YYZ RJ landing Accident

[cjp]

Normally on a crosswind touchdown it’s not right at the point of a stall with a flat pitch. Therefore the right wheel here, although it seems like almost a “three point”, took on all of weight (W). The wing’s W (most of the left as well, and tail downforce) is all unloaded (exactly straight down) onto the one main in that split sec … so a ‘fresh breakage’ not impossible IMO , ie ‘fatigue’ evidence may be not available..,

Crew gets a warning about some kind of “bump” (possible ahead) … any PIC considers such ‘heads up’ warning. It’s seconds ahead of this event, so any reaction to that info is with-in the sequence of events of this accident as well.

The “Bump” ATC was referring to is regarding an aircraft holding short beyond the CAT 1 line for 23. I’ve seen this on the ILS 23 before, the glide slope buggers off for a few seconds above path while an aircraft is in the way of the antenna.

Fox Flight (EMT) was holding short of the runway, not the CAT 1 (they were the ones that took that critical video). As they crossed the glideslope bars, it causes a momentary instrumentation deviation for Endeavor.

Endeavor was on the visual at that point, and it's unlikely the glideslope bump had any real effect on the stable approach of the RJ. I'm sure the TSB will have a prelim report out that will show it was pilot error (mistakes happen). It was challenging conditions; snowy runway, gusts, crosswind. Poor landing technique led to an overload of the gear and wing spar.

Incredibly thankful no one died. It's in insurances hands now. The PIC and SIC are going to have to lean pretty heavy on the union, but they'll likely be released and unhireable at the 121 level.

[cdnavater]

Crew gets a warning about some kind of “bump” (possible ahead) … any PIC considers such ‘heads up’ warning. It’s seconds ahead of this event, so any reaction to that info is with-in the sequence of events of this accident as well.

This word "bump"...is this standard ATC-approved terminology? I've never heard this term before and it seems pretty vague to me.

There would have been some context in conjunction with the word bump, fairly certain I read that ATC said “bump in the glide path”, not uncommon at major airports to hear this. When you hear this, you are prepared to disconnect the autopilot if the “bump” presents itself, if not already hand flying.
That being said, if the PF did not anticipate or react appropriately to this it could destabilize the approach, depending on the level of deviation.

[Deadcat]

It was challenging conditions; snowy runway, gusts, crosswind. Poor landing technique led to an overload of the gear and wing spar.

Occam’s Razor view, and I agree.

I don’t agree that “mistakes happen”, randomly, to otherwise trained, experienced and qualified flight crew.

Sure it wasn’t a blue sky calm wind summer day, but conditions weren’t even serious enough for an SOP mandated handover of controls.

We’ll have to did deeper into management’s training and crew pairing direction. And no, lest our woke snowflake mod (that’s recently backed off) get the wrong idea, I don’t even think airlines should be considering relative competency. Set the bar, you pass you pass. Other pilots might be “safer” or “better” but it doesn’t matter if your standards ensure a safe efficient operation. There has been a watering down of regulatory standards for a copilot in the US, maybe review that. They need an ATP but there’s a few fudges around the 1500 hr requirement.

The regulatory and insurance environment won’t tolerate the occasional “oops, sorry ‘bout that”.

[cdnavater]

It was challenging conditions; snowy runway, gusts, crosswind. Poor landing technique led to an overload of the gear and wing spar.

Occam’s Razor view, and I agree.

I don’t agree that “mistakes happen”, randomly, to otherwise trained, experienced and qualified flight crew.

Sure it wasn’t a blue sky calm wind summer day, but conditions weren’t even serious enough for an SOP mandated handover of controls.

We’ll have to did deeper into management’s training and crew pairing direction. And no, lest our woke snowflake mod (that’s recently backed off) get the wrong idea, I don’t even think airlines should be considering relative competency. Set the bar, you pass you pass. Other pilots might be “safer” or “better” but it doesn’t matter if your standards ensure a safe efficient operation. There has been a watering down of regulatory standards for a copilot in the US, maybe review that. They need an ATP but there’s a few fudges around the 1500 hr requirement.

