when the aircraft was 1.0 NM from threshold.

When you are doing a CAT II with a minimum of 100 AGL, do you want your colleague to call minimums at 100', or six seconds later ?

[CpnCrunch]

The aircraft crossed the MDA at 1.2 from threshold
The PM called minimum lights only when the aircraft was 1.0 NM from threshold.

If you look at the graph, it crossed MDA at 1.1nm from threshold (the report says "almost immediately after", but the graph shows 1.1nm). So PM called minimums 0.1nm (or 2.4 seconds at 150kts) after descending through MDA. If you want to say they "busted minimums", well I guess they busted it by 30ft before the PM opened his mouth.

[confusedalot]

question.....

never flew an airbus.

In a boeing, minimum autopilot disconnect is 50 feet unless doing an ils autoland.

what is the airbus autopilot disconnect limit on an airbus in a no precision approach environment?

Like i said before, I dunno, something is not adding up.

[confusedalot]

Sorry I forgot to mention that I recognize that severe fatigue can wreak havoc on the human brain, no matter the experience level.

High stress will also play a role. But still......touchdown before the approach lights? After all of those automated callouts?

Quite a mystery to me anyway.

It's all coming down to some ''other lights'' being mistaken for a runway environment, as hard as it is to comprehend.

[Eric Janson]

Seems to be a lot of confusion about how this approach was flown.

You select this approach in the Flight Management system but you are not flying an overlay. You use LOC mode to track the Localiser and the FPA is manually selected. (LOC/FPA).

All discussions about GPS and LPV are irrelevant imho as the aircraft was being flown using ground based Navaids.

FPA mode on the A320 works very well and makes it very easy to fly a non precision approach. You can adjust the FPA as required to maintain a vertical profile.

What the report doesn't mention is how often Pilots fly non precision approaches. It is possible not to ever see one outside the Simulator. If you haven't flown one in a while there are plenty of ways to mess things up.

What makes no sense is why you wouldn't monitor your vertical profile - that's basic IF.

The fact that this was not in the SOP and apparently missed by everyone is really incomprehensible to me.

There does seem to be an issue with non precision approaches and how they are flown by Canadian companies (Montego Bay and Sint Maarten).

Non precision approaches have changed from step down to SCDA - have the SOPs remained the same?

On the night in question my company would not have been able to fly this approach as the visibility was too low.

I see that the visibility requirements for this approach have now increased to 11/4 sm.

[Gilles Hudicourt]

The Airbus safety magazine, #23, January 2017 which contains this article, "Safely Flying Non Precision Instrument Approaches", that although it does not mention the Halifax accident, is clearly in response to it and its investigation findings.

Safely Flying Non Precision Instrument Approaches

Historically the distinction between flying ILS/MLS and non-precision approaches was very clear. However, many new kinds of instrument approaches are now available and this makes the distinction less obvious.
What remains true today for any approach is that disregarding basic flying techniques and procedures reduces safety margins.
This article clarifies which technologies are available to perform approaches using an Airbus aircraft. It also emphasises the safety messages that are important to remember whenever flying an approach.

OVERVIEW OF NAVIGATION TECHNOLOGIES

Ground based navigation technologies

Development of the earliest radio navigation systems started in the 1920s and 1930s. Initially, only the lateral course was supported by a radio navigation aid through systems such as Localiser (LOC), Non-Directional Beacons (NDB), and VHF Omni-Range (VOR). These systems provided, and continue to provide, guidance data for non-precision approaches.
With the growth of the air-transport system in the 1970s, it became necessary to reduce the number of accidents occurring due to lack of vertical guidance in approach, as well as to enable more consistent operations in poor weather.
Instrument-based Landing Systems (ILS) satisfy the requirement to provide both lateral and vertical (glide-slope) guidance, and therefore quickly became standard equipment at airports during the early 1970s. The inclusion of glide-slope guidance created what has become known as ‘precision approaches’. Later in that decade, the Microwave Landing System (MLS) was developed to reduce ILS -beam distortion and multi-path errors; but although it is in operation today, MLS has never gained a significant commercial aviation foothold and is only in limited service.
Historically, with the ground-based technologies described above providing the guidance, it was easy to differentiate between precision approaches and non-precision approaches simply on the basis of whether glide-slope guidance information was provided or not.

