Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors
- 1. The approach speed of the aircraft was higher than outlined in the Air Canada Jazz standard operating procedures (SOPs). Because the aircraft could not be configured for landing until it slowed to the appropriate speed, commencement of the final descent to the minimum descent altitude (MDA) was delayed.
- 2. The final descent to the MDA was not initiated at the final approach fix (FAF). Therefore, even though the flight path angle (FPA) of the aircraft was about 3° and the rate of descent was constant, the aircraft was well above the desired vertical profile, resulting in the aircraft reaching the MDA well beyond the missed approach point (MAP).
- 3. The flight crew was not cognizant of the distance or time to the MAP during the approach. Therefore, the aircraft crossed the MAP before arriving at the MDA, but a missed approach was not conducted.
- 4. When the runway edge lights came into view, the flight crew continued the approach and began the landing sequence without being able to accurately assess the aircraft position and rate of change of position. This assessment may also have been hindered by a windrow obscuring the runway end lights.
- 5. Air Canada Jazz had not provided the flight crew members with adequate initial stabilized constant descent angle (SCDA) training, or any recurrent SCDA training and they were therefore unfamiliar with many aspects of SCDA approaches.
- 6. Transport Canada approved the Air Canada Jazz training program without data to indicate that the SCDA training met the requirements of the Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs) and the Commercial Air Service Standards (CASS). This resulted in flight crews not receiving all the required training to safely conduct this type of approach.








