NT Air King Air Accident - Pilot Discussion Thread

[cncpc]

Is anybody certain that one of the engines was indeed not making any power at the time of the crash?

From what I see, the detached propeller and the one that stayed with the aircraft both look like they were being driven at the time they contacted.

There is nothing to say though that they weren't in beta, perhaps but I do not think either one displays indications of having hit while feathered.

When I first saw this accident, my thought was that maybe with their unscheduled return to the airport, they'd been slotted in too close behind a heavy jet and got caught up in the wake turbulence; reminiscent of the Navajo that ended up in Ikea's parking lot a couple years ago.

Just a thought.

'48

They were No. 1 from a long ways back and no wake turbulence caution on the tape. Wind was right down the runway at 5 knots, so I doubt there would be any driftover from 26 right, HS.

[Rowdy]

I dont have a ton of time on the 100's. Heck I still have more time in DHC's.. which still isnt saying much..but...

I'd be looking closely at the props and the gearboxes/governors! A low oil pressure indication could be many many things and IIRC in the book it didnt warrant an immediate shutdown until below a certain pressure, just a power reduction! (Can someone confirm the #'s, I dont have my POH or GS book handy..) Its a tough call to shut down an engine that is still producing some power, providing bleed air and a gen! For those that havent flown one, King airs are very much electrically run airplanes. Flaps, gear motor, both the main and stby trim in the 100 plus all the instrumentation, GPS's etc. Sure one gen will suffice, but why put all that strain on the system and risk more issues? Dont forget that they arent fresh spring chickens either and I dare you to see what happens if you close ONE bleed at alt. It wont hold a cabin alt. and who would believe it should at 30 some odd years old with how many thousand hours and cycles? ahramin.. do you remember that conversation we had enroute sachs harbour about the time I'd had troubles with the YRB machine with joe?? I can 100% see and agree with the thought process and decision to keep it turning under the conditions and I'm also playing the devils advocate a bit here. Food for thought!

Now this could have been a total non event and as we've now seen something went drastically wrong in the very last few moments of the flight that changed that. Short short final.. No panic or strain in the pilots voices prior.. so it'll be interesting to see what comes of the CVR tapes and proper investigation. Could it have been a gearbox decide to come apart catastrophically in that last few seconds? How about the governors failing? Oil leak resulting in a fire near the accesory gearbox etc right towards the end? Lots and lots of theories.. lots and lots of maybes. The human brain always wants to determine the cause of something so it can be put at ease.. I know, I want to understand why a friend is no longer with us.

ahramin, I 100% agree.. she does sound a bit out to lunch, but I'll forgive her as she's probably higher than a kite on all that morphine. Been there! We should all also remember to discredit much of the eye witness bs as what do they say.. 80% of it is usually false and people have a tendency to distort facts and 'see' things. I also fail to see how some feel the trucks should have been called out regardless. That would make sense IF the aircraft impacted on the airport grounds and not outside of them and on the other side of a rather large fence/culvert! However it didnt and luckily there is a fully staffed hall just a few hundred meters up russ baker that responded incredibly quickly! Impeccably swift in their response times actually.. Kudos to themn and to the many who helped pull the passengers out, and I do believe that included one helijet employee! Can someone confirm that? If so, they deserve a solid avcan pat on the back and a round of beers or cheers. Or both!

SOmeone else also brought up a fantastic point. The LACK of available exits for the pilots on the 100! What a joke! One over the wing plug and the rear door. Brutal. Perhaps its time those old birds get crushed! Make em into pop cans I say, I never did much like them anyways

[ahramin]

Rowdy I do indeed remember that flight. However that close to the return airport I don't think the extra pack and gen would be factors affecting the shutdown decision. I'd be more prone to shut it down except for 2 things. We don't know what indications those guys had and we don't know what performance issues they would have been worried about. On a 200 or better I'd be inclined to shut down but a 100 is a different story, you can't always maintain altitude on 1 engine. Unless I had everything else going for me (weather, load, distance, etc) I'd be inclined to run it to failure.

As for rolling the fire equipment, in my King Air days with 1 shut down and everthing else normal I probably wouldn't have called for it either. After seeing this accident it's solidified my decision to call for it on every Pan Pan or Mayday to do with airplane issues.

[Jim la Jungle]

Hi Rowdy,

The numbers for oil pressure on the A100 are:

Between 80 and 40 psi, throttle back to 70% N1, which is pretty much high idle.
Below 40 psi is a shutdown.

