Final Air France Report Out

[pdw]

My own questions - answers to which may never be known:

Why does Bonin apply an initial nose up input? Was he trying to fly over the storm?

Nose up tendency could be a trim issue. Earlier, Capt and PF were actually discussing potential of a climb to get higher.

Why does it accept two simultaneous inputs at all?

only one side in use at one time

[xysn]

More info:

Final AF447 Report Suggests Pilot Slavishly Followed Flight Director Pitch-Up Commands
http://www.ainonline.com/comment/1627

Co-pilot Bonin kept on pulling the plane up, possibly because a faulty computer indicator was telling him to do so. The so-called Flight Director, an instrument straight in front of him, which initially failed but then came on again, told him: pull the plane up!

http://www.spiegel.de/international/wor ... 43421.html

I guess this explains a few things?

http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090 ... 601.en.pdf
Final report in English

"Section 1.16.5.4 Calculation of the flight director orders" reconstructs what the FD might have shown ... chilling. Still, why the PF felt that following the FD was a priority with all the noise going on is a mystery.

[Eric Janson]

Why, revert to basics and what you know to be true about your plane. Hold the stick full back and the magic will take care of everything. It will pitch up to the optimum AOA, reducing the sink and be at the best attitude to fly out of anything.

That's a very interesting observation. We all have fall-back thinking, but to have THAT as fall-back highlights an issue with training, I think.

This is certainly not what I was taught on my airbus training - nor is this the airbus philosophy.

Why does the Airbus "dual input" system "average out" the inputs? Why does it accept two simultaneous inputs at all? It's not like with FBW that you need additional muscle power to overcome pressure on the control surfaces.

The two sidesticks operate independently of each other. If both are deflected simultaneously then a voice call "Dual input" will come accompanied by an arrow on the glareshield. Part of the procedure when taking over control in manual flight is to push the red button on the sidestick to lock out the other side. An aural "Priority Left/Right" call will come.

You should not have "dual input" - only one sidestick should be operated at any one time.

All of the above is covered in training.

There is more than enough information on the PFD to tell you what the aircraft is doing. The issue here is not the sidestick design or operation - it is a failure of basic flying skills.

[pdw]

The barrage of unending aural warnings start with the cavalry call (AP disconnect alarm sound). Might be too hard to find this kind of training regimen using the interior of an unexpected severe thunderstorm with just the artificial horizon. Kept it from stalling for a whole minute while also worrying about 'high speed', and looks like "I've got control" was done right until all became futile after the stall (where ice on the wings makes a recovery impossible at the increasing DVV).

The FD screen going off so briefly, then on again with all those messages. More CB detection/avoidance and systems-failure training for sure ... also fatigue (rest) management research.

[Eric Janson]

Once again there is a lot of incorrect information on this thread - some of you need to read the report.

Was the RADAR working ?
I would guess it was not working at 100 percent,why else would any pilot fly into a large nasty CB.
Maybe they should take a look at the RADARs on their planes as this was the second fight they lost with a CB.

Radar was working and the gain was changed from calibrated to maximum. A heading change was made to the left to avoid weather. Only light turbulence was encountered. This is not consistent with flying into a CB.

From what I've read this flight had been filed to Madrid with CDG as an alternate. This procedure is known as In-flight re-fileing or re-dispatch. It is becoming increasingly common as commercial pressures to minimize costs mount. Unfortunately, carrying extra gas does not generate extra revenue.

The fuel figures in the report show this was not a re-dispatch flightplan. Captain took 900+ kg extra which is consistent with a requirement to avoid tropical weather enroute.

It is a safe system, however, it places extra pressure on the pilots to cross the ocean without burning into to the fuel require to make it to their planned destination. We all know how much pressure 'get-home-itis' can put on a flight crew. I'm not trying to speculate on the cause of this crash, but don't you think the crew of AF447 would have diverted around the thunderstorms if they knew they had the fuel to do so and continue to CDG?

