Why a pilot might do things a little differently...

[sportingrifle]

PilotDAR brought up a very interesting point, and complexintentions "nailed it."

Most airline operations are very procedural, and for a good reason. The volumes of policies and procedures cater to routine operations and the most likely non-routine ones, including the "standard" type emergencies. It also allows pilots to fly effectively together as a crew even when they have never worked together before. But all the policies, regulations, and procedures are guidelines that you are expected to follow unless you have a good reason not to. Think of them like a center line on the road....staying close to it will keep you out of the ditch for miles and miles with little effort.

But airlines also recognize that they can't cater to every situation, and that when somebody has a really bad day in an airplane, the difference between success and failure can be the application of a very high degree of airmanship, stick and rudder flying, and judgment. I could fill the page with examples, some of which have already been mentioned. But two great examples are the un-contained Quantas A380 engine failure, and the dual engine failure of the BA777 on short final to Heathrow. In the A380 case the crew had incredibly confusing information to try and process as well as duelling checklists. But the important thing is that they realized the fuel leak was going to quickly take the airplane out of C of G and render it un-flyable. They internally prioritized the tasks that they could achieve immediately and abandoned all their other checklists and procedures. They put the airplane back on the ground as quickly as possible, using their best judgment with the aid of an incredible amount of crew experience to aid them.(More on that later.) The BA 777 captain was borderline superhuman. In the space of less than 10 seconds he recognized the problem, retracted the flaps from 30 to 25 to extend the glide, disconnected the electronic engine control switches ( A "Hail Mary" move that in this case didn't help, but might have. And I'll bet many 777 pilots couldn't find those switches in 30 seconds!), and steered the airplane off the localiser away from the approach lights. Not only was he never "trained" to perform any of those actions, under normal circumstances they would be prohibited.

Contrast that with the loss of SwissAir in Peggys Cove. I am not judging the crew in any way and may have done no better at the time myself. But they did what they were trained to do, trying to isolate a fault and reduce their landing weight so they wouldn't run off the end of the runway. And probably a whole bunch of other things that their policies and procedures dictated. And ultimately it resulted in a hull loss with all on board. The entire industry learned and matured from that accident.

And part of that learning and maturing was training. We don't train for "multiple unrelated failures." But bad days in an airplane often involve multiple failures that are more related than it first appears. So airlines, while strongly enforcing adherence to regulations and procedures, are looking for Captain candidates who know when a situation requires judgment and airmanship to deal with situations outside of what was contemplated when the books were written. Situations that are time critical (un-controlled fires, bomb on board as examples) or for which there is no written checklist or procedure, like the UA B777 on the way to Honolulu. We are trying to avoid another Swiss Air. And it is working.

At my airline, captain candidates are trained, and then tested on their abilities to manage these types of situations. Don't get me wrong, if you don't follow policies and procedures willy nilly you are not going to get the keys to the car. But they also want their aircraft commanders to have the confidence and judgment to make good decisions in very "out of the box" situations if required.

A personal observation, having been involved with this program, is that we were seeing an increasing number of failures to upgrade in the last few years. This is not because "the younger pilots are not as good as us old guys." This is because of the the huge lack of PIC experience many of the candidates have thanks to the 7 unprecedented boom years in aviation that preceded Covid. When candidates had spent many years flying single pilot Navajos, and had previous command time at other smaller airlines, this wasn't much of an issue. But there are now candidates trying to upgrade to the left seat of an airliner, whose last real PIC decision was in a flying school 172. I have watched candidates in a simulator fly 50 miles from an airport with a cargo fire while running checklists. Contrary to what some expensive MCPL training schools claim, there is no substitute for experience and in these situations, it really shows.

I am going to leave off with a link to an hour long video interview with the Capt. of the UA B777 that lost a fan blade on the way to Hawaii a few years ago. It was all I have talked about and more, and everybody who was on board that aircraft should be thankful for the handling abilities, experience, and airmanship of the crew that resulted in a successful landing in HNL. The airplane was difficult to keep upright, couldn't maintain altitude - in fact had the crew instinctively tried to maintain their cleared altitude, the airplane would have rolled on its back. There was also erroneous information being presented to the crew, and the airplane had numerous "unrelated" system failures. It is a long video but there are a lot of lessons, and I hope that if I am ever faced with such a situation, that I would handle it as well.

https://youtu.be/J7_lzeY23dI

[rookiepilot]

Great Post SportingRifle.

[montado]

Captain Behnam looks like Dwayne Johnson

Or what I should really say is Dwayne Johnson looks like Captain Behnam. Thanks for the video .

[airway]

Just use common sense. The regulations are not designed for emergency scenarios. In fact, there is a specific FAR in the US that allows one to break a regulation during an emergency as long as it is appropriate to resolve the emergency).