I've had lot's of weird oil pressure indications in my king air days. Turned back a few times to find that it was always indication. This accident makes me wonder....scary. The mechanics told me that if you loose oil pressure, the prop will go towards feather, which is logical when you look at the system. This was discussed earlier.

As for gen or bleed off, it doesn't matter in this situation. 1 gen is sufficient and maybe you can get a few pounds of torque by turning the bleed off on the remaining engine. But this is not in the book. I'd be more worried about the ice vanes that are supposed to be on during landing. Turn them off and you get 100 pounds of torque more, which could help you a lot on that heep.

Also very good point on that cockpit. It's a trap. It's hard to get in or out in normal time, can you imagine when you're in shock and or injured...

With this post I'm merely answering technical questions. I have no clue on what happened that day.


Safe King air flying boys and girls. That plane can bite.

[Brown Bear]

I'm guessing the original cause was a dip stick was not properly placed in its hole. What happened next is for the investigators to establish. But I'll bet the dip stick got it started.

[Rowdy]

I like that this thread has stayed the course as a logical and proper discussion, without any mud slinging or bickering.

BB, It could very easily have been an oil cap/disptick not properly seated as much as it could have been a weak line or a crack in the case etc. Sometimes the cause is the most straightforward and simple and often initially overlooked answer.

Jim La jungle, thats also a very very solid point. A heavy 100 on a single engine sure can use every last bit of power.. She is a bit of a brick! Doubtful they put out the vanes under such conditions. Also doubtful if they figured it was just an indication that there would be reason to even think of all the things we've mentioned and discussed.

I honestly wonder how they were configured and what was going through their minds. It truly is hard to judge decisions and actions that they had but minutes and often seconds to think through, where we have the liberty of many years as we sit on the ground and pontificate.

It has solidified in my mind that if asked by the tower during such an occurence , I wouldnt hesistate for an instant to let them roll the trucks! Those fine gents in the nomex gear could use the exercise

[plhought]

Are the instrument AC fuses still by the co-pilot elbow there in the 100?

Is there any definite info that it was a single oil pressure indication? or both?

Good job though to those who ran up to help extricate those they could.

[The Hammer]

How many people has SFAR 41C killed over the years???

The demand to travel would have created aircraft designs that met higher standards had SFAR 41C never existed.

Did anyone really benefit from SFAR 41C other than the manufacturer's?? ie cheaper to design and sell due to lower standards

[PanEuropean]

The numbers for oil pressure on the A100 are: Between 80 and 40 psi, throttle back to 70% N1, which is pretty much high idle. Below 40 psi is a shutdown.

Folks:

I don't want to make any comment on this unfortunate accident, so I will confine my remarks to the limitations published for the engine - specifically oil pressure limitations, without any prejudice to the circumstances of the accident.

I think that the interpretation of the oil pressure limitations on the small PT6A series engines (for example, the -27 or -28) as posted by Jim is an example of what you could call "looking through the wrong end of the telescope".

The normal oil pressure range for these engines is 80 to 100 PSI (the green arc). As the engine gets older, oil pressure at idle will sometimes stabilize below 80 PSI. Pratt & Whitney permits continued operation of the engine at idle power (defined as less than 72% Ng) with oil pressure between 40 and 80 PSI (the amber caution range) provided that oil pressure increases to above 80 PSI (i.e. into the normal range) when the engine speed is increased above the idle range.

In other words - the rationale for publishing the 40 to 80 PSI caution range is to enable continued operation of the (presumably older) engine on the ground with lower than 'normal' oil pressures at idle, as long as the oil pressure rises up into the 'normal' range for flight operations. The 40 to 80 PSI caution range was not published when the engine was first certified, it was added in the late 1960s or early 1970s several years after first certification of the engine.

I have often seen people interpret the permission granted by the caution range 'backwards' - in other words, state, as Jim did, that if oil pressure in flight decreases below 80 PSI, Ng should be reduced to the idle range. I don't believe that this interpretation is congruent with Pratt & Whitney's original objective, which was to eliminate the need to pull and overhaul an older engine if oil pressure at idle was below 80 PSI.

For the purposes of flight, if the engine oil pressure drops below 80 PSI in flight (presuming normal flight power), there is a serious problem with the engine. Whether or not the limitations permit us to continue to operate the engine at Ng within the idle range for the remainder of the flight is kind of moot. Although the engine could continue to provide us with electrical generation and (perhaps some) bleed air, it's certainly not going to provide any useful propulsion. Plus, in the case of a drop of oil pressure below the green arc during flight, what we have encountered is a sudden degradation of the engine oil pressure system, not the gradual degradation at low Ng in older engines foreseen by P&W.