This is complete nonsense. I regularly fly on a re-dispatch flightplan and we certainly avoid enroute weather. Once again there is nothing in the report to suggest the crew flew into a CB.

With any ice on the wings it is also very possible there wasn't the chance to recover once the point of stall was reached near full gross weight. It says minus 40C, however before the ice shut down the pitots the copilot explains "ozone smell" and comments on the sudden heat in the cabin (CVR info).

The pitots are heated and operational very soon after but may only have been possible for attitude/speed recovery right after sudden climb from 35,000 to 38,000. Once in stall with ice it is not the same. Even clean, how many such stall recoveries are on record ?

Nothing in the report about airframe icing. The pitot tubes appear to have been blocked by ice crystals not iced over. Aircraft weight was 205T vs 232T maximum. The report states the presence of supercooled water droplets would have been unlikely.

The barrage of unending aural warnings start with the cavalry call (AP disconnect alarm sound). Might be too hard to find this kind of training regimen using the interior of an unexpected severe thunderstorm with just the artificial horizon. Kept it from stalling for a whole minute while also worrying about 'high speed', and looks like "I've got control" was done right until all became futile after the stall (where ice on the wings makes a recovery impossible at the increasing DVV).

Nothing in the report about flying through a CB or ice on the wings.

All the warnings can be cancelled using the Emergency cancel button on the ECAM Control Panel

The FD screen going off so briefly, then on again with all those messages. More CB detection/avoidance and systems-failure training for sure ... also fatigue (rest) management research.

FD = Flight Directors. They are displayed on a screen.
All screens were working normally.

[Learning2Fly]

Friends of mine were over yesterday which I hadn't seen in months. We talked about this accident, and then I looked at the report
on Wiki (< taken with a grain of salt).

Wiki says the pilots had no stall recovery training:

The pilots had not received specific training in "manual airplane handling of approach to stall and stall recovery at high altitude"; this was not a standard training requirement at the time of the accident.

I find that incredible, especially knowing that stall is so easily achieved, and such a dangerous mode of aerodyanmics.

Wouldn't you have visual reference to realize that the aircraft isn't moving forward very quickly? Mushy/unreacting control surfaces?
A feeling of weightlessness (descending at incredible rates!)?

I'm just shocked that forward flight not be corrected from 38,000 feet when training requirements are to break a stall, and recover
within 200 feet (if I recall).

From the little I know, the static portion of the pitot static system should have continued to function. If not, there are alternate
ports to select. This would mean the pressure altitude, VSI, and STBY altimeter would still operate, correct?

If the pitot heaters failed, would you get a caution light on the warning panel? I know there are pitot warning lights on our sims
when the toggle switches are left in the "off" position.

Almost 11,000 FPM descent rate at impact. Wouldn't you feel something at 5,000 fpm (~ - 3g)?

Sorry about all of the questions, just thinking out loud.

[ahramin]

Pdw, I'd suggest you read a lot more about the A330 in general and this accident in particular before commenting.

Many here have stated that the actions of the pf are inexplicable. The reality is that it was night, there were multiple ECAM messages, horns going off, a loss of airspeed indication, and he found himself suddenly having to fly the aircraft manually. First of all just flying the aircraft manually was likely to cause a high level of stress, if not outright panic. It was probably the first time in his career that he had been in control of an aircraft at that altitude. Most airline SOPs prohibit manual flying at altitude, and this is not something that would ever be covered in sim training. The pilot probably had few hours manually flying the aircraft in his six years, and almost certainly had never done so at altitude. Add to this a screen full of error messages on the ECAM, which I doubt either pilot could make much sense of initially, and I think it's obvious that he panicked, and wasn't really flying the aircraft so much as hanging on for the ride. The initial pitch up was probably not a concious move, it's simply all he could come up with.

As others have stated here, what was needed was a calm pilot - confident with their flying abilities - to fly 2.5 degrees pitch, about 80% N1, and call 'unreliable speed checklist'.

