Air France 447 Reported Missing

[roger.roger]

.

[Braun]

theoretically under control? Hard to take control of an aircraft if you didn't get a hand off on it...

[TTJJ]

theoretically under control? Hard to take control of an aircraft if you didn't get a hand off on it...

That is not quite true.

As the newspaper reported (correctly for a change), Atlantico and Dakar Oceanic like a lot of Oceanic Airspace have a letter of agreement whereby no action is required from the ATC unit whose airspace an aircraft is leaving if the ETA at the FIR boundry is within 3 minutes of that last given.

Atlantico routinely requests an ETA for the boundry, in this case TASIL, about 40 minutes before crossing it. They then send this ETA via voice to Dakar.

It is the pilot's responsability to inform ATC if the ETA is in error by more than 3 minutes as per IFR SOPs. ATC then revises the ETA, via voice, to Dakar. This works in both directions.

As the aircraft along this route are not required to report the FIR Boundry to the ATC Unit behind them, at the given ETA the next ATC Unit has in fact assumed control of the aircraft, as per the letter of agreement.

The last ATC Unit has no way of knowing if the aircraft has reached the boundary. The next ATC Unit is responsible for that report.

Atlantico sent the ETA for Air France 447 via voice to Dakar along with an ETA for a Swiss flight.

The recording of the transmission is imbedded in this Brazilian newspaper article. The loud voice is the Brazilian controler. Near the end of the recording you can clearly hear Atlantico giving the ETA at TASIL for AF 447 to Dakar.

http://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/acidente- ... 639256.asp

[Cat Driver]

TTJJ during the flight we did from Toulouse to Santiago in the Cat thanks to the magic of GPS we got to circle around the St. Peter and Paul rocks at low altitude.

[TTJJ]

Good God. If you look up "the middle of no where" in the dictionary I am sure that it will have a picture of that place. It makes Shamattawa, Manitoba look like downtown New York.
Population 4.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saint_Pete ... rchipelago

[Topspin]

Russians order Flight Changes, after Massive Magnetic Shift downs Airliners...

Reports circulating in the Kremlin today are saying that Russian Air Force Commanders have issued warnings to all of their aircraft to exercise “extreme caution” during flights “in and around” an area defined as Latitude 17 North [North Atlantic Ocean] Latitude 3 South [South Atlantic Ocean] to Latitude 8 North [Indian Ocean] Latitude 19 South [Indian Ocean] between the Longitudes of 46 West, 33 West, 46 East and 33 East, and which covers the greater part of the African Tectonic Plate.

The reason for this unprecedented warning, these reports state, are the rapid formations of “geomagnetic storms” emanating from the boundaries of the African Tectonic Plate that due to their intensity have caused the loss of two major passenger aircraft during the past month leaving nearly 300 men, women and children dead.

The first aircraft to be downed by this phenomenon was Air France passenger flight 447, and which these reports say that upon encountering one of these geomagnetic storms, on June 1st, near the western boundary of the African Tectonic Plate close to Brazil’s Fernando de Noronha Islands, was “completely annihilated” causing the deaths of 216 passengers and 12 crew members as their plane plunged in pieces into the Atlantic Ocean.



The second aircraft to be downed occurred on the eastern boundary of the African Tectonic Plate today when another of these geomagnetic storms slammed from the sky a Yemeni Airways flight to the Island Nation of Comoros in the Indian Ocean of which of the 153 passengers and crew aboard, only 1 “miracle child” has been rescued, so far.


further info
http://tinyurl.com/lflsvq

Not Fair! You had me going before I googled the title. We don't all have the same experience....

[canwhitewolf]

topspin i dont know how that url ended up like that, ill recheck

I tiny urled the big link and thats what i got for a link

ill see if i can correct it

im not a scientologist lol

thanks

this should be proper link

http://macedoniaonline.eu/content/view/7331/53/

[Topspin]

topspin i dont know how that url ended up like that, ill recheck

I tiny urled the big link and thats what i got for a link

ill see if i can correct it

im not a scientologist lol

thanks

this should be proper link

http://macedoniaonline.eu/content/view/7331/53/

I wasn't implying that you were. I was just embarrassed that I started to believe the story before flipping the on/off switch attached to my brain.