Michael

[The Old Fogducker]

How many people has SFAR 41C killed over the years???

The demand to travel would have created aircraft designs that met higher standards had SFAR 41C never existed.

Did anyone really benefit from SFAR 41C other than the manufacturer's?? ie cheaper to design and sell due to lower standards

Hammer .... what does this category of certification has to do with the Beech 90/100/200 series of aircraft which are certified under FAR 23?

[Big Pistons Forever]

How many people has SFAR 41C killed over the years???

The demand to travel would have created aircraft designs that met higher standards had SFAR 41C never existed.

Did anyone really benefit from SFAR 41C other than the manufacturer's?? ie cheaper to design and sell due to lower standards

Hammer .... what does this category of certification has to do with the Beech 90/100/200 series of aircraft which are certified under FAR 23?

SFAR 41C demands significantly more than FAR 23, especially for single engine performance and system redundancy. If all commercial turbine aircraft were required to operate under CAR 704 all of the old generation low performance A100, SW2's etc would be long gone. I think it is crazy that you can operate a 9 passenger 2 crew pressurized IFR aircraft in any weather under the same rules as an islander.

[The Old Fogducker]

How many people has SFAR 41C killed over the years???

The demand to travel would have created aircraft designs that met higher standards had SFAR 41C never existed.

Did anyone really benefit from SFAR 41C other than the manufacturer's?? ie cheaper to design and sell due to lower standards

Hammer .... what does this category of certification has to do with the Beech 90/100/200 series of aircraft which are certified under FAR 23?

SFAR 41C demands significantly more than FAR 23, especially for single engine performance and system redundancy. If all commercial turbine aircraft were required to operate under CAR 704 all of the old generation low performance A100, SW2's etc would be long gone. I think it is crazy that you can operate a 9 passenger 2 crew pressurized IFR aircraft in any weather under the same rules as an islander.

BPF, I fail to see what your answer has to do with the question and comment above regarding the Specially created commuter category, but the solution for the Islander is easy .... melt 'em down and turn them into frying pans. Keep the turbine powered aircraft in service operated by two crew .... only kidding Britten Norman fans.

I see nothing wrong with the broad range of operations permitted in 703 Ops aircraft up to 19,000 lbs with 9 passengers or less ... the key to it all is the quality of the training program in support of each type operated. Scrape the bottom of the barrel for training by only meeting the minimums through the falsification of logs and training records, and that's the level of expection of day in, day out performance.

Foggy

[whoop_whoop]

Take this with a grain of salt:

I suspect that the crew got themselves into a pickle at the last minute and didn't have enough time to deal with it. Here's my hypothesis...feel free to shoot holes in it.

I figure they returned with two good engines (as good as they can get) and somewhere over Richmond the left engine got degraded in it's performance. Specifically I've figured that they had a partial power loss somewhere below 500' AGL and, since it was partial, there would still be oil pressure, hence no feathering of the prop. I suspect that the drag increased to a point where power was needed and that's when they figured out they had a problem. I would imagine they applied power but only got a good result from the right engine and then started dealing with the left engine. At low altitude and having to deal with power loss isn't easy nor fast. I figure they then got behind the power curve and started to sink faster. At that point they'd be in dire straights...low, slow, behind the power curve, mostly single-engine, full load.

Please keep in mind that I've created a situation that plays into what we've already seen...both engines seemed to be producing power on impact, there was an oil problem with an engine, they veered left. I don't know...maybe I'm making too many assumptions and have turned my story into a slippery slope??

Constructive criticism welcome!

[magic wand]

Was the landing gear up or down at the time of the accident?
In this link -
http://news.nationalpost.com/2011/10/29 ... -children/
- the passenger says
“They were doing such a good job, they got so close. I mean, 900 metres away. Just prior to the point of collision we were listening to the bad sound of landing gear not going down.

“Clearly something was wrong there and the pilots shot each other a look and I knew that they were not going to make it despite a gallant effort.

I know that passengers do not always know what is going on, but do you think maybe the gear didnt go down and they tried a go around from a low energy landing regime? VMCa roll?

http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/s ... 1-1588.htm

[cncpc]

Please keep in mind that I've created a situation that plays into what we've already seen...both engines seemed to be producing power on impact, there was an oil problem with an engine, they veered left. I don't know...maybe I'm making too many assumptions and have turned my story into a slippery slope??

Constructive criticism welcome!