During a similar event a few months later the fo, pnf this time, pulled back three quarters of the way on the sidestick and the aircraft climbed several thousand feet before they recovered control. During later debriefing he stated that he did not remember these inputs at all. Simply panicked.

Once AF447 got into the stall, the plane started descending rapidly and this confirmed to the panicked fo that he needed to pull back. Through 10 000 feet when he called out to the captain that no matter how much he tried to climb, the plane kept descending, the captain called 'No No, don't climb, descend!' Unfortunately too late.

Airline pilots are supposed to have received all the stall training they need by the time they are flying an airliner, and the training centers around recognizing an impending stall and recovering at the first sign of it. This accident has highlighted the problem with this paradigm and training programs are changing. Unfortunately most chief pilot departments still encourage or mandate the use of autopilot almost all the time so the lack of flying competence is not being addressed.

[Learning2Fly]

Oh my...I need some forensics here. Talked to a friend pilot/engineer last night living in the USA about Air France 447.
He sent me a zip file of a news broadcast recorded in Portuguese (?) about Air France 447. It's an FLV video file with
a date on August 2010.

He claims the photos are taken from a passenger's camera showing the rear tail section ripped off!
Do we have any Portugese members that can translate the dialogue? Just PM me your e-mail, and I'll send the files.










Can anyone confirm the seating to be consistent with an Airbus A330?

[Flying Nutcracker]

I might be way off, but those pics look like they have daylight. That accident happened at 0211 UTC over the Atlantic. Think it's pretty dark at that time of the day...

[Navaids]

I suggest you youtube search lost (the tv show) plane crash scene . Notice the handcuff on the woman.

[cienki]

Those pictures are from the crash sequence on the first episode of the TV series "Lost". See here:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=pl ... lb8#t=223s

[Learning2Fly]

Thanks Cienki, I'll have to let him know! I wonder what the news lady is saying, and why it would be reported on the news?

Crazy stuff.

[Learning2Fly]

Turns out the language spoken is Spanish from the video.

The caption, "captadas por un pasajero" translates to, "captured by a passenger" in English via Google.
If it's not obvious enough, "Las fotos de la tragedia" means, "photos of the tragedy".

It seems like somebody Punk'd that news station too. What's with the air accidents, and news blunders (Asiana 214)?

I'll bring the video into work today; we have many Spanish speaking pilots around.

[complexintentions]

I readily defer to the Airbus guys on the technical side of this accident, but a couple questions were more general, such as asking if airlines do stall training.

Large-jet operators do have stall training, although with the large number of "training events" that are squeezed into the sessions, it hasn't always been a priority. However my employer does use "evidence-based training", which is just a fancy way of saying they try and use real issues encountered on the line (ours or others) and incorporate them into the curriculum. So when we do our "manual handling" sims, which are dedicated to real-life events and concentrate on actually flying, we do things like simulate the AF loss of pitot-static, the BA dual engine failure on short final, and so on. Somehow I don't think we'll practice dragging into SFO 30 knots below Vref at 100 feet...I digress.

One of the changes that has been made in our own training has been to demonstrate and practice the differences in stall recovery technique at high altitudes. Historically the emphasis has, naturally, always been on recovering from low-altitude stalls, typically in the landing configuration, as they are 1. most likely to happen in the landing phase of flight and 2. it's the point in flight where you have the least time to recover, in time and altitude. As a result, in the B777 at least, for a low-altitude stall, there is very little, almost none at all, downward pitch introduced to break the stall. The key is the application of full thrust, with the priority being on minimal altitude loss. With the amount of excess thrust available at landing weight for a large airplane, this makes sense. When all of that thrust pounds in, the wing starts flying almost immediately again, especially if the recovery is right at the shaker.

