182 down by Smithers

[Its What I do]

Anyone know anything??

Just heard through a friend....

Hope all are ok

[rookiepilot]

https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british- ... -1.5123479

[PilotDAR]

It's a good thing that the CBC stated it is a stock photo! For a second I was worried that a Polish 182 had crashed in BC!

I thought for a pilot who was doing what he/she loved....

[Schooner69A]

This one may be close to home...

[cncpc]

This was a commercial operator engaged in testing or actually using an underslung IR sensor along the Babine River to check for hot spots from last year's fires. This thing...http://www.airbornescientific.com/content/cessnacam

Sadly, three have been lost and one person has a broken arm.

The pilot was very high time and while I know where he was from, not the time to say now.

The pilot put out a Mayday in which he said he was not sure he could make some bush strip in that area, and I understand the site is near to whatever that place is. So engine failure most likely, possible something went wrong with that contraption underneath.

[cncpc]

This one may be close to home...

Probably is.

[Capt. Underpants]

https://www.interior-news.com/news/smit ... rash-site/

R.I.P.

[patter]

I understand this to be my neighbour. To the family and friends, I am very sorry for your loss. It was always a pleasure to have a visit with Lorne.

[ckl]

Any updates on names?

[cncpc]

Any updates on names?

The pilot's name is out there but nothing official yet. No word on the name of the injured passenger.

There is an update with the latest TSB report. Photo of wreckage. Wing missing, starboard stab ripped off, elevator ripped off that. Doesn't really look like an engine failure/forced approach gone wrong. Unless it was a very bad forced approach. It is in a gorge and not many people chose a gorge for a forced approach. They would have been 2000 AGL when the mayday went out, if they were in survey mode. The call to forestry was along the lines of not knowing if the Silver Hilton lodge strip could be reached.

That's a dodgy looking rig in that photo up at the top in this thread.

https://globalnews.ca/news/5258084/nort ... w-details/

[PilotDAR]

That's a dodgy looking rig in that photo up at the top in this thread.

I was thinking that too, and I make my living issuing STC's for things that hang from planes! I can't immediately see how its failure would cause an accident, but it still does not fill me with confidence.....

[cncpc]

That's a dodgy looking rig in that photo up at the top in this thread.

I was thinking that too, and I make my living issuing STC's for things that hang from planes! I can't immediately see how its failure would cause an accident, but it still does not fill me with confidence.....

The pilot was 66 and word is he had 40,000 hours. That may be a way of saying he had a lot of time. If it was an engine failure, that seems like something much more destructive than you would expect from a guy with that much time. It takes a lot of force to take the wing right off a 182, much more than you'd get treetopping at forced approach speed. Lot of force on those tail feathers hanging up in that tree.

He didn't say he had an engine failure in the mayday to forestry. He said he was "having problems" and didn't think he could make the strip at Silver Hilton, a fishing lodge.

That box is held on by a cable system which is cinched down where each strut connects to the fuselage. It has no connection to any metal of the aircraft. It is only pressure and friction which keeps it in the position behind the nosewheel. If it lets loose on one side, the loop on the other can likely slide all the way up the strut to the wing connector. If it hangs on, you've got about a two foot drogue trailing and giving a fair bit of assymetric drag about 6 foot off to the side. If each side has an independent cable and one side snaps, then the box breaks loose and is flapping behind the strut on the other loop. That loop would almost certainly move up to the wing.

It was three hours into the flight. How much fuel can you carry with four on board a 182 with that rig and a bit of gear?

[cncpc]

I went back and looked at the system owner's page. Watched the guy install the box and hand tighten that turnbuckle. That just doesn't seem right. It does seem to be a single cable, but the turnbuckle probably wouldn't come through the guide holes or whatever on the box, so it would trail if it separated. That wouldn't be a normal downward pull on that bottom strut fitting, would it?

[Heliian]

That's a dodgy looking rig in that photo up at the top in this thread.

I was thinking that too, and I make my living issuing STC's for things that hang from planes! I can't immediately see how its failure would cause an accident, but it still does not fill me with confidence.....