On-board technologies enhance Non Precision Approaches

With the increase in Flight Management System (FMS) capability through the 80’s and 90’s, and especially with the introduction of Global Positioning System (GPS) equipment into civil aviation, the simple distinction between precision and non-precision approaches used earlier is no longer possible. These on-board technologies have rapidly become very sophisticated and are progressively enabling vertical and lateral approach guidance at a similar level to that of an ILS precision approach.
The first enhancement of these non ILS/MLS instrument approaches came in the 1980s, with the replacement of the step-down technique (“dive & drive”) by Continuous Descent Final Approach (CDFA). Today, the majority of non-ILS/MLS approaches are flown using a barometric vertical guidance, for which QNH setting and temperature are key factors and this must be taken into consideration by the crew. The most sophisticated instrument approaches use geometric vertical guidance based on an augmented GPS signal to create ‘ILS-like’ approaches. In addition, various new GPS based techniques offer sufficient accuracy, even to the point of taking the industry beyond the traditional ‘straight-line’ approaches and enabled curved approaches.
As a result of all this development, some airports may have several approach charts available for a given runway as shown in (fig.1). In addition, each chart can present several minima. Therefore, pilots must be familiar with the charting from their provider in order to ensure correct understanding of approach charts.
Whatever the type of technology, we can state that with the introduction of the CDFA technique, all approaches now share two common characteristics:

• Descent profiles of instrument approaches have become similar: vertical guidance is provided and there is no level-off required at minima
• If the required visual references are not acquired by the applicable minima, or indeed lost after, a missed approach must be initiated.

FLYING APPROACHES WITH AN AIRBUS

The importance of vertical guidance

ICAO Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) studies have shown that once some form of vertical guidance is added to approaches, the safety margin is increased by a factor of 8. As a consequence, a focus was placed at Airbus in recent years to offer some guidance on the vertical path for all instrument approaches. If we now discount ILS and MLS approaches, there are different guidance modes available on Airbus aircraft to fly all types of instrument approaches, from TRK/FPA to managed modes offering guidance on both the lateral and vertical trajectory. Depending on the approach type, the crew has to select the appropriate one (fig.2). Managed modes are recommended, but selected mode might be useful in case of system or equipment failures. It is worth recalling that in selected mode, the Flight Path Angle (FPA) easily permits to follow the published descent gradient, but the pilot must still ensure that the vertical trajectory relative to the touchdown point is precisely followed.
The creation of new approach modes that have lateral and vertical profiles independent of navaids followed the introduction of the Flight Management System (FMS) in the 1980s and of the GPS in the 1990s. The objective was to standardize the way of flying all approaches down to the published approach minima, whatever the airport, and whatever the equipment on the ground. The FLS (FMS Landing System) is part of that concept and today, it is an Airbus option offering a solution to fly 99% of approaches that are not ILS/MLS, with a barometric vertical profile. It offers lateral and vertical guidance for a straight-in instrument approach, referenced from the aircraft position, along a trajectory retrieved from the FMS navigation database.

Navigating through approaches: key characteristics

Ultimately, what is needed to safely fly an approach is a clear picture of what it represents in terms of:
• The aircraft capabilities and crew qualifications (e.g. RNP-AR)
• The approach type
• The approach lateral axis, including potential offset with the runway axis (or FLS anchor point position)
• Vertical profile (barometric and temperature considerations)
• Applicable minima
• Aircraft guidance mode
• The recovery scenario in case of system failures or deviations exceedance