[mabcan]

Interview of Pierre-Henri Gourgeon, CEO of Air France : (sorry, in french)
http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france ... lyses-.php

AF 447 : «Tous les scénarios du drame vont être analysés»
Propos recueillis par Fabrice Amedeo et Christine Ducros
08/07/2009 | Mise à jour : 19:25

INTERVIEW - Cinq semaines après l'accident du vol AF 447 entre Rio et Paris, Pierre-Henri Gourgeon, directeur général d'Air France s'exprime pour la première fois. Une interview vérité dans laquelle il tire les premiers enseignements du drame.

LE FIGARO - Depuis la catastrophe, les rumeurs les plus folles ont circulé. Comme celle d'un enregistrement, que vous garderiez secret, du pilote de l'AF 447 qui aurait dit sa détresse à celui d'un autre appareil. D'autres ont évoqué l'inaction de vos services à la réception des messages Acars, qu'en est-il vraiment ?

Pierre-Henri GOURGEON- Comme les boîtes noires n'ont pas encore été retrouvées, nous avons très peu d'informations, ce qui ouvre le champ à toutes sortes de spéculations. Mais c'est une certitude, aucun échange radio n'a été entendu entre le vol AF 447 et les avions circulant à proximité. Les témoignages des pilotes d'Air France comme ceux des autres compagnies sont formels. Ils le savent d'autant mieux qu'ils se trouvaient alors dans un secteur hors de portée radar et où une veille radio - les pilotes se mettent en fréquence d'autocontrôle pour communiquer entre eux en cas de problème - est obligatoire.

Quant au système qui émet automatiquement des messages pour la maintenance, c'est un équipement très moderne. Ce système n'est pas obligatoire. Tous les avions dans le monde n'en sont pas équipés, mais nos long-courriers le sont. Personne ne réceptionne en temps réel les messages, dits Acars, émis automatiquement par l'avion. Personne n'a vocation à le faire. Ces messages ont pour but de préparer les interventions techniques à l'arrivée des vols à Roissy, afin que tout soit prêt pour assurer les étapes suivantes.

Reprenons le film des événements. Qui réceptionne chez vous, ces 24 messages Acars qui arrivent en moins de 4 minutes à 4 heures du matin ce lundi de Pentecôte ?

Quand notre technicien arrive ce matin-là, il traite les messages de l'AF 447 - qui doit arriver à 11h15 - comme ceux d'autres vols de la nuit (en général entre 10 et 15 vols). Rien ne lui indique alors la gravité de la situation.

Mais 24 messages, c'est tout de même beaucoup pour un seul vol ?

D'autres appareils qui volent et atterrissent sans le moindre souci peuvent émettre plus de messages encore.

Oui, mais à cette heure-là, le contrôle aérien de Dakar qui devait entrer en contact avec l'appareil n'a pu le faire.

C'est vrai. Aussi une procédure d'alerte et de recherche est-elle lancée entre les différents centres de contrôle aériens. Nous sommes dans la phase d'incertitude. Mais là encore ce n'est pas forcément grave : nous perdons souvent des avions au dessus de la Russie, de l'Afrique ou des océans et nous les retrouvons. Car il arrive que des avions subissent des pannes de radio. Entre 6h30 et 8h30, il est encore trop tôt pour que l'avion soit repéré par les centres de Madrid ou de Brest.

Quand quelqu'un fait-il le lien entre la disparition de l'appareil et les messages Acars, notamment celui qui évoque des problèmes de sonde Pitot et de givrage ?

Peu avant 8h30. Alors que l'avion est recherché, le centre de contrôle des opérations d'Air France est informé par la maintenance que les messages Acars indiquent la discordance des informations de vitesse, ce qui pourrait indiquer un problème de givrage. Cela ne suffit pas à expliquer l'accident, mais cela peut avoir été un facteur. Nous sommes dès lors très inquiets. Gilbert Rovetto, directeur général adjoint Opérations, m'appelle et m'annonce, alors que les centres de contrôle confirment les uns après les autres ne pas être en contact avec le vol AF 447. Cela signifie que nous avons vraisemblablement perdu un avion.

