NT Air King Air Accident - Pilot Discussion Thread

[KK7]

I've had a fellow pilot I was working with get a false engine fire indication on a single engine aircraft. Although he knew it was likely false, he declared an emergency, returned to the airport and requested CFR services to be standing by. He was rightly applauded by management for his handling of the emergency.

Sadly, our maintenance engineers on site were downright pissed and chastised the pilot for declaring an emergency and requesting CFR to stand by, and to this day I don't understand why. There was no paperwork involved other than an incident report that was completed by the pilot and would have been filed regardless. The work that had to be completed on the aircraft was unaffected by the pilot's actions. What gives?

I'll get to the point and say for all the support personnel out there, don't be chewing out pilots for declaring emergencies and requesting the trucks to come out. It's not your butt in the airplane, and if it were I'm sure you'd want the pilot to do all these things.

[Flybabe]

Nothing worse than being chastised by management for erring on the side of caution.

Actually, there is far worse than being chastised by management for doing your job properly. For example rolling your plane into a ball. In fact, I can't think of anything that isn't worse. If some idiot in management chastised me for calling out emergency services when it turned out I didn't need it, no big deal. I'd put them in their place, referencing the company's SOPs, OPS Manual, CARs, etc.

+1

[AEROMONKEY]

I can tell you that a chain link fence wouldn't even slow my truck down....they are built like tanks! And pumping out 3000 + liters per minute ...they can spray pretty far too, not to mention the 200 + ft of hose , jaws of life and quick cut saws...we're well equipped...obviously time is important so like they said earlier "if in doubt call them out". At the very least it gives us the chance to meet someone new....and there is barely any paperwork involved for us coming out...like 5 minutes worth. If anyone in CYQT would like to come for a tour of our facility feel free to contact me. Thanks.

[righthandman]

Doesn't look like the plane climbed after they turned around:

The flight path, air speed and altitude of Flight 204.

3:41 p.m. - Plane takes off from Vancouver International Airport

----snip----
4:11:28 - Speed: 162 Km/h, Altitude: 61 metres near airport

4:11:34 - Speed: 198 km/h, Altitude: 61 metres (Final reading on radar before plane disappears from radar)

Source: WebTracker: YVR

© Copyright (c) The Vancouver Sun

(VMC forB200): 86 KIAS= 159 km/hr so if B100 is comparable (maybe not.. diff engines??) then they were operating close to it (second to last radar hit) and low to the ground. This could have turned into a problem. But then who the heck knows.

I knew Luc personally mainly from my instructor days in YUL and we kept in touch while he was globe trotting. I know he was a top notch pilot and a top notch individual. RIP

[Wilbur]

On the issue of activating ARFF, I wonder if airports should establish stronger protocols with the FD's in their surrounding communities. Could things have turned out more favourably for the victims in this accident if the responding Richmond FD crews had been in their trucks, engines running and ready to roll before the crash happended? Would the 2 or 3 minute decrease in response time have made a difference?

[200hr Wonder]

On the issue of activating ARFF, I wonder if airports should establish stronger protocols with the FD's in their surrounding communities. Could things have turned out more favourably for the victims in this accident if the responding Richmond FD crews had been in their trucks, engines running and ready to roll before the crash happended? Would the 2 or 3 minute decrease in response time have made a difference?

Up until just a few years ago the ARFF at YVR was staffed by the Richmond FD, there was a bunch of political fallout at the time when that was changed. I have found an archived Vancouver Sun article which is no longer online about that:

RICHMOND, BC - The loss of a multi-million-dollar fire contract with the Vancouver International Airport has cost the City of Richmond more than $2.5 million in early retirement buyouts for 31 senior firefighters, according to a city document detailing remuneration and expenses for 2004.

The fire department was forced to reduce its staffing to 212 from 254 after the airport cancelled its $3.3-million fire contract with the city and started its own fire department. Richmond Fire Chief Jim Hancock said 11 of the 42 positions eliminated were done through retirements, while the remainder were buyouts.

