Metro 3 ( dangerous as they say it is )

[Z28]

Hello aviators,

I might have an opportunity to fly a metro 3 but I’ve been reading and hearing it’s a dangerous beast to fly ?

I’d like to hear from other pilots that have flown it or still fly it if this is true ?

Fly safe

[Turboprops]

It’s not a forgiving aircraft that’s for sure, but if you know what you’re doing it’s a lot of fun.
If your other option is unemployed or instruct, metro flying sure is a way better job (imo anyway)

[BTD]

As mentioned it can be an unforgiving aircraft. Usually the place it will bite is ground control. I’m not sure statistically how it fairs against its peers. Keep in mind the environment it is flown in is generally a tough one, so that can make it seem worse.

3000 hrs in the metro 3/23.

[Maynard]

That's funny. The only thing that makes it dangerous is pilot decision making.

[Eric Janson]

Hello aviators,

I might have an opportunity to fly a metro 3 but I’ve been reading and hearing it’s a dangerous beast to fly ?

I’d like to hear from other pilots that have flown it or still fly it if this is true ?

Fly safe

It's true that any aircraft can kill you if not flown correctly.

Here's a very extreme case involving an A320

https://avherald.com/h?article=4d7a6e9a/0000&opt=0

[digits_]

Hello aviators,

I might have an opportunity to fly a metro 3 but I’ve been reading and hearing it’s a dangerous beast to fly ?

I’d like to hear from other pilots that have flown it or still fly it if this is true ?

Fly safe

Dangerous? Not necessarily.
Uncomfortable, hot, loud and noisy. Yes, absolutely.

[goldeneagle]

Uncomfortable, hot, loud and noisy. Yes, absolutely.

It's only hot in the summer...

[jeremyh1]

Metro's are only as dangerous as whoever is controlling them. They've been around for a long time for a reason. I have around 300 hours on Metro 2s and I loved flying those birds. Classic case of blame the equipment and not the operator. The Bearskin YRL incident is an outlier, that crew unfortunately had no change due to the nature of the partial engine failure they experience with enough residual torque and oil pressure to ensure NTS did not kick in. That isolated incident aside, which sucked, they're a perfectly safe airplane to help to build your multi-crew turbine IFR experience. Quite common in central Canada in both regional sched and medevac roles into 3500' gravel strips. Long live the San Antonio Sewerpipe.

[digits_]

The Bearskin YRL incident is an outlier, that crew unfortunately had no change due to the nature of the partial engine failure they experience with enough residual torque and oil pressure to ensure NTS did not kick in.

Couldn't they have feathered the affected engine? I get that they might have been confused about the situation, but from what I've read about the accident, feathering the engine would likely have worked and have saved the plane.

[DHC-1 Jockey]

The Bearskin YRL incident is an outlier, that crew unfortunately had no change due to the nature of the partial engine failure they experience with enough residual torque and oil pressure to ensure NTS did not kick in.

Couldn't they have feathered the affected engine? I get that they might have been confused about the situation, but from what I've read about the accident, feathering the engine would likely have worked and have saved the plane.

The could have, but due to the nature of the engine issue, and combined with being at a near-idle power setting, they didn't realize what the issue actually was. According to the report: "The right engine was at a low power setting when the left engine power loss occurred, which would have made it difficult for the pilot flying to sense the yaw resulting from the malfunctioning engine. The left engine continued to run, which resulted in engine readings of 98% engine rpm, with likely normal oil pressure, exhaust gas temperature, and fuel flow. The low torque indication in the cockpit would have provided some indication of the engine problem, but it was not noticed."

Based on all the engine indications (torque aside), and lack of yaw due to both engines already being near idle, the left engine appeared to be still operational and producing power. Being only at 500' AGL when the incident occurred, and the belief that the engine was actually still running, it explains why the crew didn't feather it and shut it down.

[digits_]

The Bearskin YRL incident is an outlier, that crew unfortunately had no change due to the nature of the partial engine failure they experience with enough residual torque and oil pressure to ensure NTS did not kick in.

Couldn't they have feathered the affected engine? I get that they might have been confused about the situation, but from what I've read about the accident, feathering the engine would likely have worked and have saved the plane.