A quel moment comprend-on chez vous que la catastrophe est irrémédiable ?

Nous décidons d'activer une cellule de crise à 9h50. Celle-ci est ouverte à Roissy, dans une salle spécialement équipée. Autour d'Antoine Pussiau, directeur du réseau Caraïbes et Océan Indien et directeur de crise de permanence, prennent place des représentants des fonctions opérationnelles de l'entreprise : exploitation, personnels navigants, médecins, maintenance, communication, etc. Cette cellule de crise restera active 24 heures sur 24 pendant toute la première semaine et 18 heures sur 24 pendant la deuxième semaine. La première de nos priorités est d'organiser l'accueil des proches à Roissy. Ils ne sont que 60 à 70 car de nombreux passagers sont en correspondance. On les accueille dans une zone dédiée, le salon du terminal D, c'est une pièce qui est agencée de façon à laisser un peu d'intimité aux familles. A 12h15, un avion militaire décolle de Dakar pour faire les premières recherches. A 13h00, nous mettons en place un numéro vert. A 13h30, je fais un point de presse. A 14h00, je suis auprès des familles. Dans les jours qui ont suivi, nous avons pris contact avec près de 2 000 proches des victimes, qui étaient de 32 nationalités différentes.

Justement, on vous a reproché d'avoir parfois tardé à prévenir les familles…

Aujourd'hui, quand vous prenez un billet d'avion, vous mettez votre numéro de portable. Il n'y a plus la rubrique «personnes à prévenir en cas d'accident». Or, le portable de nos passagers était évidemment avec eux. C'est difficile de retrouver les gens, on le fait grâce à une date de naissance, une adresse périmée sur un passeport. Parfois, certains membres des familles ont pu être contactés par Air France, d'autres non, qui s'en sont plaints. Nous butons parfois sur des homonymies. C'est très compliqué, tout cela se fait dans le désespoir. C'est abominable.

Pourquoi ne pas être allé immédiatement au Brésil ?

Je ne suis pas allé immédiatement au Brésil pour pouvoir assister à la cérémonie en hommage aux victimes à Notre-Dame de Paris. Le lendemain, j'étais à Roissy pour le rassemblement en mémoire des douze membres d'équipage et de quatre autres salariés disparus dans le vol AF 447. C'était très émouvant, il y avait 10 000 personnes. Le silence était total. Le moment très difficile. Nous avions la mission d'amener nos passagers à bon port et nous ne l'avons pas fait. Chacun pense dans la compagnie : «Air France, ce n'est pas ça». La charge émotionnelle est immense. Quant au Brésil, j'en reviens. Là-bas, le 30ème jour après la disparition d'un proche est un jour de deuil très important. J'y étais. Les familles que j'ai rencontrées en étaient très touchées.

Quelle leçon tirer de cette catastrophe ?

La compagnie est sûre. Elle l'était hier, elle l'est aujourd'hui mais elle le sera plus encore demain. Car tout va être passé au crible : les domaines mécaniques, les facteurs humains, les connaissances météo. Tous les scénarios de l'accident vont être analysés. Tout va être regardé et nous améliorerons des éléments qui sont peut-être liés à l'accident et d'autres qui ne le sont pas. Il n'y a pas de contradiction entre la sécurité et l'économie. Quand on améliore la sécurité, on améliore l'image de la compagnie et on améliore logiquement ses performances économiques. Il n'y a jamais le moindre arbitrage entre ces deux domaines. Par exemple, il est écrit noir sur blanc que lorsqu'il y a des orages, il faut les contourner, il n'est pas question de faire des économies de carburant. Les pilotes ont toute latitude pour choisir leur route.

Concrètement, qu'allez-vous faire ?

Nous allons regarder à nouveau le contenu de la formation des équipages, la qualité des informations météo disponibles et la mise à jour des informations par des échanges avec le sol. A l'occasion d'un incident et à fortiori d'un accident, le retour d'expérience fait apparaître des possibilités de défaillance. Qu'elles aient ou non un lien avec la cause de l'événement, notre devoir est de les corriger.