That "cessnacam" box was stc'd in 1958, it's used for old fashioned camera's on the cheap. They could have jammed an ir camera in there but you would think they would use a standard ball for that.

[PilotDAR]

I have no idea about the cause or factors of the accident of this thread. I do not attribute a cable attached camera to the accident, because I have no reason to think it was a factor.

However, if a client approached me to attach any item of mass under the belly of a Cessna by a cable around the wing struts, I would decline the project. My concerns would be: what if it came loose, and what of one or both cables released? Aside from persons and property on the ground, best case it comes off, and departs the plane entirely - not good, but least negative effect on the airplane. If one cable let go, yes, I imagine the remaining cable could shift up the wingstrut. Whether up the wingstrut, or still at the fuselage, there would be horrendous banging off the airframe. I've had this happen, it sounds worse than it is, but it's not good. Something banging off the aileron would annoy the pilot, but again, "I've had it happen, it feels and sounds worse than it is (Cessna ailerons are surprisingly tough!). If the object trailed up to the wing, and banged around up there, the 182 would remain yaw controllable, though it would be scary. I had four jumpers try hand over hand up the wingstrut of a 185 I was flying on a slow jump run (without briefing me). The first jumper was yaw controllable, the rest really weren't. They yelled "Yahoo" as I was pushing the nose down and adding power to prevent a spin entry. Cessnas have an amazing amount of control available, which most pilots really never have to use much - if in doubt, fly the plane, it has more ability to get you home than you might expect.

That said, I'm empathetic to a pilot who is simply startled by something going wrong. 'Having to analyze, plan to continue flying while you figure out what when wrong, and, what to do about it, and trying to calm passengers. That would be very distracting.

Survey flying may entice a pilot to fly more slowly, and with four occupants in a 182, slow flying will require more attention. When I STC external equipment on aircraft, often non essential occupants are not permitted during survey flying.

[corethatthermal]

One would think that 4 in a C-182 would at least have 1 pax as non-essential!
Not too long ago, I was flying a C-206 in the Rockies and just entered very light rain when all of a sudden the whole aircraft shook like hell, Myself and observer were quite concerned, I reduced speed and headed directly to the airport. It turned out to be the RH wing strut vibrating at its oscillating frequency, brought upon by the airflow disturbance caused by the light rain! ( Google is your friend) 2 new bolts fixed that, but not before spending days flying trying to induce it again!
Once had a CH300 go into aileron flutter which induced the wing to flutter, Very disconcerting! It was during a buzz of the local airport and i had to pull up hard and lock the aileron in full right turn and let it roll until the flutter stopped. Chris Heintz made some odd departures from standard over the years and balance-less ailerons was one of them ( Having cable tension prevent flutter!!! )

[pelmet]

One would think that 4 in a C-182 would at least have 1 pax as non-essential!
Not too long ago, I was flying a C-206 in the Rockies and just entered very light rain when all of a sudden the whole aircraft shook like hell, Myself and observer were quite concerned, I reduced speed and headed directly to the airport. It turned out to be the RH wing strut vibrating at its oscillating frequency, brought upon by the airflow disturbance caused by the light rain! ( Google is your friend) 2 new bolts fixed that, but not before spending days flying trying to induce it again!
Once had a CH300 go into aileron flutter which induced the wing to flutter, Very disconcerting! It was during a buzz of the local airport and i had to pull up hard and lock the aileron in full right turn and let it roll until the flutter stopped. Chris Heintz made some odd departures from standard over the years and balance-less ailerons was one of them ( Having cable tension prevent flutter!!! )

Interesting comments. Was the 206 strut loose to begin with?

As for the CH300, my theory, which could be wrong, is to not fly those sort of aircraft faster than normal,(ie what other people have been flying). I don't trust the workmanship and staying far away from VNE is my plan.

[cncpc]

Scuffing is eliminated with rubberized cushions between the pod and airframe, and the pod is attached with a 3/16 steel cable rated at 4400 lbs, the wings will fall off before the pod falls off. The CessnaCam is STC approved, it is not an experimental device.

Is that qood thing? Wouldn't it be better if the pod fell off?

