St. Catharines Flying Club or Brampton Flight Center

[CpnCrunch]

There's another thread somewhere with pics of the weather.

http://avcanada.ca/forums2/viewtopic.ph ... rm#p977931

They went through a line of thunderstorms IFR.

[photofly]

Is there another report with these details? The newspaper article actually says that there might have been some rain around, but there was no heavy weather.

Per the NTSB preliminary report:

The flight continued and at 1944, the pilot was advised of moderate precipitation to the left and right of the airplane's current flight track, and in 20 miles, another area of moderate to heavy precipitation. He was also advised there were no "ride reports;" there was no reply from the pilot. At 1945, the ZOB controller advised the pilot of moderate precipitation in the vicinity of the airplane's position and if deviation was necessary, to please advise. An occupant responded
that they would deviate by turning left about 20 degrees.

But once again, whether there was weather in the forecast or not, based on this instructor's level of experience, the club should not have permitted him to make an IFR night cross-country with two pre-PPL students. Nobody in the airplane was studying for an instrument rating, or even a night rating. There was no reason or benefit to filing IFR except to be able to fly through poor weather which would have forced a VFR flight to divert or turn back. By permitting him to file IFR the aircraft operator gave explicit permission for that instructor to continue the flight into conditions in which he should not have been flying, should they be encountered. Those conditions were encountered, and three people died.

Also, it doesn't say anywhere how the plane was equipped.

Go and look at the flying club website, and examine how the other Piper Warror II's in their fleet are equipped. And the Cessna 172. Of course the accident airplane is no longer listed, so it's just possible they put the newest most junior flight instructor in the only airplane in the entire school (and probably the only Piper Warrior in the world) equipped with a working three-axis autopilot, weather radar and a set of backup instruments on the co-pilot side. But somehow, I doubt it.

And ... lo: here is a picture of the instrument panel of the accident airplane. Does anyone fancy penetrating a line of CBs from the right seat of this??
http://www.poweredparaglidingontario.ca ... hoto-1.jpg

I'm just playing devil's advocate here, but do we know that the club wanted them back by Monday? The rush to get back was probably self imposed.

You miss the point. It is precisely the self-imposed rush to get back that IS the risk factor. The duty of the club and the CFI was to assess the weather and order the planes to remain on the ground. If I can guess that that the instructor and his two students were keen to get back for Monday morning, so can everyone else involved. The fact that the aircraft took off means this duty was not fulfilled.

I also find it telling that most of the other planes left the day before - why didn't they? We can speculate about how the club should have done a better job at supervising, but if prior to starting the trip they were told to leave for home on Sat, and then they just decided to ignore that, what precisely was the club to do? If the instructor didn't turn his cell on during his fuel stops, how was the club to reach him?

The supervision requirements for a class IV instructor are not met by "here are the keys, have a nice weekend." Someone, somewhere, let that instructor think it was permissible to undertake this particular flight. Be that by omission, by accident, or by poor judgement. It doesn't matter. The instructor deserved competent supervision and even the most basic supervision would have prevented this flight.

Again, I'm not saying that there definitely isn't culpability on the part of the club, but until you know what instructions they were given prior to departure, we can't judge that.

We can, and we must:we have a moral imperative to do so.

The club is required in law to maintain effective operational control of every single individual flight. Even if an instructor goes rogue (and every piece of evidence tells that that is not what happened here) the club is still at fault for what happens because the club handed over the keys.

I am stunned that you are working so hard to exculpate this organization. Do you think it would be appropriate for the club to say "we did nothing wrong - we need change nothing about the way we operate, the system worked perfectly"?

I don't. I don't think anyone at the club thinks that -I don't think any responsible person would. And on that basis, I want to know what the club has changed since that accident.

[rookiepilot]

While it does look on the face of it to possibly be a lack of supervision, I would like to hear more details before I crucify the club.

There are enough details, and there was clearly active weather. Appropriate supervision would have prohibited the departure, or prohibited proceeding in IMC of any kind, let alone in weather at night.

And a reason to crucify the club is running these trips in the first place with pre - ppl students. Nothing in the PPL Syllabus has any requirement for this kind of cross country.

I find it EXTREMELY hard to believe there wasn't ANY pressure to return that aircraft in a timely manner.

[pdw]

Does anyone fancy penetrating a line of CBs from the right seat of this??

No CB's .. so not "penetrating a line". Careful with suggestive facts ...

