YYZ RJ landing Accident

[pdw]

…wrapping my head around the human factors of how two people could be so fixated on the landing that they miss all the inside cues that it wasn't going well.

Well, the unusual peak surface wind of 28G37 would have had to be 100 percent anticipated in effect for their particular approach (tower comm) as also depicted G35 in advance on the surface GFA across upper lowerlakes basin valid 1800z / issued 0529z. Might not have been bumpy at all, on gfa looked like a kind of a shortwave trough smoothly across lake/basin towards northeast.

[daedalusx]

The absolute state of this forum that a never-was is trying to argue against a senior CRJ LTC about landing techniques in YYZ of all places ... How embarrassing.

[daedalusx]

You are just absolutely wrong, the wind was a factor in the only sense that this crew mismanaged it, I’m telling you without hesitation, if the FO went to flight idle at 150’ a go around should have been called. There are a few things I watch for with FOs and flight idle above 50’ or not going to flight idle for touchdown are two of them,

This exactly. I've never seen flight idle above 50' on a 738, I can't even imagine what it would look like on a tiny wing like the RJ regardless of being slightly hot on the approach speed.

[pelmet]

You are just absolutely wrong, the wind was a factor in the only sense that this crew mismanaged it, I’m telling you without hesitation, if the FO went to flight idle at 150’ a go around should have been called. There are a few things I watch for with FOs and flight idle above 50’ or not going to flight idle for touchdown are two of them,

This exactly. I've never seen flight idle above 50' on a 738, I can't even imagine what it would look like on a tiny wing like the RJ regardless of being slightly hot on the approach speed.

A pilot flying a Continental 727 into Micronesia with flaps 40 tried chopping the power at 50'. It did not end well.
Been there on a stopover but didn't see the wreckage.

http://www.missingaircrew.com/yap/MISSI ... /index.asp

[pdw]

Pelmet, this one was only at flaps 30 when he cut it over the trees. Also looks like at “1008hPa” too ( seems the signature pressure for some reason for these types) …. so maybe some kind of shear their too among the trees (so close to the storms). Lots of good info here from crew commentaries.

For sure seems to be an “embarrassing” type of accident. … maybe some facts often covered up a bit for that reason?

[pelmet]

Pelmet, this one was only at flaps 30 when he cut it over the trees. Also looks like at “1008hPa” too ( seems the signature pressure for some reason for these types) …. so maybe some kind of shear their too among the trees (so close to the storms). Lots of good info here from crew commentaries.

For sure seems to be an “embarrassing” type of accident. … maybe some facts often covered up a bit for that reason?

The term flaps 30 can be very misleading. Take a look at the 777. It has inboard and outboard flaps. When the flaps are set at the 30 setting, perhaps the outboard flaps are at 30 degrees relative to the wing, but take a look at the inboard flaps(search online). Those inboards appear to be at least 60 degrees if not more. It must be a huge amount of drag. The 727 also had inboards and outboards(still have never seen a picture of one landing with only inners or outer in some sort of failure scenario).

https://www.alamy.com/emirates-boeing-7 ... archtype=0

[pdw]

It must be a huge amount of drag.

Yes, and there at Yap if the accident captain avoided max flap may have been better maneuvering (ie for those lower alt approach turns into the short field). A detailed NTSB report; it mentions the 30 at different times; also describes the ‘dragged-in approach’ (I think “tad low” already from shear during/after the ‘sinking’ base-turn) but how much difference from 4O when it got to the end part after cutting power in slightly higher component over treetop/60ft after climbing nose higher/added power initially out of the “sink” already two miles final … was a stiffer/shortlived increased performance IP above those “trees” (the vague surface analysis based on NTSB weather data supplied). In “four-five sec” at flight-idle was down on the deck / into no-breeze-at-all or less (a DP Shear in those 60 feet). (Anemometer “7kts” was at a greater elevation, therefore much different component below the threshold than higher-up a mile NE)

It is similar rate of AS&Alt lost in these last four seconds here at YZ with the increased vertical speed out the bottom of the lengthy 33kt sub-zero gust thereby shaving“9kts” super-cold airspeed within one second (TSB data) at only the third-last second airborne.

Note where both of the 144kt airspeed bug recognitions would have been at each end of this YZ accident sequence (tsb info … AS bug set at 144kts), obviously the given 175agl/144kts and then as 145kts sheared to 136kts at the 3 second mark prior to the moment of impact/touchdown is the only other (14 seconds in between the two bleeds of IAS).

[SpyPilot]

Your word-salad skills continue to improve.

[GyvAir]

word-soup

[Liftdump]

Say again ,you’re coming in garbled.

[pelmet]

Folks.........

[CL-Skadoo!]

Folks.........

No. P means well. I’ll just say he doesn’t deserve ridicule and leave it at that, you guys are smart enough.

[pelmet]

No. P means well. I’ll just say he doesn’t deserve ridicule and leave it at that, you guys are smart enough.

Unfortunately, over the years, there have been several accidents that were blamed by him on windshifts when there was really more to it. Virtually every analysis involves a blame of windshift. I'm afraid that there is more to it than that in many cases and therefore, misleading info is being presented, even if it is well-meaning. That could negatively affect a lesser experienced pilot reading this, instead of realizing the hazards of significantly reducing thrust to idle(or near idle) too early in most airliners. I read the Yap accident report many years ago and it left an impression on me of the hazards of such an action. Meanwhile, he alluded to a cover-up in an earlier post.