The downsizing also robbed the department of many of its experienced managers. "We lost a lot of talent and a lot of experience," said Hancock. "These guys were icons, they'd been here a long time -- 30 to 35 years -- and we just reeled from that."

So how close are the ties? Does Airport Ops or Nav Can call 911 like everyone else?

[Topspin]

On the issue of activating ARFF, I wonder if airports should establish stronger protocols with the FD's in their surrounding communities. Could things have turned out more favourably for the victims in this accident if the responding Richmond FD crews had been in their trucks, engines running and ready to roll before the crash happended? Would the 2 or 3 minute decrease in response time have made a difference?

Up until just a few years ago the ARFF at YVR was staffed by the Richmond FD, there was a bunch of political fallout at the time when that was changed. I have found an archived Vancouver Sun article which is no longer online about that:

RICHMOND, BC - The loss of a multi-million-dollar fire contract with the Vancouver International Airport has cost the City of Richmond more than $2.5 million in early retirement buyouts for 31 senior firefighters, according to a city document detailing remuneration and expenses for 2004.

The fire department was forced to reduce its staffing to 212 from 254 after the airport cancelled its $3.3-million fire contract with the city and started its own fire department. Richmond Fire Chief Jim Hancock said 11 of the 42 positions eliminated were done through retirements, while the remainder were buyouts.

The downsizing also robbed the department of many of its experienced managers. "We lost a lot of talent and a lot of experience," said Hancock. "These guys were icons, they'd been here a long time -- 30 to 35 years -- and we just reeled from that."

So how close are the ties? Does Airport Ops or Nav Can call 911 like everyone else?

Tower calls airport ops on the red phone, airport ops responds as necessary, Off-site Ambulances, airfield coordinator, ARFF, etc, whatever is necessary.

They have a good relationship with 911 dispatch, if you call 911 to the building, 911 dispatch will notify airport ops who will dispatch bike paramedics or ARFF or whatever.

Interesting caveat I really hope had no role in the response, Airport Ops switched to $12/hr subcontracting as recently as two weeks ago, putting a couple of brand new folks in the hot seat.

Richmond Fire has a hall 500 metres or so from the crash site, would be surprised if they didn't show up as well.

[human garbage]

...Interesting caveat I really hope had no role in the response, Airport Ops switched to $12/hr subcontracting as recently as two weeks ago, putting a couple of brand new folks in the hot seat...

Do you have a source on this? The only change I had heard of was the Wildlife officers, who were replaced by cheaper, non-union employees after the airport declined to renew the Commissionaires contract.

Not saying you are wrong, but I do have a hard time believing that YVR would replace ARFF with $12/hr employees. Look at the quality of the CATSA folks at the same price point. Potential PR nightmare for the airport if they have... Risking lives to save some cash. Pretty risky move...

[Topspin]

...Interesting caveat I really hope had no role in the response, Airport Ops switched to $12/hr subcontracting as recently as two weeks ago, putting a couple of brand new folks in the hot seat...

Do you have a source on this? The only change I had heard of was the Wildlife officers, who were replaced by cheaper, non-union employees after the airport declined to renew the Commissionaires contract.

Not saying you are wrong, but I do have a hard time believing that YVR would replace ARFF with $12/hr employees. Look at the quality of the CATSA folks at the same price point. Potential PR nightmare for the airport if they have... Risking lives to save some cash. Pretty risky move...

Not ARFF, Airport Ops Centre Agents.

[human garbage]

Not ARFF, Airport Ops Centre Agents.

Ahhh OK. Makes sense now. Sorry for misunderstanding your post sir!

That is too bad. There are (were??) some great women working in Ops when I had to deal with them. Sucks to take a 50% pay cut. Pilots know all too well that 12/hr is not a living wage.

[Topspin]

Not ARFF, Airport Ops Centre Agents.

Ahhh OK. Makes sense now. Sorry for misunderstanding your post sir!