Le commandant de bord du vol Sao Paulo - Paris, passé peu après le vol AF 447 dans le Pot au Noir, a raconté avoir traversé une première zone orageuse qui n'avait pas été détectée par son radar et du coup en avoir évité une beaucoup plus importante en renforçant manuellement la sensibilité de son radar. Le vol AF 447 n'a peut être pas eu la chance d'avoir ce premier coup de semonce et n'a peut-être pas pu éviter une zone orageuse très active. Ce témoignage va nous inciter à revoir la façon d'utiliser les radars. Qu'il s'agisse ou non de la cause de la disparition du vol AF 447, on doit étudier tous les facteurs et faire évoluer les processus et les règles. Dans l'aérien, la limitation des risques fonctionne ainsi : soit un élément fait courir un risque rédhibitoire à l'avion et il faut le supprimer par tous les moyens, soit cet élément lui fait courir un risque non catastrophique et il faut le corriger.

Sur cette question des sondes, pourquoi n'avez-vous pas expliqué plus tôt ce que vous aviez fait ?

On l'a dit et écrit dès le 6 juin dans un communiqué. En septembre 2007, Airbus avait émis des notes techniques qui recommandaient, sans être obligatoires, le remplacement des sondes Thalès de modèle «AA» par des sondes de modèle «BA». Il était indiqué que ces nouvelles sondes limitaient l'ingestion d'eau par fortes pluies à basse altitude et réduisaient le risque de givrage à haute altitude. Air France a lancé cette modification sur les A320, qui avaient connu des incidents d'ingestion d'eau. A l'été 2008, nous avons observé des incidents inédits, liés au givrage des sondes sur A340 et A330. Air France a alors demandé à Airbus une solution. En réponse, le constructeur a indiqué que le modèle «BA», recommandé sur A320, n'était pas conçu pour prévenir ces incidents de givrage et sa recommandation de septembre 2007 a été modifiée en conséquence en novembre 2008. Début 2009, des essais en laboratoire ont fait néanmoins apparaître que la sonde «BA» pouvait apporter une amélioration par rapport à la sonde précédente. Airbus en informe Air France le 15 avril et lui propose une évaluation en vol. Air France décide de changer toutes les sondes de sa flotte A330/340 sans attendre. Le programme a été lancé le 27 avril. Les nouvelles sondes ont été livrées par le fabricant dans la semaine précédant la disparition de l'AF 447. Il faut donc bien comprendre qu'au moment de l'accident, le changement des sondes était en cours mais qu'aucun document d'Airbus n'en exigeait le remplacement. Le lendemain de l'accident, on s'est dit qu'il y avait peut-être eu un problème de givrage. Un changement de méthode de remplacement a permis d'accélérer ce programme. C'est moi qui l'ai décidé. Cette décision n'a pas été prise sous la pression des syndicats de pilotes, comme cela a pu être dit.

Ces échanges tendent à prouver qu'Air France a fait son travail mais n'écartent pas la piste des sondes pour expliquer l'accident.

C'est aux enquêteurs de préciser le rôle exact des sondes dans l'accident.

Qu'avez-vous vraiment changé depuis le très critique rapport Colin sur la sécurité aérienne ?

Je suis fier du rapport Colin, diffusé à tous les navigants de la compagnie, et qui montre que chez nous, il n'y a pas de tabous en matière de sécurité. En octobre 2005, nous avions confié à trois commandants de bord instructeurs d'Air France une mission d'analyse portant sur l'organisation et le fonctionnement de nos opérations aériennes. Depuis, il faut savoir que les recommandations de ce rapport ont été mises en œuvre dans tous les domaines : règles opérationnelles, organisation et sécurité des vols, formation des personnels navigants, exploitation et maintenance au sol.

Pensez-vous que l'on retrouvera les boîtes noires ?

Pour Air France, il est capital de retrouver les enregistreurs pour comprendre. Les recherches acoustiques des boîtes noires vont se poursuivre jusqu'au 10 juillet, avec l'engagement du sous-marin nucléaire «Emeraude» et le déploiement d'appareils d'écoute très sophistiqués. Après cette date, les recherches continueront avec des sous-marins robots, afin de localiser l'épave de l'appareil. Tout espoir n'est pas perdu.