However, at altitude a stall is quite different. It requires a fair amount of downward pitch to break the stall, the engines take much longer to develop full thrust, and the thrust they produce is of course less. Accordingly there is a large altitude loss, easily 10,000 feet at times! But when you haven't practiced one, it's amazing how much time it takes to break the stall, and typically on the first recovery attempt a secondary stall develops when you so much as try to raise the pitch to level. You have to hold the nose down and wait, and wait, and wait for the airspeed to recover. It was an eye-opener for someone who's done hundreds of stall recoveries over the years.

Still, the fundamentals all remain the same - you need to get the wing flying again. But the wing's characteristics at altitude are totally different from low altitude.

If nothing else is taken away from this accident, it's a reminder to always, always know the approximate pitch and thrust settings needed to maintain any particular flight path. It doesn't need to be perfect, just keep it in the ballpark until you can get yourself sorted out.

And, for those who think from threads elsewhere that I have some sort of anti-Asian racist bias because I dared to suggest that culture may have played a role in the Asiana accident, I can tell you I am no more impressed with the training culture within Air France either. The nepotism and lack of meritocracy within that company, may go a long way to explaining their dismal accident record.

[CID]

And, for those who think from threads elsewhere that I have some sort of anti-Asian racist bias because I dared to suggest that culture may have played a role in the Asiana accident, I can tell you I am no more impressed with the training culture within Air France either. The nepotism and lack of meritocracy within that company, may go a long way to explaining their dismal accident record.

Yes, this is totally a "culture" related crash. Those French are just a bunch of wine snorting cheese eating surrender monkeys. And speaking of culture as a cause, that Maverick aero-car was a result of the culture on the west coast of Canada. West coast operators suffer an inordinate amount of crashes as compared to other regions in the country. I blame it on the large Asian population on the west coast. That must be it.....

[jpilot77]

He said Air France not France or French.

[Cat Driver]

He said Air France not France or French.

In time you will get to understand that CID has a very deep rooted " culture " paranoia and will flash off at any hint of differences in cultures.

[jpilot77]

It seems so Cat, I guess there are no different cultures in the world.

[Cat Driver]

For sure there has never been any friction between cultures......well at least not until the Bible started recording the stories of friction between different groups of people.

One of the most frightening incites I ever had into cultural hatred was in Alexandria Egypt when we were guests in an Egyptians home.....his hatred of Israelies was so emotional it scared me.

The most troubling thing about that experience was when I asked him if he ever met an Israeli and he said no, but if he ever did meet one he would kill him.

Anyone who denies there are real differences in cultures has a big problem with understanding reality.

[CID]

Cat Driver, I apologize for calling you a one trick pony a few days ago. You are in fact a "two" trick pony. Your other trick is taking things out of context in order to discredit someone or push your agenda. Context. Look it up. It's not something one reads while incarcerated. Once you understand what it means, you will quickly realize that you are causing people to misinterpret my remarks because you took them out of context.

I never said that different ETHNIC cultures do not exist. Nor did I state that in general those ETHNIC cultures and their customs are not huge factors when it comes to activities beyond accidents involving of large airliners operating internationally. Re-read my comments and try to comprehend this time. (I doubt comprehension is your goal however.....just mean spirited attacks)

If ETHNIC culture was in fact a significant factor in international airline operations, I would certainly expect far more accidents. The statistics don't support that. But now let's talk about company culture. That is most certainly a factor.

Consider the fact (in this thread) that jpilot77 stated "He said Air France not France or French." He/she was alluding to company culture, not ethnic culture is a factor. But we both know that complexintentions was referring to ETHNIC culture.

Funny no? And just a little pathetic. Grow up man.

[Learning2Fly]

Out of interest:

I had the news video translated today. The news reporter stated that the camera was found (damaged), but the memory card was
intact. The camera belonged to an actor.

I wonder if this actor was part of the Lost episode, or was taking shots of his TV when the show aired?

Maybe the news station was setup, and didn't check their facts (like KTVU 2 news! )

I'll be removing the photos linked above. Carry on.