THE FMS LANDING SYSTEM (FLS) GUIDANCE MODE

FLS replicates the ILS beam concept, but using only the onboard navigation sensors with no need for additional ground aids. The FMS constructs a “pseudo beam” which has an anchor point (not necessarily aligned with the runway threshold), approach course and Flight Path Angle (FPA) (fig.3), and which overlays the final segment of an instrument approach with a temperature compensation on final segment for the indicated altitude. FLS allows a pilot to fly an approach down to minima as an ‘ILS-alike approach’ thanks to the CDFA technique. In addition, the human / machine interface has been designed similar enough for the crew to capitalize on their current techniques but different enough for the crew not to mistake a non-precision approach flown
with FLS for an ILS thanks to a distinctive symbology (fig.4). In the end, this concept makes these approaches more simple to fly, thereby contributing to an increase in safety. A characteristic of the FLS is that it can only be used for straight-in approaches but it is not compatible with curved RNP-AR approaches. Indeed, for curved approaches, crews need to undertake specific training and checking, and use the FINAL APP (or APP-DES on A350 aircraft) mode. Nevertheless, Airbus is working towards co-existence of the two modes so that all non-ILS/MLS approaches are flown in FLS and the FINAL APP mode remains available for RNP-AR.

FLYING AN INSTRUMENT APPROACH SAFELY

A well trained and briefed crew: why preparation is key to a successful approach, whatever its type

For a flight crew, after possibly long hours of flight or a busy day’s flying schedule, the objective is to perform the most appropriate approach available at the airport according to the weather, aircraft capability, crew knowledge and training.
To fly a non-ILS/MLS approach using managed guidance requires a valid FMS data base. If not, then selected guidance must be used. The FMS data base is considered validated if the provider is compliant with Regulatory requirements and/or validated by the Operator (depending on FMS standards and approach types). In addition, because instrument approaches that are not ILS/MLS may not be flown on a daily basis they require good preparation both on ground and in flight.
Before the flight commences, GPS coverage (Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) / Autonomous Integrity Monitored Extrapolation (AIME)) at destination must be checked if approach requiring GPS only is expected.
When in flight, the crew should ensure that the status of the aircraft is compliant with the technical requirement to fly the approach. In accordance with SOP, the FMS waypoints have to be checked versus the applicable chart to ensure that the correct approach has been selected and that the aircraft will fly the charted trajectory. During the descent preparation, the crew must define and agree on the aircraft guidance mode depending on the approach type and applicable minima. For this purpose, the cross-reference table published in FCOM is helpful (fig.5). The action plan to fly the approach must also consider threats and errors management, e.g. vertical profile, visual segment after minima and offset. During the descent, the flight crew should check that the navigation accuracy is compliant with the approach type and use the guidance mode that was intended to be flown, as per SOP.

Minima must be respected

With the increasing precision of the navigation means used to fly any approach (e.g. GPS positioning) and the improved reliability of aircraft on-board systems, there is an observed tendency of crews to delay the go-around decision perhaps because of increased confidence in the aircraft automation to guide them below the published minima. This tendency translates into a significant reduction of the safety margins, especially with respect to flying without visual references below the minima.
Data has shown that if visual conditions were not achieved at the minima but were still expected, some crews waited a little bit longer, hoping for visibility to improve before they made the decision to go-around. This means that they were now flying unsafely below minima with no visual references. Likewise, if visibility is good at minima but it then reduces, some crews may decide to continue the approach, hoping for an improvement in the visibility. This tendency could also be reinforced if pilots are not go-around minded. In reality, any “negotiation” with the visibility requirement from the minima and below for any approach is a drift into danger

The most important safety messages to keep in mind to fly any kind of instrument approach are:
• Know which procedure your company allows
• Prepare the approach well in advance; on ground and in flight
• Know which parameters and deviations or systems failures should trigger a go-around decision
• Brief, share and understand the intended approach technique to be used
• Fly as you are trained. Fly the brief
• Respect the minima; from the minima and below, visual references are primary references. If they are not there or don’t
remain there, go-around!
• From the minima, ensure the aircraft can continue with a normal rate of descent and bank angle, to land within the touchdown zone.
Finally, the Pilot Monitoring (PM) has a vital role to play in all instrument approaches. The PM must understand what the Pilot Flying (PF) has planned to do, what the PF is doing right now and what the PF will do in the near future. The PM supports the PF in using the SOP callouts and ultimately ensuring that the minima are respected. He/she also assists the PF in monitoring the appropriate arming and engagement of guidance modes at the right time.

