Boeing Systemic Problems Continue

[L39Guy]

There is no interaction between the thrust system and the stall warning system - this is not like the Airbus when the speed is at alpha floor and the power goes to max. In both fatal accidents, the crew did not do the Unreliable Airspeed (UAS) memory checklist which includes disconnecting the autopilot (if it was on) and autothrust, setting an attitude and power setting (10 degrees/80%). In both of those cases the engines were at take-off power (94% in the case of Ethiopian) and the aircraft was flying around at Vne (~340 kts), making manually trimming the aircraft virtually impossible.

Contrast those two cases with the Lion Air incident the day before the Lion Air fatal accident where the crew did the UAS drill after take-off, controlled the speed of the aircraft (needle, ball, airspeed, etc) and were able to control the aircraft, shut off the stabilizer trim and manually trim the aircraft. Indeed, they flew to the destination (1 1/2 hours) with unreliable airspeed and manual trim (i.e. trim wheel with the crank handle).

So this begs the question: how is it that incident crew recognized a UAS (long before MCAS was present), shut the magic off, managed the aircraft (i.e. flew the aircraft) and were able to manage the MCAS but the accident crews were not able to even do the UAS drill, let alone the runaway stab trim drill.

To me, this points to a training issue with respect to flying in general and the B737 in particular.

[yycflyguy]

Having reflected on all of the above... I still have a fundamental problem with this issue. Namely, hands and feet. Situational awareness. Needle, ball, airspeed. The Ethiopian accident occurred in day VFR conditions. Despite what the technology was doing, commanding the auto systems to input a response, was there not a way for someone, in the loop, to say, "NO!" — and to regain control of the aircraft?

Apparently the thrust system was responding to a fault indicating a stall, which, combined with the pitch down-commanded attitude led the aircraft to rapidly increase speed, imposing tremendous loads on the flight controls. As part of the attempted recovery, did the pilots disengage the auto thrust and reduce the thrust to idle?

The AT is not in any way related to the MCAS. It's been pointed out several times that the pilots did not fully complete the memory items for the Runaway Trim despite what Ethiopian told the media in the first days post accident. They did not disengage the AT. The thrust remained at take off power increasing the aerodynamic forces exponentially.

At AC we did not have AOA indications until after the Lion Air accident. Boeing is guilty of selling safety features.

The AD put out to operators should have already been known by Boeing operators. The lack of corrective action by the crew does not absolve Boeing for hiding the system completely from AOM descriptions and training nor does it absolve the FAA for essentially allowing Boeing to self certify another B737 that is nothing like a NG as far as W&B, engines, flight envelop and flying characteristics.

[Raymond Hall]

Boeing says 737 Max update is being held up by FAA questions

Regulator has asked the aerospace giant how pilots interact with flight controls and displays

Boeing [says] that its update for the 737 Max software has been completed.

The U.S. regulator has asked Boeing to provide more details about “how pilots interact with the airplane controls and displays in different flight scenarios,” the company said in a statement Thursday. A spokesman for the FAA confirmed the agency is asking about pilot interaction on the 737 Max but declined to provide more information about the review process or how long it is expected to take.

“This process will take as long as necessary to ensure the aircraft is returned to service safely,” FAA spokesman Gregory Martin said.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/business ... e02a6a78n

[Rezy]

As part of the attempted recovery, did the pilots disengage the auto thrust and reduce the thrust to idle?

Looking at the FDR, this likely would have killed them sooner. Reducing thrust would have lowered the airspeed. With the higher airspeed the more lift the wings create to offset the negative lift of the horizontal stabilizer (which was stuck in a nose down trim condition). The slower the airplane flies, with a nose down trim, the harder it is to stay in the air because the elevators are less effective.
Although the UAS drill has been mentioned lots, no evidence has been shown that it would have prevented either accidents at all.
The only thing the crew could have done was use the manual electric trim to center and then hit the cutout switches.
Flying slower would have killed them sooner.
Theory of Flight 101.

[Rezy]

It all started with an Unreliable Airspeed (which includes the false warning) then, once the flaps were up and in manual flight, the Stab Trim Runaway. Two emergencies, both with recognized procedures.