That is too bad. There are (were??) some great women working in Ops when I had to deal with them. Sucks to take a 50% pay cut. Pilots know all too well that 12/hr is not a living wage.

Actually in a pinnacle of retardation, management didn't even layoff. Most were retained in bee keeping positions, I don't believe one went to the subcontractor, for a net savings of negative, but that's not a story for this thread.

[elvis]

This getting off the topic of this thread but!!

Wildlife control officers were hired 01 March 2009 at a higher wage than Commisionars had been paid.but less than they were asking for if they had not been replaced by more highly trained replacement staff. The escorts that park and watch outside workers paint or build the new YVR fence make more than the wildlife crew that have free range on all taxiways!!!Even pilots must ask for taxi clearance..

The Wildlife Control Officers are Teamsters Local 213 since day one starting with westguard

[180]

Any word on how the co-pilot is doing?

Thoughts and prayers...

[Prairie Chicken]

This year the number of RIP messages and causal discussions has been depressingly high. We'll have to wait for several months yet, but my suspicions are that 2011 has thrown a real spike into Canadian accident stats.

I am a strong believer and supporter of SMS, when diligently conducted, but is it possible that we are starting to see a trend as a result of the move toward SMS? I certainly hope not, and from a statistical perspective I can't see such a dramatic change so soon, but is it possible?

Just wondering if anyone else had the same thought?

[trey kule]

Well, as we are drifting from topic PC

SMS, as a philosophy, is excellent. Unfortuantely, ICAO, when advocating it as a formal procedure, was focused on international airlines.As a formal process,it was never intended to be implemented in small operations. Transport, in Canada, decided it was such a good idea, that they attempted to formalize it, and make it work for small operators..It was, and continues to be, in most cases, nothing more than an extra paper exercise in an attempt to turn a small operator into the same beauracratic quagmire that exists in TC itself. It is not achieving the objectives, and TC will just not face up to that fact, instead choosing enforcement actions to try and implement what should not have been implemented.
Couple this with the shift in trying to replace experience with training, and we have a problem.
Very inexperienced FO's in two crew operations who are more a student pilot than a working flight crew member, and you have breakdowns in CRM, SOP's etc. This is not the case with the Canadian majors, as they ,for the most part hire experienced crew, and have excellent training, monitoring, and good equipment.
The accidents we are going to see, as I predicted a few years ago when the flight colleges starting pushing training vs experience, is with the smaller 703 type operators flying smaller twin engine and sophisticated single engine aircraft.
Some foreign regulators have seen this, and reacted by requiring FO's on two crew aircraft to have minimum PIC hours, and upgrades only after substantial time as an FO, as they have found there is simply no substitute for experience. It is to bad that TC has not learned that lesson.
Until we see some changes, first in the regulations, and then secondly by operators understanding that a 300 hour wonder flying a Navajo in hard IFR in the north, faces some serious challanges, and having another 250 hr FO on board does not solve the problem, the accident trend, will unfortunately continue to go upward.

The solution is expensive for operators, having to hire experienced pilots means higher wages, and particularily in the north, will present some challanges to filling flight crew positions.
Generally, those with experience realize just how dangerous this flying really is, particularily if the equipment is not top notch, and having a talking bag of sand in the right seat does not make it safer...in fact, in my opinion , less safe, because the authority gradient is just to steep.

Anyway, this in not a comment on the NT accident at all., as I have no idea of all the facts in this case, and any comments would be uniformed wild speculation, and there are other posters here who seem quite capable of providing that.

[Prairie Chicken]

I guess I was trying to stay on topic by asking if SMS could have contributed to the NT accident (and others). I hope not, but the thought has crossed my mind given the number of accidents Canada has experienced this year.

