fish4life wrote: ↑Mon Dec 05, 2022 7:37 am
Is it not habit to just pull the reversers on touchdown all the time? I don’t think I even think about it anymore
Yes it is under normal circumstances.
However, when you read the accident reports, often there is some other mentally demanding issue going on that distracts. Such as hydroplaning and drifting for example. In that example keeping the airplane straight becomes the priority and tunnel vision sets in and it is overlooked. And usually in those cases the PM is overwhelmed and misses the calls about speedbrakes and reverse.
In addition, the reversers sometimes get stuck in the locked out position if the airplane lands and doesn’t register weight on wheels right away. This is made much worse if the speed brakes don’t deploy, which funny enough is the back up to deploying the speedbrakes.
fish4life wrote: ↑Mon Dec 05, 2022 7:37 am
Is it not habit to just pull the reversers on touchdown all the time? I don’t think I even think about it anymore
fish4life wrote: ↑Mon Dec 05, 2022 7:37 am
Is it not habit to just pull the reversers on touchdown all the time? I don’t think I even think about it anymore
Yes it is under normal circumstances.
However, when you read the accident reports, often there is some other mentally demanding issue going on that distracts. Such as hydroplaning and drifting for example. In that example keeping the airplane straight becomes the priority and tunnel vision sets in and it is overlooked. And usually in those cases the PM is overwhelmed and misses the calls about speedbrakes and reverse.
In addition, the reversers sometimes get stuck in the locked out position if the airplane lands and doesn’t register weight on wheels right away. This is made much worse if the speed brakes don’t deploy, which funny enough is the back up to deploying the speedbrakes.
Thrust Reversers can be deployed at less than 10' RA. Weight on wheels is not a factor.
fish4life wrote: ↑Mon Dec 05, 2022 7:37 am
Is it not habit to just pull the reversers on touchdown all the time? I don’t think I even think about it anymore
Yes it is under normal circumstances.
However, when you read the accident reports, often there is some other mentally demanding issue going on that distracts. Such as hydroplaning and drifting for example. In that example keeping the airplane straight becomes the priority and tunnel vision sets in and it is overlooked. And usually in those cases the PM is overwhelmed and misses the calls about speedbrakes and reverse.
In addition, the reversers sometimes get stuck in the locked out position if the airplane lands and doesn’t register weight on wheels right away. This is made much worse if the speed brakes don’t deploy, which funny enough is the back up to deploying the speedbrakes.
Thrust Reversers can be deployed at less than 10' RA. Weight on wheels is not a factor.
Had to go into the AOM since I don’t fly the 737 anymore. But here is the quote:
“ The thrust reverser can be deployed when either radio altimeter senses less than 10 feet altitude combined with an air/ground safety sensor in the ground mode”
You’ve never greased one on and had the speedbrakes take a second or 2 to deploy and in the mean time the reverse levers are locked out until the aircraft settles firmly?
“ The thrust reverser can be deployed when either radio altimeter senses less than 10 feet altitude
combined with an air/ground safety sensor in the ground mode”
Now THAT makes sense.
Now we sit back and wait for the investigation. Is Flair still doing the red eye turns?
Eric Janson wrote: ↑Wed Nov 30, 2022 10:30 am
There is an increasing drive to save fuel by landing with a lower flap setting and to use idle reverse - this is usually in the SOPs.
I guess the increased wear on landing gear, tires and brakes is offset - but I've never seen a detailed analysis.
Some airports also want idle reverse except for safety reasons.
What I have never seen published are conditions under which you shouldn't be doing this. I have my own:-
- Not if the runway is wet or contaminated.
- Not with a tailwind.
- Not under Lovis conditions.
- Not if the landing distance required and the runway length are close together.
I won't hesitate to use max reverse if I think it's needed. There's nothing in our SOP about reduced flap landings - I don't do them.
There is another issue that is not taken into account - rubber deposits in the touchdown zone at the far end. It's possible to have minimal braking in the last 1000 - 1500' especially at airports where it doesn't rain much and the runway is wet. Under these conditions I plan to be at taxi speed by this point.
I guess the final report will show if any of the above is relevant.
In the meantime I'm curious what the policy is at other Airlines?
Straight from my AOM, I’m surprised to hear there is no guidance in any AOM of an aircraft with reverse thrust.