[complexintentions]

With regards to injuries, not all of them were pax. According to the report (and yes, I read all 96 pages of it), the FO suffered a serious eye injury due to hitting the glare shield on impact when his harness inertia reel failed. I was truly sad to read that and hope the injury wasn't career-threatening.

A question about the Airbus FPA control - elsewhere it seems to state that the angle can't be altered once selected. That seemed a bit odd - is that correct? Surely there is a way to shallow the descent if you realize it's too steep? And I do realize now that conducing the approach in V/S is not in the SOP's for this fleet (or at least not the "recommended" procedure). But I stand by my distrust of FPA mode, have always hated it. Vertical speed is measured in ft/min, and the instruments reflect that - I've never seen any climb/descent "angle" displayed on a VSI. A mode designed to (attempt) to hold a specific angle from any random point in space is more clever than useful. And then when there are "perturbations" that move it from the desired flight path, there is nothing to indicate that EXCEPT a distance/height crosscheck. FPA is a backwards way of looking at a descent profile: I consider rate of descent over distance, FPA calculates a constant angle no matter where it originates or terminates. What could go wrong?

Which leads in a big circle all the way back to my original point: how do experienced pilots conduct a NPA in terrible weather using a vertical mode not linked to any fixed navaid without some sort of backup check? Because they believed the SOP's were infallible?

I'm sorry, but that HAS to go in the "airmanship" column, not analysis of lighting/procedural disrepancies/approach bans. Yes, the regulations may be insufficient - which is why we need to protect ourselves with our own experience!

Once again a PPRune poster has said it best:

But why would you not check the vertical profile whether required by SOPs or not.
Isn't there an element of self preservation in all of us pilots.
mcdhu

[Gilles Hudicourt]

Seems to be a lot of confusion about how this approach was flown.

You select this approach in the Flight Management system but you are not flying an overlay. You use LOC mode to track the Localiser and the FPA is manually selected. (LOC/FPA).

All discussions about GPS and LPV are irrelevant imho as the aircraft was being flown using ground based Navaids.

Not entirely true.
The LOC mode indeed tracks the localiser, and RAW localiser data is displayed, but the distance to the runway is FMS derived. The Rwy 05 localiser in CYHZ does not have a co-located DME. So if the crew relied solely on the FMS to start their 3.5 degree descent path, and the FMS (in absence of GPS) was off by .3 miles....

Thats a lot of Ifs, but IFs that the report should have cleared up instead of leaving readers in the dark......

[Cliff Jumper]

So, now that everyone has decided to hand the crew on 'bad airmanship' for not cross checking their alt/distance.... did anyone look at the graph and notice the first cross check point where they were actually low?

3 dme. 1.3 to the threshold.

[Gilles Hudicourt]

A question about the Airbus FPA control - elsewhere it seems to state that the angle can't be altered once selected. That seemed a bit odd - is that correct? Surely there is a way to shallow the descent if you realize it's too steep?

That is not correct. It can be corrected. When you realize you are too high or too low, you modify the FPV to bring yourself back into the slot.....

[Jack Klumpus]

The PF will adjust the FPA according to their path. It's a knob that you turn +/-. At my company, the PM will call out the deviation every 1nm according to the chart. Take into effect the hot/cold temperature corrections.

Minimums are minimums. You go around anytime before. Once you reach your minimums is not when you start to think about the go around.

By the way, what's the FCOM say about disconnecting the autopilot when flying a non precision approach? This crew didn't follow the airbus FCOM limitations for auto-pilot disconnection in a non precision approach.