In general, I started ignoring his posts quite a while ago but maybe it is time to call them out. The Yap accident did not happen because of a windshift and it is about time that he stops blaming accidents on windshifts when they are not. Garbled writing is not an excuse and I don't think we should have to avoid ridicule at the cost of having bad safety info being the result.

[cdnavater]

No. P means well. I’ll just say he doesn’t deserve ridicule and leave it at that, you guys are smart enough.

Unfortunately, over the years, there have been several accidents that were blamed by him on windshifts when there was really more to it. Virtually every analysis involves a blame of windshift. I'm afraid that there is more to it than that in many cases and therefore, misleading info is being presented, even if it is well-meaning. That could negatively affect a lesser experienced pilot reading this, instead of realizing the hazards of significantly reducing thrust to idle(or near idle) too early in most airliners. I read the Yap accident report many years ago and it left an impression on me of the hazards of such an action. Meanwhile, he alluded to a cover-up in an earlier post.

In general, I started ignoring his posts quite a while ago but maybe it is time to call them out. The Yap accident did not happen because of a windshift and it is about time that he stops blaming accidents on windshifts when they are not. Garbled writing is not an excuse and I don't think we should have to avoid ridicule at the cost of having bad safety info being the result.

Agreed, well intentioned or not, it is utter nonsense and extremely ill informed, the lack of operational experience is quite apparent!
I have always felt like the poster has some kind of mental issues, started out thinking troll but nobody can troll for that long!

[pdw]

he alluded to a cover up

No, there Pelmet I actually meant that about “embarrassing” where I would have clarified it as possible imperfect descriptions; you’d started an actual thread a while back “Are the pilot’s lying to the accident investigators ?”. I’d argue sooner, as in that discussion, how accident pilots sometimes might not come ‘out with it’ as accurately as they perhaps could know (ie: hold back …if not so certain) when asked about everything during their investigation’s questioning.

This category of accident, more tricky to describe how it sets up and still happens like clockwork “9 times a year on average in Canada” (TSB), has a distinct profile, one that could use an improved explanation. On this thread there were accurate presentations as to error(s) involved, yet to me it was mainly a focus outlining what was so tricky to get sucked in like that!

they are not

No. I have never used (do not use) the term “windshift”. These can start-in very smooth and gradual as the aircraft itself rapidly enters a “different air” (DAR tm term … if I recall correctly) not necessarily so obvious/disruptive as it so often is with ‘wind shear 101’.

Mismanaged

Throughout/after the low-rate bleed off duration from 500ft/150kt to “144kt” “bug” the flightpath DOES cross changing strengths, verifiable using the tsb/fdr speed numbers given here at 4 levels; but the component variations are all steady directionally. ‘Pitch FOR airspeed’, as the 144 knot bug presents still with 64n1 just ahead-of aggressive “gust” entry, then needs ‘pitch up adjust’ response for REDUCING airspeed even as it has begun rising before that peak/”154kts” as immediately the flightpath goes above glide slope where we see (prelim report) “43n1” for continuing/keeping to descent slope. This action’s timing coincides with timing of ATC audio exchange (link pg 1 of thread), and is same time as ‘go-around needed’ (previous posters)

An important aspect is the very cold air produces greater (better) performance for this “increased performance gust”, a TSB term from the report and measuring .9km in a 14 second duration from top-entry to bottom-exit. The exit, the subsiding of the gust (where the AC breaks out of it finally) is also therefore a much sharper IAS loss. Here in about a second it is 9 knots of decreased/negative performance 3-4 seconds (plus 2kts more) before the right-maingear’s / right-wing crush and left wheel’s wing unloading BOUNCE into right roll-over. The intact left wing is flying the AC/fuselage over to inverted in that same second as right yaw is pivoting it into ‘perfect headwind’, as the tail, dropping slightly down (proportionately nose higher) during impact, boosts AOA.

Airspeed on target and steady, a frigid wintry touchdown aim point in sight, at 3 seconds to ground-contact (3 x “18.3ft per sec”/TSB ….55ft AGL) the anticipated energy needed for a 4sec flare vanishes as the squall-like “increased performance gust” (“33kts” or more) has arrested VERY abruptly. The AC is on target for normal touchdown location on sno-covered rwy (videos) out of an ‘accurate glide slope adherence’ (TSB) until only that last second of flaring height got “slightly below” (TSB) transitioning back down to a “23kts” ‘sustained’.

Understanding the timing of this POWER CUT and seeing the PIC ensured accurate slope negotiating the shear, is there actually a preferred power that guaranteed short-enough landing distance? One can compare/study fluctuating airspeeds against meanderings of GS/energy throughout these final 40 seconds. But a default to GO-AROUND (the rule) makes sense when tempted to cut to “idle power still up at 150ft” to compensate for a persistent rapid-rising IAS, ie once inside the unpredictable airspeed-increasing gust as strong/long as starts here by “153ft AGL”, regardless if hard to justify after as ‘overrun prevention’.