Idle reverse shall be used for normal operations and must be deployed on every landing when available. The use of reverse thrust above idle may be used based on environmental and operational considerations which include:
• Slippery or contaminated runways
• Landing with a tailwind
• Anticipated high BTMS temperatures after landing
• During any normal/Abnormal/Emergency landing condition where maximum stopping capability is required The intent of using idle reverse for normal operations is primarily to minimize incidents of foreign object damage and reduce fuel consumption. It is not to restrict the use of maximum reverse thrust if required for the safe operation of the aircraft.
Thanks for the information.
I don't like the use of the word 'may' - this creates a choice for the Pilot. Under the conditions listed maximum reverse should be used - that it how this should be worded.
Under the conditions listed I'd be using max reverse.
This is going to get someone into trouble imho.
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When the captain applied maximum braking, there was 2500 feet of runway remaining, and the aircraft was travelling at a ground speed of 115 knots with no speed brakes, one engine at near maximum thrust, and the other nearing maximum reverse thrust.
When the captain applied maximum braking, there was 2500 feet of runway remaining, and the aircraft was travelling at a ground speed of 115 knots with no speed brakes, one engine at near maximum thrust, and the other nearing maximum reverse thrust.
Wow.
I think the bigger wow should be for what led to this situation.
#1 TR had been snagged 23 times and was continually MEL’d for 6 months before they even got the replacement part, which was procured but not installed. Absolutely ridiculous.
Had the aircraft been functioning properly the Captain would have most likely had his hands on the thrust levers normally and caught the accidental activation of the Go around button.
There had been 23 defects reported that were related to the left thrust reverser during the 6 months leading up to the occurrence. During that time the left thrust reverser defect had been deferred per the MEL on 6 occasions. Three of those deferrals were granted an extension4, including the deferral in effect at the time of the occurrence, which was recorded on
The captain had a period of approximately 20 consecutive hours (Monday afternoon to Tuesday morning) without sleep 3 days before the occurrence and a period of approximately 25 consecutive hours (beginning late Tuesday night and spanning most of Wednesday) without any sleep 2 days before the occurrence.
The occurrence flight was the captain’s 3rd overnight flight assignment in the 4 days leading up to the occurrence.
During the cruise portion of the flight, a passenger medical issue occupied the flight crew’s attention for a significant length of time, preventing them from having an opportunity to obtain controlled rest on the flight deck during the flight.
Curious as to how this could occur with only two pilots onboard. Is it normal for the PNF to actually sleep during a redeye?
The investigation found that if pilots do not monitor their rest to assess if they have accrued a sleep debt, there is an increased risk of fatigue going undetected and unmitigated.
Yes, if we don't monitor our rest, we would of course not know if anyone is fatigued after 3 night shifts
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As an AvCanada discussion grows longer:
-the probability of 'entitlement' being mentioned, approaches 1
-one will be accused of using bad airmanship
The investigation found that if pilots do not monitor their rest to assess if they have accrued a sleep debt, there is an increased risk of fatigue going undetected and unmitigated.
Yes, if we don't monitor our rest, we would of course not know if anyone is fatigued after 3 night shifts
Unfortunate that the TSB comes out with statements like this.
FurHat wrote: ↑Thu Feb 13, 2025 2:23 pm
There are several "Wow"s in the report.
There had been 23 defects reported that were related to the left thrust reverser during the 6 months leading up to the occurrence. During that time the left thrust reverser defect had been deferred per the MEL on 6 occasions. Three of those deferrals were granted an extension4, including the deferral in effect at the time of the occurrence, which was recorded on
The captain had a period of approximately 20 consecutive hours (Monday afternoon to Tuesday morning) without sleep 3 days before the occurrence and a period of approximately 25 consecutive hours (beginning late Tuesday night and spanning most of Wednesday) without any sleep 2 days before the occurrence.
The occurrence flight was the captain’s 3rd overnight flight assignment in the 4 days leading up to the occurrence.
As if I needed another set of reasons to never fly Flair, heres a few.
MX-5 wrote: ↑Fri Feb 14, 2025 11:13 amDuring the cruise portion of the flight, a passenger medical issue occupied the flight crew’s attention for a significant length of time, preventing them from having an opportunity to obtain controlled rest on the flight deck during the flight.