Auto pilot off, FD off, bird on.

[complexintentions]

Just to be clear, I have no interest in "hanging" anyone, Cliff Jumper.

I'm just making a statement - perhaps more of a plea - to set aside years of "investigation", thousands of hours of finger pointing and navel-gazing, pages of jargon and assignation of blame and leaning on procedure and government regulation to save us all.

To suggest, that maybe this could have been prevented with as little, as a bit of common sense as exercised by even a fairly new pilot flying up north in the bush.

Know your distance and altitude, no matter what, or how, or what aircraft you're in, or what type of operation.

That is not correct. It can be corrected. When you realize you are too high or too low, you modify the FPV to bring yourself back into the slot.....

I did not say it was correct, I asked if it was. I've rarely been curious enough about Airbus to even ask.

Next question: how do you know you're "back into the slot"?

Thats a lot of Ifs, but IFs that the report should have cleared up instead of leaving readers in the dark......

Well, it only took several years and 96 pages, perhaps the answers are in the next 96...

[Gilles Hudicourt]

posted by error

[Gilles Hudicourt]

Next question: how do you know you're "back into the slot"?

Well for starters, I would have not have initiated the approach the way this crew did it. Maybe they did it according to AC SOPs, I don't know, but here is my reasoning:

A SCDA NPA is one where you do a NPA as though it was a precision approach and where one treats the MDA as a DH. The separate MAP (the Rwy 05 threshold in this case) is done away with. Reach DH, and its "landing" or "Go around", with no need to level off until reaching the MAP.

So, my reasoning is that you are supposed to fly this as though it was an ILS. Had the crew been on an ILS for 05 and had been cleared to 4000 feet and then cleared for the ILS approach, they would have descended to 4000', armed the approach (NAV) and left 4000' on the G/S. So why didn't they do the same here ?

We learn from the report :

At 0016, the terminal controller cleared AC624 to the intermediate fix ODKAS, 11.6 nautical miles (nm) 12 from the runway, and cleared the flight to descend to 4000 feet ASL.

At 0023, AC624 levelled off at 3400 feet ASL about 12 nm from the threshold.

At approximately 0026, about 8 nm from the runway threshold, the PF called for the landing gear to be extended and for the landing checks to be completed. The aircraft levelled off at 2200 feet ASL, the landing gear was extended, and the missed approach altitude was set.

Why all these level offs and step downs ? Maybe AC SOPs, I don't know. It seems to defeat the purpose of SCDA.

The way I fly such an approach is I calculate a descent point for a of 3.5 degree FPA before the FAF, in order to pass the FAF at 2200'. In this case, 5 NM from the FAF (4.7 NM plus the .3). By doing it that way, you have a first chance to correct your descent path by adjusting the FPV it in order to pass the FAF at 2200. By putting 2200 in the ALT window of the FCU, the instruments place a marker in your ND to show you where you will reach the target altitude, based on the current FPV setting. If you are too steep, the marker will appear before the FAF, if you are too shallow, the marker will appear after the FAF. You adjust the FPV so the marker and the FAF are co-located on the ND.

(some people would first calculate and fly a 3 degree FPA to the FAF and then change the FPA to 3.5 degrees after passing the FAF)

That would be the first 'GATE' that the AC SOPs talks about:

Air Canada's Stable Approach Policy is built around an Arrival Gate concept whereby a flight shall not continue the approach unless the required criteria for each Arrival Gate are met. There are two Arrival Gates for every approach; the first is the FAF (or FAF equivalent), the second Arrival Gate is at 500 feet AGL (or 100' above minimums, whichever is higher). A Go-around is mandatory if the criteria for each Arrival Gate is not met.

No flight shall continue an approach past the FAF Arrival Gate unless it is being flown in a way that ensures the Stable Approach Criteria will be met by the 500 foot Arrival Gate.