[PilotDAR]

with a 3/16 steel cable rated at 4400 lbs, the wings will fall off before the pod falls off. The CessnaCam is STC approved, it is not an experimental device.

Is that qood thing? Wouldn't it be better if the pod fell off?

Yeah, the Cessna wings have a fatigue life in the millions of hours (I've paid to have the analysis done!). A 3/16" steel cable, particularly when bent and pulled around sharp corners, and tensioned to mystery cable tensions, may not do as well. Perhaps nylon jacked cable? Harder to inspect for frayed wires. I have cabled things structurally, but that was with cables acting linear only, with properly swaged terminal ends, properly bolted, as intended in AC43.13 - no bending cables around corners, unless there's a proper pulley in that corner! The fact that something works, and has been STC'd (particularly a long time ago) is not a foolproof guarantee.

Yes, when I have designed and approved things attached to aircraft, where there was any possibility of it coming off/being knocked off in flight, it was designed to break cleanly away from the aircraft. I designed, and installed under a flight permit, four underwing pylons for a Cessna 207. My client was miffed when I filed off the three locking pins for each very expensive Amphenol connector which connected the payload to the onboard computers, and tywrapped them together. I explained that if a pylon was knocked off/shook itself off in flight, I wanted it to separate cleanly. After the accident, the first thing my client told me was that the four pylons were found in the trees, and had separated cleanly when the airplane crashed. I still have them. judging by their condition, the wings were not damaged by the separation, the pylons took the damage as intended. The pilot was killed, and the plane burned, only the pylons survived. The last thing I wanted was one of my pylons letting go, and banging off an aileron by it's electrical cables. Accident caused by pilot sightseeing in the mountains, and loosing situational awareness in a valley, nothing to do with the highly modified plane carrying more than a million dollars of Environment Canada's atmospheric research equipment!

Again, I have no idea what happened in the case of this 182 accident. Perhaps that camera was a factor, perhaps not. But, there's no way that camera made the plane safer!

[ckl]

I have yet to see any publication of the name of the pilot.......

[cncpc]

Report on this out Monday.

https://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-repo ... p0059.html

[youhavecontrol]

Records indicate that the aircraft had an ongoing history of carburetor air box repairs and alternator-related maintenance.

The carburetor air box was crushed at impact and no determination could be made of its pre-impact condition. However, the carburetor heat control remained connected to the carburetor air box and was found in the fully-in (cold) position. At impact the control had been bent at 90 degrees immediately forward of the instrument panel, trapping the centre control wire in the “carb heat cold” position.

The carburetor heat control was found in the fully-in (cold) position. The pilot owned 3 carbureted aircraft and would have been familiar with the operation of carburetor heat systems, so it was unlikely that he would not have applied it in these circumstances. The investigation also considered other scenarios. Carburetor heat may have been selected on at some time before the crash but was likely returned to the cold position before impact. It is also possible, though less likely, that the carburetor heat control was returned to fully-in (cold) position when the carburetor air box was crushed at impact. If carburetor ice had indeed accumulated, it could not be determined why it would not have been removed or reduced by the carburetor heat system.

There's not really anything definitive in this investigation. That's too bad. It sounds like poor management of the carburetor heat, but possibly that the system did not work properly?

[cncpc]

There's not really anything definitive in this investigation. That's too bad. It sounds like poor management of the carburetor heat, but possibly that the system did not work properly?

There are a number of things that do show up in the report.

Early on, there was interest in the modification of the IO-550 to an O-550 by that Texas company. It had to do with a concern that the carburetor system had come entirely or in part from the O-470, the factory engine of that aircraft. The theory was that the system for the smaller engine did not have sufficient heat output to deal with icing in the larger displacement O-550. It seems that was the type of issue that would manifest itself in the worst way in conditions of heavy carb icing. Those were the conditions on the day. Carb icing in that aircraft had been an issue in the past, and it seems to have at least resulted in some alternate placement of the carb heat box.