[Pratt X 3]

Google translation:

AF 447: "All the scenarios will be analyzed drama"
Interview by Fabrice Amedeo and Christine Ducros
08/07/2009 | Updated: 19:25

INTERVIEW - Five weeks after the accident of flight AF 447 between Paris and Rio, Pierre-Henri Gourgeon, CEO of Air France spoke for the first time. Truth in an interview that he draws the first lessons of the tragedy.

LE FIGARO - Since the disaster, the wildest rumors were circulated. Like a record, you keep secret, the pilot of the AF 447 which would have expressed his distress to another device. Others mentioned the lack of services to receive messages Acars what it really?

Pierre-Henri Gourgeon Like the black boxes have not yet been found, we have very little information, which opens the field to all kinds of speculation. But it is a certainty, no radio contact was understood between the flight AF 447 and airplanes traveling nearby. The testimony of the pilots of Air France and other companies are formal. They know much better they were in an area away from radar and a radio listening watch - pilots start a self-frequency to communicate with each other in case of trouble - is mandatory.

As for the system that delivers messages automatically for maintenance is very modern equipment. This system is not mandatory. All aircraft in the world are not equipped, but our long-haul are. Nobody receives real-time messages, known Acars issued automatically by the aircraft. Nobody intended to do so. These messages are designed to prepare technical interventions with the arrival of flights at Roissy, so that everything is ready for the next steps.

Resuming film events. Receiving at home, these 24 messages Acars arriving in less than 4 minutes at 4 am on Monday of Pentecost?

When our technician arrives this morning, it handles messages from the AF 447 - which should arrive at 11:15 - like those of other flights of the night (usually between 10 and 15 flights). Nothing indicates the gravity of the situation.

But is 24 messages still much for a single flight?

Other aircraft that fly and land without any order may issue even more messages.

Yes, but at this time, air traffic control in Dakar, which had come into contact with the aircraft could not do so.

That's true. Also a warning and research being launched between the various air control centers. We are in the phase of uncertainty. But again this is not necessarily serious, we often lose planes over Russia, Africa or the ocean and we find. For it happens that planes undergo radio blackouts. Between 6.30am and 8.30am, it is too early for the aircraft to be spotted by the centers of Madrid or Brest.

When does someone link between the disappearance of the aircraft and messages Acars particular that evokes issues of pitot probe and icing?

Shortly before 8:30. While the airplane is sought, the Operations Control Center Air France was informed by the maintenance Acars messages that indicate the discrepancy of speed information, which might indicate a problem with icing. That is not enough to explain the accident, but this may have been a factor. We are therefore very concerned. Rovetto Gilbert, Deputy Director General Operations, call me and m'annonce, while control centers confirm one after another not to be in contact with the flight AF 447. That means we have probably lost a plane.

When we understand that your home is irretrievable disaster?

We decide to turn a crisis at 9.50. It opened at Roissy, in a specially equipped room. Around Pussiau Antoine, director of the Caribbean and Indian Ocean and director of permanent crisis, take place with representatives of the operational functions of the company: operations, personnel, medical, maintenance, communication, etc.. The crisis will remain active 24 hours on 24 during the first week and 18 hours over 24 during the second week. Our first priority is to organize the reception of close to Roissy. They are only 60 to 70 because many passengers are in correspondence. It welcomes in a dedicated area, the lounge of Terminal D, it is a piece that is arranged so as to leave a little privacy for families. At 12:15, a military aircraft took off from Dakar to the initial research. At 13:00, we set up a hotline. At 13:30, I do a press briefing. At 14:00, I am with families. In the days that followed, we made contact with nearly 2 000 relatives of victims, who were 32 different nationalities.

Exactly, you have been accused of sometimes slow to prevent the families ...

Today, when you take a ticket, you put your phone number. There is no longer the "people to contact in case of accident." However, the laptop of our passengers was obviously with them. It's hard to find people, we do it with a date of birth, an address on an expired passport. Sometimes certain family members have been contacted by Air France, others not, who have complained. We sometimes buton homonyms. It's very complicated, it is done in desperation. It is abominable.