The additional flying skills that would have helped would have been:

• autothrottle - off
  set 10 degrees pitch
  set 80% power
  (these are part of the NNC
  with or without doing the NNC, someone should have been flying the airplane, and this includes
  manage the speed, instead the speed got up to max velocity of 340 Kts, which made manual trimming nearly impossible
  trim the aircraft, to maintain an in trim condition, with large bursts of trim, not timid, little tickles of the trim switch

There are other airmanship issues that I think we can all learn lessons about too:

• with either problem, you are not going anywhere. Land the aircraft immediately
  if the problem stops, stay in that configuration and don't change configuration back to one that causes the issue to reappear
  know your emergencies

I don’t think we agree on the sequence of events and are getting confused in our discussion.
After getting the stall warning at rotation, the first action taken was to turn the autopilot on. Which was likely an attempt to prevent MCAS from running away as, according to the Boeing letter, it only operates in manual mode. Having solved the MCAS, because the autopilot came on, the crew decided to bring the flaps up. Why not? Autopilot is on and that means MCAS is off. Now when the autopilot turns off and the nose drops, resulting in max elevator force to keep the airplane in the air - the only thing that gave them a fight chance once they reached this point was airspeed. Airspeed allowed the elevator more force, allowed the wings to produce more lift, and thrust to pitch the nose up (slightly). While this was happening the only question that is really fair to ask, in my opinion, is why they didn’t manually use the electric trim to center the stabilizer and then hit the cutout switches.
I think for the most part we are in agreement, you’re just talking more about the first 60s and I’m talking about the last 60s.

Also to note, Boeing never mentions that leaving the flaps down prevents MCAS in their letter, how would these guys have know that? The only info they had to disable MCAS was to turn on the autopilot, which they did, and then it turned off.

[L39Guy]

It all started with an Unreliable Airspeed (which includes the false warning) then, once the flaps were up and in manual flight, the Stab Trim Runaway. Two emergencies, both with recognized procedures.

The additional flying skills that would have helped would have been:

• autothrottle - off
  set 10 degrees pitch
  set 80% power
  (these are part of the NNC
  with or without doing the NNC, someone should have been flying the airplane, and this includes
  manage the speed, instead the speed got up to max velocity of 340 Kts, which made manual trimming nearly impossible
  trim the aircraft, to maintain an in trim condition, with large bursts of trim, not timid, little tickles of the trim switch

There are other airmanship issues that I think we can all learn lessons about too:

• with either problem, you are not going anywhere. Land the aircraft immediately
  if the problem stops, stay in that configuration and don't change configuration back to one that causes the issue to reappear
  know your emergencies

I don’t think we agree on the sequence of events and are getting confused in our discussion.
After getting the stall warning at rotation, the first action taken was to turn the autopilot on. Which was likely an attempt to prevent MCAS from running away as, according to the Boeing letter, it only operates in manual mode. Having solved the MCAS, because the autopilot came on, the crew decided to bring the flaps up. Why not? Autopilot is on and that means MCAS is off. Now when the autopilot turns off and the nose drops, resulting in max elevator force to keep the airplane in the air - the only thing that gave them a fight chance once they reached this point was airspeed. Airspeed allowed the elevator more force, allowed the wings to produce more lift, and thrust to pitch the nose up (slightly). While this was happening the only question that is really fair to ask, in my opinion, is why they didn’t manually use the electric trim to center the stabilizer and then hit the cutout switches.
I think for the most part we are in agreement, you’re just talking more about the first 60s and I’m talking about the last 60s.

Also to note, Boeing never mentions that leaving the flaps down prevents MCAS in their letter, how would these guys have know that? The only info they had to disable MCAS was to turn on the autopilot, which they did, and then it turned off.

First, turning the autopilot on for either UAS (which is what was present for the first few minutes) is not the checklist procedure nor is it for a stall, if they thought they were stalled. But they tried the autopilot at 400 ft (minimum autopilot engagement altitude) as I suspect that is how they fly each and every day. The autopilot would not stay on, that is clear in the preliminary report. Fine.

But if they were really thinking that they had an MCAS event going on, then why raise the flaps as MCAS is not active with the flaps extended either, particularly if the autopilot will not engage?

It is true that speed is life, however too much speed is a problem as the control forces increase exponentially with increasing speed, all other things being equal. If you are above the stall speed and motoring around at maneouvering speed (roughly 220 kts clean), going 340 knots adds no extra value but it makes flight control forces for an out-of-trim stabilizer impossible to handle manually.

They did use electric trim but only in small bursts, according the preliminary report. That just wasn't going to cut it as a long trimming period was required much like one uses when flaps are being retracted or extended. I suspect that they did not do this is because they probably have never flown the aircraft manually where they actually had to trim the aircraft. The policies at most of these carriers is autopilot on at 400 ft on departure (long before any flap retraction and acceleration requiring manual trim) and autopilot off at 1000 ft. 500 ft, 200 ft or not at all on landing (after the deceleration and flap extension). Friends of mine that fly in Asia and Africa tell me that is the policy and as a result they have no manually flying skills, like managing the airspeed.

[corethatthermal]

A circuit labelled MCAS would have easily prevented this alongside training on the system before the 1st accident. With a CB labelled MCAS , Boeing would have to tell the pilots MCAS existed and whether there must be type training ! Not having 2 sensors inputting allowed Boeing to do away with differences training SAD!!!