One need only look at a simple TCAS RA. One can violate an ATC clearance to resolve the issue. I even had an interview question of what I would do if I was at the aircraft's maximum allowable altitude and got a climb RA. Climb carefully is the response. It is legal to violate your ATC assigned altitude, it is legal to exceed the maximum allowable aircraft altitude, and it is legal to be willing to not maintain the commanded rate of climb by the TCAS if it risks getting the aircraft in an unsafe situation speed-wise.

A good example of the follow-the-rules blindly-crowd was a NZ Air Force 757 a few years back flying down to the Antarctic with no alternate. The forecast weather changed and it was a bit below minimums when they got there. So what do they do? They held for a long time waiting for the weather to improve and be legal for landing. The weather got worse and their fuel ran low. So they ended up barely making it in after seriously busting minimums instead of busting minimums a bit.

Poor decision-making. The forecast is already much worse. Is it any surprise that the trend continued.

Here is an article about the NZ Airforce 757:

A TAIC incident report reveals that a Royal New Zealand Air Force Boeing 757 had to carry out a landing on a runway in Antarctica below published minima weather conditions because it had already passed the point of no return and the destination runway at Pegasus Field was the only suitable runway in the area.

On 7 October 2013, a Royal New Zealand Air Force Boeing 757 departed Christchurch, New Zealand for Pegasus Field in Antarctica. There were 117 passengers and 13 crew on board. The passengers included a New Zealand Government Minister, staff from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and staff from Antarctica New Zealand and the United States Antarctic Program.

The flight departure had been delayed while the flight crew gathered additional information on the forecast weather conditions at Pegasus Field. The Boeing 757 aircraft did not have sufficient fuel capacity to complete the return trip without refuelling at Pegasus Field.

A point of safe return had been pre-calculated. The aircraft would only continue past this point if the weather conditions at Pegasus Field met certain criteria that would allow the aircraft to land safely; otherwise it would return to Christchurch.

The crew received regular and additional weather observations and forecasts during the flight. Weather observers at Pegasus Field were noting the existence of a fog bank about five kilometres from the runway. The crew received assurances from the forecasters that the weather was forecast to improve. Based on these assurances and using the crew members’ collective experience, both recent and from previous seasons, the crew made the decision to continue past the point of safe return towards Pegasus Field. About 20 minutes thereafter, the crew received the first of several weather observations that conditions had deteriorated and that a fog bank had enveloped the runway and its approaches.

With insufficient fuel on board to return to Christchurch, the crew was committed to continuing to Pegasus Field. There was no other safe alternative aerodrome in Antarctica where the aircraft could land. The crew made two attempts to land at Pegasus Field but the restricted visibility prevented them gaining the required visual reference with the runway markings and lights. After the first attempt the crew decided to hold to see if the weather would start to clear. After holding for nearly two hours with no improvement in the conditions, the crew decided to make a second approach using a lower “minimum descent altitude” than the published minima in an attempt to increase the chance of becoming visual with the runway. A member of the flight crew caught a glimpse of runway markings just as the approach was aborted and a missed approach procedure was initiated.

With dwindling fuel reserves and conditions deteriorating the crew elected to make a third attempt at landing. They again used the lower “minimum descent altitude”. When the aircraft reached about 110 feet above the runway , the crew saw the runway approach lights and markings and was able to make a successful landing in near-whiteout conditions. There was no damage to the aircraft and no-one was injured.

The Transport Accident Investigation Commission found that the observed and forecast weather conditions as reported to the crew met the criteria for the crew to continue past the point of safe return. It also found that, given no safe alternative, the actions of the crew in proceeding below the allowable minima for the aerodrome were appropriate, and that the crew had taken all reasonable precautions to mitigate the risks involved in doing so.

However, the Commission found that the risk assessment undertaken when considering the suitability of the Boeing 757 aircraft type for Antarctic operations had not adequately taken into consideration five key points:

the potential consequences of the weather deteriorating were elevated for the Boeing 757 aircraft because of the lack of alternative approach procedures and aerodromes suitable for the aircraft type
the weather criteria for an aeroplane passing the point of safe return should consider the presence of low cloud and fog below the main cloud base as a limiting factor
there is an increased likelihood of weather conditions deteriorating below minima early in the summer season
the accuracy of instrument approaches should be treated with caution prior to re-calibration flights being conducted early in the summer season
the Royal New Zealand Air Force Boeing aircraft is capable of completing only one type of instrument approach in Antarctica.
The Commission recommended that the Chief of Air Force review the risk assessment for using the Boeing 757 aircraft for Antarctic flight operations, taking into account these matters and any other matters not considered during the initial risk assessment.






.

[airway]

PilotDAR brought up a very interesting point, and complexintentions "nailed it."

Most airline operations are very procedural, and for a good reason. The volumes of policies and procedures cater to routine operations and the most likely non-routine ones, including the "standard" type emergencies. It also allows pilots to fly effectively together as a crew even when they have never worked together before. But all the policies, regulations, and procedures are guidelines that you are expected to follow unless you have a good reason not to. Think of them like a center line on the road....staying close to it will keep you out of the ditch for miles and miles with little effort.