The regulatory and insurance environment won’t tolerate the occasional “oops, sorry ‘bout that”.

Some companies do have a green on green policy, new Captain with a new FO is not a desirable situation but is very common given relative seniority of the positions. That would make scheduling difficult since most companies award schedules based on seniority.

[pdw]

The “Bump” ATC was referring to is regarding an aircraft holding short beyond the CAT 1 line for 23. I’ve seen this on the ILS 23 before, the glide slope buggers off for a few seconds above path while an aircraft is in the way of the antenna.

When the particular holding-aircraft’s more blocking position is sure to interrupt part of the beam system … makes sense it becomes mentionable to approaching aircraft with AP connected and unfamiliar. Can’t be much elapsed time (seconds here) for discerning for that kind of directive and the initiation of this type of accident sequence (ie where metar’s also showing potential for stronger gust-abatements ).

[Dias]

I feel bad for pilots from non-English speaking countries that likely have no idea what ATC is talking about.

[Jet Jockey]

It was challenging conditions; snowy runway, gusts, crosswind. Poor landing technique led to an overload of the gear and wing spar.

Occam’s Razor view, and I agree.

I don’t agree that “mistakes happen”, randomly, to otherwise trained, experienced and qualified flight crew.

Sure it wasn’t a blue sky calm wind summer day, but conditions weren’t even serious enough for an SOP mandated handover of controls.

We’ll have to did deeper into management’s training and crew pairing direction. And no, lest our woke snowflake mod (that’s recently backed off) get the wrong idea, I don’t even think airlines should be considering relative competency. Set the bar, you pass you pass. Other pilots might be “safer” or “better” but it doesn’t matter if your standards ensure a safe efficient operation. There has been a watering down of regulatory standards for a copilot in the US, maybe review that. They need an ATP but there’s a few fudges around the 1500 hr requirement.

The regulatory and insurance environment won’t tolerate the occasional “oops, sorry ‘bout that”.

The captain was a training/line indoc pilot while the co-pilot was had been hired only the year before and was most likely low time on the aircraft.

[pelmet]

It was challenging conditions; snowy runway, gusts, crosswind. Poor landing technique led to an overload of the gear and wing spar.

Occam’s Razor view, and I agree.

I don’t agree that “mistakes happen”, randomly, to otherwise trained, experienced and qualified flight crew.

Sure it wasn’t a blue sky calm wind summer day, but conditions weren’t even serious enough for an SOP mandated handover of controls.

We’ll have to did deeper into management’s training and crew pairing direction. And no, lest our woke snowflake mod (that’s recently backed off) get the wrong idea, I don’t even think airlines should be considering relative competency. Set the bar, you pass you pass. Other pilots might be “safer” or “better” but it doesn’t matter if your standards ensure a safe efficient operation. There has been a watering down of regulatory standards for a copilot in the US, maybe review that. They need an ATP but there’s a few fudges around the 1500 hr requirement.

The regulatory and insurance environment won’t tolerate the occasional “oops, sorry ‘bout that”.

The captain was a training/line indoc pilot while the co-pilot was had been hired only the year before and was most likely low time on the aircraft.

Actually, mistakes do happen to well trained, experienced, and qualified crew. That being said, assuming that the aircraft was airworthy and serviceable(no structural weakness in the airframe or design flaw), what happened in this case was extreme.

As of now, everyone is assuming that the F/O made the landing. But that is based on radio transmissions. It is not out of the ordinary for there to be a transfer of control in difficult conditions, whether initiated by the captain or requested by the F/O.

I'm sure training records will be looked at by the TSB but not necessarily the hiring policies. I don't think I have ever seen that investigated. Unfortunately, we will not get the CVR transcript unless something happens on the US side.