[flyinthebug]

Well, as we are drifting from topic PC

SMS, as a philosophy, is excellent. Unfortuantely, ICAO, when advocating it as a formal procedure, was focused on international airlines.As a formal process,it was never intended to be implemented in small operations. Transport, in Canada, decided it was such a good idea, that they attempted to formalize it, and make it work for small operators..It was, and continues to be, in most cases, nothing more than an extra paper exercise in an attempt to turn a small operator into the same beauracratic quagmire that exists in TC itself. It is not achieving the objectives, and TC will just not face up to that fact, instead choosing enforcement actions to try and implement what should not have been implemented.
Couple this with the shift in trying to replace experience with training, and we have a problem.
Very inexperienced FO's in two crew operations who are more a student pilot than a working flight crew member, and you have breakdowns in CRM, SOP's etc. This is not the case with the Canadian majors, as they ,for the most part hire experienced crew, and have excellent training, monitoring, and good equipment.
The accidents we are going to see, as I predicted a few years ago when the flight colleges starting pushing training vs experience, is with the smaller 703 type operators flying smaller twin engine and sophisticated single engine aircraft.
Some foreign regulators have seen this, and reacted by requiring FO's on two crew aircraft to have minimum PIC hours, and upgrades only after substantial time as an FO, as they have found there is simply no substitute for experience. It is to bad that TC has not learned that lesson.
Until we see some changes, first in the regulations, and then secondly by operators understanding that a 300 hour wonder flying a Navajo in hard IFR in the north, faces some serious challanges, and having another 250 hr FO on board does not solve the problem, the accident trend, will unfortunately continue to go upward.

The solution is expensive for operators, having to hire experienced pilots means higher wages, and particularily in the north, will present some challanges to filling flight crew positions.
Generally, those with experience realize just how dangerous this flying really is, particularily if the equipment is not top notch, and having a talking bag of sand in the right seat does not make it safer...in fact, in my opinion , less safe, because the authority gradient is just to steep.

Anyway, this in not a comment on the NT accident at all., as I have no idea of all the facts in this case, and any comments would be uniformed wild speculation, and there are other posters here who seem quite capable of providing that.

I had the privledge of running a small 703 op for over 4 years in Northern Sask. We ran a Beech 100, 3 PA31, PA34, C310 and 3 single trainers. Never once did I allow any of our Ho#s to leave the ground with a 300 hr wonder in the left seat and a 250 hr wonder in the right. I dont know ANY ops that allow guys with 300 hr to Captain a PA31-350. Our minimums were 1000 hours TT with 250 MPIC before we would upgrade to captain. What makes you think small 703 ops send out 300 hr pilots into hard IFR in old equipment...Its just not so! When I left in 2005 we had been 31 years accident free and counting. I believe most ops run like ours did. An experienced captain in the left seat and newbies in the right. It was never 2 newbies and its kinda ridiculous to suggest other 703 ops do this. ALL the ones ive ever done business with or worked for, had similiar progressions.

Yes, the flying is at times dangerous but we ALL know the risks going in. If you run a 703 like a professional air service, you will often have positive results. Treat the young pilots as you treat experienced pilots and you can safely run a 703 op for years to come.

This all said, I do concur with PC that maybe SMS on the 703 level is allowing the lunatics to run their own asylum and that could be a potential problem. The threat of TC oversight and random `drop ins`managed to always keep us on our toes and ensure our equipment was safe and legal. With this threat of oversight now gone, it opens the door for less then honest ops to run rampant and without accountability. That is the REAL scare of SMS as ive been preaching since its inception.
Fly safe all.

[cncpc]

I guess I was trying to stay on topic by asking if SMS could have contributed to the NT accident (and others). I hope not, but the thought has crossed my mind given the number of accidents Canada has experienced this year.

The NT air accident was caused by an oil leak and problems which developed when the oil depleted to a level at which other events would occur. I'm not sure how SMS would have prevented this, unless the NT Air SMS mandated a land as soon as possible decision in these circumstances, which I doubt it did. It may in future.

[Cat Driver]

I'm not sure how SMS would have prevented this, unless the NT Air SMS mandated a land as soon as possible decision in these circumstances, which I doubt it did. It may in future.