The could have, but due to the nature of the engine issue, and combined with being at a near-idle power setting, they didn't realize what the issue actually was. According to the report: "The right engine was at a low power setting when the left engine power loss occurred, which would have made it difficult for the pilot flying to sense the yaw resulting from the malfunctioning engine. The left engine continued to run, which resulted in engine readings of 98% engine rpm, with likely normal oil pressure, exhaust gas temperature, and fuel flow. The low torque indication in the cockpit would have provided some indication of the engine problem, but it was not noticed."

Based on all the engine indications (torque aside), and lack of yaw due to both engines already being near idle, the left engine appeared to be still operational and producing power. Being only at 500' AGL when the incident occurred, and the belief that the engine was actually still running, it explains why the crew didn't feather it and shut it down.

I agree. I was reacting to the 'the crew had no chance' comment above. Even without the feathering, they could still have prevented the VMC roll by keeping up the speed an committing to the crash. Not a mentally easy thing to do, but it could have resulted in a possibly better outcome.

[Beefitarian]

Are they more dangerous than those old fashioned planes with the little wheel at the back?

[J31]

The Bearskin YRL incident is an outlier, that crew unfortunately had no change due to the nature of the partial engine failure they experience with enough residual torque and oil pressure to ensure NTS did not kick in.

Couldn't they have feathered the affected engine? I get that they might have been confused about the situation, but from what I've read about the accident, feathering the engine would likely have worked and have saved the plane.

The could have, but due to the nature of the engine issue, and combined with being at a near-idle power setting, they didn't realize what the issue actually was. According to the report: "The right engine was at a low power setting when the left engine power loss occurred, which would have made it difficult for the pilot flying to sense the yaw resulting from the malfunctioning engine. The left engine continued to run, which resulted in engine readings of 98% engine rpm, with likely normal oil pressure, exhaust gas temperature, and fuel flow. The low torque indication in the cockpit would have provided some indication of the engine problem, but it was not noticed."

Based on all the engine indications (torque aside), and lack of yaw due to both engines already being near idle, the left engine appeared to be still operational and producing power. Being only at 500' AGL when the incident occurred, and the belief that the engine was actually still running, it explains why the crew didn't feather it and shut it down.

The crew was not able to identify a partial engine failure in the short period of time they had. They were at reduced power making it even more difficult to identify the engine damage.

The TPE331 engine is a fixed shaft engine where the propellor is directly connected to the power turbine. Jetstream's, Metro's, MU2's, Turbo Commander's, B100 King Air's all have the TPE331.

If the TPE331 has internal damage but continues to run at reduced power it will cause the propellor to drive to fine pitch in an effort to maintain engine RPM (N1). The only way out of this severe asymmetric drag situation, is to quickly identify the failing engine via the engine gauges and pull the STOP/FEATHER lever. You NEVER pull the power lever back to idle to identify a partial loss of power on the TPE331 engine.

Engine damage and engine failure drills for a TPE331 engine MUST be memorized and known cold.

From the TSB report.
https://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports- ... c0150.html

The engine power loss was unexpected, and the crew had only 56 seconds between the time the left engine malfunctioned and the time the aircraft struck the trees. The crew did not verbally call out the emergency, likely due to difficulty in identifying the precise nature of the problem.

The following factors likely contributed to the crew’s difficulty in identifying the nature of the malfunction:

The right engine was at a low power setting when the left engine power loss occurred, which would have made it difficult for the pilot flying to sense the yaw resulting from the malfunctioning engine;
The left engine continued to run, which resulted in engine readings of 98% engine rpm, with likely normal oil pressure, exhaust gas temperature, and fuel flow. The low torque indication in the cockpit would have provided some indication of the engine problem, but it was not noticed; and
There was little time available to identify the nature of the malfunction.
The loss of power and drop in N1 speed to 98% would have commanded the left engine propeller governor to attempt to maintain a constant engine speed of 100% by reducing the propeller blade angle. As a result, the left engine and propeller went from a low thrust condition to a high drag condition, with the fining out of the propeller blades. The left engine negative torque sensing (NTS) system was likely not operating because the engine had not completely lost power and was developing torque greater than the −4% value required to activate it. With the landing gear extended and flaps at ½, the aircraft was in a high drag asymmetric state.