[rudder]

I have flown that approach on that runway in that aircraft type in those conditions more than once. There are several ‘traps’ if the operating crew - in particular the PF - are not careful in recognizing the potential hazards and applying the proper handling responses depending on actual aircraft performance. And it is the PM’s responsibility - and most certainly the Captain’s ultimate responsibility - to make appropriate callouts ensuring situational awareness and crew actions to ensure an acceptable outcome (either landing or go around).

On this aircraft type, a ‘pushover’ manoeuvre initiated below 50’ AGL will most certainly generate a dramatically excessive descent rate that in most cases can only be arrested by adding a significant amount of thrust that may necessitate an aborted landing due instability. In this accident, the aircraft touched down well short of the normal touchdown zone suggesting either a dragged in low trajectory approach profile (not the case based on ADSB data), or a pushover continued to landing with the resulting touchdown at high rate of descent. The video seems to confirm the latter.

A pushover is typically initiated by a pilot who has the sensory perception that they are high on the profile. That may have been the case here due the displaced threshold on runway 23 after the PF transitioned to visual cues only for landing. I have only ever experienced a pushover with a low experience training candidate. It was unexpected and requires an immediate and aggressive crew response.

Everything related to this accident will be available via the reading of the CVR/DFDR devices and crew debrief. It will be informative to see exactly what transpired so as to disseminate that information at large to avoid a repeat occurrence.

[dontcallmeshirley]

The crash appears to have had the aircraft approximately 1-2 degrees nose up as the maximum flare and at the time of touchdown.


A normal landing appears to have a more significant flare.


Hardly a conclusive argument, but in addition to rudder's post, it seems to me that the most likely explanation is that the aircraft landed hard due to pilot inputs and it resulted in a structural failure of the landing gear and then wing spars.

[pdw]

The crash appears to have had the aircraft approximately 1-2 degrees nose up as the maximum flare and at the time of touchdown.


A normal landing appears to have a more significant flare.

Notice a bright sun flashover initiating at the flight deck end of the fuselage, in top pic. Moves across the whole aircraft in same second of “1-2 deg max nose-up flare”. Just an isolated sharper sunlight beam magnifying between the cloud a second ahead of this plane/touchdown. Is this not a factor, the ‘sunlight whiteout’ in light of all the other variables, a degree or two of pitch up missing for proper flare on account of unexpected disappearing visual lost one or two seconds prior?

[TCAS II]

Possibly no radio altimeter? Makes it more difficult to judge the flare. Copy of Flight plan below mentions this.


https://www.westernstandard.news/canadi ... rash/62416

[Jean-Pierre]

Children of the magenta need radar altimeter to tell them to flare.

[SpyPilot]

‘sunlight whiteout’

Signal next time before changing lanes like that, okay pdw?

[pdw]

‘sunlight whiteout’

Signal next time before changing lanes like that, okay pdw?

Still focused there, ie “Pushover” just reminded about when transitioning a gust peak (max 40mph given here) then let’s say goes right back into the lower sustained windspeed (given min 23mph in this case); alone right there seems to me can be enough of a smaller (“unexpected”) degree of “pushover” pitch effect, immediately to be reclaimed (that same degree or two extra pitch up) in flare’s upward pitch change, but here coinciding with the extreme (sun induced) ‘brightness” out front on the fresh/packed/blowing snow. The minor pitch-up degree missing for the flare (at the point of this hard touchdown) makes sense a blinding would have contributed.

(Edited: semicolon midsentence, a couple of commas)

[MX-5]

Still focused there … ie “Pushover” just reminds about when transitioning a gust peak (max 40mph here) then let’s say goes right back into the lower sustained windspeed (23mph minimum in this case) alone right there seems to me can be enough of a smaller (“unexpected”) degree of “pushover” pitch effect … immediately to be reclaimed (that same degree or two extra pitch up) in flare’s upward pitch change but here coinciding with the extreme (sun induced) ‘brightness” out front … against fresh/packed/blowing snow. (That amount of pitch still missing from flare at point of touchdown)

Holy cow, getting punctuation anxiety on that one LOL

[pelmet]

Initial TSB brief is out........