Certainly is one possibility.

There is an eyewitness who saw the airplane fly overhead and said it was making a squealing type of sound. If I remember though, he was in Delta and you'd think if he could hear it, the crew could and would have had equipment out. On the other hand...

Ok, here is exactly what he said, from the Sun comments...

I work in Delta and watched this plane go by. The only reason I noticed it was because the engine sounded too loud and had a strange squealing sound that I knew was not normal. I'm sure the engine ran out of oil and seized but the investigation will show the reason. My prayers for the survivors.

[Big Pistons Forever]

Hammer .... what does this category of certification has to do with the Beech 90/100/200 series of aircraft which are certified under FAR 23?

SFAR 41C demands significantly more than FAR 23, especially for single engine performance and system redundancy. If all commercial turbine aircraft were required to operate under CAR 704 all of the old generation low performance A100, SW2's etc would be long gone. I think it is crazy that you can operate a 9 passenger 2 crew pressurized IFR aircraft in any weather under the same rules as an islander.

BPF, I fail to see what your answer has to do with the question and comment above regarding the Specially created commuter category, but the solution for the Islander is easy .... melt 'em down and turn them into frying pans. Keep the turbine powered aircraft in service operated by two crew .... only kidding Britten Norman fans.

I see nothing wrong with the broad range of operations permitted in 703 Ops aircraft up to 19,000 lbs with 9 passengers or less ... the key to it all is the quality of the training program in support of each type operated. Scrape the bottom of the barrel for training by only meeting the minimums through the falsification of logs and training records, and that's the level of expection of day in, day out performance.

Foggy

How many A100's, all of which are operated under 703 have crashed in the last 10 years in Canada ? By my count at least 5

How many B1900's, all of which are operated under 704 have crashed in the last 10 years in Canada ? By my count none.

Fleet size is about the same, so why the difference ? My personal opinion is operating under 704 forces the operation of SFAR41C aircraft, all of which are newer and more capable than those of the A100 generation, I think that makes for a safer operation.

[The Old Fogducker]

Sorry BPF, but you've erred ... CAR 704 doesn't force operation of SFAR 41 aircraft. FAR 23 is quite acceptable ... for example, a Beech 200.

One of my complaints with the division of 703 and 704 ops for a long time was that someone could buy 2 King Airs, one after the other down the production line ....absolutely identical in every way. TC insisted that if you were register one 703 for single or two pilot operation with 9 pax or less, and the other in 704 for 11 pax .... if one aircraft went U/S ... the other couldn't be used to fill in because it was termed to be "Flip-Flopping" between categories.

Since then they have become less restrictive.

Do many 704 AOC holders operate aircraft certified in the Commuter Category? Yes .... sure do. Is it a regulatory requirement that they do so? No.

The difference between the 100 and 1900 hull losses is likely due to the quality of the training and enforcement of the way the aircraft is utilized. The 1900 pilots I know have had the benefit of advanced training in simulators in a very structured program, followed by line indoctrination flying, and then periodic supervised monitoring of the way they comply with SOPs in Line Checks. Not many of the 100 pilots have the benefit of that level of training and oversight. After annual PPC and minimal training, generally zero else takes place.

Fog

[Topspin]

Was the landing gear up or down at the time of the accident?
In this link -
http://news.nationalpost.com/2011/10/29 ... -children/
- the passenger says
“They were doing such a good job, they got so close. I mean, 900 metres away. Just prior to the point of collision we were listening to the bad sound of landing gear not going down.

“Clearly something was wrong there and the pilots shot each other a look and I knew that they were not going to make it despite a gallant effort.

I know that passengers do not always know what is going on, but do you think maybe the gear didnt go down and they tried a go around from a low energy landing regime? VMCa roll?

http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/s ... 1-1588.htm

Emergency vehicles were declined around 2 minutes prior, seems an unlikely course of action with a gear problem.
Also believe that a lack of gear would be something the media would jump all over from eyewitness accounts, and that woman appears to be incorrect about pretty much everything.

[MrWings]

Pilot speculation, however misguided, I can deal with.

Ignorant passenger interpretation makes me angry.

“I looked at his hands and they were shaking, trembling, and at that moment I knew we were going to die.”

An low oil pressure indication in a twin engine turbined scared the captain so much he was trembling? So much that he didn't declare an emergency?

she said it was clear the pilots knew the aircraft was in serious trouble.She said the pilots aimed the nose up, she assumed to gather enough altitude to coast back to the airport.