But airlines also recognize that they can't cater to every situation, and that when somebody has a really bad day in an airplane, the difference between success and failure can be the application of a very high degree of airmanship, stick and rudder flying, and judgment. I could fill the page with examples, some of which have already been mentioned. But two great examples are the un-contained Quantas A380 engine failure, and the dual engine failure of the BA777 on short final to Heathrow. In the A380 case the crew had incredibly confusing information to try and process as well as duelling checklists. But the important thing is that they realized the fuel leak was going to quickly take the airplane out of C of G and render it un-flyable. They internally prioritized the tasks that they could achieve immediately and abandoned all their other checklists and procedures. They put the airplane back on the ground as quickly as possible, using their best judgment with the aid of an incredible amount of crew experience to aid them.(More on that later.) The BA 777 captain was borderline superhuman. In the space of less than 10 seconds he recognized the problem, retracted the flaps from 30 to 25 to extend the glide, disconnected the electronic engine control switches ( A "Hail Mary" move that in this case didn't help, but might have. And I'll bet many 777 pilots couldn't find those switches in 30 seconds!), and steered the airplane off the localiser away from the approach lights. Not only was he never "trained" to perform any of those actions, under normal circumstances they would be prohibited.

Contrast that with the loss of SwissAir in Peggys Cove. I am not judging the crew in any way and may have done no better at the time myself. But they did what they were trained to do, trying to isolate a fault and reduce their landing weight so they wouldn't run off the end of the runway. And probably a whole bunch of other things that their policies and procedures dictated. And ultimately it resulted in a hull loss with all on board. The entire industry learned and matured from that accident.

And part of that learning and maturing was training. We don't train for "multiple unrelated failures." But bad days in an airplane often involve multiple failures that are more related than it first appears. So airlines, while strongly enforcing adherence to regulations and procedures, are looking for Captain candidates who know when a situation requires judgment and airmanship to deal with situations outside of what was contemplated when the books were written. Situations that are time critical (un-controlled fires, bomb on board as examples) or for which there is no written checklist or procedure, like the UA B777 on the way to Honolulu. We are trying to avoid another Swiss Air. And it is working.

At my airline, captain candidates are trained, and then tested on their abilities to manage these types of situations. Don't get me wrong, if you don't follow policies and procedures willy nilly you are not going to get the keys to the car. But they also want their aircraft commanders to have the confidence and judgment to make good decisions in very "out of the box" situations if required.

A personal observation, having been involved with this program, is that we were seeing an increasing number of failures to upgrade in the last few years. This is not because "the younger pilots are not as good as us old guys." This is because of the the huge lack of PIC experience many of the candidates have thanks to the 7 unprecedented boom years in aviation that preceded Covid. When candidates had spent many years flying single pilot Navajos, and had previous command time at other smaller airlines, this wasn't much of an issue. But there are now candidates trying to upgrade to the left seat of an airliner, whose last real PIC decision was in a flying school 172. I have watched candidates in a simulator fly 50 miles from an airport with a cargo fire while running checklists. Contrary to what some expensive MCPL training schools claim, there is no substitute for experience and in these situations, it really shows.

I am going to leave off with a link to an hour long video interview with the Capt. of the UA B777 that lost a fan blade on the way to Hawaii a few years ago. It was all I have talked about and more, and everybody who was on board that aircraft should be thankful for the handling abilities, experience, and airmanship of the crew that resulted in a successful landing in HNL. The airplane was difficult to keep upright, couldn't maintain altitude - in fact had the crew instinctively tried to maintain their cleared altitude, the airplane would have rolled on its back. There was also erroneous information being presented to the crew, and the airplane had numerous "unrelated" system failures. It is a long video but there are a lot of lessons, and I hope that if I am ever faced with such a situation, that I would handle it as well.

https://youtu.be/J7_lzeY23dI

Good post sportingrifle

I have a question about one thing:

Regarding the Heathrow 777 accident, is there any evidence that retracting the flaps on short final actually did stretch the glide? Anything I have ever read or have been told is if all engines are out, and you are doing a forced approach, once you have extended the flaps, do not retract them as this will not extend the glide.






.

[sportingrifle]

Airway...good question. I am unaware of any data to support what he did. The accident report stated that he extended the glide by retracting the flaps but as far as I am aware, did not analyze its effectiveness.

What I do know is that with the B777 the optimum L/D configuration I’d Flaps 20. Intuitively I would think that 25 would be better than 30, and 20 would be better than 25. The counterpoint is the transitional lift loss. I suspect at the end of the day, they didn’t have time for it to make a huge difference. But it is also worth remembering that they only just cleared the airport fence and perimeter highway so despite not making the runway, everybit helped.