Why not be gone immediately to Brazil?

I did not go immediately to Brazil to attend the ceremony in honor of the victims in Notre-Dame de Paris. The next day I was at Roissy to the gathering in memory of the twelve crew members and four other employees missing in flight AF 447. It was very moving, there were 10 000 people. The silence was total. The very difficult time. We had the mission to bring our passengers safely and we did not. Everyone believes in the company: "Air France, is not it." The emotional burden is immense. As in Brazil, I come back. There, the 30th day after the disappearance of a loved one is a day of mourning very important. I was there. The families I met were very affected.

What a lesson learned from this disaster?

The company is safe. It was yesterday, it is now but it will be more tomorrow. Because everything will be scrutinized: the mechanical fields, human factors, weather knowledge. All of the accident scenarios will be analyzed. Everything will be looked at and we will improve the elements that may be related to the accident and others who are not. There is no contradiction between security and economics. When security improves, it improves the image of the company and improving its economic performance logically. There was never any arbitrage between these two areas. For example, it is in black and white when there are thunderstorms, we need them, it is not to save on fuel. Pilots are free to choose their route.

Specifically, what will you do?

We will look at the contents of crew training, the quality of weather information available and updated information through exchanges with the ground. On the occasion of an incident and a fortiori of an accident, the return of experience shows the possibilities of failure. Whether or not a connection with the cause of the event, it is our duty to correct them.

The captain of Flight Sao Paulo - Paris, passed shortly after the flight AF 447 in the Pot in Black, said to have gone through a stormy first area that was not detected by the radar and thus have avoided a lot largest manually increasing the sensitivity of the radar. The flight AF 447 may not have been lucky to have the first warning shot and may not have avoided a very active thunderstorm. This testimony will motivate us to reconsider how to use radar. Whether or not the cause of the disappearance of flight AF 447, one must consider all factors and evolutionary processes and rules. In the air, the risk mitigation works: either an element represents a fatal risk to the aircraft and you must remove it by all means, it is this element represents a catastrophic risk and should be corrected.

On this question of probes, why have not you said earlier that you did?

It has been said and written since June 6 in a statement. In September 2007, Airbus had issued technical notes which recommended, not compulsory, replacement probes Thalès model "AA" by probes model "BA". It was indicated that these new probes limited the intake of water by heavy rain at low altitude and reduced the risk of icing at high altitude. Air France has launched this change on the A320, which had experienced incidents of ingestion of water. In the summer of 2008, we have seen unprecedented incidents related icing probes on A340 and A330. Air France has asked Airbus a solution. In response, the manufacturer has indicated that the model "BA", recommended on A320 was not designed to prevent incidents of icing and its recommendation of September 2007 has been amended accordingly in November 2008. Beginning in 2009, laboratory tests have however shown that the probe "BA" could provide an improvement over the previous probe. Airbus inform Air France April 15 and offered him a flight test evaluation. Air France decided to change all the probes A330/340 fleet immediately. The program was launched April 27. The new probes were supplied by the manufacturer in the weeks preceding the disappearance of the AF 447. We must therefore understand that at the time of the accident, the change of probe was underway but that no material fact required Airbus replacement. The day after the accident, we said that there had perhaps been a problem with icing. A change for an alternative approach has helped to accelerate this program. C'est moi qui l'ai decided. This decision was not taken under pressure from unions of pilots, as has been said.

These exchanges tend to prove that Air France has done its job but do not rule out the track sensors to explain the accident.

It is up to investigators to clarify the exact role of the probes into the accident.

What have you really changed since Colin highly critical report on aviation security?

I am proud of Colin report, circulated to all the sailors of the company, and shows us that there was no taboo on security issues. In October 2005, we assigned three commanders aboard Air France instructors mission analysis of the organization and functioning of our air operations. Since you must know that the recommendations of this report have been implemented in all areas: business rules, organization and flight safety, crew training, operations and ground maintenance.

Do you think you will find the black boxes?