With all due respect to the crew of the aircraft being discussed and the company involved I would like to pass on my personal thoughts and how I dealt with similar problems when I was flying for a living.

First of all I agree that SMS in this case is not relevant, at this point in time.

However during my career I " Always " landed at the nearest suitable airport when I was faced with a mechanical problem that had the potential to become an emergency that could get out of hand.

Why this crew did what they did is something I do not know, however the results were devastating and I feel I need to at least pass on my own personal thoughts and my own personal rules for mechanical problems that have the potential to go real bad real fast.

P.S.:

If the mods feel I have stepped over the line here please just nuke this post.

. ..

[SoundAir11]

The NT air accident was caused by an oil leak and problems which developed when the oil depleted to a level at which other events would occur. I'm not sure how SMS would have prevented this, unless the NT Air SMS mandated a land as soon as possible decision in these circumstances, which I doubt it did. It may in future.

If you are going to start concluding the cause of this accident based on conjecture,theories or circusmtantial evidence, you can't blame this on an oil leak. With all due respect to the crew, on the basis of your investigation, you have to blame this accident on the mishandling of an in-flight emergency.

[cncpc]

I am not basing my comment on any of the things you said. It is not speculation.I haven't done an investigation.

There was not an in flight emergency until less than five seconds before ground impact. All there was before that was indications of issues with oil.

I doubt there are very many of us on here who could have produced a different outcome than what occurred in those five seconds.

There is nothing of substance to your claim that the crew failed to handle an in flight emergency.

I will leave it at that for now.

[cncpc]

I'm not sure how SMS would have prevented this, unless the NT Air SMS mandated a land as soon as possible decision in these circumstances, which I doubt it did. It may in future.

However during my career I " Always " landed at the nearest suitable airport when I was faced with a mechanical problem that had the potential to become an emergency that could get out of hand.

It seems that landing at the nearest airport was not the SOP response for the issue which caused the turnaround. I expect it will be in the future for at least the King Air 100 with four blade props.

[bobcaygeon]

Full SMS doesn't really exist for 703/704 according to TC. They recently removed the date (no date at all) on website of proposed implementation for 703/704. It was 2015, a decade after 705. Additionally, if your 703/704 company is not officially registered as an SMS company, TC can use your program info for findings, violations, etc. (Brand new policy released this summer). If your not registered then you better sweep it under the carpet according to TC (like the old days).

Tindi, ASW, and FA are all full 705 SMS airlines and had accidents. What can you make of that ? I don't know........



Why would a feathered 4 bladed Beech 100 with altitude and a/s (initial issue reported at approx. 15000ft ??) have to land ASA Possible vs Practical? The only procedure change might be to feather it vs reduce to idle (other a/c do require this procedure because of the risk of windmilling prop). Just a thought, not try to guess what happened in this accident.

Please request the equipment, CADOR's are F. all and these guys were getting one anyway.

Some places issue a Cador's when you do an immediate return because company called and said you forgot a pax or bag. The guidelines are weak. I have had the TSB call about an immediate return because the fuel cap tab wasn't pushed down. We both laughed but he had to follow up on some station's BS report.

[cncpc]

Why would a feathered 4 bladed Beech 100 with altitude and a/s (initial issue reported at approx. 15000ft ??) have to land ASA Possible vs Practical? The only procedure change might be to feather it vs reduce to idle (other a/c do require this procedure because of the risk of windmilling prop). Just a thought, not try to guess what happened in this accident.

I don't think there was a feathered prop on the way in.

[Prairie Chicken]

The NT air accident was caused by an oil leak and problems which developed when the oil depleted to a level at which other events would occur. I'm not sure how SMS would have prevented this, unless the NT Air SMS mandated a land as soon as possible decision in these circumstances, which I doubt it did. It may in future.

Management processes/SMS could have been a factor leading up to a loss of oil pressure or other maintenance problems.