The SA227’s NTS system may not always activate in response to an engine failure. The nature of the engine failure and aircraft profile may affect whether or not NTS activation parameters are reached. If pilots believe that the NTS system in the SA227 aircraft will activate in the event of any power loss or that NTS activation alone can provide adequate anti-drag protection in the event of an engine power loss, there is a risk that flight crews operating these aircraft types may not initiate the Engine Failures In Flight checklist in a timely manner.

Because the exact nature of the engine malfunction was not identified, the crew did not follow the standard operating procedures (SOPs) prescribed action of calling out the associated emergency procedure, which required them to stop and feather the propeller of the affected engine. This may have resulted from a belief that the NTS system would always activate in the event of a power loss and that NTS activation alone would provide adequate anti-drag protection from a windmilling propeller. Feathering the failed engine’s propeller would have decreased the drag associated with it and likely would have allowed the crew to maintain control of the aircraft.

[J31]

Couldn't they have feathered the affected engine? I get that they might have been confused about the situation, but from what I've read about the accident, feathering the engine would likely have worked and have saved the plane.

I agree. I was reacting to the 'the crew had no chance' comment above. Even without the feathering, they could still have prevented the VMC roll by keeping up the speed an committing to the crash. Not a mentally easy thing to do, but it could have resulted in a possibly better outcome.

With the left engine running at 98% N1 there is so much drag on the propeller that the only way out is to feather. It is not about VMC, it is about the massive drag.

I have experienced this event several times in a full motion Jetstream simulator. It is a violent departure for controlled flight if you not not get the STOP/FEATHER lever pulled.

[digits_]

I agree. I was reacting to the 'the crew had no chance' comment above. Even without the feathering, they could still have prevented the VMC roll by keeping up the speed an committing to the crash. Not a mentally easy thing to do, but it could have resulted in a possibly better outcome.

With the left engine running at 98% N1 there is so much drag on the propeller that the only way out is to feather. It is not about VMC, it is about the massive drag.

I have experienced this event several times in a full motion Jetstream simulator. It is a violent departure for controlled flight if you not not get the STOP/FEATHER lever pulled.

The table in the accident report doesn't show any bank until they were at/below VMC. Would it not be correct to assume they wouldn't have started to roll if they kept the speed up?

[Big Pistons Forever]

King Air 100 has a worse accident rate than the Metro series. It’s not the airplane that is dangerous it is the operator

[CaptDukeNukem]

King Air 100 has a worse accident rate than the Metro series. It’s not the airplane that is dangerous it is the operator

Please elaborate how bearskin was a worse operator than other 703/704s at the time of this crash? Many operators use metros across the country and frankly worldwide. I’d love to hear your thoughts.

[CaptDukeNukem]

I agree. I was reacting to the 'the crew had no chance' comment above. Even without the feathering, they could still have prevented the VMC roll by keeping up the speed an committing to the crash. Not a mentally easy thing to do, but it could have resulted in a possibly better outcome.

With the left engine running at 98% N1 there is so much drag on the propeller that the only way out is to feather. It is not about VMC, it is about the massive drag.

I have experienced this event several times in a full motion Jetstream simulator. It is a violent departure for controlled flight if you not not get the STOP/FEATHER lever pulled.

The table in the accident report doesn't show any bank until they were at/below VMC. Would it not be correct to assume they wouldn't have started to roll if they kept the speed up?

I knew the FO. Armchair quarterback is a shitty way to analyze things.

[DHC-1 Jockey]

I agree. I was reacting to the 'the crew had no chance' comment above. Even without the feathering, they could still have prevented the VMC roll by keeping up the speed an committing to the crash. Not a mentally easy thing to do, but it could have resulted in a possibly better outcome.

With the left engine running at 98% N1 there is so much drag on the propeller that the only way out is to feather. It is not about VMC, it is about the massive drag.

I have experienced this event several times in a full motion Jetstream simulator. It is a violent departure for controlled flight if you not not get the STOP/FEATHER lever pulled.

The table in the accident report doesn't show any bank until they were at/below VMC. Would it not be correct to assume they wouldn't have started to roll if they kept the speed up?

They were about to hit the trees... How do you keep the speed up without increasing the power on the operating engine to attempt to stop the descent? That massive amount of asymmetric thrust of a high-drag unfeathered left engine plus adding power on the right engine to not hit the trees in a last ditch effort to save the airplane would surely roll the aircraft, even if they are above VMC. Remember, a windmilling non-feathered prop greatly increases your Vmc speed compared to a feathered prop.