"N932XJ, a CL-600-2D24 (CRJ-900) manufactured by Bombardier Inc, was operating as Endeavor
Airlines flight EDV4819 from Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport (KMSP), MN, USA, to
Toronto / Lester B. Pearson International Airport (CYYZ), ON. During the landing on Runway 23,
the aircraft impacted the runway, the right wing detached and a fire ensued. The aircraft
overturned, and slid down the runway inverted, coming to rest near the intersection of Runway 23
and 15L. Aircraft rescue and firefighting responded, and all passengers and crew evacuated."

Nothing new. The only thing I found interesting is that they called it a Class 2 investigation. I wonder what it takes to be a class 1 investigation?

[Plausibledeniability]

TSB Class 1 investigation is a safety issues investigation not related to only one occurrence. Such as the 703 operations and CYYZ runway incursions studies. Class 2 is the highest class for a single occurrence.

[Rooster69]

When you can’t impress with talent, baffle with bollsheet.




Simple accident analysis…pilot didn’t flare.

[Deadcat]

Simple accident analysis…pilot didn’t flare.

More complex analysis “why didn’t the pilot flare?”

They were properly licensed with an ATPL, and current with demonstrated proficiency. They were assigned by operations to crew that flight.

So where to look? Licensing standards too weak? Training and Checking flawed in that company? Did operations have any indication the crew was a poor choice and didn’t act? It shouldn’t matter who you hire, if the training/checking can’t weed out the incompetent, then what good is it? I mean we all bullshit, enhance, pencil-whip, etc to get ahead in the industry, but we all need to meet the standard. Where did the system break down here?

Now it gets interesting.

[JHR]

I mean we all bullshit, enhance, pencil-whip, etc to get ahead in the industry

Really? Speak for yourself

[rookiepilot]

When you can’t impress with talent, baffle with bollsheet.




Simple accident analysis…pilot didn’t flare.

Obviously.

Yet I was told earlier in this thread that I needed to have more empathy for the flight crew than the pax who were turned upside down and nearly turned into a roman candle. I did not understand this and still don't. Peoples lives are more important than any flight crews feelings.

Respect isn't earned by people like me unless you hold your own to an exacting standard. There is loads of incompetence (and far worse) in my industry (finance) -- and I am absolutely brutal in calling it out. So are my peers with integrity.

[cdnavater]

I mean we all bullshit, enhance, pencil-whip, etc to get ahead in the industry

Really? Speak for yourself

Yep, I was thinking the same thing, NO, we ALL don’t!
Some of us and I would like to believe most of us don’t lie and cheat to get ahead because that’s really what you are saying!
It took me 12 years to get to 6000 hours because I didn’t exaggerate or pen whip or enhance my logbook but clearly you do and don’t see a problem with that!
For what it’s worth, I have encountered pilots who clearly lied about their experience and have sent them packing

[Jean-Pierre]

Simple accident analysis…pilot didn’t flare.

More complex analysis “why didn’t the pilot flare?”

They were properly licensed with an ATPL, and current with demonstrated proficiency. They were assigned by operations to crew that flight.

So where to look? Licensing standards too weak? Training and Checking flawed in that company? Did operations have any indication the crew was a poor choice and didn’t act? It shouldn’t matter who you hire, if the training/checking can’t weed out the incompetent, then what good is it? I mean we all bullshit, enhance, pencil-whip, etc to get ahead in the industry, but we all need to meet the standard. Where did the system break down here?

Now it gets interesting.

We all know why. How will they choose to deflect that reason is the interesting part.

[Canoehead]

Unfortunately we will never see the detail in the final report that would be present in a report published by the NTSB. I'm sure our investigators are top shelf, however the final reports published by the TSB are full of word salad, and short on detail.

TSB vs NTSB

Worlds apart.