Yes ok ..there was speculation about convective activity possibly having begun to initiate in the area where they were at by a clear path ahead in the radar (Maybe got worse after the accident ?) ... but AFTER doesn't count[/i]).

Filing IFR is common (a privelege for an IFR PIC) even though only VFR.

No question the PIC did not have info-of nor expected convective activity. Now seeing clearly there (flightaware gap) they would have had so much farther to divert West than the plane way over to their left on identical northerly tracking; so that choice immediately ahead may have looked too inviting, thinking just a few minutes and we're through ... even as Control might have pointed out the 'rain to the left and right of course'.

[CpnCrunch]

No CB's .. so not "penetrating a line". Careful with suggestive facts ...

There were thunderstorms in the METARs at KYSR:

SPECI KSYR 162310Z 31007KT 7SM -RA BR BKN044 OVC065 18/17
A2992 RMK AO2 TSE09 TS DSPTD P0009 T01780172=

SPECI KSYR 162303Z 31009KT 3SM +TSRA BR SCT040 BKN049CB OVC060
18/17 A2992 RMK AO2 VIS 2 NW LTG DSNT NE OCNL
LTGICCC W-SW TS OHD-SW-W MOV SE P0009 T01780172=

METAR KSYR 162254Z 32016G31KT 1 1/2SM +TSRA SCT043CB BKN050
OVC090 18/18 A2992 RMK AO2 PK WND 33031/2247 WSHFT
2239 LTG DSNT NE AND W RAE14B31 TSB50 SLP127 OCNL
LTGIC W TS OHD-W MOV SE P0007 T01780178=

SPECI KSYR 162250Z 32018G31KT 1 1/2SM +TSRA SCT043CB BKN050
OVC090 18/18 A2991 RMK AO2 PK WND 33031/2247 LTG
DSNT NE AND W RAE14B31 TSB50 OCNL LTGIC OHD-W
TS OHD-W MOV E P0002=

Although the thunderstorms weren't forecast, they didn't just pop up immediately out of nowhere. There was more than enough weather information available, in terms of graphical weather on their iphones, or talking to ATC.

[Zaibatsu]

If you look at Wunderground on the night in question, it shows a gradual 2kt increase from the NW concurrent with the wind veering from 350 to 355 degrees true.

[photofly]

Filing IFR is common (a privelege for an IFR PIC) even though only VFR.

But he wasn't in VFR conditions. He flew into IMC, and died.

Filing IFR says to ATC "ready and willing to proceed into IMC". If you're not prepared to do that, don't file IFR. This is not a game where we play with our privileges.

[rookiepilot]

No CB's .. so not "penetrating a line". Careful with suggestive facts ...

There were thunderstorms in the METARs at KYSR:

SPECI KSYR 162310Z 31007KT 7SM -RA BR BKN044 OVC065 18/17
A2992 RMK AO2 TSE09 TS DSPTD P0009 T01780172=

SPECI KSYR 162303Z 31009KT 3SM +TSRA BR SCT040 BKN049CB OVC060
18/17 A2992 RMK AO2 VIS 2 NW LTG DSNT NE OCNL
LTGICCC W-SW TS OHD-SW-W MOV SE P0009 T01780172=

METAR KSYR 162254Z 32016G31KT 1 1/2SM +TSRA SCT043CB BKN050
OVC090 18/18 A2992 RMK AO2 PK WND 33031/2247 WSHFT
2239 LTG DSNT NE AND W RAE14B31 TSB50 SLP127 OCNL
LTGIC W TS OHD-W MOV SE P0007 T01780178=

SPECI KSYR 162250Z 32018G31KT 1 1/2SM +TSRA SCT043CB BKN050
OVC090 18/18 A2991 RMK AO2 PK WND 33031/2247 LTG
DSNT NE AND W RAE14B31 TSB50 OCNL LTGIC OHD-W
TS OHD-W MOV E P0002=

Although the thunderstorms weren't forecast, they didn't just pop up immediately out of nowhere. There was more than enough weather information available, in terms of graphical weather on their iphones, or talking to ATC.

No, they didn't.

Anyone who has flown in the area of the accident, -- I have a number of times, and with some weather around, -- and anyone at that club would be certainly familiar as it isn't that far from the accident site -- would know that area, south of 2 Great Lakes, is a thunderstorm alley. A moist air mass, and stuff blows up fast.