Curious as to how this could occur with only two pilots onboard. Is it normal for the PNF to actually sleep during a redeye?
Some companies have Controlled Rest programs in place (I assume it has to be written into company manuals).
Controlled Rest on Flight Deck
700.72 (1) A flight crew member shall not take a controlled rest on the flight deck of an aircraft that is operated by an air operator unless
(a) the rest is 45 minutes or less, is taken during the cruise portion of the flight and is completed at least 30 minutes before the scheduled beginning of the descent;
(b) no other flight crew member is taking a rest at that time; and
(c) at least two flight crew members remain on the flight deck.
(2) Before taking a controlled rest on the flight deck, a flight crew member shall
(a) transfer their duties to a flight crew member who is not taking a rest;
(b) review the status of the flight, including any specific duties to be performed during the rest;
(c) review the wake-up criteria; and
(d) advise the flight attendants of the start and end times of the rest.
(3) A flight crew member who takes a controlled rest on the flight deck shall not assume any duties, and no other flight crew member shall transfer any duties to them, until 15 minutes after the end of the rest.
(4) When a flight crew member returns to duty, another flight crew member shall provide them with an operational briefing.
evilgravy wrote: ↑Sun Feb 16, 2025 11:37 am
wouldn't surprise me at all if this report lead to an audit or two for F8...
Nah…. Transport Canada is too busy working from home
Not TC. I can think of a few others that may like a word with ol' Maciej, but then he's way too busy on X https://x.com/MacVVilk about nothing to do with F8.
The incident started with the pilot not following the SOP and disconnecting the autothrottle at the same time as the autopilot. Doing as required by the SOP means using both thumbs to operate a button at the same time(left for autopilot/right for autothrottle). I typically did a double press with both thumbs. Many Flair pilots were leaving the autothrottle engaged for a while after disconnecting the autopilot and while not normally a problem, if it leads to an incident(as happened here), you don't have much of an excuse.
With fairly low ceilings, the captain had likely primed himself for doing a go-around and one of the actions to do that would be to press on a different button located on the throttles. We don't know but it is possible that he had a finger resting on or close to that button. Then, when he decided to disconnect the autothrottle(below 100'), he pressed the wrong button(that TOGA button). This commanded go-around thrust and the thrust levers were activated to move toward go-around thrust.
One would think that the pilot's hand would immediately feel the thrust levers starting to move forward and then not only prevent them from moving forward but also disconnect the auto throttle, but guess what? The report says that these thrust levers moved forward for 4-5 seconds(which means that they must have gotten close to full thrust). That makes me think that his hand was not even on the thrust levers, which is strange. I did fly with one guy that liked to take his hand off the throttles and use both on the control wheel for the flare. Proper throttle control is a good reason not to do something like this.
The captain did become aware of the high thrust situation and retarded the thrust levers but remember, they are still trying to move forward and once one touches down, the pilot has to remove their hand from the thrust levers and grab the right reverse thrust lever(left was locked out). This is when the left one moved forward again which creates more problems as spoilers retract(or never even extend in the first place) and the auto-brake stops. All this happened with that left thrust lever moving forward again adding a bunch of thrust. So the pilot had the right engine in reverse, the left engine at high forward thrust and no spoilers or automatic braking along with directional control issues due to asymmetric thrust. The F/O notice the left engine at high power and did grab it to put it in the idle position but did not notice it move forward again due to the directional control issues they were encountering with high thrust on one side followed by it rapidly reducing. Meanwhile, the relatively short 7000' wet runway was being used up quickly.
Finally, things were figured out and heavy braking applied but too late to stop before the end of the runway.
There seems to have been quite a few runway overruns due to inadvertent TOGA button pushes. One should be able to simply correctly click off the autothrottle if this happens but it might be a good idea to go-around if one can't get things in order. And there seems to be several crashes due to improper procedure with a reverse thrust lever blocked out. Maybe a good time for thorough review of planned procedure for a safe landing and go-around if necessary.
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Last edited by pelmet on Sat Apr 26, 2025 3:30 am, edited 2 times in total.
This is insane, first why do the auto throttles not disengage as soon as someone overrides them by manually adjusting them, I would have thought this. Admittedly, I don’t have experience with auto throttle.
