Don't Completely Isolate Yourself From the Flight

[pelmet]

I have seen it before. One of the pilots is on the radio communicating with company or the cabin crew(or both) with head down due to some issue for a long period of time to concentrate while the other pilot is left flying the aircraft on descent/climb. In my case, with an engine inop(at idle actually) on descent and the captain coordinating with cabin crew and company.

Why not just look back up on a regular basis to ensure everything appears normal. That is monitoring, which doesn't seem to be the lesson learned based on the final discussion they had.

In the incident below, the captain looks up to find a 2,000 FPM climb through FL360 with power at idle and speedbrakes deployed. Airspeed was close to overspeed. And that was during the descent profile. I suspect that was his first glance up in quite a long time. At my most recent company, one of the primary responsibilities of the pilot not flying is to monitor the pilot flying, regardless of whether it is captain or F/O. That is why the term PNF(Pilot Not Flying) was changed to PM(Pilot Monitoring).

One can still make regular brief glances for monitoring even when there are multiple distractions.........


"Battling multiple Human Factors while handling a medical emergency, this Captain was showered with distractions.

■ Just after…the flight attendants (FAs)…had secured the cabin as requested and were seated due to expected turbulence on the arrival, I was notified we had a medical emergency in progress.… I informed the First Officer (FO) and Pilot Flying (PF) of the situation and asked him to take COMM 1, inform ATC, and do his best to avoid weather and turbulence, since we would now have people up in the cabin during the descent.… He acknowledged, and I began the STAT MD [radio] procedure and coordination with the FAs. Unfortunately, the FAs were having a rough time getting their medical headset connected and finding a doctor onboard. The passenger was unconscious with a very low breath and heart rate. By the time the FAs were able to respond to STAT MD,…a new [STAT MD radio] patch had to be made.… The FA could not communicate on the headset and decided to put the headset on the doctor assisting.

This caused a complete lock-up of the COMM due to the doctor…not knowing our procedures and keeping the transmit button depressed, causing a hot microphone. STAT MD was trying to give us instructions but was inaudible due to the blocked frequency. After repeated attempts of calling the FAs over the intercom and…PA announcements, the doctor was…removed from the headset, so we could make a plan…with STAT MD and Dispatch. I immediately made contact with the FAs and requested to not put the doctor on the headset again.… I could relay if needed.… At that point, I heard the autopilot disconnect and felt a semi-abrupt pitch-up.… Immediately, I observed the FO hand-flying the aircraft at a 2,000 FPM climb through FL360 with power at idle and speedbrakes deployed. Airspeed was close to overspeed.… I made a callout…and inquired what was going on. The FO stated that he had an updraft and was preventing an overspeed. I aggressively called for him to lower the nose, observing the airspeed decreasing rapidly and the engines…near idle. The FO immediately lowered the nose and regained control of the aircraft.… He reconnected the autopilot, and I went back to dealing with the emergency medical issue and inquired of the FO what happened. He was descending to FL240 from FL400 when he said we hit an updraft. We were in moderate turbulence the entire time, but I did not observe much airspeed fluctuation.… I notified Center of the climb during the descent due to an updraft.… We were given another crossing restriction.

Now back in the green, I was trying to get landing data and ATIS for a low visibility approach.… We were experiencing difficulties due to ACARS NO COMM through the weather.… At that point I observed the FO once again near overspeed and made the callout. He corrected speed and was complaining it was the aircraft. Trying to figure out what was going on, I noted the descent [speed] had been set to 320 knots. I immediately corrected the setting to 280 (turbulent penetration speed) and explained you can’t set an airspeed that high and not expect an overspeed, especially since we had been in moderate turbulence the entire time. I asked ATC to waive the next crossing restriction so we could slow,…and we continued safely.… While debriefing the event, we talked about task saturation and what had happened."

https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/publications/ ... b_492.html

[valleyboy]

I thought "fly the Fkin aeroplane" was the first rule of piloting.

[CensoredLF]

I think the PNF did pretty good. Twice he caught problems with how the other pilot was handling the aircraft while he was busy dealing with other dangers and risks.
Now, my opinion of the the PF is very different.

CLF