vic777 wrote:Obviously, we never let that arbitrator near our negotiations. And just as obviously, we have to grow a backbone.
In the traditional collective bargaining process, arbitrators are not involved, of course. Unions and employers engage in bargaining to the point where they reach an impasse, and then either the union serves strike notice, or the employer serves lockout notice. We haven’t experienced the traditional collective bargaining process since our strike of 1998. In the 2000 negotiation, the federal Minister of Labour intervened to tell both Air Canada and the ACPA that if both did not take her offer of a mediator, that she would take actions that neither would find attractive.
Neither party called her "bluff" because neither thought she was bluffing. Needless to say, it was that report of that mediator that wound up being applied as the basis for the contractual changes that were ultimately implemented.
One of the main problems with arbitrator Stanley's report was not that he did not accept ACPA's position, but that he refused to deviate significantly from the decisions of other arbitrators who had already rendered their similar decisions for Air Canada and the other unions dealing with the 2006 wage reopener. Also, he evidently had a tough time buying any of ACPA's arguments, especially about the need to rescind the narrow-body pay discounts.
Consider these words, for example:
ACPA presented two demands to which they assign a very high priority. The A320 15% adjustment and moving the Embraer pilots to the formula pay system from their present flat pay. These represent departures from a normative pay increase. I find that both these demands go to the core of adjustments made in the CCAA process. Those adjustments were viewed as necessary to achieve the labour cost reductions required to get Air Canada back to being a viable going concern. The evidence does not support a conclusion that either the A320 pilots or the Embraer pilots are compensated at a rate below that being paid to similar pilots at Air Canada’s competitors. I cannot find a justification for making an exception for these two groups of pilots in this Award.
There is another significant theme that plays repeatedly throughout his decision that is relevant to this thread (CHRT Remedy). Namely, ACPA's
refusal to face reality. As he stated above, ACPA not only did not seriously believe that Air Canada was facing bankruptcy, but ACPA did not believe that it could not get back what it lost in CCAA negotiations. The arbitrator saw Air Canada's new cost structure as being permanent, not temporary. There is no "going back." On the last page of his decision he states, "the pilots continue to view themselves as being hard done by..." which may account in part for our dogged refusal to face reality.
Windfall gains are rarely in the cards, either through arbitration or through negotiation. The last windfall gain for pilots in the airline industry that I am aware of occurred over 40 years ago when the pilot unions persuaded their employers to maintain the formula pay system, based on weight and speed, with the arrival of the heavy jet. Although it created the anomaly of B747 Second Officers (unlicensed pilots) earning more than DC-9 or B737 Captains, it also put the B747 Captain in the top 1% of income earners in the country. That was a windfall never to be replicated in any other form, and certainly not through negotiation or by going on strike.
We Air Canada pilots are not an island unto ourselves, but rather only a bit player in the larger scheme of things, and our refusal to get our minds around this fact is seriously problematic both in terms of our expectations and in terms of our actions.