The fact that a potential emergency landing strip in the work area was not in the GPS database stands out. The holes in the cheese seem to be related to the pilot not knowing where Silver Hilton was. The report says he was 2.5 miles away from it on the first call about problems. He turned away and eventually came down 5.6 miles away. There is some evidence he thought he was that distance west of Silver Hinton, and he was flying east towards where he thought it was. The crash site and the Silver Hilton location look quite similar. Same bend in the river, same tributary flowing into the Babine from the north.

The area forecast for that area shows the 6000 foot winds forecast to be 27 knots out of the west. Figure 4 shows that the approach to the touchdown in trees was with a 15 knot tailwind. A turn into wind would have resulted in a net decrease of 30 knots in the impact speed. There is info that the aircraft was in contact with treetops for 500 feet before the accident site. This would indicate that the pilot did a very good job of keeping the aircraft under some control in the forced landing sequence.

It is hard to not notice that the TSB early on commented that the operator had a section in its manual in which it was "suggested" that when river levels were high and currents fast, forced approaches should be made into trees rather than water. It seems that there was a message in that inclusion. I have never seen an operations manual, or training manual, with that advice in it. It may be there with the best of intentions, but it is based on a flawed analysis of what the risks are in each choice.

[PilotDAR]

I have no association with the accident airplane, nor the engine conversion which was installed. That said, I did participate in the development and STC approval of a carburetted version of the 520 and 550, and flew a number of them. I did the testing in 1988 of a 185 with a carburettted 520. I modified the MA-4 carb to incorporate a larger venturi to breath better, and did all of the testing for development and certification. the design requirement for carb deicing reads:

§ 3.606 Induction system de-icing and antiicing provisions. The engine air induction system shall incorporate means for the prevention and elimination of ice accumulations in accordance with the provisions in this section. It shall be demonstrated that compliance with the provisions outlined in the following paragraphs can be accomplished when the airplane is operating in air at a temperature of 30° F, when the air is free of visible moisture.

(a) Airplanes equipped with sea level engines employing conventional venturi carburetors shall be provided with a preheater capable of providing a heat rise of 90° F. when the engine is operating at 75 percent of its maximum continuous power.

This was very challenging to achieve, but we did, as TC took the requirement very seriously. Think back to carb equipped engines with a carb air temperature gauge, which you have flown, how many of them are able to increase the temperature 90F? Not many for my experience! My C 150M is complete factory configuration in this regard, and O-200's have a less than nice reputation for carb ice. I have a digital carb air temperature gauge, and I cannot get anywhere near this temperature increase. Believe me when I say I've been over the system with a fine tooth comb, to assure it's right. It is, but it does not meet that requirement, not even close. Similarly other Cessnas I have flown.

Note that if you're operating at more than 75% power, you may not get that heat rise, and similarly with less than 75%. There is more to this than meets the eye...

There are tricks to optimize the effect of carb heat, once applied, and I spent a lot of test time learning these, and I think applying them have kept me in the air a couple of times. This accident is sad, and a pilot of that experience should have been able to anticipate carb ice. That said, with the load, and that less than refined external load, even with a 550, that plane would not have been a stellar performer as power was decreasing.

[pelmet]

Carb ice is just one of those things where it is best for the pilot to be a bit paranoid. I was fortunate enough to have a worrisome experience during my initial flight training which burned it into my memory. I have been a bit paranoid about it ever since and operate the heat every so often even if it appears to not be necessary. Most of the time in my experience, there is no problem but on the other hand, you may be melting a slow accumulation each time with the heat. And, no doubt most of the time it turned out to be unnecessary, but every once in a while it seems like there was some ice.

Bottom line....it seems like it can be a random kind of thing where some aircraft are more susceptible than others. I have flown on days where one would think that they would be guaranteed a bunch of ice but had no issues.

Maybe the really smart guys know better and know when heat is really needed but I have never had a significant issue with my regular checks since that day where the whole airframe shuddered for several seconds as the ice melted in a Cessna 150.

This accident report is a good reminder that perhaps ice may be more likely at lower power settings when things were OK at higher power settings.

A thread on a different forum makes it sound like susceptibility to carb icing can be hit and miss for similar aircraft types. Best to just operate it every once in a while.

https://backcountrypilot.org/forum/520- ... -ice-17094