At the second gate (500 feet AGL or 100 feet above the MDA), no flight shall continue unless the following stable approach criteria are met

One of which being:

Established on the correct vertical approach path

To cross check your vertical path past the FAF, you'd have to use the table from the approach chart which is reproduced in Table 14 of the report. That would not only require tuning in the IHZ DME but compensating for temperature as well.

So in my view, by initiating the PFV descent at the FAF instead of at 4000', the crew missed a first opportunity to correct its FPV angle and cross the FAF at the correct altitude (instead of passing it at 2170, as the report states it did). Monitoring the DME and setting a second GATE after passing the FAF, as per their SOPs, would have allowed them to further correct the FPV or at least realize that they were below flight path.

I am in no way criticizing the crew here, for all they did or did not do was colored by their SOPs, their training, the company history and culture, the documentation that was or was not available to them, the input that Transport Canada may of may not have put into AC training and procedures, and AC communications and support with Airbus..... all subjects about which I know zip.....

Just discussing the approach technique in a bubble......

[Rockie]

If you look at the graph, it crossed MDA at 1.1nm from threshold (the report says "almost immediately after", but the graph shows 1.1nm). So PM called minimums 0.1nm (or 2.4 seconds at 150kts) after descending through MDA. If you want to say they "busted minimums", well I guess they busted it by 30ft before the PM opened his mouth.

0.1 nm is 600 feet. I don't know what the issue is here either because the PM did exactly what he was supposed to do and the PF responded exactly the way he was supposed to. He thought he saw the lights and continued just like he was trained and as allowed by Transport Canada.

In a boeing, minimum autopilot disconnect is 50 feet unless doing an ils autoland.

what is the airbus autopilot disconnect limit on an airbus in a no precision approach environment?

The limitation in the Airbus is to disconnect the autopilot at MDA. From that point on the pilot is (supposed to be) flying visually.

FPA mode on the A320 works very well and makes it very easy to fly a non precision approach. You can adjust the FPA as required to maintain a vertical profile.

A question about the Airbus FPA control - elsewhere it seems to state that the angle can't be altered once selected. That seemed a bit odd - is that correct?

That is not correct. It can be corrected. When you realize you are too high or too low, you modify the FPV to bring yourself back into the slot.....

Next question: how do you know you're "back into the slot"?

The PF will adjust the FPA according to their path. It's a knob that you turn +/-.

On a LOC approach the descent is started from a known DME position at the FAF. Beyond the FAF company SOP is to not adjust the FPA as there is no reliable displayed glidepath in non-GPS aircraft. In a GPS aircraft the FMS/GPS derived GP can be used as additional information, but as it is not the primary reference no corrections are to be made using it as such. If things look like they're going off the rails you do a go-around.

Now many of you are saying it definitely did go off the rails so the crew should have done a go-around, and in 20/20 hindsight, sitting comfortably at your computer with a cup of coffee in your hand you're right. However on that dark and dirty night to the crew it looked like everything was going as planned. They thought they saw what they were supposed to see given the regulation approved visibility conditions until it was too late. The autopilot disconnect issue is irrelevant because had they disconnected it at MDA how exactly would that have improved the situation?

Worldwide, the airline industry cooperates on safety and as a result we enjoy a record many times better than any other sector of aviation even given the thousands upon thousands of flights that occur every day/night in all kinds of weather, terrain etc. If you look at graphs of historical accident rates they show that over the years the rate has decreased dramatically, but leveled off at a very low level. The target though remains zero. Now the industry is looking at more than just typical contributing causes like human factors, mechanical, weather etc. Now they are looking more at everything supporting a crew like training, SOP's, policies, technology and regulations.

Some of the obvious causes are already being addressed like SOP's and airfield lighting. What is completely lacking in this report though is regulatory culpability. Nowhere else on earth would this crew have been permitted to even attempt this approach in the conditions existing at the time. Canada's approach ban and required visual references allowed this accident to happen. It's all well and good to say the crew should have done this or shouldn't have done that, but the bottom line is they did everything correctly and in accordance with SOP's and regulations. How about we fix those?