Second, the two hands for the flair drives me nucking futs, from either seat I can manage to flair with one hand on the thrust levers, this should be absolutely mandatory. If you can’t do this, go back to the bush. How did this captain not realize the thrust levers move forward again after deploying the working reverser, both hands back on the controls?
Eric Janson wrote: ↑Sat Apr 26, 2025 4:37 am
I've only flown the 737-300 and it's been a few years.
When you press the TOGA switch the target speed will increase. Perhaps someone who flies the 737 can provide some additional information.
Continuing with the approach while the aircraft in go-around mode is not a good idea. JMHO.
I see that in the report 2/3 of these events resulted in continuation and landing and 1/3 resulted in a go-around (correct decision imho).
Inadvertent go-around mode selection can happen to anyone - the trick is to handle it correctly if it happens.
I used to give a scenario in the sim where as soon as TOGA mode was selected I would set CAVOK weather to see if anyone would try to land.
My debrief was to always fly the go-around once it was selected.
Depending on the situation, I think that one can get away with quickly disconnecting the autothrottle on a typical Boeing and land. Simply hold the thrust levers in the proper position, move your thumb that is adjacent to the autothrottle disconnect button to disconnect and continue. Airbus is a little different.
pelmet wrote: ↑Sat Apr 26, 2025 7:24 am
Depending on the situation, I think that one can get away with quickly disconnecting the autothrottle on a typical Boeing and land. Simply hold the thrust levers in the proper position, move your thumb that is adjacent to the autothrottle disconnect button to disconnect and continue. Airbus is a little different.
You'll need to turn off both FDs as well - these will continue to give go-around pitch commands. I've always been taught that if you're not going to follow the FD commands they need to be switched off.
If the accident flight had just performed a go-around - sorted everything out - completed a second approach - we wouldn't have had the runway excursion imho.
Medium/Large jet close to the ground is not a place where you want to be fighting the aircraft. Jmho.
Just keep things simple - works very well.
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Always fly a stable approach - it's the only stability you'll find in this business
pelmet wrote: ↑Sat Apr 26, 2025 7:24 am
Depending on the situation, I think that one can get away with quickly disconnecting the autothrottle on a typical Boeing and land. Simply hold the thrust levers in the proper position, move your thumb that is adjacent to the autothrottle disconnect button to disconnect and continue. Airbus is a little different.
You'll need to turn off both FDs as well - these will continue to give go-around pitch commands. I've always been taught that if you're not going to follow the FD commands they need to be switched off.
If the accident flight had just performed a go-around - sorted everything out - completed a second approach - we wouldn't have had the runway excursion imho.
Medium/Large jet close to the ground is not a place where you want to be fighting the aircraft. IMHO.
Just keep things simple - works very well.
Visual at 70 feet, you are not looking at command bars anymore. Time to focus on landing if you have rightly or wrongly decided to land. Ignore the FD’s.
Just because someone always said turn off the FD’s doesn’t mean they should be at a critical moment.
If the pilot had simply had his hand on the throttles and moved his right thumb a bit, he could have easily landed as well. But a go-around is definitely a good option on a runway like that if the flight has become destabilized, especially with one reverser inop.
Probably a good thing to think about in advance. if you accidentally hit the TOGA switch, consider simply disconnecting the autothrottle and continuing to land if safe to do so with no more disturbance to the aircraft than is cause by turbulence on a bumpy day.
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Last edited by pelmet on Sat Apr 26, 2025 5:55 pm, edited 1 time in total.
cdnavater wrote: ↑Sat Apr 26, 2025 2:26 am
This is insane, first why do the auto throttles not disengage as soon as someone overrides them by manually adjusting them, I would have thought this. Admittedly, I don’t have experience with auto throttle.
Second, the two hands for the flair drives me nucking futs, from either seat I can manage to flair with one hand on the thrust levers, this should be absolutely mandatory. If you can’t do this, go back to the bush. How did this captain not realize the thrust levers move forward again after deploying the working reverser, both hands back on the controls?
They don’t disconnect to allow you to help the auto throttles out. Sometimes they don’t react as quickly as you would like and you can help them along without them disconnecting completely. I know the A220 disconnects as soon as you touch them and most people find it quite annoying.