Proper supervision would mean having been aware of the overall conditions of the air mass that night and guiding the flights appropriately (meaning stay on the ground or divert well short)

To declare because any one station didn't have TS in the forecast as any kind of all clear sign, is ludicrous, I'm sorry.

[pdw]

Brett, both are good choices to learn at. We see Brampton aircraft quite often from the terminal, on practise flights. Choice depends where you live too, the proximity to the airport.

privilege

I meant that it's an option, to practice filing IFR even though VFR prevails.

CpnCrunch, the 22:54 Metar was not available yet; for sure not 4 min from the accident, and likely not the 22:50 either ... esp if any delay in disemmination. And SYR is quite a bit east of there as well ...

EDIT: KSYR is more than 100nautical miles east of the flight-aware tracks, northeast of the city itself. Hot air often rises over a city to cause storms/lightening. What about KBUF METAR (on track) .. anything there ?

[rookiepilot]

CaptainCrunch, the 22:54 Metar was not available yet; for sure not 4 min from the accident, and likely not the 22:50 either ... esp if any delay in disemmination. And SYR is quite a bit east of there as well as well ... esp .. the other aircraft

So the note, "lightning observed to the W" means nothing to a pilot?

TS often form lines , often very intense, south of those lakes. He should have known that. Any TS in the area is a big warning, as it should be for anyone with TS anywhere near their route. Sadly, not briefed on how to conduct that kind of flight.

If I HAD to make that flight in that aircraft -- with a gun to my head, being at night, and no radar -- I'd be constantly asking AC for current cell information, and doing mega - huge deviations out of the way. Or land if I couldn't.

It's obvious PDW you have no idea how fast these cells can develop. I've seen it on my weather data when I was well clear -- and visual, in daylight -- and it's shocking in the right conditions what can happen. I was glad to see it happen behind me!

[photofly]

I meant that it's an option, to practice filing IFR even though VFR prevails.

VFR didn’t prevail.

Are you telling me this was a practice flight for the instructor? I wonder if his passengers knew he was practicing something for his benefit, and not for theirs. How nice for them. Or not, as it turned out.

The man was a professional instructor, working for a professional flight school.

Why are you so keen to whitewash the accident? All decisions were good ones, just unfortunate that people died. Couldn’t be helped. Nothing to learn here.... move along...

[rookiepilot]

https://m.imgur.com/a/n4ga0

A Radar image of the accident, from the original thread.

There is no way anyone who recieved a briefing, would be unaware of this line, assuming the timeframe is correct.

[pdw]

That's captured right at that accident's time. Previous hits at 4-5min intervals did not have the tiny red area (right side of the gap on above image) and the gap is clearer (maybe possible to retrieve from flight-aware).

EDIT [C.W.E is using quotation marks below/next-post for what seems-to/might be unquoted text ... or is that actually said anywhere ? For credibility it is vital to only use quotes where there is an actual reference, ... esp where claiming it to be pertinent to the discussion. There may be another one (misquote) bottom of the next page (page 3) regarding "biggest insult" .. but pending verification (or please correct if I'm wrong).]

[C.W.E.]

There has been a lot of verbal diarrhoea back and forth about this accident and in my personal opinion Photofly has gotten to the root cause of why it happened in another thread.

I guess I am most angry at the "it was just one of those things that happens in the normal course of training, nothing to learn here" attitude from the St Catharines Flying Club.

With proper supervision from the school it is my personal opinion that flight would never have taken place in those conditions.

And these people would not have died.

[CpnCrunch]

That's captured right at that accident's time. Previous hits at 4-5min intervals did not have the tiny red area (right side of the gap on above image) and the gap is clearer (maybe possible to retrieve from flight-aware).

There were thunderstorms on the METAR that I posted for a full hour before the accident.

[C.W.E.]

When I owned a flying school I would never have allowed a class four at that low hour rate to fly that trip period even it the weather was perfect....

....because in that area perfect weather can become bad weather in short order and flying at night in single engine airplanes is risky enough close to home never mind in that area of the country, it is not called thunderstorm alley for nothing.

[pdw]

That's captured right at that accident's time. Previous hits at 4-5min intervals did not have the tiny red area (right side of the gap on above image) and the gap is clearer (maybe possible to retrieve from flight-aware).

There were thunderstorms on the METAR that I posted for a full hour before the accident.

OK, except SYR is 100NM east of those northerly tracks

[rookiepilot]

That's captured right at that accident's time. Previous hits at 4-5min intervals did not have the tiny red area (right side of the gap on above image) and the gap is clearer (maybe possible to retrieve from flight-aware).