The only way to prevent a roll might have been to leave both levers at idle and mush it into the trees, but with the only prospect being crashing into the trees short of the runway, it's reasonable to see why they added power, which caused the roll.

At 500' AGL when the engine malfunctioned, combined with almost near normal engine parameters, idle power on the right engine (thereby no yawing moment to alert the crew of an issue, etc), they might have not even known they had a major issue until they brought the power up. The left engine windmilled, and the asymmetric thrust from the right engine rolled them. They really had no chance, aside from feathering the left engine. Which, by all accounts, aside from one engine gauge showing the torque, they would have had no reason to even think about shutting it down so close to the ground.

[rookiepilot]

With the left engine running at 98% N1 there is so much drag on the propeller that the only way out is to feather. It is not about VMC, it is about the massive drag.

I have experienced this event several times in a full motion Jetstream simulator. It is a violent departure for controlled flight if you not not get the STOP/FEATHER lever pulled.

The table in the accident report doesn't show any bank until they were at/below VMC. Would it not be correct to assume they wouldn't have started to roll if they kept the speed up?

I knew the FO. Armchair quarterback is a shitty way to analyze things.

Yeah, and you also don’t tend to die in a simulator, and you know an engine failure is coming, too.

[J31]

The table in the accident report doesn't show any bank until they were at/below VMC. Would it not be correct to assume they wouldn't have started to roll if they kept the speed up?

I knew the FO. Armchair quarterback is a shitty way to analyze things.

Yeah, and you also don’t tend to die in a simulator, and you know an engine failure is coming, too.

Sorry for your loss CaptDukeNukem. I am not judging the actions of the Bearskin crew. The crew did not have much time or altitude to analyse the failure that they had. I'm sure they did the best they could but sadly the crew and several passengers lost their lives.

We can not stick our head in the sand carry on as normal and hope for the best. We need to learn from this crash and realize that the TPE331 has failure modes that are very different from a piston or PT6A engine.

The Bearskin crew had about 30 seconds to analyse the failure they were dealing with. That is why pilots operating the TPE331 need to know the engine failure modes and memory drills cold and with instant recall.

The TPE331 is a single shaft engine with the propellor directly connected to the power turbine and gas turbine. It DOES NOT have autofeather! It does have Negative Torque Sensing (NTS) system that can activate with a total engine failure by increasing propellor pitch to reduce drag. But NTS only gives you a few extra moments to react and feather the failed engine.

When a TPE331 suffers internal damage, the engine may continue to run but at a reduced speed. If this happens the propellor is driven towards 0 pitch in an effort by the governor to increase to selected engine speed. The NTS most likely will not be active and the result is you have a 9+ ft spinning propeller at 0 pitch causing massive drag.

The only way out of this is to quickly identify the failing engine and immediately pull the STOP/FEATHER lever on the affected engine. This action shuts off fuel to the engine, dumps oil pressure from the propellor allowing the spring in the propellor dome to drive the prop to feather.

If the gas turbine stops producing power, then the Negative Torque Sensing system should dump oil pressure from the propellor and partially feather the propellor. This gives you a few seconds more time to react but you still need to identify the failed engine, pull the STOP/FEATHER lever to complete the engine shutdown and feather the prop.

I'm not sure what your point is rockiepilot? That is why we train in simulators, to experience what could kill us in the real airplane. The simulator allows us to train for events like this.

Unfortunately, I do not think there are any TPE331 full motion simulators operational anymore.

So operators of the TPE331 need to know the engine failure modes and memory drills cold. They need to train these critical items in the airplane but are limited to what can safely be accomplished.

[rookiepilot]

J31, point is I agree with you and others.

They had zero time to identify the problem and minimal instrument indications it seems.

Shitty and classless to dunk on them in any way shape or form. Sad outcome.

[J31]

Double post

[godsrcrazy]

I spoke with a young guy years back that was an RCAF pilot. He left the military and went to the commercial side. He said there is one thing that compares the Metro to a fighter jet. You CANNOT let the plane get ahead of you it will kill you. The beauty of the F18 is you can eject. You have to ride the Metro to the ground.

[SpyPilot]

You have to ride the Metro to the ground.

Or push the nose over into a dive and spear it into the ground taking your co-pilot with you.

Carson Air Flight 66 out of YVR on April 13, 2015.

https://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports- ... p0081.html