[corethatthermal]

Looking at the large engine and its position relative to the small original hor. stab, this A/C must be reaching its min. design requirements at both ends of the travel OR did it already exceed allowable design parameters in the nose- down position ( le up ) ? Perhaps the A/C would lose all pitch authority above the min required speed and hence the MCAS. Like an A/C that is unable to be certified for stalls in certain configurations and therefore needs a stick pusher AND a stick shaker. Many A/C, many band-aid solutions come back to bite!

[L39Guy]

A circuit labelled MCAS would have easily prevented this alongside training on the system before the 1st accident. With a CB labelled MCAS , Boeing would have to tell the pilots MCAS existed and whether there must be type training ! Not having 2 sensors inputting allowed Boeing to do away with differences training SAD!!!

Since MCAS presents identical characteristics to a Stab Trim Runaway, doing this checklist including turning off the stab trim, per the NNC, would have achieved the same result.

It is also important to note that the Lion Air crew the day before with the same aircraft and issue flew the aircraft to destination (1 1/2 hours away) with manual trim (i.e. with the stab trim switches off). They seemed to get it right.

[L39Guy]

Looking at the large engine and its position relative to the small original hor. stab, this A/C must be reaching its min. design requirements at both ends of the travel OR did it already exceed allowable design parameters in the nose- down position ( le up ) ? Perhaps the A/C would lose all pitch authority above the min required speed and hence the MCAS. Like an A/C that is unable to be certified for stalls in certain configurations and therefore needs a stick pusher AND a stick shaker. Many A/C, many band-aid solutions come back to bite!

The MAX had an issue of neutral stability at high angle of attack/g loading (in a turn); the FAR's state that aircraft shall have positive stability, i.e. the angle of attack would decrease without any input. MCAS, like stick pushers in other aircraft, is there to provide that stability.

Most aircraft have a band aid solution as reality is rarely the same as theory. As an example, look at all that stuff hanging off the Beech 1900D, look at the vortex generators on the wings of many aircraft, there is a stall strip on the leading edge inboard of the engines on the B737 NG, etc. Did you know that the B747-800 has a band aid software solution to fix an aileron flutter issue.

[Raymond Hall]

From today's New York Times:

The executive in charge of Boeing’s troubled 787 Dreamliner factory in North Charleston, S.C., is leaving the company, according to an internal company memo reviewed by The New York Times on Wednesday.

The departure of the executive, David Carbon, the vice president for 787 operations at Boeing South Carolina since 2016, comes about a month after The Times published an article detailing shoddy production practices and weak oversight at the factory. …

The Times’s article detailed a decade of problems at the South Carolina plant that continue to plague the factory. Debris was often left on finished jets, planes were badly damaged during the manufacturing process, and employees who tried to register complaints were frequently sidelined.

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/busi ... e=Homepage

[L39Guy]

Is this a real issue or is this an issue created by the newspapers to create headlines and sales?

Airlines have inspectors on site to inspect their multi-million dollar purchases as they are assembled. The aircraft are test flown by production test pilots prior to delivery and the airlines perform acceptance test flights to verify all of the systems. The aircraft are under warranty for x years following delivery. Have any aircraft crashed as a result of these so called production issues?

How much of this is a case of kicking Boeing while they are down? How much of this a union issue as the South Carolina facility is non-union? I am skeptical that this is a big issue, no bigger at Boeing than it would be at Airbus, GM, BMW, etc.

[Raymond Hall]

Is this a real issue or is this an issue created by the newspapers to create headlines and sales?

I believe that the key element of this story is the appearance of turmoil within the management, especially the senior management, of Boeing. That is usually indicative of a larger problem.

[yycflyguy]

Is this a real issue or is this an issue created by the newspapers to create headlines and sales?

I believe that the key element of this story is the appearance of turmoil within the management, especially the senior management, of Boeing. That is usually indicative of a larger problem.

Agreed. Especially this part "No full-time successor to Mr. Carbon, who plans to return to his native Australia, was announced. The Boeing memo, written by Brad Zaback, the head of the company’s 787 program, said Mr. Carbon was leaving “to care for his family.”

Sacking a VP Operations for the B787 is a significant admission of a greater issue.

[Eric Janson]

More information emerges on the -MAX certification

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/01/busi ... crash.html

I'm not a Lawyer but this looks like Criminal Negligence to me.

Doesn't look like this aircraft will be returning to service anytime soon - if at all.

[Raymond Hall]

More information emerges on the -MAX certification Doesn't look like this aircraft will be returning to service anytime soon - if at all.