PDW -------

If your idea of a prudent plan is either, at night, in a completely unequipped aircraft, is to either:

Fly through a thick solid line filled with yellow cells,
Try to squeeze through ANY gap without radar, (and a strike finder) and not necessarily even with it --

I will not be flying with you.

Like PF, I do not get your defence of your local club.

As I said before, I doubt very much you've flown anywhere near serious convective weather.

I suggest you keep it that way.

Yellow can turn into a huge red cell in minutes.

[pdw]

Brett may not need to pick a flight school, he might learn everything he needs to know right here just reading AV Canada.

I studied the accident here that we're talking about in great detail in the weeks after. Not defending; it really looked to me that it was a surprise entry into the cloud ... judging by how far the other aircraft west of the accident plane still had to deviate west around that western head of the narrow cloudband (both reached cloud at the exact same time). The NTSB don't say anything about that ... and it's not the TSB's jurisdiction. So the anger around this seems to me more about the silence, which must at least be kept in part due to the small community grieving still going on.

[photofly]

The accident was eighteen months ago. I hope the flight school has made whatever changes it feels are necessary to the way it operates by now. And I hope the OP can ask what those changes have been.

[kilr4d]

I learned to fly at Brampton, and would happily recommend it.

Same here. Busy; narrow runways; right beside Class C; close to practice area; good management and instructors; decent aircraft, etc.

[PilotDAR]

it was a surprise entry into the cloud

Which, other than for prepared, filed IFR flight, should be followed by a 180, and exit from that cloud. Sure, conditions change, that's why turning around is a possibility! Decision making training, and good supervision are the prime things needed to assure that a 180 is always considered as an option!

I would not be flying a 172 into a yellow radar return weather system under any conditions!

[CpnCrunch]

I studied the accident here that we're talking about in great detail in the weeks after. Not defending; it really looked to me that it was a surprise entry into the cloud ...

Well, you mustn't have studied it very well. They filed an IFR flight plan at 7000ft, so it wasn't a "surprise entry into cloud".

[HiFlyChick]

...Are you telling me this was a practice flight for the instructor? I wonder if his passengers knew he was practicing something for his benefit, and not for theirs. How nice for them. Or not, as it turned out.

The man was a professional instructor, working for a professional flight school....

I guess I always thought that the purpose of the Class IV being under supervision was that he didn't pull anything like charging his students for stuff that he wanted to do for fun, which I agree seems like it might be the case here.

I perhaps have not been expressing my objections well - what I really object to with laying the blame for the accident entirely at the feet of the school, is that it can be perceived as taking responsibility off the shoulders of Class IV flight instructors to act like responsible pilots/adults. I left your quote about being professional in to emphasize that point. If they knew he was going to do something unsafe then yes, I agree they should do something about it. Given that a commercial pilot can walk in and request a rental and then take it away for a weekend wherever, based on him being licensed and presumably a responsible pilot, I don't see where it makes sense that a school should not be able to trust their instructors to at least act similarly. If they knew that he did unsafe things, then they are culpable if they keep him on. Also, they should be monitoring his students' progress and ensure that he is providing good service.

If they had any notion whatsoever that he would be endangering his students, then yes, they have an obligation to those students. I think my bias in this regard is due to the currently popular notion that "It's not my fault, the _____ should have told me/stopped me/protected me...." and the litigation that tends to follow. It's not my fault that I got hurt climbing that tower, they should have stopped me from doing it... it's not my fault my I got washed out to sea standing on the black rocks - I didn't read the signs so you should have put up a fence...it's not my fault I burned myself on the coffee - they didn't tell me it was hot....

No one likes to blame someone who paid with their life for poor judgement, but you also can't just blame the nearest entity, either. Maybe you're right and they knew he was unsafe or that he tended to push the limits, etc - if so, they should indeed have the sky fall on them and fall on them hard. But if instead they believed he was going on a cross country that the students requested and would exercise sound judgement in doing so, everything has to be considered before assessing blame/punishment.

[C.W.E.]

Flying schools have a responsibility to ensure safe flying over site in their flight operations both with their instructors and their renters.

When I operated a flying school my rules were based on risk management.

Single engine training at night was only allowed in accordance with the TC requirements and only in weather that was clear or scattered cloud.

I did not allow night or IFR flying with single engine aircraft both fixed and rotary wing outside of training for a license.

Also I did not allow single engine flying over water beyond gliding distance of land.