“They went very high up ... The pilots were taking us much higher than normal and I understand that is because they were going to glide us in. I understood that halfway down. They were doing such a good job, they got so close. I mean, 900 metres away.”

So, their plan was to glide your "doomed" aircraft past several closer airports? And you know what the "normal" altitude is?

This lady's rambling is nothing more than Hollywood flavoured sputum.

[SoundAir11]

For what it is worth, the CADORS for this (2011P1817) reports they had both oil pressure and oil temperature indications. Here it is, in part:

"The Northern Thunderbird Air Beechcraft Kingair 100, C - GXRX, operating flight NTA204, departed IFR Vancouver (CYVR) to Kelowna (CYLW). Vancouver Area Control Centre coordinated NTA204 returning to CYVR due to engine oil temperature and pressure. The aircraft was asked by the Tower if additional equipment or help were required and the pilot answered negative. NTA204 received landing clearance RWY26L. The aircraft subsequently crashed short of RWY26L in the vicinity of Russ Baker Way. Aircraft Rescue & Fire Fighting were activated."

[wallypilot]

Sorry BPF, but you've erred ... CAR 704 doesn't force operation of SFAR 41 aircraft. FAR 23 is quite acceptable ... for example, a Beech 200.

One of my complaints with the division of 703 and 704 ops for a long time was that someone could buy 2 King Airs, one after the other down the production line ....absolutely identical in every way. TC insisted that if you were register one 703 for single or two pilot operation with 9 pax or less, and the other in 704 for 11 pax .... if one aircraft went U/S ... the other couldn't be used to fill in because it was termed to be "Flip-Flopping" between categories.

Since then they have become less restrictive.

Do many 704 AOC holders operate aircraft certified in the Commuter Category? Yes .... sure do. Is it a regulatory requirement that they do so? No.

The difference between the 100 and 1900 hull losses is likely due to the quality of the training and enforcement of the way the aircraft is utilized. The 1900 pilots I know have had the benefit of advanced training in simulators in a very structured program, followed by line indoctrination flying, and then periodic supervised monitoring of the way they comply with SOPs in Line Checks. Not many of the 100 pilots have the benefit of that level of training and oversight. After annual PPC and minimal training, generally zero else takes place.

Fog

Training sure is one factor. But many 1900 operators don't do SIM training....cargo ops, for example, tend not to. And the stats are similar. I would argue that a very significant factor is the single engine performance and how flyable the aircraft is on one engine.

[oldncold]

thankyou for some real intelligent info on the ole be100 ,, there is a bunch of other ?
1/ could a fatigue crack in the fuel oil heater result in a leak that got progressively worse ? ie no noticeable problem on taxi as low power, would you catch that on a run up high power?
2/ was this an sop and if so done before departure

3/if not then it would be noticeable on shortly after takeoff re high power settings and as outside ambient air pressure decreases with altitude?

4/ then would this compound the fcu scheduling and hence mentioned prop gov "Hunting" for the on speed ?


would be a chain of events that would be somewhat logical?

[boeingoingone]

“I looked at his hands and they were shaking, trembling, and at that moment I knew we were going to die.”

Luc and I had a low oil pressure situation in a twin otter on floats (he was in the right seat doing a line check on me). An in flight shutdown was not a good option for various reasons I'm not going to get into. We got it on the water and it was a non-event. I can assure you there was no hand shaking, queer looks or other dramatic BS going on in the cockpit. It was professional, straight forward, well thought out emergency using CRM. I worked with this guy around the world in demanding conditions, and I can assure you he was very capable, professional and safety conscious. Whatever happened that day I can only assume it was quick and at the worst possible time. It's easy to arm chair quarterback in hind sight that he shouldn't have done this and gone there, however, remember every situation is unique. There are lots of factors to take into account. Regardless of what the cause was, we lost a great guy that day. I'm sure he was doing the best he could in the last minutes to get that piece of crap on the ground, and I feel terrible his wife and daughter will never see him again.

[hf4you]

Don't rely too much on the appearance of the prop, alot of variables besides engine power, including momentum, aircraft speed, how solid the article that the prop ran into was, etc. I don't think anyone should be jumping to conclusions yet regarding whether or not an engine was producing power.

Fluctuating oil pressure is far more serious than simply a low oil pressure, because you often see it fluctuate when a bearing is letting go. 9 times out of 10 an oil pressure indication problem is just an indication problem, but it is important to take it seriously each time. Regardless of what they find, these guys did the best they could with what they were given. We can learn from this and gain a lesson that these guys were not privy to at the time.

[TreeBlender]

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