'
A superbly researched article providing the most extensive detail yet re the process leading to the events. Big company. Big mistakes. Especially wilfull blindness and prioritization of profit over safety.

However, the design and implementation flaws are able to be remedied. There is just too much at stake for this aircraft to not be put back into service. 4,600 copes at around $150 million per copy. the equivalent of the annual GDP of many countries. Big bucks, and tremendous sunk cost for not just Boeing but for many of the airlines already in possession of the deliveries.

My expectation is that it will take longer and cost more than anticipated, but that we will start to see a lifting of restrictions early this autumn, combined with significant changes to the FAA oversight regimen.

[yycflyguy]

My expectation is that it will take longer and cost more than anticipated, but that we will start to see a lifting of restrictions early this autumn, combined with significant changes to the FAA oversight regimen.

Agreed on all fronts.

[Raymond Hall]

From CNN today:

Sullenberger:

I recently experienced all these warnings in a 737 MAX flight simulator during recreations of the accident flights. Even knowing what was going to happen, I could see how crews could have run out of time before they could have solved the problems.

"We must make sure that everyone who occupies a pilot seat is fully armed with the information, knowledge, training, skill and judgment to be able to be the absolute master of the aircraft and all its component systems and of the situations simultaneously and continuously throughout the flight," he said.

Pilots need physical, firsthand experience to be prepared for emergencies, Sullenberger said.

"Reading about it on an iPad is not even close to sufficient," he said.

https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/19/politics ... index.html

[Raymond Hall]

A short interview, today..

https://tunein.com/podcasts/News--Polit ... =131894046

['97 Tercel]

Boeing may come out of this less scathed than we all think...

PARIS, FRANCE — The parent company of British Airways said on Tuesday that it is buying a new fleet of Boeing 737 Max jets — the first big-ticket order for the plane since it was grounded around the world after two fatal crashes.

International Airlines Group (IAG) announced at the Paris Air Show that it would buy 200 of the jets in a deal worth about $24 billion.

Willie Walsh, the CEO of IAG, said the company was "pleased" with the decision and that the Max would "be a great addition to IAG's short-haul fleet."


IAG is the parent company of British Airways, Aer Lingus, Iberia, and Vueling.

The company said it would buy a combination of the 737 Max 8 and the larger 737 Max 10.

https://www.businessinsider.com/iag-to- ... sis-2019-6

[telex]

Boeing may come out of this less scathed than we all think...

PARIS, FRANCE — The parent company of British Airways said on Tuesday that it is buying a new fleet of Boeing 737 Max jets — the first big-ticket order for the plane since it was grounded around the world after two fatal crashes.

International Airlines Group (IAG) announced at the Paris Air Show that it would buy 200 of the jets in a deal worth about $24 billion.

Willie Walsh, the CEO of IAG, said the company was "pleased" with the decision and that the Max would "be a great addition to IAG's short-haul fleet."


IAG is the parent company of British Airways, Aer Lingus, Iberia, and Vueling.

The company said it would buy a combination of the 737 Max 8 and the larger 737 Max 10.

https://www.businessinsider.com/iag-to- ... sis-2019-6

How do you anticipate an order for 200 airframes will affect anything related to this situation?

[FL410AV8R]

Boeing may come out of this less scathed than we all think...

PARIS, FRANCE — The parent company of British Airways said on Tuesday that it is buying a new fleet of Boeing 737 Max jets — the first big-ticket order for the plane since it was grounded around the world after two fatal crashes.

International Airlines Group (IAG) announced at the Paris Air Show that it would buy 200 of the jets in a deal worth about $24 billion.

Willie Walsh, the CEO of IAG, said the company was "pleased" with the decision and that the Max would "be a great addition to IAG's short-haul fleet."


IAG is the parent company of British Airways, Aer Lingus, Iberia, and Vueling.

The company said it would buy a combination of the 737 Max 8 and the larger 737 Max 10.

https://www.businessinsider.com/iag-to- ... sis-2019-6

How do you anticipate an order for 200 airframes will affect anything related to this situation?

I am pretty certain that Willie Walsh negotiated this order at a significant discount.

[goingnowherefast]

Probably gave the planes away. I wonder if they sold them below cost, a la CSeries dumping scandal that Boeing fought....

[Babar350]

New flaw discovered on Boeing 737 Max, sources say :

https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/26/politics ... index.html

What are the odds to see the 737Max fly again?

[goingnowherefast]

They'll spend billions to get it flying again. Probably already have. Boeing reputation is riding on this jet. Even if they never make a penny on the 737 program again, they'll fix it to save face. Even if they have to jack up the landing gear and lower the engines, but I bet they'd do it.

I certainly wouldn't buy a 797 I were worried I'd be buying a plane that might turn into a giant paperweight forever.