For Air France, it is crucial to retrieve the recorders to understand. The acoustic research black boxes will continue until 10 July with the commitment of the nuclear submarine "Emerald" and the deployment of devices to listen very sophisticated. After that date, the research will continue with submarine robots to locate the wreckage of the aircraft. All hope is not lost.

[Widow]

Airbus will fund third search for crash debris
July 31, 2009 -- Updated 1228 GMT (2028 HKT)

LONDON, England (CNN) -- Aircraft manufacturer Airbus is ready to fund a third search of the Atlantic Ocean if a second search, now under way, fails to find debris from last month's Air France crash, the company said Friday.

Airbus is discussing a payment of between 12 to 20 million euros ($17-28 million) to help pay for a third search, but it is still too early to settle on a figure, company spokesman Stefan Schaffrath said.

"We are ready to give a significant share, whatever is needed," he told CNN.

The company is driven by the desire to understand what caused the crash of Air France Flight 447 on June 1, he said. All 228 people aboard were killed.

"Our priority is increasing aviation safety," Schaffrath said. "The aviation community can learn from an accident."

Airbus is already helping in the second search alongside Air France and the French accident investigations agency, the BEA.

French investigators began the second phase of their search for remnants of the flight Thursday, weeks after the locator beacons of the plane's flight recorders would have stopped working.

A ship arrived in the area of the Atlantic considered the most likely location of the flight data recorder and the cockpit voice recorder, according to the BEA.

Using two submersible units and lateral scanning sonar, search teams will look for debris sites on the sea floor that could lead to finding the recorders, the BEA said.

The locator beacons of flight data recorders and cockpit voice recorders are designed to emit acoustic beacons, or "pings," for 30 days after a crash.

Flight 447 went down in stormy weather during a flight from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, to Paris, France, on the first day of June. The search for the pings ended July 10.

Investigators hope the recorders will help them determine the cause of the crash.

Flight debris recovered so far is being stored in France, authorities have said.

Only 51 bodies were recovered from the crash of Flight 447, the worst accident in Air France's 75-year history.

http://edition.cnn.com/2009/TECH/scienc ... cnnSTCText

[Rubberbiscuit]

Sad to hear. Hopefully they will decide to continue searching again.

Submarines stop search for Air France black boxes
Thu Aug 20, 2009 1:04pm EDT

PARIS, Aug 20 (Reuters) - French submarines have halted their search for the flight recorders of an Air France jet that crashed into the Atlantic on June 1, killing all 228 people aboard, investigators said on Thursday.

"The search has not been able to locate the wreck of the plane," France's BEA air investigators said in a statement.

However, the BEA indicated it had not lost all hope of finding the so-called black boxes and said a team of international experts would meet in the coming weeks to decide how best to continue the search process.

Despite the fact the flight recorders have not been found, investigators have stitched together information gleaned from a final burst of automated messages sent by the plane just before disaster struck, and from debris recovered in the sea.

The Air France plane was flying from Rio de Janeiro to Paris when it crashed into the Atlantic Ocean not far from the equator after hitting a powerful storm.

The final messages showed sensors on the Airbus 330 were providing incoherent speed readings, sparking speculation that the pilots might have inadvertently stalled the jet.

Airbus has since urged clients to switch speed sensors on about 200 similar airplanes, replacing equipment made by France's Thales (TCFP.PA) with parts supplied by U.S. firm Goodrich (GR.N).

The plane plunged into a very remote part of the ocean and experts said the wreckage could have fallen to a depth of anywhere between 2,835 and 13,120 feet (864 and 4,000 meters), making any search extremely difficult. Just as the hunt for the Air France wreck was wound down, French authorities announced that a boat with an underwater robot had arrived at the place where a Yemeni jet had plunged into the Indian Ocean on June 30, killing 152 people.

The French foreign ministry said the robot would be used to try to recover the black boxes of the Airbus 310-300 which crashed in bad weather off the Comoros archipelago.

A French submarine detected a signal from the plane's flight recorders in July and the underwater robot will now be used to try to locate the precise site and extract the recorders.

Officials say the cause of the crash remains unknown.

The plane was flying the final leg of a trip from France to Comoros, via Yemen. Only one person, a 14-year-old-girl, survived the crash.

[RFlyer]

There is an article from Spiegel Online with an interesting summary of the last 4 minutes of this flight:

http://www.spiegel.de/international/wor ... 80,00.html

RF

[yycflyguy]

Not impressed. Very little wreckage nor FDR, CVR has been recovered to make these conclusions. It is all based on reverse math to come up with these suggestions. There are many inaccuracies in this article including meteorological errors reporting "storm front". In the ITCZ there are no fronts. All related CBs are air mass variety and although they do not form classic lines like what you see in the mid latitudes they can cluster.

It seems to be a paper on speculation. The pitot tubes have always been suspected but it is still inconclusive as to the sequence of events that night.

The experienced copilot remains in his seat on the right-hand side of the cockpit. Under normal circumstances, that is not a problem, but in emergencies it can increase the likelihood of a crash.

Oh really?

[moocow]

WTF? Where is the co-pilot suppose to be then? They are restarting the search soon after redoing the water current modeling. I hope they find the boxes.

[ywgflyboy]

Here's an idea that may be far fetched but worth me being insulted by someone... haha. Why is full blackbox data not streamed to some sort of "on ground" database? I mean we are always struggling to find these damm things, sometimes they are damaged, and sometimes they need more than 30 minutes of recordings to piece together an accident.

[ywgflyboy]

Now that I have actually read all of it.. What do they mean by the pilots would not have been used to the controls in this situation. I am not fully familiar with airbus systems but I am aware that airbus stops pilots from exceeding aircraft limitations in their manual control. Are they saying the aircraft would have eliminated those limitations and the aircraft reaction to pilot input were different then normal?

[PJ1]

Now that I have actually read all of it.. What do they mean by the pilots would not have been used to the controls in this situation. I am not fully familiar with airbus systems but I am aware that airbus stops pilots from exceeding aircraft limitations in their manual control. Are they saying the aircraft would have eliminated those limitations and the aircraft reaction to pilot input were different then normal?

That part also caught my attention and discredited the article a bit, no mention of direct or alternate law.

[xsbank]

I heard today that the captain was in the bunk, the two firsts managed to disconnect the autopilot and were unable to manually fly the aircraft (coffin corner, doncha know). All the major operators in Europe recalled their guys into the sim the last few months and gave them 4 hours of hand-flying....

Must read this thread from the beginning...

[blackbear]

Pilots are supposed to be pragmatic.

And then we read that we know the FOs where trying the fly the aircraft after disconnecting the autopilot and that the captain was in the bunk...
Nobody was there, but they all know what has happened.

All of this without any proof, not even a piece of a black box.

From which voice did you "hear" that today? What is/Who is your source?

Amazing.

[yycflyguy]

All the major operators in Europe recalled their guys into the sim the last few months and gave them 4 hours of hand-flying....

What a colossal waste of money. What is your source for that tidbit? I find it unlikely that "major operators" could find the manpower, available sim time and the budget to waste when 2 times a year guys get their time hand flying in emergency situations.

[Rockie]

The airplane had cascading failures that among other things caused the loss of the autopilot, and the loss of protections including AOA protection. It degraded to alternate law and remained there for the rest of the flight.

It's possible the pilots may have disconnected the autopilot and autothrust themselves before it was lost since those are the first two memory items on the "Unreliable Speed Indication/ADR Check Procedure" drill. Establishing a 5 degree NU attitude with climb thrust is also in the drill.

[yycflyguy]

Yup, that's the drill. How quickly do you think it was identified as "unreliable airspeed indication" and not related to the turbulence they were undoubtedly in?

The autopilot also would have disconnected without pilot input if the computers thought it was in a pure overspeed condition along with pitching the aircraft off to bleed off the excessive speed. It will not be known what the sequence of events were until the CVR/FDR is recovered. Sending guys to the sim for 4 hours of this training is wasteful.

[Rockie]

Yup, that's the drill. How quickly do you think it was identified as "unreliable airspeed indication" and not related to the turbulence they were undoubtedly in?

I don't know that it ever was. As you say, no one will know that until the recorders are found.

[xsbank]

Well, I got it from the CAA inspector who is here this week. If you don't believe me, I honestly couldn't GARA.